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ABSTRACT 
Prior to September 11, 2001, a calculated image problem related to America’s 
defence strategy in the Near East and its foreign policy of exceptionalism culminated in its 
unfavourable perception in the Muslim world. To counter this setback, leading think-tanks 
recommended that US public diplomacy must lead the way in order for America to reclaim 
its positive image. During the Bush administration, this guidance was applied through the 
expansion of public diplomacy measures such as the State Department’s “Brand America” 
campaign and the “Shared Values Initiative”. Whilst they were successful at applying secular 
approaches to engaging international Muslim audiences, both campaigns failed to reach the 
core of Islamic society. This study contends that to reach this core, the crucial requirement 
must be to apply direct communicative engagement with local networks in order to restore 
trusted relations. In defining a new way forward, this study breaks new ground by examining 
the origin of this problem for America from the angle of communication. By acknowledging 
the many setbacks caused by various public diplomacy measures, we examine the prospects 
for the State Department in applying the post-secular communication strategy, Interfaith 
Diplomacy, to enrich political communication between US diplomats and key religious 
players in the Muslim world.  
 
Findings reveal that communication training under an Obama administration is 
essential for improving US-Muslim world relations, and this requires the recruitment of a 
Religion Attaché Officer Corps within the United States Foreign Service. A new Religion 
Attaché, equipped with a background in broad religious affairs and communication training 
in Interfaith Diplomacy, is likely to make significant headway in counteracting the tension 
caused by the US-Muslim world communication problem. 
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Let it be told to the future world, that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could 
survive, that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet and to 
repulse it… There are cases which cannot be overdone by language, and this is one. There are 
persons, too, who see not the full extent of the evil which threatens them; they solace themselves with 
hopes that the enemy, if he succeed, will be merciful.1 
 
The Crisis  
Thomas Paine 
December 23, 1776 
                                                        
1   Thomas Paine and Eric Foner, Collected Writings (New York: Library of America, 1995).  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The United States is too powerful and influential to be loved in the Middle East, but there was a time not so long 
ago when it was respected for its values and commitment to peace. Regaining that respect will be important if 
the next president is to persuade the publics in the Arab and Muslim worlds to support their leaders in working 
with the United Sates.2 
 
Richard N. Haass and Martin Indyke 
A Time for Diplomatic Renewal, 2008 
 
 Hurdles have obstructed US diplomacy over the last decade. Interrelated challenges 
have included applying new measures to maintain regional security in the Near East and 
restoring America’s standing in the world after 9/11. Meeting these new demands requires 
the United States Government (USG) to make serious effort to regain the moral high ground 
in international relations. This will not require the United States to lower its defences; rather, 
it will encourage the USG to take strategic communication and the role of broad religious   
affairs in the Muslim world more seriously. Over the last decade, carelessness has resulted in 
many US foreign policy and intelligence setbacks, indicating the need for a new approach. 
Though religion and politics are considered by some to be strange bedfellows to the 
American political system, neither ignorance nor meaningless debate toward their role in 
foreign affairs will assure peace in this era. In order to restore America’s standing and make 
peace with the Muslim world, the United States must convey a new attitude toward the 
missing dimension of US-Muslim world engagement – namely, communication. If “the war 
of ideology is over [and] the war of ideals is just beginning”, it is vital the United States 
recognises the dynamic of communication for appropriately engaging Islamic society.3 
 
                                                        
2 Richard Haass, Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). 
3 Anthony J. Blinken, “Winning the War of Ideas”, The Washington Quarterly, No. 25 
(Spring 2002):102. 
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Since 2009, some have seen hope for the United States of America in the election of 
its first African-American president, Barack Hussein Obama. In his first year, the President 
has pursued unprecedented measures to engage the Muslim world through direct-Oval Office 
diplomacy. (Watershed moments include his January 2009 inaugural address, an official 
interview with the Al-Arabiya new agency days after entering the White House, the 
President’s Nowruz address to the people of Iran, and, most pressing, the “President’s 
Remarks on a New Beginning” in Cairo, Egypt.4)  Consulting with leading experts in the 
field of national security (i.e. Holbrooke, Nye, Albright, Brennen, Haass and Bergen), Obama 
acknowledges that new challenges facing US national security require the application of non-
traditional approaches in order to restore trusted relations with Muslims.5 Though Obama 
implies that such approaches are essential, it remains unclear as to how the current US 
Department of State might apply such approaches in a diplomatic setting to restore relations 
and establish a common ground. Based on the many false starts and setbacks arising under 
the Bush administration, it may not be wise for the current State Department to re-apply 
many of the traditional secular approaches taken up prior to and after 9/11. These approaches 
include unilateral engagement with nation states in the Near East, the building of ties with 
officials and groups recognised as legitimate, and the promotion of secular dialogue on topics 
related primarily to science, economics,  defence, education and health. 
 
                                                        
4 See Barack Obama, Inauguration Address [address online]; available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/; Internet, accessed 12 January 2010; A New Year, 
A New Beginning [address online]; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/nowruz/; Internet, 
accessed 12 January 2010; The President’s Speech in Cairo: A New Beginning [address online]; 
available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/NewBeginning/; Internet, accessed 12 January 2010; 
Hisham Melhem (27 January 2009) President Gives First Interview Since Taking Office to Arab TV: 
“Obama Tells Al Arabiya Peace Talks Should Resume” [online transcript]; available from 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/01/27/65087.html; Internet, accessed 9 April 2009. 
5 Audrey Gillian, Obama Would Welcome Talks with Taliban Moderates (8 March 2009) 
[article online]; available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/08/barack-obama-talks-
taliban-afghanistan; Internet, accessed 12 January 2010. 
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Amidst these challenges, this study contends that the most vital foreign policy 
obstacle that will confront the Obama administration within the next year will be the US-
Muslim world communication problem. Presently, there is an imbalance in America’s 
communicative relationship with the Muslim world, caused in part by a persistence of key 
USG officials with regards to applying a non-cooperative game theory to both its 
communicative and foreign policy relationships with Near Eastern nations. Success over 
understanding has dominated the communicative arena where the essential aim on the part of 
the US was that of manipulating its opponent to reach a predetermined end. This was seen 
particularly between 2001 and 2008 in American public diplomacy and its reliance upon 
secular approaches (such as commercial advertising and its efforts to sell the perfect image of 
America by promoting democracy and cultural exchanges).  
 
Today’s communication problem is distinct in that it cannot be separated from an 
American history of adverse foreign relations with the Near East. Hence, the symptoms of 
this prolonged problem are two-fold:   
 
1) Some Muslims state that their dismay toward the US originates from an American history 
of inconsistent foreign policy in predominantly Muslim countries, and America’s unbreakable 
bond with Israel.  
 
2) In contrast, key US officials suggest that the problem actually arises from ideological 
forces linked to the spread of political Islam and religious violence projected towards 
America and its allies. 
 
Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, the US diplomatic community 
would encounter this communication problem to a great extent. In handling this tension, 
traditional secular approaches were applied when communicating with religious audiences; 
however this has only served to complicate matters further. Since 2001, US engagement 
efforts have experienced numerous diplomatic and programming setbacks arising from a lack 
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of expertise and insight by key US Department of State officials with regards to employing 
strategic communication as the first option. Instead of re-evaluating its use of secular 
approaches (which often exclude integrating moderate Islamic perspectives and aspirations 
into the US foreign policy debate), corporate logic coloured US diplomacy under the Bush 
administration, and Secretary Colin Powell’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, “Brand 
America” – a government-run marketing campaign to bolster America’s image in the Muslim 
world – led an inimical crusade to sell America. Instead of taking seriously the option of 
directly engaging Muslims at a grassroots level to establish trusted relations with local 
networks, commercial marketing approaches prevailed. Findings suggest that such efforts 
neither raised US favourability ratings nor improved America’s image after 9/11. 
  
Table 1 
Limitations of US Public Diplomacy after 9/11 
 
A) Rather than establishing a non-traditional strategy to communicate with Muslim publics, key 
State Department officials considered the “Brand America” campaign that previously existed, 
five months prior to 9/11; 
B) This commercial marketing campaign served as a pre-existing programme solely intended to 
raise US favourability ratings throughout the Muslim world, while selling an American foreign 
policy of exceptionalism to predominantly Muslim audiences;  
C) After the events of 9/11, a reluctance by key officials to re-evaluate and/or reorganise the 
current public diplomacy campaign (to address the Muslim world) was not considered;  
D) Such reluctance resulted in the State Department applying a pre-existing campaign to a more 
intense US-Muslim world communication problem after 9/11; and  
E) State’s redeployment efforts of “Brand America” distorted communicative relations with the 
Muslim world (between 2001 and 2008).  
  
While I will argue here that maintaining favourable perceptions throughout the 
Muslim world is vital to maintaining US national security, applying alternative strategies that 
include the aspirations and perspectives of religious audiences and others is equally essential. 
This argument is based on the fact that over the last decade, post-9/11 religious forces are 
colliding considerably with US-foreign relations. Today, identity politics are contributing to 
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religious terrorism more so than ever before, interrupting secular ideals in the public sphere. 
The once-credible secularisation thesis of the twentieth-century (which anticipated the 
decline of religion’s impact on political affairs) is increasingly replaced by a new term – post-
secularism. Contrary to the secularisation thesis, post-secularism points to the re-emergence 
of the religious voice and religious ideas in public life. In addition, it brings with it an 
intractable tension experienced between religious and political players in the public sphere.  
 
Instead of engaging in discourse with the religious forces that emerged to confront US 
foreign affairs, the State Department avoided the consideration of religious aspirations in the 
Muslim world by relying instead on “branding” America with a narrow foreign policy of 
exceptionalism. In proposing a method that includes non-traditional approaches, this study 
will examine how the integration of religious and political perspectives may enrich social 
relations. Through this integration, both the religious and political realms may recognise the 
value of embracing a “complementary learning process” to discover their similarities within 
society.6 Conversely, seven years of continuously branding American values and foreign 
policy to the Muslim world has created an audience that is, today, resistant to indirect 
communication. In order to determine a new way forward in US-Muslim world relations, this 
thesis challenges pre-existing approaches applied under the Bush administration by exploring 
how identity politics damage communicative relations.   
 
In the case of the Obama administration, might non-conventional approaches be of 
benefit to its diplomatic strategy toward the Muslim world? Addressing this problem will 
require key Obama State Department officials such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale, and the new                                                         
6 See Jürgen Habermas, Notes on a post-secular society [article online] available from 
http://www.signandsight.com/features/1714.html; Internet, accessed 10 January 2010. 
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Director General7 of the US Foreign Service to a) comprehend the significance of post-
secularism; b) take seriously the shortcomings of the previous “Brand America” campaign; c) 
appreciate how diplomatic communication stands as the cornerstone to assuring trusted 
relations with Muslim publics; and d) ensure that Clinton’s proposed use of smart power8 is 
accompanied by a post-secular communication strategy. In determining a new way forward 
with regards to addressing the Muslim world communication problem under an Obama 
administration, serious consideration must be given to how an American history of political 
apprehensiveness toward religion and the personal and political ideology of President Bush 
contributed to a gross misreading of Islamic society. Both themes were instrumental in the 
creation of the Bush Doctrine, whose core objectives included: the endorsement of pre-
emptive strikes against potential targets linked to terrorist activity, advancing military 
primacy, supporting a new multilateralism by establishing a coalition of the willing, and the 
spread of democracy to combat terrorist ideology within the Near East.9   
 
Beyond staunch militarism, a lack of consideration toward direct communicative 
engagement, and the failure to have on board advisors or Foreign Service Officers trained in 
broad religious affairs has meant that both conservative academic and political ideals have 
fuelled misreadings of Islamic society (in the Oval Office, Department of Defense and 
Department of State). A misguided integration of various perspectives contributed to Bush’s 
lacklustre policies toward the religion of Islam, the treatment of Muslim detainees, and 
engagement efforts in the Muslim world. Political realism, on the whole, stimulated the 
                                                        
7 Recently, President Obama has nominated the current Director General Harry K. Thomas to 
become US Ambassador to the Philippines.   
8 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Nomination Hearing to be Secretary of State (13 January 2009) 
[online transcript]; available from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/01/115196.htm; Internet, 
accessed 9 April 2009. 
9 Lamont Colucci, Crusading Realism: The Bush Doctrine and American Core Values After 
9/11 (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008). 
  7 
debate of what is legitimate with regards to US relations and why the overall political 
discourse must remain in liberal-secular terms (i.e. power, economics and strategic defence). 
Hans Morgenthau’s prescription was to ensure that “moral principles were not applied to the 
actions of the state”.10 This conservative reading toward legitimising the religious voice 
diminished opportunities to employ sacred-secular relations in the US political sphere. Maria 
J. Ryan acknowledges the impact of neo-conservatism as an additional source of impairment 
on US domestic and foreign policy during the Bush era11, however neo-conservatism also 
served as the spark that lead to the rise of compassionate conservatism, “the theory that the 
government should encourage the effective provision of social services without providing the 
service itself.”12 Nevertheless, this conservative perspective led to the USG outsourcing 
religious outreach and peacemaking initiatives to local faith-based organisations, as opposed 
to employing its own cadre of Foreign Service Officers trained in broad religious affairs and 
conflict reconciliation. 
  
Among these integrated forces, the conservative academic perspectives of 
confrontationalism influenced Bush’s ideological position and foreign policy toward Islamic 
society. Though confrontationalism did not begin with the Bush administration, it was given 
academic ground both in discourse and theory in purported application by academics such as 
Daniel Pipes, Giles Kepel and scholars linked to the Oval Office including Bernard Lewis 
                                                        
10 Hans Morgenthau, “Six Principles of Political Realism”, Politics Among Nations [article 
online]; available from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm; Internet, assessed 20 
October 2008; see also Hans Morgenthau, eds., Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, 7th ed. Revised (Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education, 2005). 
11 Maria J. Ryan, The Imperatives of Power: Neoconservatism, Unipolarism and the new 
American Century (Ph.D. diss., University of Birmingham, 2007).   
12 Naomi Shaefer Riley, Mr. Compassionate Conservatism (21 October 2006) [article online]; 
available from http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110009135; Internet, accessed 20 
October 2009. 
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and the late Samuel P. Huntington.13 Their collective arguments suggest that the 
communication problem between the US and the Muslim world is framed around the notion 
that “liberal democracy is compatible neither with Islamic fundamentalism nor Islam 
itself.”14 Furthermore, in order for US policy to be effective within the Muslim world, the 
religion of Islam must reform. This thesis takes issue with this vague assertion by siding with 
Fawaz A. Gerges: it is not the religion of Islam, but a hostile strand linked to a distorted view 
of Islamic fundamentalism, that may benefit from moderate perspectives. In essence, the 
Bush administration after 9/11 focused specifically and increasingly on exporting democracy 
and improving America’s image problem, while carrying out pre-emptive military strikes 
against a small segment of the Muslim world; the aim of the administration was to win the 
War on Terror by winning the hearts and minds of all Muslims via the “branding” of 
America.   
 
Clearly, a form of diplomatic renewal is necessary in order to counteract the tension 
inherent in US-Muslim world relations, and this requires an enhancement of the mechanics of 
US diplomacy when engaging religious publics. In defining this new way forward, this thesis 
shall return to the origin of the problem – communication. To clarify my use of the term “US-
Muslim world engagement”, its application throughout this study is applied in a 
communicative context. In order that we may better comprehend the approach taken to solve 
the general communication problem, this term is expressed in five modes: 
 
 
                                                         
13 See Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), 21-22. 
14 Ibid., 24. 
  9 
Table 2 
Modes of US-Muslim World Communicative Engagement 
 
The first mode, Acknowledgement, welcomes activities relating to the proactive recognition of former political 
relations toward Muslim publics by the USG. In addition, the discovery of various trajectories to engage, 
through communication, the multiple ideas behind hostile actions are unveiled in this mode. 
The second mode, Pursuance, is dedicated to understanding the practise of communication (which inevitably 
includes training and application rehearsal between religious and political officials).  
The third mode, Proficiency, gives attention to critical language training. This recognises the often overlooked 
reality that after personal communication training, a working knowledge of the local language is a pre-eminent 
concern (i.e. Arabic, Farsi, Pashto, Turkish, Urdu, Swahili, Indonesian, etc.). 
The fourth mode, Policy Formation, focuses entirely on the establishment of coherent US foreign policy-
making with the Muslim world by adding the aspirations and perspectives of Muslim publics into the overall 
foreign policy discussion. This occurs most successfully when USG officials are personally and linguistically 
adept at communication. At this level, policy is established out of an awareness of the impact of the previous 
two levels, which hinge on communicative activity and an acute awareness of America’s historical foreign 
policy relationship to Muslim publics.  
The fifth and final mode, the Resolution, realises that attempts to counteract the tension caused by the US-
Muslim world communication problem require the constant improvement of strategic partnerships with local 
networks. The emphasis in this mode is on assuring global coexistence by combining the previous elements 
(awareness, communication/language training, and coherent policy formation) to assure stability with 
international Muslim publics.15   
 
 With consideration to the setbacks in US diplomatic engagement with the Muslim 
world and this study’s focus on communication, only the first two modes (Acknowledgement 
and Pursuance), which relate to communication training and diplomatic renewal, are 
explored in this thesis. While the thesis will not address the last three modes in detail 
(Proficiency, Policy Formation, and Resolution) though equally essential, this study makes 
clear that its recommendations, on their own, may only go so far unless there is a 
complimentary interaction within the USG between the support of a progressive US foreign 
policy and a strategic approach to engage the Muslim world.   In doing so, this study makes                                                         
15 These four preparational levels to US-Muslim world engagement resemble (in a unique 
way) the organisation of John Coltrane’s popular 1965 jazz composition, “A Love Supreme”. 
Coltrane’s composition is separated into three themes (Acknowledgement, Resolution, 
Pursuance/Psalm). As with America’s historical relationship to the Muslim world, “A Love Supreme” 
speaks of a struggle relating to the engagement process by depicting the epic battle of two lovers 
attempting to reach harmony. This activity parallels the current relationship between the US and the 
Muslim world and the US’s attempt to strike a balance and achieve global coexistence. For further 
insight on “A Love Supreme”, see Ashley Kahn, A Love Supreme: The Story of John Coltrane’s 
Signature Album (New York: Viking Press, 2002). 
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clear the awareness of post-secularism in the US diplomatic arena and the impact 
communication training is likely to have on introducing the aspirations and perspectives of 
moderate Muslims into the larger US foreign policy debate. This study does not set out to 
identify a new way forward solely to improve America’s image problem in the Muslim 
world, but is rather concerned with revitalising a component of the State Department’s 
communication process to ensure non-secular aspirations from the Muslim world are 
incorporated into the larger US foreign policy debate.       
 
The decision to address the first two modes of US-Muslim World Communicative 
Engagement are taken up given the current US foreign policy direction and the commitment 
by the Obama administration to restore US foreign relations with international Muslim 
communities.   While proposing this communication approach, this study recognises that 
elements related to the practise of interfaith dialogue (which convenes sacred and secular 
players together to promote mutual interest and mutual understanding) offer a favourable 
trajectory that underpins two-way communication for restoring trusted relations between the 
US government and religious communities.   This study recognises that within this proposal a 
caveat is imperative that in order to function there needs to be a US foreign policy that is 
complimentary to the two-way communication applied in interfaith dialogue and in future 
USG projects that consider this approach.   
 
This will be a change from the experience of US agencies, notably the US Department 
of Defense, applying a one-way communication approach to interacting with Muslim 
communities. While proposing this forward thinking project, a series of challenges surface, 
the first of which are related to the convergence with and consistency of US foreign policy.  
Clearly, the most successful US government project promoting dialogue with the Muslim 
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world will be hampered if the US’s overall foreign policy is interpreted as being adverse to 
Muslims.  In order for a   forward-thinking project that promotes two-way communication 
with Muslims to materialize, US foreign policy must move in a direction complementary to 
prospective government projects that are understanding-over-success oriented.   
  
 Beyond these broad policy issues stands the second limitation, related to existing   
bureaucratic maneuvers which may reinforce the support of one-way communication. 
Though the State Department and Pentagon have often worked in collaboration on critical 
issues as confronting US national security, various limits are set which may stymie 
prospective State Department communication projects that seek to promote two-way 
communication to restore relations with Muslims.    This includes the Pentagon’s success 
oriented agenda to distort information operations, by promoting highly successful propaganda 
campaigns.     In addition, its ability to reach Muslim audiences quicker and more skilfully 
(especially in combat zones) than the State Department is linked in part to its increasing 
budget over the last decade that has contributed to its dominant position in shaping US 
foreign policy in critical regions (as Central and South Asia).  A striking financial 
comparison is recorded in the current White House’s FY 2011 budget request with $708.2 
billion  for the Pentagon and  $52.8 billion requested for the State Department and the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID).16   
 
 
 
                                                         
16 United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request, “Overview-
FY2011 Request” [document online] available from http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget.html; 
Internet accessed 9 April 2010.  
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“$548.9 billion for the [Pentagon’s] base budget excludes costs related to overseas 
contingency operations [totalling 159.3 billion].  This is $18.2 billion higher than $530.7 
billion enacted for FY 2010—an increase of about 3.4 percent.”17 Considering the State 
Department’s fiscal allocation, Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, Jacob J. 
Lew, indicates State and USAID’s, “total $52.8 billion is a $4.9 billion increase, $3.6 billion 
for programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.  War-related spending represents a 7.5 
percent increase in overall spending, and funding that is not war-related grows by $1.3 
billion, which is 2.7 percent above 2010 total spending.”18  
 A mammoth budget coupled by a foreign policy agenda to apply one-way communication, 
either to influence or coerce foreign publics, has great potential to obstruct future State 
Department efforts that will require US officials to build sacred-secular relations to promote a 
dialogue of understanding with Muslim communities. Giles Scott-Smith presents an accurate 
assessment that    
 
“When referring to the dominance of the Pentagon, it is not just a matter of weaponry or the 
questionable deployment of US Marines.  Looking to develop its role in the field of ‘strategic 
influence’, the military has also greatly expanded its activities in communication and media, 
with questionable consequences.” He insists, “The consistent under-funding of the State 
Department has led to a desperate shortage of trained embassy personnel, especially in 
languages, and a serious lack of morale.  Meanwhile, under Bush the military establishment 
[took a lead role] in US diplomatic, public diplomacy, and assistance task across North 
Africa, the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and the Far East. In many regions the 
Pentagon is at the forefront in engaging with foreign public opinion, even though this 
remains, officially, the job of the State Department.”19  
 
The Pentagon’s dominant position is flawed in that it makes a critical mistake in its 
approach to engage Muslim communities.  Instead of recognising the value in applying an 
understanding-over-success posture, its vision is in fact success-over-understanding oriented.  
Following September 11, the Pentagon’s agenda, in this regard, was set by hiring private                                                         
17 Ibid. 
18 Jacob J. Lew, “President’s Proposal for the FY 2011 State Department Budget” [document 
online] available from http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/remarks/2010/136358.htm; Internet accessed 20 
April 2010.  
19 Giles Scott-Smith, “Obama’s Challenge: Curbing the Pentagon” (29 November 2008) 
[article online] available from http://enduringamerica.com/2008/11/29/obamas-challenge-curbing-the-
pentagon/; Internet accessed 20 April 2010;  See also  Giles Scott-Smith, “There is No More Outside” 
(24 September 2009) [article online] available from http://www.neoamericanist.org/there-no-more-
outside; Internet accessed 20 April 2010.    
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contractors as the Lincoln Group  and the Rendon Group to control the flow of information 
that either entered or circulated throughout  Muslim countries of interest. These activities 
were regarded as US military Psychological Operations (PSYOP), “Planned operations to 
convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence the emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals.”20  While such   efforts by the Pentagon are 
considered communication activities to “influence” foreign publics in Muslim countries, the 
truth stands that communication, in this case, would only obstruct the prospects of gathering 
insight while promoting mutual understanding.  While PSYOP contractors are fulfilling their 
duties by distributing propaganda, the valuable opportunity of the USG to comprehend the 
many perspectives of Muslims is often tarnished due to this caviler foreign policy agenda.  
Hence, this thesis recognises that the most effective of two-way communication models will 
not succeed if there is not consideration given to US foreign policymaking and the nature of 
the bureaucracy that implements it.   
 
Bureaucratic recognition includes putting a two-way approach in the hands of US 
officials who are mostly capable of carrying out projects that are understanding-over success 
oriented (i.e. the US Department of State).   A “feed-back loop” created by two-way dialogue 
introduces a Muslim perspective upon US foreign policy into the discussion.  In addition, this 
study calls for a recognition by US policymakers that the policies they pursue should not be 
separate from this effort, for they are integral to the success or failure of this approach.  
Emphasis on the State Department brings out two crucial points: a) an understanding-over-
                                                        
20 Mark Kilbane, “Military Psychological Operations as Public Diplomacy” in Nancy Snow 
and Phillip M. Taylor eds., Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2009), 
187-192. 
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success mode to engagement is more applicable within its constructs; and b.)   its broad 
diplomatic framework (despite its minuscule budget) provides broader possibilities when 
promoting a two-way dialogue within a special post-secular political forum.    Applying this 
type of activity by employing aspects of socio-political interfaith dialogue—engagement 
between religious and political players to understand and resolve critical social issues—
ensures a greater opportunity, as an alternative to one-way communication, for restoring 
trusted relations with Muslims.    
 This thesis emerges as an interdisciplinary study integrating literature from the fields 
of theology and political science with communication theory. In comprehending how the 
State Department might approach the US-Muslim world communication problem more 
directly, the study considers the impact of faith-based organisations in brokering peace. 
Arguably, the 1990s was a key decade, since international organisations such as the United 
Nations, faith-based NGOs, and civil society pooled their resources in order to resolve 
widespread intractable conflicts, in the wake of many diplomatic failures. (Hence, the nation-
state proved in this case that the strength would lie in symmetrical secular engagement with 
“legitimate” state powers, as opposed to direct engagement with non-state combatants to 
broker peace in conflict-prone settings.) In order to reconcile a decade of intractable religious 
and ethnic/tribal conflicts throughout the Balkans, Latin America, South-East Asia, and parts 
of Africa, faith-based NGOs including the World Conference of Religion for Peace and the 
Community of St. Egidio employed religious peacemaking to curb tension and convene 
hostile parties.21 Prominent Western nations such as the US, Britain and France would later 
depend upon many of these organisations to resolve longstanding intractable conflicts, due to 
its poor communication resources and the failure to have on board trained FSOs. But, nearly 
two decades on, should this still be the case?                                                            
21 See David Smock, ed., Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding (Washington, USIP, 2002). 
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Reflecting on the many successes of these organisations, especially the momentum 
(as described by post-secular writers as Dostert22, Trigg23, Hauser24 and Stout25) created in 
integrating the religious voice into public deliberations, offers insight to the US as to how to 
relax the tension with the Muslim world. In attempts to reconcile many of these events over 
the years in Mozambique, Nigeria, Northern Ireland and Kashmir, Non-Government 
Organisations (NGOs) such as the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) regularly employ 
“interfaith dialogue forums”, which convene religious leaders of different faiths and 
traditions to explore how spiritual principles may influence the peacemaking process. USIP 
director of Religion and Peacemaking, David Smock, acknowledges in Interfaith Dialogue 
and Peacebuilding:   
 
Organising dialogue across religious boundaries enables people of faith to live out what most 
faith traditions considered a sacred duty to peacemakers. Interfaith dialogue carries with it the 
benefit of secular dialogue but also the potential for deeper and more meaningful engagement 
because of the possibility for spiritual encounter. This in turn may enhance the participant’s 
commitment to peace work and social change.26 
 
 It is elements within this unique communicative application that must be taken 
seriously as a first step to restoring US-Muslim world relations and regaining regional 
security. In contrast to convening merely religious players for inter-religious dialogue (in the 
case of religious peacemaking), the emphasis in this thesis is on thinking about how a type of 
socio-political dialogue that convenes both religious and political officials into a special 
                                                        
22 Troy Dostert, Beyond Political Liberalism: Toward a Post-Secular Ethics of Public Life 
(Notre Dame, Notre Dame Univ. Press, 2006). 
23 Roger Trigg, Religion in Public Life: Must Faith be Privatized (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2007). 
24 Gerard A. Hauser, “The Public Voice of Vernacular Rhetoric”, Vernacular Voice 
(Columbia: South Carolina Press, 1999). 
25 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2004). 
26 David Smock, Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding, 127-128. 
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space can be made possible. While, today, numerous books and research projects are less 
hesitant to investigate the en vogue topic of US-Muslim world engagement, my initial 
literature survey in 2005 unveiled limited resources (relating to interfaith relations and US 
diplomacy or how alternative communication strategies may restore trusted relations with 
Muslim publics). In order to convey the impact that the fields of both religion and politics 
might have on improving US diplomatic relations, various forms of interdisciplinary research 
were organised.  
 
This Ph.D. study began as a pre-doctoral research project conducted in 2005, 
observing inter-religious relations in West Africa from a social standpoint. While surveying 
the US Department of State’s diplomatic relationship with religious audiences and other 
groups in Senegal and The Gambia, four key points were identified:  
 
1) Gaps in the US Government’s (USG) diplomatic approach when engaging Muslim publics 
in Africa and South Asia;  
 
2) Shortcomings in the US Foreign Service with regards to hiring diplomats versed in broad 
religious affairs;  
 
3) Reluctance by the US Foreign Service Institute to train diplomats in a post-secular 
communication strategy; and  
 
4) Consideration for how the aspirations and perspectives of religious and tribal leaders may 
play a fundamental role in restoring US-Muslim world relations and promoting public policy 
at a grassroots level.  
  
 Funding by the Nali Dinshaw Bursary and Roberts Fund supported additional field 
research in 2007 with the State Department’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs 
and the William J. Clinton Foundation, to investigate these major developments further. 
Working with the State Department’s Office of Peacekeeping, Sanctions and Counter-
terrorism, additional projects included handling a diplomatic portfolio on Sudan and Lebanon 
UN peacekeeping missions. In addition, data was collected on how diplomats engaged 
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predominately Muslim countries and territories via Washington and US embassies. Here, I 
came into contact with “Brand America” and the setbacks experienced by diplomats in 
restoring relations with Muslim audiences via the State Department’s public diplomacy 
campaign. Recognising the limitations of “Brand America” and the inability of US diplomats 
to engage Muslim publics directly, a final project was conducted with the Clinton Foundation 
and University of Arkansas Clinton School of Public Service, which included integrating 
initial findings to develop a practicable communication strategy to train new recruits in the 
US Foreign Service.  
 
 Based on the shortcomings of academics and think-tanks with regards to integrating 
inter-disciplinary literature (from the fields of communication theory, comparative religious 
studies and US foreign policy), this study is able to make a contribution by thinking more 
critically about how post-secular relations may improve US national security. However, in 
recent years many have handled the topic of US-Muslim world engagement through a narrow 
spectrum that either focuses on religious freedom issues or creating structural change in the 
State Department itself:  
 
• The Brookings Institute, The Need to Communicate: How to Improve US Public Diplomacy 
with the Islamic World27 
 
• Council on Foreign Relations, Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating US 
Public Diplomacy28 
 
• Center for the Study of the Presidency, Strengthening US-Muslim Communications29                                                         
27 Hady Amr, The Need to Communicate: How to Improve US  Public Diplomacy with the 
Islamic World (Washington, D.C.: Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 
2004). 
28 Peter G. Peterson, et. al., Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating US 
Public Diplomacy [document online]; available from 
www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/public_diplomacy.pdf; Internet, accessed 10 January 
2010.  
29 Phyllis d' Hoop, An Initiative: Strengthening US -Muslim Communications (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2003).  
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• Government Accountability Office, US Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts 
but Faces Significant Challenges30 
 
• Heritage Foundation, How to Reinvigorate US Public Diplomacy31 
 
In a real sense, prominent US officials and academics researching religion and US diplomacy 
have yet to take seriously the dynamics of communication, which would include employing a 
new type of Foreign Service Officer to restore trusted relations at a grassroots level. For 
example, former director of the Office of Religious Freedom, Thomas F. Farr, has focused 
attention in recent years on championing religious freedom and national security, asserting 
that “US diplomacy should move resolutely to make the defence and expansion of religious 
freedom a core component of US foreign policy. Doing so would give the United States a 
powerful new tool for advancing ordered liberty and for undermining religion-based 
extremism at a time when other strategies have proved inadequate”32. Former US diplomat 
John D. Stemple, however, suggests that the USG must recognise the strengths of both 
religion and diplomacy in order to curb religious violence, but dedicates much of his research 
to exploring the culture of diplomacy.33 Walter A. McDougall, though wrestling with the 
history of religion and US diplomacy in a single essay, Religion in Diplomatic History, 
makes a unique observation, implying, “it is not difficult to imagine some of the reasons for 
the scarcity of literature on religion and international relations. First, very few scholars, much 
less pundits, theologians, or diplomats, display expertise in both fields. Some have a                                                         
30 US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Science, the Departments of State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies, House Committee 
on Appropriations, US Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences 
Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges, GAO-06-535 (May 2006). 
31 Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, How to Reinvigorate US Public Diplomacy [document 
online]; available from http://www.heritage.org/Research/PublicDiplomacy/upload/bg_1645.pdf; 
Internet, accessed 22 January 2010.  
32 Thomas F. Farr, “Diplomacy in an Age of Faith”, Foreign Affairs, 87, No. 2: 110-124 
(2008).  
33 John D. Stemple, Faith and Diplomacy in the International System [document online]; 
available from http://www.uky.edu/~stempel/faith.htm; Internet, accessed 20 January 2010. 
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profound understanding of one or more religious traditions, perhaps also a personal faith, but 
lack knowledge or experience of the rough and tumble of politics.”34 However, this astute 
observation has not led to a practical treatment by fellow researchers in addressing the 
ongoing communication problem in a diplomatic context.  
 
 The closest attempt, thus far, is credited to the work of Ambassador John McDonald, 
whose research has focused on the value of Track 2 (NGO) peacemaking. McDonald has 
examined at length why State officials should look beyond traditional secular approaches to 
improve its overall relations with nation-states and traditional groups. By taking a “systems 
approach”, US diplomats are likely to tap into the core of society (i.e. business, private 
citizenry, academic research, activism, religion, fundraising and media relations).35 While 
many US think-tanks are just beginning to broach the topic of US-Muslim world relations, 
this thesis breaks new ground in proposing how the State Department might improve the US 
communicative relationship with predominantly religious publics. To a degree, Douglas 
Johnston and Cynthia Sampson’s study, Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft 
(1994), could potentially have addressed this theme, but their research focused entirely on the 
impact of religion and the role of US foreign policy.36 Despite the study’s shortcomings, 
Edward Luttwak’s recommendations warrant further review: Luttwak proposes that structural 
changes are made in the constructs of the State Department with the deployment of “religion 
attachés to diplomatic missions.”37 Recognising its prospects, Douglas Johnston concurs by 
                                                        
34 Walter A. McDougall, Religion in Diplomatic History [document online]; available from 
http://www.fpri.org/fpriwire/0603.199803.mcdougall.religionindiplomatichistory.html; Internet, 
accessed 20 June 2010.  
35 Louise Diamond and Amb. John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach 
to Peace. 3rd ed. (Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1996). 
36 Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, “The Missing Dimension”, Religion: The Mission 
Dimension of Statecraft (Oxford Press: Oxford,1994), 
37 Edward Luttwak, “The Missing Dimension”, Religion: The Mission Dimension of 
Statecraft, Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (Oxford Press: Oxford, 1994), 8-20. 
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picking this recommendation up a decade later in the essay, Case for a Religion Attaché 
(2004), and again in the study, Faith-based Diplomacy: Trumpeting a Realpolitik.38 
Additionally, Secretary of State Madeline Albright, in the text Mighty and the Almighty 
(2006) weighs in on this proposal, acknowledging, “the State Department should hire or train 
a core of specialists in religion to be deployed both in Washington and in key embassies 
overseas.”39  
 
The real dimension that is missing from their exploration points back to the dynamics 
of a forgotten communication strategy that may support an integrated discourse between 
sacred and secular officials.   Since little research has surveyed the rise of interfaith dialogue 
on a diplomatic basis for this task, we will explore this possibility by examining a new 
communication strategy in context with previous recommendations presented in the field. 
The treatment presented in this study covers training the proposed Johnston religion attaché 
model in a post-secular communication strategy (in order to relax tension and restore 
relations with Muslim audiences). The strategy developed in this study is the  Post-Secular 
Communication Strategy of Interfaith Diplomacy (IFD2). It is a post-secular communication 
strategy which integrates elements taken from the contemporary interfaith movement (that 
include resolving intractable disputes non-violently, aiding public deliberation, embracing 
multi-religious options, and providing a safe space for plural engagement) with strategic 
communication. Since the latter part of the twentieth century, the faith-based NGO 
contributions linked to the contemporary interfaith movement, which sets out to promote 
                                                        
38 Douglas Johnston and Brian Cox, “Faith-based Diplomacy and Preventative Engagement”, 
in Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumpeting a Realpolitik, Douglas Johnston, ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2003); Douglas M. Johnston, “The Case for a Religion Attaché”, Foreign Service Journal 
(February 2002). 
39 Madeline Albright and Bill Woodward, The Mighty & The Almighty: Reflections on Power, 
God, and World Affairs (London: MacMillian, 2006), 73. 
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international peacemaking among religious groups, shed light on why and how the current 
State Department must implement its change in course when dealing with socially-
constructed religious audiences in the Muslim world. IFD2 is a smart communication strategy 
applicable to Secretary Clinton’s smart power to resolve a number of diplomatic 
shortcomings that might occur. Thus, extensive forms of engagement beyond Obama’s Oval 
Office diplomacy are required and have yet to be explored.  
 
*** 
  
This thesis will investigate a new way forward in three parts: Part 1, Possibilities of a 
Coexistent Future, reviews several interdisciplinary approaches to enhancing US-Muslim 
world communicative engagement. Part 2, Practises in US-Muslim World Engagement 
(2001-2008), explores how America’s political apprehensiveness has manifested in US 
foreign policy after 9/11, and the hope of broader forms of engagement. Part 3, When 
Possibility Meets Practise, considers this new way forward under a new presidency by 
illustrating how both sacred and secular players may engage in direct communication within 
the political arena to restore relations and enhance regional security.    
 
Chapter 1 sets the stage by calling into question President Bush’s political 
manoeuvring toward the Muslim world, reviewing his inability to support a strategy for direct 
communication. In addition, a review is taken of the State Department’s reliance on its 
“Brand America” campaign and the lack of success it had with regards to improving 
America’s image in the Muslim world. A post-9/11 eagerness by key State Department 
officials to employ robust public diplomacy measures points to a larger fear toward religion 
held by many within the American political system. Chapter 2 opens up this tension by 
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examining the impact of post-secularism. Here, we will explore both contributions (that 
welcome the religious voice into the public sphere) and the sacred-secular discord it often 
brings. Chapter 3 takes into account the political apprehensiveness of the American political 
system by considering a non-conventional mode of engagement that welcomes both sacred 
and secular players to restore trusted relations. In re-reading the impact of the contemporary 
interfaith movement, we draw upon the practicable traditions that are likely to have an impact 
on US relations. Socio-political interfaith dialogue is unveiled in this chapter as a progressive 
form of engagement for promoting direct communicative relations between USG officials 
and Muslims.   
  
In reviewing this theme, Chapters 4 and 5 handle the impact of the Bush Doctrine and 
its influence on US diplomacy. At this point, the reason why key State officials would advise 
against sacred-secular engagement on all levels after 9/11 becomes clear. In addition, we 
examine what happens when broad international religious affairs are not examined by top 
USG agencies, and the general outcome of US-Muslim world relations when a 
communication strategy is not integrated into the diplomatic process. Moving beyond the 
setbacks of US diplomacy, Chapter 6 incorporates qualitative research findings gathered 
while working at the State Department and surrounding agencies. A review of various 
recommendations by seasoned diplomats and military commanders supportive of direct 
engagement with religious publics is considered. The chief recommendation, however, 
recommends the recruitment of a new type of Foreign Service Officer (religion attaché) into 
the US Foreign Service.   
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Chapter 7 explores President Obama’s current communicative approach to engaging 
the Muslim world, which (as of late) is through direct Oval Office diplomacy. While 
executive-level engagement is instrumental in relaxing tension with the Muslim world, this 
chapter will argue that a more direct and concrete approach by US diplomats at a grassroots 
level is required. Reflecting upon this possibility, Chapter 8 revisits earlier recommendations 
calling for the recruitment of a religion attaché into the US Foreign Service. Douglas 
Johnston’s (2004) religion attaché model is considered, but attention is given to its 
communicative shortcomings. While focusing here on the possibilities of integrating the 
contributions of post-secularism, socio-political interfaith dialogue and communication 
theory, the final chapter introduces into the Johnston religion attaché model the Post-Secular 
Communication Strategy of Interfaith Diplomacy (IFD2). Though this communication strategy 
is not considered to be the last word in resolving the ongoing US-Muslim world 
communication problem, it stands as a principle component in communication training for 
future US Foreign Service Officers.  
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Possibilities of a coexistent future 
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Chapter 1  
 
Assessing the tension in US-Muslim world relations after 9/11 
 
1.1. Introduction: “Why do they hate us?” 
 
In presenting a declaration of war (which inevitably became the cornerstone of the 
proverbial Bush Doctrine) at a joint session of the US Congress on 20 September 2001, 
President George W. Bush raised the profound question which would go on to shape 
America’s perception of the global war on terror, “Why do they hate us?”. Providing a 
subjective rationale which he hoped America would grow to accept, he answered: 
 
They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected government. 
Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our 
freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. They 
want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries such as Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive 
Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa. These terrorists kill not merely to 
end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America 
grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us 
because we stand in their way.40 
 
When Bush delivered what would become one of the most defining addresses of his 
presidency, the Muslim world (like America) listened, possibly pondering the United States 
Government’s (USG) aim in bringing to justice those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Young, 
male, Muslim, educated and from well-to-do families would become familiar terms in the 
                                                        
40 George W. Bush, Transcript of President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on 
Thursday night, September 20, 2001, CNN.com [article online]; available from 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/; Internet, accessed 20 January 2009; see 
also Lamont Colucci, Crusading Realism: The Bush Doctrine and American Core Values after 9/11 
(Maryland: Univ. Press of America, 2008).  
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ensuing weeks to describe the 9/11 hijackers. But another element, visible to the international 
eye, which appeared more hostile, rugged and eager to defeat the US (with its Western allies) 
in its efforts to combat the power of the Afghan Taliban, would define the new portrait of 
Islamic extremism and become the scapegoat for prolonging both the war in Afghanistan and 
that in Iraq. In outlining the Bush administration’s demands, the ten years of fighting in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are evidence that its hearers were not swayed by its non-negotiable 
requests to: 
 
• Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land; 
• Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned; 
• Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country; 
• Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand 
over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to the appropriate authorities; 
[and] 
• Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no 
longer operating.41 
 
Under Bush’s presidency, the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda became the symbolic example of 
forces whom US foreign policies would attempt to protect the world from (even though 
innocent civilians similar in character would be the victims of US human rights violations, 
such as extraordinary rendition and torture).42 
 
                                                        
41 George W. Bush, Transcript of President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on 
Thursday night, September 20, 2001, CNN.com [article online]; available from 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/; Internet, accessed 20 January 2009. 
42 Jay S. Bybee, Steven Bradbury, and John Anthony Rizzo, et al., The Secret Torture Memos: 
Bush Administration Memos on Torture As Released by the United States Department of Justice, April 
16, 2009 (Maryland: Arc Manor, 2009); Phillippe Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the 
Betrayal of American Values (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2009). 
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Two points are apparent from this. First, at the core of Bush’s address is a tension 
which now characterises aspects of America’s foreign policy with the Muslim world. 
Beginning with Bush’s enquiry “why do they hate us?”, this tension later matured within an 
American political environment susceptible to the creation of culture wars. This tension is 
bound up with the USG’s interpretation over the next decade of the notion of “they” and, in 
turn, how the Muslim world came to stand accused of breeding an extreme element that was 
at odds with US national security. At a deeper level, within Bush’s address (and numerous 
succeeding speeches), the President clearly did not distinguish between Muslims who 
apparently hate the US (those willing to inflict violence in pursuit of their ends) and the vast 
majority of Muslims, who are not entirely at odds with America. The political manoeuvring 
that arose from this perception bound the entire conception of the Muslim world together 
with the minute elements of extremism which gained public prominence. The fixed attitude 
of the Bush administration (which inevitably developed over the course of his administration) 
interpreted the religion of Islam as the central problem, Islamic fundamentalism as its source, 
and Islamic militants as the extreme combatants.  
 
Secondly, this tension developed into an unwillingness by the President to outline a 
plan of action to engage with the resurgence of political activity linked to religion in the 
public sphere (post-secularism) after 9/11. Bush’s treatment of the post-secular was at best 
ambiguous and lacklustre. His treatment of this mounting resurgence of religious attitudes 
within the public sphere, and the USG’s attempt to combat symbolic examples of it, seems to 
be, on the one hand, a declaration of war from Bush to the Taliban and Al Qaeda and, on the 
other, a colourless appeal to all Muslims in the claim “America is not at war with Islam, nor 
  28 
the Arab world.”43 Thus, Bush’s timid vacillation marked the beginning of an imbalance 
which shaped international public opinion toward America. Though the President outlined a 
plan to combat terror and Islamic extremism with staunch military force, unfortunately he 
failed to outline a strategic plan of action to directly engage the vast majority of the Muslim 
world which was not at odds with American society. 
The general debate over the last decade concludes that the failure of American foreign 
policy in the Muslim world relates solely to the USG’s national security and energy interests 
within the Middle East and Iran. Chapter 1 will move beyond this argument to establish a 
new conversation on the question of communication as considered, developed and even 
pursued (at the diplomatic level) within the US Department of State between 2001 and 2008. 
In making this exploration, important evidence surfaced with regards to the reason why 
public diplomacy and nation-branding became (though indirectly) the US Department of 
State’s central tactic in spreading the USG’s foreign policy message. A space where 
discourse, dialogue and engagement to address issues relating to post-secularism might be 
constructively pursued in public between US secular and religious spokespersons did not 
receive due consideration.   
Before examining the setbacks in US diplomatic communication under the Bush 
administration, it is imperative we turn our attention, first, to comprehending how elements 
of American foreign policy has contributed to less than favourable perceptions held by 
Muslims.   In briefly exploring this matter, we comprehend how the historical background of 
American intervention (especially within the Middle East) intersects with the development of 
America’s image problem after 2001.  This study suspects, however, that America’s inability 
                                                        
43 George W. Bush, Transcript of President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on 
Thursday night, September 20, 2001, CNN.com [article online]; available from 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/; Internet, accessed 20 January 2009. 
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to withstand a period of consistent positive interchange with the Muslim world and 
international Muslim communities has inevitably contributed  to the longstanding decline in 
public perceptions toward American foreign policy and American leadership by Muslims. 
 
 1.2.  Complicating US foreign relations with Muslims    
US foreign policy in the Middle East has gained many economic, diplomatic, and 
military successes at the expense of complicating relations with international Muslim 
communities. While key leaders in the Middle East may readily embrace America’s presence 
in the region (through foreign aid or military assistance) there are others, as non-elites, 
(belonging to the private sector) that regard an American military presence or the US’s 
political influence as problematic. Some fear this arrangement has the potential to contribute 
to the spread of an American hegemony throughout the region.44     This challenge to the 
American approach interacts with an uneven U.S. foreign policy, based upon bilateral 
relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia, two regional pillars presenting different agendas.45       
 
                                                        
44 Noam Chomsky takes up this position from an academic standpoint suggesting,  “The 
expectation I presume is that the United States will end up with military bases in Iraq, stable bases 
right at the heart of the oil producing region for the first time, in a client state, a state which will be 
called free and independent and even democratic, but in secret will be described the way the British in 
secret described their colonial domains. It will be run by what the British called an Arab façade, 
behind which Britain effectively ruled. That’s pretty much the way the United States has run its own 
backyard, Central America and Caribbean, for a hundred years, and it’s familiar in the history of 
imperialism. Noam Chomsky  “The Dilemmas of Dominance” in Boron, Atilio New Worldwide 
Hegemony – alternatives for change and social movements 2004 (Buenos Aires: CLACSO); See also 
Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2003). 
45 See Noam Chomsky, Gilbert Achcar, and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom. Perilous Power: 
The Middle East & U.S. Foreign Policy: Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War, and Justice 
(Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007).  See also John L Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of 
Islam (Oxford: OUP, 2002);   Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and 
the Paletinians (London: Pluto Press, 1999). 
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The context for the growing scepticism held by Muslims toward the US government 
includes:  Resistance toward modernisation introduced by interaction with Western nations 
as the United States, the prospects of spreading America’s growing political and ideological 
influence on Islamic society, and America’s ardent support for the state of Israel as a 
“strategic asset” in the Middle East.46  Each concern is shaped out of an acute awareness by 
Muslims that the US since WW II has become a dominant power in the Middle East and that 
its  foreign policy is essentially crafted remote from the   many aspirations and perspectives 
of non-elite Muslims in the region.  Michael C. Hudson acknowledges this point in the essay, 
To Play the Hegemon, asserting, “Today, the American President can summon the leader 
from most Middle Eastern governments to endorse his regional (and domestic) political 
agenda.  American financial officials can write the domestic economic policy for most 
governments in the region. [And] The U.S. military enjoys unprecedented access and 
acceptance from North Africa to the [Persian] Gulf.”47 
 
  Since 1933, when King Abdel Aziz granted American oil countries entrance into the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the USG has built a relationship to fulfill its oil interest (and after 
1945) to establish a geo-political position against the Soviet Union to combat the spread of 
communism.48   In achieving its contemporary goals, the US has to deal with a set of issues 
which may complicate or support its current foreign policy approach: Security in the post-war                                                         
46 P. W. Singer, M. J. Akbar, and Kurt M. Campbell, “A Strategic Look at US-Muslim World 
Relations”, Brookings Project on US Relations with the Islamic World (Washington, D.C.: Saban 
Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2008); Morris Mehrdad Mottale, The 
Origins of the Gulf Wars (Lanham: University Press of America, 2001).  
47 Michael C. Hudson,  "To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy Toward the Middle 
East." The Middle East Journal. (1996) no. 3: 329-343.  
48 Regarding the US-Saudi relationship and the tension (since September 11) that has surfaced 
between the two see, Craig Unger , House of Bush, House of Saud: The Secret Relationship between 
the World's Two Most Powerful Dynasties (New York: Scribner, 2004); Parker T.  Hart and David E 
Long, "Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership" in The Middle East 
Journal no. 4 (2000); see also Rachel Bronson, Thicker Than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with 
Saudi Arabia (Oxford: OUP, 2006). 
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Gulf region, the Saudi position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, arms transfers to Saudi Arabia, 
Saudi external aid programs, bilateral trade relationships and oil production, and Saudi 
policies involving human rights and democracy.49  A lucrative relationship between the USG 
and Saudi elites has prospered at times at the expense of ignoring the lack of consensus of 
hostile non-elite Muslims in the Saudi private sphere.50 “Since the attacks on the United 
States on September 11, 2001, some commentators have maintained that Saudi domestic and 
foreign policies [with the US] have created a climate that may have contributed to terrorist 
acts by Islamic radicals.”51    
    
There have been parallel tension in the US’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and the 
state of Israel.   Since recognising the state of Israel in 1948, the US and Israel have 
maintained an alliance based on strong US domestic support for Israel; shared democratic 
values; and largely shared strategic goals in the Middle East (i.e. concern over Iran, Syria, 
and Islamic extremism).52 While the US may of played both sides of the US foreign policy 
table with Israel and Arab allies to fulfill its self-interest, grievances of many Muslims in the 
region have been fueled by the US’s relationship with the Jewish state (especially since the 
                                                        
49  Alfred B Prados, Saudi Arabia Current Issues and U.S. Relations, (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006). According to Juan Cole on America’s 
demand for Middle Eastern oil, he writes, “The United States is far more dependent on Islamic oil 
today than it was thirty years ago. In 2007 the United States was consuming over 20 million barrels 
per day of petroleum and other liquefied fuels, mainly in its transportation sector, but producing only 
a little over 5 million barrels of petroleum per day. It was producing 3 million barrels per day of other 
liquefied fuels, including ethanol. American oil reserves are limited, so the conclusion is simple 
mathematics. The United States needs about 12 million barrels a day of petroleum or other liquefied 
fuels from somewhere else if it is to maintain its present way of life.” Juan Cole, Engaging the 
Muslim World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 21. 
50 Regarding this vocal opposition toward US foreign policy and the recruitment of terrorist in 
Saudi Arabia see, Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia” 
in The  Journal of Middle East Policy no 4 (Winter 2006): 39-60. 
51 Alfred B. Prados, Suadi Arabia Current Issues and U.S. Relations. 
52 Jeremy M. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: CRS report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 2006).  
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Six-Day War of 1967).53 Since this period, US foreign aid has led to Israel’s military strength  
“transforming Israel’s armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated 
military in the world”.54 (US foreign aid to Israel in 2010 reached nearly $3 billion and 
according to the Bush administration’s 10 Year Aid Agreement (2007), it is set to increase 
this contribution by $6 billion over the next decade).55  Muslims presenting   vocal opposition 
to the US’s foreign aid policy with Israel sees its financial support to the Jewish state as an 
instrument aiding the Arab-Israeli conflict. For many, this stands as a direct contradiction to 
the relationship that   the USG fosters with Arab nations.    
 
  One of the most recent attempts to assess the tension between US foreign policy and 
its reception by Muslim communities was the US-Muslim Engagement Project (led by former 
US Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Richard Armitage) which acknowledge varied 
US foreign policy activities and critical events occurring that colour Muslim world 
perceptions of American leadership and American foreign policy.56 The first, notably, is 
marked by America’s intervention and participation (in 1948) in recognising a homeland for 
Jewish settlers in Palestine, openly leading to wide suspicion of the US among key Arab 
nation states.   By 1953, Operation Ajax (the CIA-sponsored coup of Mohammad Mossadegh 
to install Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in Iran) caused tension among religious leaders in 
                                                        
     53   “One might argue that Israel was an asset during the Cold War. By serving as America’s 
proxy after 1967, it helped contain Soviet expansion in the region and inflicted humiliating defeats on 
Soviet clients like Egypt and Syria. It occasionally helped protect other US allies (like King Hussein 
of Jordan) and its military prowess forced Moscow to spend more on backing its own client states. It 
also provided useful intelligence about Soviet capabilities.” John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. 
Walt, “The Israel Lobby” in The London Review of Books no 6 (March 2006). 
54 Jeremy M. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: CRS report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 2006), 1.  
55 Ibid. 
56 US-Muslim Engagement Project, Changing Course A New Direction for US Relations with 
the Muslim World (Washington, DC: US-Muslim Engagement Project, 2008). 
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Iran and set the stage for political Islam to emerge two decades later.57 Ending Eisenhower’s 
first term, in 1957, the Suez Crisis would make the US an unlikely superpower in the region 
when it brokered a peaceful accord between Egypt, France and Britain in an effort to restore 
international control to the Suez Canal.58 
 
The 1960s saw its share of US-Middle East foreign policy initiatives, beginning with 
President Kennedy’s affirmation in 1961 that America was “committed to Israel’s right to 
exist, while at the same time [assuring America’s] access to Arab oil”59 (especially for 
America’s European allies, which depended on the region for three quarters of their 
petroleum). After Kennedy’s assassination and Johnson’s succession in 1963, mounting 
tension led to the Six Day War in 1967 where American intervention proved one-sided in 
settling the discord between Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Israel.60 Like the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, by 1972 the Nixon administration was forced to confront the Middle East as 
well, owing to the counterattack on Israel by the Syrians and Egyptians over the Golan 
Heights and the Suez Canal.61  
 
However, if ever a period rose where US foreign policy experienced great challenges 
in the Middle East, it was during the Carter administration.62 Upon taking office, President 
                                                        
57 See Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East 
Terror (Hoboken: J. Wiley & Sons, 2003). 
58 In addition, tension flared during this period in 1955 surrounding the Aswan Dam between 
the US (Dulles), Egypt (Nasser) and Russia; See Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2007).   
59 T.G. Fraser and Donette Murray, America and the World since 1945, 104. 
60 Moshe Shemesh, Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War: The 
Crystallization of Arab Strategy and Nasser’s Descent to War, 1957-1967 (Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 2008). 
61 Scholars thus argued that Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy contributed to a cease fire in 
the region by 1974; Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2007); see also Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). 
62 Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration 
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Carter presented a public appeal for a Palestinian homeland, which prompted a backlash by 
US Jewish lobbyists and pro-Israeli supporters throughout his administration. This challenge 
continued throughout his presidency, and throughout America’s efforts to dispel the tension 
in the Middle East following the Six Day War, by maintaining stability between Egypt and 
Israel up to 1977. Beyond doubt, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the hostage crisis 
thereafter became a further tipping point for Carter’s presidency and American credibility 
throughout the Middle East. In reaction to the mounting pressure from American and British 
interests in the Middle East, by the 1970s political Islam would take precedence as a religio-
political ideology, creating an unmanageable tension in US-Iranian relations.63  
 
 In this case, if the 1980s were given a title it might read: the decade when the US made 
friends out of enemies and enemies out of friends. This decade saw the USG covertly 
supporting Islamic factions and governments whom, today, it is forced to confront (for 
example, the Afghan Mujahedeen [later becoming the Taliban] in the US’s proxy war against 
the Soviets) as it sought to contain communism. During this period, the Reagan 
administration took centre stage in carrying out its implicit foreign policy objectives to 
contain communism in Central and South Asia, even if it meant funding the militant 
Mujahedeen and openly regarding the faction as “freedom fighters”.64 The events that 
occurred during the Reagan administration would include Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai 
in 1982, the same year as its invasion of Lebanon; the failure of the Middle East peace 
process in the early 1980s; the rise of Hezbollah in 1983; and, unforgettably, the Iran-Contra 
Affair. By the time George H. W. Bush took office in 1989, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and                                                         
(DeKalb: Northern Illinois UP, 2008). 
63 Based on the social theory that Muslim governments should rule according to Islamic law 
(Sharia), political Islam gained a unique popularity throughout the Middle East, South and Southeast 
Asia, as a way to express opposition to authoritarian governments. 
64 See Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2008). 
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America’s Gulf War military intervention in Iraq contributed to generating negative 
perceptions held by Iraqis toward the US. “Regardless of whether or not the Iraqi masses 
agreed with Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait, most Iraqis hoped for a negotiated 
settlement to avoid war, and they formed critical opinions of the US when it did launch a war 
which devastated their nation yet kept their dictator intact.”65  
  
 Arguably, the 1990s would become the most hostile decade of the twentieth century for 
the US, and one in which its solid relations with some Muslim countries, their dictators and 
Islamic fundamentalist factions such as the Taliban and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, would 
become tenuous.66 During this period, Muslim extremist movements were not as successful 
as before in toppling governments in such countries as Algeria, Uzbekistan and Chechnya. 
With many of these countries perturbed by American dominance67 in Muslim countries, 
Muslim extremist groups 
  
                                                        
 65 Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Katherine Durlacher , Iraqi Perceptions of UK and American Policy 
in Post-Saddam Iraq [document online] available from http://www.foreignpolicysociety.org/iraq.pdf; 
Internet accessed 10 May 2010;  Al-Marashi and Durlacher acknowledge, “Iraqi perceptions of the 
US were effected by certain events that were shared by other Arabs who hold critical views of 
American foreign policy.  The first factor is American support for Israel, which became US policy 
after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and continues to the present.  Iraqis seem to express almost equal 
hostility towards Israel and the US support for this country.   The second factor that formed Iraqi 
perceptions of the US was the 1991 Gulf war.  Regardless of whether or not the Iraqi masses agreed 
with Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait, most Iraqis hoped for a negotiated settlement to avoid war, 
and they formed critical opinions of the US when it did launch a war which devastated their nation yet 
kept their dictator intact.  Lastly, whether Iraqis supported the Hussein regime or not, they universally 
suffered under UN imposed sanctions.  During this period, many Iraqis blamed America for 
perpetuating these sanctions that hurt he Iraqi people and did nothing to their regime.” Ibid. 
66 Examples include the shift in relations with Saddam Hussein after 1992 and the US Gulf 
War; the US expansion of bases throughout parts of Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries; and 
tension inside such countries as Algeria, Uzbekistan and Chechnya, which all claimed to be struggling 
against Western influence within the region. 
67 The American dominance witnessed under the Bush administration is synonymous to the 
“Brinkmanship” foreign policy activity taken by Joseph Forster Dulles. Dulles’ policy hinged, 
however on pushing a hostile situation to the verge of disaster in order to receive a beneficial outcome 
by a party. See Thomas Cromble Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, HUP, 1980), 200. 
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Began to shift their strategy toward attacking the US and other Western nations. Al-Qaeda 
affiliates were involved in attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993, US embassies in East 
Africa in 1998, and the USS Cole in 2000. Their core justification for attacking the US was to 
free the Muslim world – particularly the Arab lands that house Islam’s sacred sites – from 
what they saw as Western domination. Pushing the West out of Muslim lands was to be the 
first step toward overthrowing the governments they saw as illegitimate, and establishing true 
Islamic states.68 
 
 By the 1990s the Clinton administration showed some promise in its landmark success with 
the Oslo Accords (though feebly signed between Israel’s Yitzak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, 
Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Movement). The legacy of Camp David II in July 
2000, where a settlement between the US, Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat was broached, 
established a workable framework for George W. Bush’s administration.  
 
America’s image problem did not begin after September 11, 2001.  The problem arose 
from the US’s ascendancy in the Middle East after WW II.  Based on fulfilling the US’s 
foreign interest, US policymakers have often overlooked the perspectives and aspirations of 
non-elites living within the Middle East. This in turn shapes negative perceptions towards 
American foreign policy and American leadership.    The outcome is an inconsistency in 
America’s foreign relations with Muslim countries diminishing any form of US credibility 
that might facilitate the promotion of US-Muslim world relations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
68 US-Muslim Engagement Project, 108. 
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1.2.1. Muslim world perceptions 
 
 Since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan (October 7, 2001), maintaining the US’s 
favourable and credible standing throughout the Muslim world has proven a hard task. In a 
Pew Forum sub-study on anti-Americanism and favourable opinions of US perceptions, 
(polling 17,000 people from 15 different nations) US favourability was found not only to 
have slipped among the five Muslim countries polled, but was still drastically declining.69 US 
favourability among the general population of the five Muslim countries polled indicated 
ratings set at: Indonesia 30%, Egypt 30%, Pakistan 27%, Jordan 15% and Turkey 12%.70 As 
an indicator, each country’s rating had consistently fallen below 50% since polling begin in 
2002. Strangely, each Muslim country polled since 2001 had maintained something of a 
diplomatic relationship with the USG since the attacks of 9/11 and the entry of Western allied 
forces into Afghanistan and Iraq. However, if we look closely at these findings, we observe 
that the general population, as opposed to the government in each country, was growing 
indifferent to the US political agenda and American leadership in the Muslim world.71  
 
 According to the Pew Forum president Andrew Kohut, in his 2007 testimony on 
Foreign Affairs – US House of Representatives, which was presented to the Subcommittee on                                                         
69 The overall study between 2001-2006 polled more than 110,000 people in 50 countries. 
70 Carroll Doherty, ed., “America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share US Concerns Over Iran, 
Hamas”, by The Pew Global Attitudes Project (Washington, Pew Forum, 2006); see also Pew Forum, 
America’s Image in the World: Findings from the Pew Global Attitudes Project Testimony of Andrew 
Kohut [document online]; available from http://pewglobal.org/commentary/pdf/1019.pdf; Internet, 
accessed 20 May 2009.  
71 These findings indicate a “visible problem”. Although the USG relationship with some 
predominantly Muslim countries is often used to send a symbolic message to Muslim audiences, I 
suggest that this “visible gap” between the Muslim public’s view of the US and the open relationship 
between their country and the USG is apparent from the low ratings in this poll of the general public 
in each country. This raises the question, “Is constructing a visible conversation with the heads of 
state of a predominantly Muslim country more important than building a trusted relationship among 
its general public?” I argue that both sectors share equal importance, but the techniques targeted at 
addressing heads of state may not be equally as successful when “addressing” or “engaging” its 
general public. 
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International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight (March 2007), findings of polls 
stretching back to 2002 reveal that in:72 
 
• December 2002 – America’s image slips, although goodwill towards the US remains.  
• June 2003 – US image plunges, in the wake of the Iraq war.  
• March 2004 – No improvement in US image, some worsening in Europe.  
• June 2005 – US image improves slightly, although still negative in most places; 
 anti-Americanism is becoming increasingly entrenched.  
• June 2006 – Little progress – in fact, some backsliding, even though the 
 publics of the world concurred with the Americans on many global problems.  
 
 A rapid sense of global distrust of American leadership (and its unilateral foreign 
policy) formulated between 2001 and 2002 was identified as the cause of this continuing 
wane by 2007 in a similar study entitled America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share US Concern 
Over Iran, and Hamas (2007).73 In its polling of ten predominantly Muslim countries, each 
openly expressed its discontent with the US. The 2007 report stated that: 
 
Not only is there worldwide support for a withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, but there also is 
considerable opposition to US and NATO operations in Afghanistan... In nearly every 
predominantly Muslim country, overwhelming majorities want US and NATO troops 
withdrawn from Afghanistan as soon as possible. In addition, global support for the US-led 
war on terrorism ebbs ever lower.74  
 
Confounding variables linked to this decline in US favourability were associated with 
additional polled reactions to American leadership throughout the Muslim world. These                                                         
72 Pew Forum, “America’s Image in the World: Findings from the Pew Global Attitudes 
Project Testimony of Andrew Kohut” [document online] available from 
http://pewglobal.org/commentary/pdf/1019.pdf.; Internet, accessed 20 May 2009.  
73 Juliana Menasce Horowitz, ed. “Global Unease with Major World Powers”, by The Pew 
Global Attitudes Project (Washington, Pew Forum, 2006). 
74 Ibid., 5. 
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views were expressed further in the overwhelmingly unfavourable ratings captured in these 
ten predominantly Muslim countries (see below). 
 
Table 3 
Pew Poll, “Views of the US and American Foreign Policy”  
Snapshot of Muslim countries polled, 200775 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By comparing the findings taken from the 2006 study with those of the 2007 study, 
we can see that US favourability continued to fall to a degree in four out of five Muslim 
countries. For example, the 2007 study reveals that Indonesian perceptions of the US had 
fallen from 30% to 29%; Egypt 30% to 21%; Pakistan 27% to 15%; and Turkey 12% to 9%. 
An uneventful 5% spike from 15% to 20% showed in Jordan, but countries with close ties to 
the USG such as Pakistan, Kuwait, Lebanon and Morocco each contributed favourability 
figures below 50%.  
  
 
                                                        
75 Juliana Menasce Horowitz, ed. “Global Unease with Major World Powers”, by The Pew 
Global Attitudes Project (Washington, Pew Forum, 2006), 5. Note: Sum rows will not equal 100% 
because many polled expressed no opinion. 
 
Nation Favourable Unfavourable 
Kuwait 46 46 
Lebanon 47 52 
Indonesia 29 66 
Malaysia 27 69 
Egypt 21 78 
Jordan 20 78 
Morocco 15 56 
Pakistan 15 68 
Palestinian Ter. 13 86 
Turkey 9 83 
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1.2.2. Revisiting the US-Muslim world communicative problem 
 
Considering the fluctuation in American foreign policy from interchange to 
dominance over the last half-century, the USG’s vacillation explains its image decline in the 
Muslim world. Evidently, by 2001 the Bush administration’s foreign policy platform would 
go on to exacerbate a previous scepticism by Muslims towards the United States. The decline 
in US favourability and the rise in animosity and Islamic anxiety support the argument that 
aspects of US foreign policymaking under the Bush administration contributed at great length 
to America’s image problem after 2001 and the widespread distrust of US foreign 
policymaking over the course of a decade. The Bush administration’s foreign policy platform 
was driven by exceptionalism; to all intents and purposes, it set out to convince all Muslims 
of America’s superiority to any other nation by presenting an exceptionalist agenda to 
eradicate an extreme element within the Muslim world.  
As Howard Zinn points out, this tone was introduced through a body of US foreign 
policies which sought to enforce an idea of the US’s disregard during the global war on terror 
for such things as multilateral organisations and international laws, in order to reach its 
national security objectives.76 Take David Malone’s argument, for example, that after 9/11 
(with such organisations as the United Nations) “where US inspired norms have come to be 
broadly accepted at the international level – as is the case with norms concerning war crimes 
and human rights violations – the United Sates has not always been prepared to craft or 
support new doctrines binding of itself.”77 At this time, it was evident that the USG was 
                                                        
76 Howard Zinn, The Power and the Glory: Myth of American Exceptionalism [article online]; 
http://bostonreview.net/BR30.3/zinn.html; Internet, accessed 20 June 2009; see also Howard Zinn and 
Anthony Arnove, Terrorism and War (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002). 
77 David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong, Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy: 
International Perspectives (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 20. 
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unwilling to adhere to documents and treaties which would bind it to the rule of law and 
ensure that, if key players were to violate human rights (extraordinary rendition or torture), 
they would suffer criminal prosecution.78 
 
The fear that gripped the Bush administration after 9/11 was part of the reaction to 
protect America’s most fundamental ideals, including its luxuries and, above all, American 
“liberties” and “freedom”. By October 2002 the stage was set, and ensuring that US national 
security interest were met, Bush’s foreign policy included the caveat of American 
exceptionalism, which today has left the US in a compromised position in the Muslim world. 
Malone affirms that: 
Like the inhabitants of some other countries, Americans tend to view their own sovereignty as 
paramount, that of others as peripheral. Within its own hemisphere, certainly, the United 
States throughout its history has successfully asserted its sovereignty largely unchallenged 
while it also, through skilful norm-building during the twentieth century, helped to define the 
content of the sovereignty of others – without necessarily internalising norms it has expected 
others to adopt completely.79  
 
The risk of losing America’s “freedoms” to an emerging religio-political ideology 
fuelled its fierce need to contain the extreme elements within the Muslim world; it had to 
ensure that US foreign and national security interests were protected by whatever means 
necessary – whether legal or illegal under international law.80 In Bush’s view, to assure the 
protection of “America’s liberties”, lines would have to be crossed and longstanding 
favourable perceptions of the US would inevitably decline (which will, it could be argued, 
take years if not another decade to restore).                                                         
78 Steven Grey, Ghost Plane: The True Story of the CIA Torture Program (New York: St. 
Martin Press, 2006); see also Michael Moore, Fahrenheit 9/11 (Culver City, Calif: Columbia TriStar 
Home Entertainment, 2004). 
79 Malone and Khong, Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy: International Perspective, 20. 
80 See, Jay S. Bybee, Steven Bradbury, and John Anthony Rizzo, The Secret Torture Memos: 
Bush Administration Memos on Torture As Released by the United States Department of Justice, April 
16, 2009 (Rockville: Arc Manor, 2009). 
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Therefore, a unique perspective in this study, which invites a more extensive 
examination, relates first to Bush’s missed communication opportunity in his 20 September 
foreign policy address to a joint session of congress. More concisely, it relates to the 
administration’s disregard for the vast majority of Muslims, who were not at extreme odds 
with America. Clearly, the administration never outlined a strategy for effectively engaging 
and building relations with the majority of Muslims, compared with the attention given to 
combating terror. Efforts to communicate the US foreign policy message were geared toward 
employing public diplomacy in order to raise US favourability and nation-branding to market 
American values throughout the Muslim world by the State Department (between 2001 and 
2008). 
 
The focus of the administration’s approach was clearly not on building a basis of 
direct communicative relations with the majority of Muslims, but on improving its image 
while carrying out its pre-emptive military objectives. After 9/11, to implement this 
approach, the US Department of State (to the surprise of the Muslim world [according to the 
evidence]) reintroduced an already established programme of public diplomacy and nation-
branding with the purpose of improving relations by winning favourability, and thus 
containing the spread of terrorism throughout Muslim countries.  
 
Five months before 9/11, preparations to restore the US’s ailing image within the 
Muslim world had begun, under the direction of then Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 
Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, which promoted a recognisable nation-branding campaign 
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entitled Brand America.81 Powell’s objective was not only related to selling US foreign 
policy, as he later recalled, in “the old USIA way [but] branding foreign policy, marketing 
the department, and marketing American values to the world.”82 By late 2001, the above Pew 
findings indicated that the State Department faced a three-fold problem in raising US 
favourability ratings, which was linked to: i) intervention and containment leading to a 
growing distrust of the US; ii) the US’s position in the global war on terror; and iii) 
impressions of American political exceptionalism for the sake of its “freedom”, despite its 
preemptive actions and violations of international human rights.  
 
This three-way problem impels one to agree with Wolfe and Rosen’s study, Public 
Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve It (2004), which acknowledges that “America 
has an image problem. The problem is global [in that] even the leaders of some traditional 
American allies have found it convenient and politically advantageous to disparage America. 
[Thus] the problem is especially acute in the Middle East and among predominantly Muslim 
populations.”83 They add that it is based upon the historical background of American 
intervention and containment intended to foster a liberal-secular outlook in parts of the                                                         
81 Colin Powell, Diplomatic Readiness Initiative: The Human Resource Strategy [document 
online]; available from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13742.pdf; Internet, accessed 
March 2008. “Brand America” is often taken to mean a US foreign policy document or initiative 
employed by the Bush Administration after September 11. In principle, “Brand America” is a national 
marketing effort employed five months before September 11 by State Department officials (former 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Undersecretary Charlotte Beers) to address the image of the 
United States among foreign audiences and, more specifically, among Muslim audiences. Since this 
time, most marketing or public diplomacy campaigns which emphasise US values, foreign policy, or 
how best to raise the morale of the US abroad are often quoted by writers as efforts to “Brand 
America”. See Simon Anholt and Jeremy Hildreth, Brand America: The Mother of all Brands (United 
Kingdom: Cyan Books, 2004); Dick Martin, Rebuilding Brand America: What we Must Do to Restore 
our Reputation and Safeguard the Future of American Business Abroad (New York: AMACOM 
Books, 2007). 
82 Jami A. Fullerton and Alice Kendrick, Advertising's War on Terrorism: The Story of the US  
State Department's Shared Values Initiative (Spokane: Marquette Books, 2006), 14. 
83 Charles Wolfe, Jr. and Brian Rosen, “Public Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve 
It”, Occasional Paper-RAND Corporation (2004) [article online]; available from 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2004/RAND_OP134.pdf; Internet, accessed 22 March 
2008. 
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Middle East which has provoked animosity, driving down perceptions of the US to a degree 
which, today, warrants a search for a foreign policy of direct communication with Muslim 
audiences. Secretary Powell’s proposed marketing approach (which served as the central 
form of communication between the US and Muslim audiences after 9/11) was in effect not 
the correct approach for the US, given the shift in the religious and political climate 
throughout the Muslim world after the 1970s.84 Instead, what was needed to improve 
relations was direct engagement with Muslim audiences, even more so than with their 
governments – though their governments also deserve attention. 
 
Powell’s proposed approach proved deeply problematic and not nearly mindful 
enough of the reason for the low reputation of the US. As the Wolfe and Rosen study affirms, 
“It is fanciful to believe that redeploying American “marketing talent”, even when 
supplemented [for example] by the $62 million appropriated to launch a new Middle East 
television network, would significantly diminish the prevalence of anti-Americanism.”85 But 
this neither improved nor very much raised the country’s favourability. In this respect, what 
could have been the State Department’s reason for its cavalier approach? The 
straightforward answer lies with the Bush administration’s unwillingness to recognise 
publically the perspectives and aspirations of Muslims. This posture became manifest 
through unilateral behaviour cultivated by an American exceptionalism. In this special case, a 
US foreign policy agenda which projected stalwart militarism on a few, but would inevitably 
create intense anxiety among the many, could only be successful if an identity politic were 
established. By 2001, this would promote a new culture war to help the US reach its national                                                         
84 See William A. Rugh, American Encounters with Arabs: The "Soft Power" of US Public 
Diplomacy in the Middle East (Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006); see also Robert B. 
Satloff, The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on US Public Diplomacy in the Middle East 
(Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004). 
85 Wolfe and Rosen, 5. 
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security and foreign policy objectives.  
 
Initially, for the Bush administration, its foreign policy was established to protect US 
sovereignty and the security of Americans at home and abroad. After entering Afghanistan in 
2001 and realising the possibility of losing American sovereignty to non-state combatants, a 
foreign policy of American exceptionalism manifested itself in order to convince Muslim 
publics of America’s superiority. Unfortunately, this foreign policy of exceptionalism 
distorted US communications with the Muslim world, as it adopted commercial marketing 
tactics to raise US favourability. Instead of the USG creating an avenue to feed back into the 
US foreign policy discussion the aspirations and perspectives of Muslims and their various 
grassroots networks, America’s foreign policy of exceptionalism upstaged the other 
opportunities presented.  
 
In addition, this explains why historical attitudes towards America (due to its 
vacillating foreign policy of interchange and dominance) remained the same or dwindled 
further by 2001 in Muslim publics. This has also contributed to the many abstract views of 
the Muslim world by USG officials. In moving to a more assertive understanding of this 
argument, let us observe how a foreign policy of American exceptionalism transpiring under 
the Bush administration became an exceptional issue of identity politics. This manoeuvring 
would go on to block US-Muslim world communicative interchange by promoting the 
academic confrontationalist agenda that Islamic society needed to reform. This academic 
position is best understood through Mary Kaldor’s reading of “new wars” and the way in 
which identity politics examined through both confrontationalism and Islamic 
fundamentalism shaped the Bush administration’s foreign policy agenda. 
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1.3. Playing identity politics: From Lewis to Islamic fundamentalism  
 
Mary Kaldor, of the London School of Economics, saw “new wars” first emerging in 
the latter part of the twentieth century grow out of the disunification of the Soviet bloc in 
Eastern Europe and appear even in former West and Central Africa.86 These “new wars” 
would especially emerge out of an erosion of the “autonomy of the state and in some extreme 
cases, the disintegration of the state” caused by activities related to hostile factions and 
corrupt regimes.87 A rise in global technology brought closer the effects of these wars on 
innocent civilians, exposing human rights violations and even mass killings based on 
ethnicity, as seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and Sri Lanka.88 An international playing 
field overrun with “new wars”, often comprising new players who were mostly hostile in 
character, as well as those recognised as neutral, converged on it from different arenas (i.e. 
NGOs, multilateral bodies and international security agencies).  
 
                                                        
86 Kaldor’s findings lead her to argue that “during the 1980s and 1990s, a new type of 
organised violence has developed, especially in Africa and Eastern Europe, which is one aspect of the 
current globalised era.” Kaldor’s approach makes a distinction between old wars (or traditional wars) 
and new wars. Old wars are recognised as war with a central goal of seizing territory or advancing a 
nation-state’s objectives. They are wars funded by the state with funds collected from citizen taxation 
or through transparent borrowing from allies to fund its war campaign. Its purposes of engaging in 
war are “linked to a notion of state interest or to some forward-looking project – ideas about how 
society should be organised.” In contrast, Kaldor asserts that “new wars” must be understood in a 
context related to the process of globalisation. Thus, a rise in globalisation has brought about a rise in 
technology and an “intensification of global interconnectedness” which summarily aids the 
transportation of new ideals (or what the RAND study “Exploring Religious Conflict” regards as new 
religious movements – making these new activities transnational, en vogue and wide spread). Mary 
Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (California: Stanford UP, 1999), 1; 
see also Peter J. Hoffman and Thomas George Weiss, ed. Sword & Salve: Confronting New Wars and 
Humanitarian Crises (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Gregory F. Treverton, Heather S. 
Gregg, Daniel K. Gibran, et. al, Exploring Religious Conflict (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005). 
87 Kaldor, New & Old Wars, 4; see also Paul Gilbert, New Terror, New Wars (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown UP, 2003). 
88 See Alex J.Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin. Understanding Peacekeeping 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). 
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Alongside this erosion and failure of the state has emerged what Kaldor identifies as a 
level of “organised violence” led by a criminal element comprised of non-state actors who 
generally contribute to the localised, low-intensity conflicts (i.e. guerrilla warfare or 
terrorism) most common today. Remarking on these “new wars”, Kaldor asserts that: 
 
In situations in which state revenues decline because of the economy as well as the spread of 
criminality, corruption and inefficiency, violence is increasingly privatised both as a result of 
growing organised crime and the emergence of paramilitary groups, and political legitimacy 
is disappearing. Thus the distinctions between external barbarity and domestic civility, 
between the combatant as the legitimate bearer of arms and the non-combatant, between the 
soldier or policeman and the criminal, are breaking down.89 
 
But, in comprehending where this violence originates and what exactly contributes to 
its motivation, we must examine its relationship to ideology. In contrast to the geopolitical 
(or ideological) goals of old wars, the forces in new wars base their “claim to power on the 
basis of a particular identity – be it national, clan, religious or linguistic”, picking up strength 
by weaving a transnational thread and creating networks to spread its extreme ideologies.90 
Its motivation is often noted as being disbursed by these new players within a hostile 
environment, but is not limited to this community alone, and is named by Kaldor as “identity                                                         
89 Kaldor, 5. Unlike old wars, these new types of conflicts have a new player who is often 
recognised as hostile in character and who has caused a rise in casualties in recent years. Old wars 
were sponsored entirely by the state through the taxation of its citizens and involved 
professional/mass military forces which most often fought an opposing military (thus maintaining low 
civilian casualties). Today, hostile players in the shape of non-state combatants are also characterised 
“as paramilitary units, local war lords, criminal gangs, police forces, mercenary groups and also 
regular armies including breakaway units of regular armies”, Ibid. 8. Her findings suggest that “80% 
of victims in the current new wars are civilians, whereas roughly 80% of casualties in old wars during 
the twentieth century were military casualties.” In this respect, a dynamic shift has changed the nature 
of warfare and the aims of the international community to address this new type of organised 
violence. “The pattern of violence in the new type of warfare is confirmed by the statistics of the new 
wars. The tendency to avoid battle and to direct most violence against civilians is evidenced by the 
dramatic increase in the ratio of civilian to military causalities. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, 85-90 per cent of causalities in war were military. In World War II, approximately half of all 
war deaths were civilian. By the late 1990s, the proportions of a hundred years ago have been almost 
exactly reversed, so that nowadays approximately 80 percent of all causalities in wars are civilian.” 
Kaldor, 100; see also, Barry S. Levy and Victor W. Sidel. War and Public Health (Oxford: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2008). 
90 Kaldor, New and Old Wars, 6. 
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politics”. Therefore, over the last decade this type of motivation to meet US national security 
objectives spread well into US political thought and influenced US foreign policymaking 
under the Bush administration. As Kaldor stated: 
 
The new identity politics is about the claim to power on the basis of labels – in so far as there 
are ideas about political or social change, they tend to relate to an idealised nostalgic 
representation of the past. It is often claimed that the new war of identity politics is more a 
throwback to the past, a resurgence of ancient hatred kept under control by colonialism and/or 
the Cold War. While it is true that the narratives of identity politics depend on memory and 
tradition, it is also the case that these are “reinvented” in the context of the failure or the 
corrosion of other sources of political legitimacy – the discrediting of socialism or the nation-
building rhetoric of the first generation of post-colonial leaders.91 
 
Bush’s American foreign policy of exceptionalism inscribed into the international debate a 
set of identity politics that physically set apart the idea of America from that of the Muslim 
world. This inevitably contributed to confrontationalist behaviour and a distortion in US-
Muslim world communicative relations, making way for a broader tension. Kaldor’s 
examination better identifies the motivation and rationale behind the USG’s position toward 
the Muslim world and how an extreme element within the Muslim world reacted to US 
foreign policy by employing aspects of its own set of identity politics – namely Islamic 
fundamentalism – with regards to its encounter with US confrontationalist political 
behaviour.  
   
 
 
 
 
                                                         
91 Ibid., 7. 
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1.3.1. Confrontationalism 
 
Though confrontationalism did not start with the Bush administration, it was given an 
academic grounding both in discourse and in theory in purported application by such 
academics as Daniel Pipes92, Giles Kepel93 and, most notably, Bernard Lewis94. Their 
collective arguments on confrontationalism suggest that, in terms of the unique tension over 
the West’s (or the US in our case) engagement with Islam, “liberal democracy is compatible 
neither with Islamic fundamentalism nor Islam itself.”95 For this reason, in order for US 
liberal secular policy to be effective within the Muslim world, Islam is recommended to 
reform so that the USG can secure its national security and foreign policy interests. In 
understanding these influential actors in US political thought, Fawaz A. Gerges identifies that 
“confrontationalists contend further that the struggle between Islam and the West is not just 
about material and political interest; it is a clash of cultures and civilisations… In this 
context, they draw a parallel between the Communist threat and Islam’s: like Communism, 
Islamic resurgence is not only a proselytising ideology but also revisionist.” It is, according 
to Daniel Pipes, “a militant, atavistic force driven by hatred of Western political thought, 
harking back to age-old grievances against Christendom.” In the words of Mortimer 
Zuckerman, “We are in the front line of a struggle that goes back hundreds of years, the 
                                                        
92 Daniel Pipes is an American academic who has held posts at the University of Chicago, 
Harvard and Pepperdine University. His research focuses primarily on the Middle East and Islam. See 
Daniel Pipes [webpage]; available from http://www.danielpipes.org; Internet, 18 November 2009.  
93 Giles Kepel is a French political analyst. He currently holds an academic post at the 
London School of Economics in diplomacy and strategy. 
94 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, The Atlantic (September 1990) [article 
online]; available from http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199009/muslim-rage; Internet, accessed 20 
August 2008.  
95 Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), 21-22. 
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principal obstacle to the extremists’ desire to drive nefarious Western values into the sea, just 
as they once did with the Crusaders.”96  
 
This confrontationalists’ world view and identity politics which influenced Bush 
foreign policymaking toward the Muslim world is largely that of the Princeton University 
historian of Middle Eastern studies, Bernard Lewis. Lewis’s perspective indicates that aspects 
of Islam are inherently problematic to Western democracy and its Judeo-Christian heritage. 
This narrow vision, which, after 2001, became instrumental in shaping American foreign 
policy, was expressed through Bush’s narrow focus on those Muslims “that hate us”. They 
were held to be ready to lead an inevitable clash of civilisations, which would and must be 
addressed through pre-emptive military action.97 Lewis indicated this position first in an 
essay in The Atlantic (September 1990) entitled “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, suggesting 
that the anger of Muslims derives from hidden tension within Islamic society over secularism 
(as opposed to its open rejection of the history of American intervention and containment 
within the region). For Lewis and other confrontationalists, American foreign policy in itself 
neither created the atmosphere nor supplied the ammunition for the rage unfolding at 
present.98 In fact, Lewis’s implausible Atlantic argument posits that it is the selfish reaction 
of Islamic society to America’s relationship with Israel, and America’s extended relations 
with Europe that foments this anti-Americanism. Lewis asserts:  
 
If we turn from the general to the specific, there is no lack of individual policies and actions, 
pursued and taken by individual Western governments, that have aroused the passionate anger 
of Middle Eastern and other Islamic peoples. Yet all too often, when these policies are 
abandoned and the problems resolved, there is only a local and temporary alleviation. The                                                         
96Ibid., 24.   
97See Richard Bonney, False Prophets: The 'Clash of Civilizations' and the Global War on 
Terror (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008). 
98 This point is reintroduced in 2003 in Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy 
Terror (New York: Modern Library, 2003). 
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French have left Algeria, the British have left Egypt, the Western oil companies have left 
their oil wells, the westernising Shah has left Iran – yet the generalised resentment [of 
fundamentalists] in particular against the West remains and grows and is not appeased. 
Clearly something deeper is involved than these specific grievances, numerous and important 
as they may be – something deeper that turns every disagreement into a problem and makes 
every problem insoluble.99 
 
Shifting the blame for the tension to Islamic society, Lewis argues that Islamic 
fundamentalism is responsible and that a reform of Islam’s core beliefs must occur, rather 
than a shift in US foreign policymaking and its view of religion in the Muslim world.100 
 
This tension often emerges out of an ongoing debate on both sides between American 
exceptionalism and Islamic fundamentalism, where exceptionalism is often held up as 
universal. For example, this was the case in the Bush administration’s foreign policy.  
American exceptionalism holds the position that it is distinct, that its unique value system has 
not occurred in another country, and that it offers an exceptional framework distinctive to the 
United States. In contrast, some hardcore supporters of Islam defend the idea that their 
religion may be held as exceptional in that it promotes universal values and ideals that lead to 
a better way of life. In this standoff, a distinct tension forms between American 
exceptionalism and hard-line Islamic fundamentalists. Generally, this is why there is one side 
that challenges the other to embrace reform. Between 2001 and 2008, Lewis’s academic 
                                                        
99 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, The Atlantic (September 1990) [article 
online]; available from http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199009/muslim-rage; Internet, accessed 20 
August 2008.  
100 Lewis further states that “Ultimately, the struggle of the fundamentalists is against two 
enemies, secularism and modernism. The war against secularism is conscious and explicit, and there 
is by now a whole literature denouncing secularism as an evil neo-pagan force in the modern world 
and attributing it variously to the Jews, the West, and the United States… [Hence] It should by now 
be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies 
and the governments that pursue them… This is no less than a clash of civilisations – the perhaps 
irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our 
secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.” Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, 
The Atlantic (September 1990) [article online]; available from 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199009/muslim-rage; Internet, accessed 20 August 2008.  
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confrontationalist argument would go on to influence USG foreign policymaking, convincing 
US officials to advocate that Muslim publics embrace such reform.  
 
 Pakistani scholar Fuad Naeem of Duke University expresses his dismay at views 
presented by such confrontationalists as Lewis and Pipes (and even Salman Rushdie), who 
propose that if the religion of Islam and Islamic society are to flourish and be respected as a 
political-religious system in the present age, reform is inevitable.101 Scholars such as Naeem 
have countered this by asking, “Why should Islam reform itself in order to meet Western 
standards?”. While Naeem’s work adopts a traditional Islamic perspective, he, along with 
such thinkers as Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanwi102, believes that if reform is needed, more 
emphasis should be given to restoring the intellectual, moral and truth-related facets of Islam 
to Islamic society and less to reforming Islam’s fundamentalist principles and political and 
religious ideals for the sake of better Islamic-Western relations.103 Naeem makes it clear that 
those adopting such a perspective are the first to suggest that Islam must first help itself, 
before bending to the will of the West. 
 
These identity politics of confrontationalism from Lewis and other Americans 
evidently shaped the US’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world and its expectations of 
                                                        
101 Fuad S. Naeem, “A Traditional Islamic Response to the Rise of Modernism, in Islam”, 
Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition by Joseph E.B. Lumbard (Bloomington: World 
Wisdom 2004), 82; see also Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses (New York: Viking, 1988). 
102 See Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanwi, Answer to Modernism, trans. Muhammad Hasan Askari 
and Karrar Husain (Karachi: Maktaba Darululoom, 1976; reprint, Delhi, 1981). 
103 Naeem affirms, “Islam’s traditional understanding of itself as a message of salvation that 
affirms the primacy of God, and seeks to awaken men and women to their true spiritual nature and 
make possible the actualisation of their God-given possibilities, stands in stark contrast to an 
anthropocentric, rationalistic, and materialistic framework which relegates the sacred to the private 
sphere – the very framework that determines much of modern Western civilisation. This is why Islam 
does not need to be reformed or modernised; it already contains within itself the principles necessary 
for renewal from within. These principles provide the discernment to both integrate truth wherever it 
is found and to reject falsehood decisively,” Naeem, 82-83. 
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how Muslims should approach political decisions which affect US foreign and national 
security interests. Clearly, Lewis’s approach of blaming the religion of Islam itself influenced 
the Bush administration, with the result that US foreign policy excluded the religio-political 
voice on the basis of Western perceptions of Islamic fundamentalism and aspects of its 
extreme behaviour toward the US and its European allies. Truly, religion within the umma 
(Islamic society) is interconnected and centralised, spanning every level of society and 
binding communal, social, political and economic relations. Efforts to remove (or desacrilise) 
religion from the umma in order to suit Western foreign interests – as in the case of the USG 
liberal secular foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq – have, in the end, aroused 
uniform hostility from the many players within the umma who oppose it. In this event, the 
challenge for US political actors may in fact be that of grasping that Islamic fundamentalism 
is, on the whole, not entirely problematic, but contains a particularly troublesome strand 
exploited by religious extremists, which as well has called for America’s reform. 
  
1.3.2. Islamic fundamentalism 
 
What is problematic at this stage is the fact that Islamic fundamentalism, on the 
whole, is recognised not as legitimate by Western political sources, but as an extreme 
ideology in contradiction to Western interests (i.e. liberal secular democracy).104  
Confrontationalists such as Lewis and some US political officials are reluctant to recognise 
that it is a strand of the traditional voice of Islam that is, today, exploited by Islamic 
extremists who have transcended traditional principles into unforeseeable identity politics. 
This point may well explain the reluctance by the Bush administration to engage at the outset 
the core of Islamic society and the traditional voice of Islam (as Naeem indicates) in both                                                         
104 See Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: 
Columbia UP, 2007). 
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Afghanistan and Iraq – and even throughout the Muslim world during its public diplomacy 
campaign to connect with Muslims – due to Western perceptions of Islam within the public 
sphere.105 Whether or not Western political researchers accept aspects of Islamic 
fundamentalism as a genuine source which may or may not aid their foreign interests, I argue 
that it is a critical variable (though interpreted as an aiding form of identity politics for those 
Muslims at odds with America), which at some point must be taken on board and addressed 
respectfully by secular players.   
 
Harvard University law professor Noah Feldman aids this assessment, affirming that 
the standard view of scholars/experts in and outside of the Muslim world that the “classical 
Islamic state had failed” were misguided.106 With a rise in modernisation came the belief that 
in the Western world religion and its influence on society would decline. Surprisingly, “new 
religious movements” relating to political Islam emerged, and were conspicuous throughout 
the Muslim nations and well into the Western world. At present, standing on opposite sides 
are two differing positions relating to the motivation behind Islamic fundamentalism, each 
linked to a different interpretation of Islamic law and the way in which it should be 
implemented both within society and among those outside the umma.  
 
This distinction is made in connection with the idea of Islamist Sharia and Islamic 
Sharia and the quest of both to assure justice within the umma and between Muslims and the 
rest of the world. Feldman points out that “Islam, according to this view, is the thing that 
makes Islamism into a distinctive approach to the reform of government and society. It is the 
engine meant to restore Muslim societies to world prominence and power. When called upon                                                         
105 Sean Hannity, Deliver Us from Evil: Defeating Terrorism, Despotism, and Liberalism 
(New York: Regan Books, 2004). 
106 Noah Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2008), 19. 
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to define the Islamic character of the state as they envision it, Islamists typically say that what 
makes the state Islamic is that it is governed through Islamic law and Islamic values.”107 This 
point is particularly important to US-Muslim world engagement, in the sense that it opens up 
a possible treatment when engaging Muslims on common ground. Moreover, it is clear about 
the true intention of Islamic extremists toward those outside Islamic society, in implementing 
what it sees as the rule of law within its society. 
 
In considering the meaning behind Islamic fundamentalism, let us consider the 
position of Youseff Choueiri, for example. What is referred to as the “extremist strand” of 
Islamic fundamentalism is recognised here as an extreme religious ideology with political 
claims that are based on traditional Islamic doctrines rooted in a direct rejection of Western 
political influence and aspects of Western secularism within Islamic society.108 Choueiri 
affirms that this growing revivalist movement is not a new response directed at the pro-
Western alliance in Europe or predominantly secularist countries, but a conventional 
response to regain what Islamic society sees as a loss of identity, values, traditional customs 
and religious authenticity, due in part to the West’s preoccupation with its foreign interests in 
the Muslim world.109 Or, if we acknowledge Lawrence Davidson’s position regarding                                                         
107 Ibid., 111. 
108 Youssef M Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990); South 
Asia, for example, is recognised here as a developing concern. Home to the largest concentration of 
Muslims on earth, it presents new implications for US foreign interests abroad. In South Asia alone 
(including Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal) there are 1.5 billion 
Muslims who in the last decade have reacted to the direction of US foreign policies in their region and 
more widely to policies directed at its neighbouring region, the Middle East – notably, at Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Palestine and Syria. US foreign policies directed at this region have sent a pulse throughout 
Muslim Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, as far as Russia’s growing Islamic fundamentalist 
movement (attracting tension between Chechnyian Muslims, Russian nationalists and Orthodox 
Christians). See Dmitry Shlapentokh, The Spread of Islamic Fundamentalism in Russia [article 
online]; available from http://www.watchdog.cz/?show=000000-000004-000002-000029&lang=1; 
Internet, accessed 20 August 2008. See also Jere Van Dyk, “Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia”, 
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Ft. Belvoir Defense Technical Information Centre (July 
19, 2007). 
109 Youssef M Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990). 
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Napoleon’s fixation with the Middle East and France’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, the 
response to Westernisation and Western secular influence has been unfavourable and linked 
to historical agitation since the onset of Western imperialism in the Middle East. 110 
 
Despite the recent surge in military activity in both Afghanistan and Iraq, on the 
whole the USG has had trouble in the past in addressing the central motivator behind these 
“new wars” in South Asia and parts of the Middle East. This study argues that a body of 
inconsistent American foreign policy instigates the core causes of these events, vacillating 
between interchange and dominance. Trying to suppress these “new wars” under the Bush 
administration with western allied sponsored military action (and nation-branding) proved 
impossible, because of the USG’s unwillingness to broaden its foreign policy reach to 
directly engage the aspirations and perspectives of Islamic fundamentalists in its foreign 
policy discourse. Naeem’s description is on par, as he suggests that “attempting to correct 
accidents without addressing their core causes is akin to treating symptoms without treating 
the internal disease that produces them… Such analyses stop at the most superficial aspect of 
the problem and do not penetrate to the roots of either modern Western civilisation or Islam, 
nor of the various political and social reformist and revivalist movements labelled 
‘fundamentalist’”.111   
                                                        
110 See Lawrence Davidson, Islamic Fundamentalism: An Introduction (Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 2003), 10. 
111 Fuad S. Naeem, “A Traditional Islamic Response to the Rise of Modernism”, Islam 
Fundamentalism and the Betrayal of Tradition: Essays by Western Muslim Scholars, Joseph B. 
Lumbard, ed. (Indiana: World Wisdom, 2005), 79. Evidence proves that the rise in Western secular 
influence brought by Western colonialism, nineteenth and twentieth century oil interests and present 
US foreign policy in the Middle Eastern and South Asian regions contributed to a rise in 
fundamentalist movements, putting Islamic societies (as some would argue) on the defensive to 
maintain their traditional customs and posture. As Davidson contends, a quest to maintain this 
protective posture has also strained the voice and relations between, for example, rising Islamic 
modernists (the intelligentsia) and traditional religious leadership in Islamic societies (the ulama). The 
end (as in the case of Afghanistan with the Taliban) and throughout parts of the Muslim world, has 
been a constant failure to maintain a level of peace between religious sects, worsened by reforming 
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To comprehend the fundamentalists’ rationale to employ Islamic fundamentalism as a 
form of identity politics, let us turn to Davidson’s description of their universal beliefs. The 
justification behind their actions includes the following four points:112 
  
Table 4 
Common Assumptions Shared by Most Islamic Fundamentalists 
  
Consequently, this brand of Islamic fundamentalism as a type of identity politics 
emerges not as a collective belief or practice by all Muslims, but comes from a small 
minority within Islamic society – those who interpret the Muslim world’s decline in Islamic 
values as brought about by the West. Akbar Ahmed expresses, in Islam Under Siege, that the 
rise in this brand of Islamic fundamentalism by non-state combatants in most cases emerges 
out of a breakdown in Islamic society and its social cohesion (asabiyya), as described by the 
noted Islamic scholar, Ibn Khaldun.113 The asabiyya, which provides a central interconnected 
support system of social cohesion within Islamic society, according to Ahmed, has 
                                                        
ideologies and contradictory political beliefs about the role and influence of the West in Islamic 
society.  
112Lawrence Davidson, Islamic Fundamentalism: An Introduction (Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 2003), 12-13. 
113 Akbar S. Ahmed, Islam Under Siege (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), 78. 
1) The Muslim world is in a state of disorder brought on by centuries of political and moral decay. 
 
2) This decay was possibly caused by Western intrusion which, to all intents and purposes, infected 
the Muslim world with an alien set of immoral, secularist values and behaviours based on the 
defining concepts of materialism and (in terms of politics) nationalism. 
 
3) In order to combat this perceived decay and infection, the Muslim world must be re-Islamised.  
4) The only way to re-Islamise society is to re-politicise Islam itself. As fundamentalist reasoning 
goes, Islam began as a religion which preached the rejection of false gods and corrupt practices. 
The West and Westernisers now represent these evils…This, in turn will inevitably lead to the 
solving of the problems of corruption and spiritual vacuousness which now seem to pervade 
society.  
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succumbed to dishonour and fragmentation under Western secular influence – thus 
explaining why non-state actors embracing this programme have invested in “new wars”. 
Akbar affirms that “the dangerously ambiguous notion of honour – and the ever-more 
dangerous ideas of the loss of honour – propel men to violence. Simply put, global 
developments have robbed many people of honour, [whereas] rapid global changes are 
shaking the structures of traditional societies.”114 In an effort to regain what was lost, hyper-
asabiyya, as described by Khaldun (“exaggerated tribal and religious loyalties resulting in 
extreme cohesion” i.e., terrorist cells such as Al Qaeda, which contribute to “new wars”), 
emerge in a sudden effort to restore what was lost under Western secular influence and its 
foreign interests in the Muslim world. 115 
 
Ahmed handles the emergence of this central motivation and where it arrives from 
clearly. It seemed that in 2001 the Bush administration pitted itself in an historical struggle 
transcending history, borders, policies and a breakdown not only in communication between 
the US and the Muslim world, but in the fabric of social cohesion within the umma. The 
question arises here as to whether those practising Islamic fundamentalism must change 
their traditional posture and ideals in order that engagement between the US and the Muslim 
world might occur? No: what is required is a type of social democracy that connects political                                                         
114 Ibid., 14-15. 
115 In this sense, J.G. Jansen contends that Islamic fundamentalism becomes its own 
religion within itself, with its own religious imagination, religious dream and theology, calling forth 
non-state actors to embrace a religio-political ideology of social emancipation. In both the 
imaginative and religious dream world of Islamic fundamentalism, the principal concern, as 
expressed in the Iranian revolution of 1979, is to oppose (or unravel, by any means available) the 
present political system, which is tainted by Western political and social ideals by basing one’s 
actions on an ideology rooted in religious ideals. Its aim, in consequence, is to pointlessly replace 
this system by a subversive one which is, as Jansen states, “in imitation of the secular regimes… 
The different fundamentalist movements the very power which the governments they oppose 
exercise: total power, complete power, supreme power, over anyone or anything that even 
contemplates resisting them,” Johannes J.G. Jansen G, The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism 
(Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997), 2. 
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and religious ideals within a special arena for the purpose of improving sacred-secular 
relations in this era. US foreign policy, at some level, must address – or at least indicate – its 
knowledge of these underlying tensions in order to restore or revive future relations. Naeem 
is correct in asserting that the most appropriate treatment for addressing the core of this 
problem begins with the USG looking into its policies and with Islamic society looking 
within itself to ensure stability.  
 
Both sides used identity politics before 2001. US policymakers under the Bush 
administration, however, crafted their foreign policy out of the confrontationalist argument 
used by Lewis and others that, in order to eradicate the proselytising ideology of Islamic 
extremism, military action must be implemented in an effort to halt an inevitable clash of 
civilisations between the US and the Muslim world. In this case, the US did not blame itself 
for the vehemence of the Islamic reaction, or imagine that the growing tension came from the 
dismay among Islamic extremists over secularism and America’s alliance with Europe and 
Israel. At the same time, an extreme few within the Muslim world (at odds with America) 
would interpret the problem as being related to a perceived decay of Islamic values brought 
on by fifty years of Western intrusion and inconsistent American foreign policy.  
Furthermore, in the view of this minority segment, the only way of addressing this decay 
would be to use the identity politics involved in re-Islamising the Muslim world. While 
opinions on both sides of the court still differ, colouring the last decade has been a body of 
miscommunication distorting favourable perceptions and the potential of future relations.  
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1.4. Conclusion 
 
Despite the rapid growth in levels of hostility between the US and Muslim world after 
September 11, 2001, the Bush administration’s principle approach was a three-fold fixation 
which interpreted the religion of Islam as being the problem itself, with Islamic 
fundamentalism as the source and the Islamic militant as the extreme combatant. Such a 
narrow view explains why the administration adopted a shallow approach to engaging the 
Muslim world; an approach that did not offer equal attention to the vast majority along with 
its minority segment. This study acknowledges that two essential points are evident. First, 
based on the Bush administration’s hesitation to engage the vast majority of the Muslim 
world, the USG, at present, has no alternative other than to move beyond its division of the 
sacred and secular in American politics. This in turn means welcoming a more integrated 
approach that ensures communicative interchange to assure that the perspectives and 
aspirations of key players and grassroots’ networks are included in the overall foreign policy 
discourse. This will call for the USG taking seriously the religious voice, as Princeton 
University Professor of Religion Jeffrey Stout writes:  
  
[The USG will need to] encourage religiously committed citizens to make use of their basic 
freedoms by expressing their premises in as much depth and detail as they see fit when 
trading reasons with the rest of us on issues of concern to the body politic. If they are 
discouraged from speaking up in this way, we will remain ignorant of the real reason that 
many of our fellow citizens have for reaching some of the ethic and political conclusions they 
do.116 
 
Secondly, in order to put this point into practice, the USG needs to take seriously the 
task of defining a strategy that deals with concrete post-secular issues which convenes (or 
                                                        
116 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 64. 
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rather transcends) the voices of both sacred and secular players in the public sphere. In order 
to accomplish this goal, the USG must a) better comprehend vital aspects within Islamic 
society by depending more on its diplomatic infrastructure, b) build more direct relations 
with Muslim audiences, in doing so, which pay due heed to the traditional voice of Islam; and 
c) restore relations at a grassroots level which build on mutual understanding and mutual 
interest, extending the voice of key religious players within Islamic society. This indicates 
that the voices and perspectives of both the sacred and secular are not exclusive of one 
another, but are interlinked. This broad approach then opens up the possibility of improving 
US-Muslim world relations by benefitting from what the post-secular might offer, as opposed 
to displaying an unreasonable level of scepticism towards it. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Transcending the post-secular 
 
2.1. Introduction: Confronting post-secularism 
 
Both US domestic and foreign relations shifted over the last decade from fields solely 
dominated by a Western-centred focus to areas currently confronted by an unsuspected rise in 
religious concern in public life. This re-emergence of religion contributes to what sociologists 
and public intellectuals have termed post-secularism.117 Over the last half-century many 
scholars have written of post-secularism as the re-emergence of religious practices in public 
life.118 This study broadens this description and identifies the activity of post-secular trends 
as being twofold: the re-emergence of religion in public life creating a unique tension 
                                                        
117 See Jürgen Habermas, Notes on a Post-Secular Society (June 2008) [article online]; 
available from http://print.signandsight.com/features/1714.html; Internet, accessed 2008; Jürgen 
Habermas, “A “Post-Secular” Society – What Does That Mean?” (June 2008), Reset Dialogues on 
Civilization [article online]; available from http://www.resetdoc.org/EN/Habermas-Istanbul.php; 
Internet, accessed 20 2008; John D. Caputo, “How the Secular World Became Post-Secular”, On 
Religion (London: Routledge, 2001), 37-66; Troy Dostert, Beyond Political Liberalism: Toward a 
Post-Secular Ethics of Public Life (Notre Dame, Notre Dame Univ. Press, 2006); Austin Dacey, The 
Secular Conscience: Why Belief Belongs in Public Life (New York: Prometheus Books, 2008); Roger 
Trigg, Religion in Public Life: Must Faith be Privatized (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007).  
118 Ananda Abeyeskara, “Politics of ‘Postsecular’ Ethics, Future of Anti-genealogy: 
Community without Community?”, The Politics of Postsecular Religion: Mourning Secular Futures 
(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2008), 227-278; Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard Univ., 2007); Alan Aldridge, Religion in the Contemporary World: A 
Sociological Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); James K.A. Smith, Introducing Radical 
Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology (Michigan: Baker Academic, 2004); Hent de Vries and 
Lawrence E. Sullivan, Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-secular World (New York: 
Fordham Univ. Press); John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason 
(Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing, 1991); Phillip Blond, Post-secular Philosophy: Between 
Philosophy and Theology (London: Routledge, 1998), 137-176; Joseph Ratzinger and Jurgen 
Habermas, The Dialectic of Secularization: On Reason and Religion (San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 
2006). 
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between sacred and secular players within the state; and a rise in domestic and international 
events directly linked to religion.119 
 
Though the USG is confronted by post-secularism, is it possible that US secular 
players are capable of integrating the religious voice into a productive framework? While 
addressing this query, let us broaden this examination by appraising the post-secular’s 
international appeal within sacred-secular relations. As Klaus Eder, the German sociologist, 
puts it, “though Western societies are secular, more citizens today are discussing religious 
issues in the public sphere.”120 This shift, in effect, contributed to a growing religious 
discourse throughout modern European society, on the one hand and, on the other, put on the 
defensive proposed US foreign policies seeking to address religious themes.121 
Acknowledging this claim, critical theorist Jürgen Habermas  maintains that a “post-secular 
society must at some point have been in a secular state. The controversial term can therefore 
only be applied to the affluent societies of Europe or countries such as Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, where people’s religious ties have steadily or rather quite dramatically lapsed 
in the post-War period.”122                                                          
119 While Chapter 2 investigates the philosophical and political understanding of post-
secularism (which argues for the inclusion of non-secular voices in the public sphere), this term is 
applied more descriptively throughout the course of this study (characterising the imperative of US 
officials to take religious violence seriously and engage religious voices in foreign affairs). 
120 Giancarlo Bosetti and Klaus Eder, Post-secularism: A Return to the Public Sphere 
[interview online]; available from http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-08-17-eder-en.html; 
Internet, accessed 20 October 2008. See also Klaus Eder and W. Spohn, eds. Collective Memory and 
European Identity: The Effects of Integration and Enlargement (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).  
121 In October 2008, criticism was levied upon US Army General David Petraeus’ suggestion 
that the USG should consider, at some point, talks with certain members of the Afghan Taliban to 
curb aggression and conflict within the region. Staunch defenders of the War on Terror suggest that 
talks with the religious faction should not be pursued despite the general’s recommendation. See 
Robert Naiman, General Petraeus: Talks with the Taliban are Kosher [article online]; available from 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-naiman/general-petraeus-talks-wi_b_133503.html; Internet, 
accessed 20 October 2008; David Morgan, Petraeus sees value in talking to Taliban, [article online] 
available from http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE497AIT20081008; Internet, 
accessed 20 October 2008.  
122 Habermas, Notes on a post-secular society, 1. 
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According to the Norris and Inglehart survey of religious behaviour, which covered 
nearly eighty countries in order to determine the impact of the secularisation thesis123, the 
United States, Italy and Ireland, among the Western countries mentioned, lead as the most 
religious post-industrial countries in the world.124 Predictably, the research also reveals that 
France, Denmark and Great Britain as less religious.125 Despite a country’s religious status, 
the fact remains that, after September 11, most Western nations’ domestic and foreign 
policies confronted emerging events linked to the post-secular either at home or abroad. 
Though religious ties in the US have remained consistent over the last century, as with its 
Western counterparts throughout Europe, the US has not been exempt from confronting 
international events linked to religion.126  
 
Interestingly, what is apparent, but often less explored by writers on post-secularism, 
is the fact that non Judeo-Christian faiths, their practices and multi-ethnic publics in 
traditional Western settings, have become more pronounced and clearly alarming to Western 
                                                        
123 The secularisation thesis is the core assertion held by post-Enlightenment thinkers during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that a rise in science, technology and urbanisation would bring 
about a decline in the practise and importance of religion in society. This study identified that the 
opposite has occurred in many urbanised Western societies. The fact is that the practise of Christianity 
has declined in some settings, but on the whole, non Judeo-Christian practises have risen 
tremendously within these Western settings. See Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and 
Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004); Paul Choi, 
Revisiting the Secularization Thesis: an historical and sociological analysis (M.A. Thesis, Boston 
University, 2002); Steve Bruce, Religion and Modernization: sociologists and historians debate the 
secularization thesis (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1992). 
124Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, “The Puzzle of Secularization in the United States and 
Western Euorope”, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2004), 83-110. 
125 Ibid., 85. 
126 Norris and Inglehart claim that the reasons for these findings are linked to “rising levels of 
human security and [the fact] that publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been 
moving toward more secular orientations; second, due to demographic trends in poorer societies, the 
world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before and; third, the 
expanding gap between the sacred and the secular societies around the globe will have important 
consequences for world politics, raising the role of religion on the international agenda.” Ibid., 25-26. 
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observers who do not know how to address the new phenomenon and its growth.127 
According to a number of global studies, the practice of Christianity is declining in many 
post-industrial countries in the West (with the exception of the US) and is being replaced 
either by secularity or New Age spirituality, whereas non Judeo-Christian faith practices are 
rising, both in their countries of origin and in Western societies (such as Great Britain, France 
and the Netherlands).128 “Nevertheless, global changes and the visible conflicts that flare up 
in connection with religious issues give us reason to doubt whether the relevance of religion 
has waned.”129 Assertions such as C. Wright Mills’s statement that, “in due course, the sacred 
shall disappear altogether except, possibly in the private realm,” and the allied beliefs held by 
seminal thinkers such as Emile Durkheim, Herbert Spencer, August Comte, Max Weber, Karl 
Marx and Sigmund Freud “that religion would gradually fade in importance and cease to be 
significant with the advent of industrial society”130, were not correct. This prediction, 
however, was only made in some Western Christian societies and the fact that concurrently 
                                                        
127 See Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2005); Steven Vertovec, “Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain”, Muslims in the 
West: From Sojourners to Citizens, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (Oxford: Oxford Univesity, 2002), 
19-35; Shireen T. Hunter, Islam, Europe’s Second Religion: The New Social, and Political Landscape 
(London: Praeger Publishing, 2002) 
128 See Hugh Mcleod and Werner Ustorf, The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 
1750-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003); Vivian S. Patrick, Scholars Find Decline of 
Christianity in the West (6 March 2004) [article online]; available from 
http://www.christianpost.com/article/20040306/scholars-find-decline-of-christianity-in-the-west.htm 
Internet; accessed 20 October 2008. Despite signs of religious erosion in numerous Western countries, 
the US, for the last century, has maintained a consistent religious posture in Judeo-Christian practices 
owed primarily to an outstanding religious market. This concept is regarded as religious-supply and is 
held by Stark and Iannanccone; it will be discussed in brief later in this chapter. See also Pippa and 
Inglehart, Sacred and Secular, 89-95. 
129 Habermas, Notes on a post-secular society, 1.  
130 Norris and Inglehart, 3. See, C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1959), 32-33. See also Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious 
Life: A Study in Religious Sociology (New York: Macmillan, 1915); August Comte, The Positive 
Philosophy (New York: Calvin Blanchard, 1858); Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion (New 
York: Norton, 1975); Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (London: 
International, 1948); Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Ethics (1897) (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 
1978). 
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intractable religious events since the mid-twentieth century proved otherwise with regards to 
religious forces today make these predictions more pronounced. 
 
Timothy Shah, Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, agrees that 
religion has not faded, and makes reference to the expression “God is Winning”. Shah 
implies that “[there seems] to be a worldwide trend across all major religious groups, in 
which god-based and faith-based movements in general are experiencing increasing 
confidence and influence vis-à-vis secular movements and ideologies.”131 Clearly these 
religious movements are not confined to Islam, Christianity or even Buddhism alone. This 
“world-wide resurgence in religion”132 appears across the board, is greatly influential and 
most relevant, and is more pronounced than the nineteenth century secularists may have 
imagined. In recent years, US foreign policy, for example, has confronted this resurgence 
with its encounter with political Islam (first in the 1970s and again in 2001) with its threat to 
US allies in the Middle East and South Asia.133  
 
These crosscurrents indicate clearly that the United States is presently confronted by 
emerging post-secular affairs which call for a reshaping of certain elements in its domestic 
and foreign policy approach, if it is to effectively address post-secularism. However, it is 
possible that  we may be able to measure the USG’s propensity to welcome the religious                                                         
131 See Timothy Shah, Timothy Shah explains “Why God is Winning” (July 2006) [interview 
online]; available from http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=119; Internet, accessed 2 November 
2008; Timothy Shah and Monica Duffy Toft “Why God is Winning”, Foreign Policy (July / August 
2006): 39-43. 
132 In Notes on post-secular society, Habermas defines this term as an overlapping 
phenomenon that has converged upon society, fuelled primarily by: “missionary expansion, 
fundamentalist radicalisation, and the political instrumentalisation of the potential for violence innate 
in many of the world religions”, 2.  
133 In the US domestic arena, this contemporary resurgence, which began in the 1970s, is 
associated with the question of gay marriage, censorship, continuous efforts by Christian groups to 
nationalise school prayer, and whether Roe vs. Wade should be overturned.   
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voice into its foreign policymaking by assessing its previous approach to engage religion in 
domestic politics. In making this determination, Chapter 2 will not focus entirely on the 
impact of secularism (Western centrism or political realism).134 Rather, it broadens an already 
existing discourse determining how a government may ensure religious expression, but yet 
remain politically apprehensive when engaging religious publics across secular lines. Three 
specific areas of consideration are covered: a) the importance of acknowledging both the 
public and private voice in reaching cohesive social relations; b) a historical look at 
America’s political apprehensiveness within the liberal-secular state; and c) different arenas 
where post-secularism is critical in US politics. In detailing these points, this chapter makes 
the distinction that forced relations between the sacred and secular are non-productive, but 
when the public sphere fully accepts the transcendence of the post-secular, both are able to 
coexist. To ensure the success of this project requires that both sacred and secular voices are 
integrated into a post-secular framework to improve social relations. 
                                                        
134 Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, “Overlooked Dimensions”, Bringing Religion into 
International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 9-34; see also Jonathan Fox, “Religion, Politics 
and International Relations: The rise of religion and the fall of the civilization paradigm as 
explanation for intra-state conflict”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20, No. 3 (September 
2007): 361-82. 
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2.2. The reverberation of the public and private sphere  
 
In A Secular Age, Charles Taylor argues that the effects of the Enlightenment on 
Western social space was “the emergence of a viable alternative to Christianity in exclusive 
humanism;…also a number of reactions against this and the understanding of human life 
which produced it.”135 Taylor sets up the argument that, after the Enlightenment, religious 
voices in Western society grew less influential as a result of the “widening gamut of new 
positions and ideals (some secular and others religious) that evolved among elite groups in 
Western society.”136 He calls this shift in influence the nova effect.137 Alongside this 
transition in social discourse and attitudes away from religion one of the most important, but 
often less recognised, shifts to take place was the partitioning of social space and the 
construction of two distinct spheres structuring the now-separated sacred and secular 
elements in Western society: the public and the private. 
 
The private sphere is the arena consisting of civil society, moral traditions and a 
citizenry which practises or identifies itself with this culture. The public sphere, on the other 
hand, refers broadly to the secular political realm of non-religious, professional and economic 
activities (particularly in the US).138 Regarding society’s secular posture, it is observed in 
Taylor’s argument that these public spaces – in both the US and Europe – “have been                                                         
135 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, 423. 
136 Ibid., 423. 
137 Ibid., 423. 
138 A note of clarification is made with respect to the work of the critical theorist Jürgen 
Habermas, who is investigated in this chapter. Habermas implies that the “public” in his study The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere refers to events and occasions which are public and 
“open to all, in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs, as when we speak of public places or public 
houses.” His referencing of the “public” in total refers to a conceptualisation of the public sphere, 
whereas my usage of the term “public space” refers specifically to the secular realm as located within 
the “public” sector of Western society and segregated from the affairs of the “private” sector. See 
Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a category of 
Bourgeois-Society (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989), 1. 
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allegedly emptied of God, or of any reference to ultimate reality.”139 Since the 
Enlightenment, most Western public spaces no longer “refer us to God, but to rationality that 
aids society in reaching its greatest benefit, without solely drawing on moral ideals.”140 
Jürgen Habermas clarifies the partition of social space, claiming that: 
 
By the end of the eighteenth century [Western society] had broken apart into private elements 
on the one hand and into public on the other. The position of the church changed with the 
reformation: the link to divine authority which the church represented, that is, religion, 
became a private matter. So-called religious freedom came to insure what was historically the 
first area of private autonomy. The church itself continued its existence as one public and 
legal body among others.141 
 
Existing now as simply one of a number of public bodies, the once-dominant voice of the 
sacred and the Church had dwindled considerably by this time. Secular fear during the late 
eighteenth century contributed to this decline by placing an emphasis on free-thinking and 
public reason – no longer drawing solely on moral ideals to construct socio-political 
frameworks for society. While the voice of the sacred should not dominate the public arena, 
consideration of that voice in the political realm would tackle many of the emerging post-
secular events that confront US national security. In considering this point, Roger Trigg 
suggests, “public debate about the proper basis for society is necessary and the religious 
voice should be heard in that debate.”142 In Vernacular Voice, Gerard A. Hauser adds that 
through “citizen participation” private citizens unintentionally sharpen their usage of 
Athenian democracy and ensure the civic virtues of the state are carried out on their behalf.143 
In this respect, the voices, ideas and opinions of religious citizens deserve public                                                         
139 Taylor, A Secular Age, 2. 
140 Ibid., 2. 
141 Jürgen Habermas, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopaedia Article (1964)”, New German 
Critique, 3 (Autumn, 1974): 49-55.  
142 Roger Trigg, Religion in Public Life, 236. 
143 Gerard A. Hauser, “The Public Voice of Vernacular Rhetoric”, Vernacular Voice 
(Columbia: South Carolina Press, 1999), 13-36; see also Cornel West, Democracy Matters: Winning 
the Fight Against Imperialism (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 201-218.  
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acknowledgement, considering the natural rights of all citizens within the liberal-secular 
state.  
 
It should be noted that it was not only religious voices, but also private opinions, that 
were encouraged during the nineteenth century to evolve outside of public space (Jürgen 
Habermas in his review, however, fails to recognise a place for religion or the cultivation of 
beliefs and ideologies within the private sphere). Habermas’ findings in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere observe this point through an examination of the 
“bourgeois public sphere model.”144 Located between bourgeois civil society and the state for 
nearly two centuries, the bourgeois public sphere served, in European society, as a social 
prescription for an alternative sphere where private citizens could meet in café salons and 
coffeehouses in the newly “enlightened” London, Germany, Paris and Vienna.145 The aim in 
the “bourgeois public sphere” was to generate widespread public discussions and political 
debates, while participating in social engagement.146 Though many of these European homes 
of public criticism were not particular political institutions, their widespread reputation 
                                                        
144 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 1-26; see also 
Frank Bechhofer and Brian Elliot, eds., The Petite Bourgeoisie: Comparative Studies of the Uneasy 
Stratum (London: Macmillan Press, 1981). 
145 See James Gordon Finalayson, Habermas: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2005), 10-13; Michael Schaich, “The Public Sphere”, A Companion to Eighteenth-
Century Europe, Peter H. Wilson, ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 125-140. 
146 “The bourgeois avant-garde of the educated middle class learned the art of critical-rational 
public debate through its contact with the “elegant world”. This courtly-noble society, to the extent 
that the modern state apparatus became independent from the monarch’s personal sphere, naturally 
separated itself, in turn, more and more from the court and became its counterpoise in the town. The 
“town” was the life centre of civil society not only economically; in cultural-political contrast to the 
court, it designated especially an early public sphere in the world of letters whose institutions were the 
coffee houses, the salon and the Tischgesellschaften (table societies). The heirs of the humanistic-
autocratic society, in their encounter with the bourgeois intellectuals (through sociable discussions 
that quickly developed into public criticism), built a bridge between the remains of a collapsing form 
of publicity (the courtly one) and the precursor of a new one: the bourgeois public sphere” Habermas, 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 30. 
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throughout the continent held mass credence in their ability to unite a diverse citizenry to test 
state laws and policies through public discourse.147  
 
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere [in which] private 
people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above 
against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules 
governing relations in the basically privatised but publicly relevant sphere of commodity 
exchange and social labour.148 
 
Habermas’ findings regarding the “bourgeois public sphere model” denote two very 
important points: (a) that there is a fundamental separation between social spaces in Western 
society; and (b) despite the manufacturing of these spaces, the opinions generated by private 
citizens deserve consideration in the political realm. Even with the decline of the bourgeois 
sphere during the late nineteenth century (due to a rise in print media), the principles and 
values are of relevance in ensuring that the voice of the sacred is acknowledged (but not 
allowed to dominate the public sphere).  
 
 Bringing this concept into the present era, Habermas recognises that the same 
strategies as those adopted by the “bourgeois public sphere” may be deployed in the present 
context with what he calls the contemporary public sphere model, which functions as a 
“realm [in] our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed.”149 
The public sphere concept, according to Habermas, is that in which:  
                                                         
147 See James Gordon Finlayson, Habermas: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2005), 11. 
148 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
category of Bourgeois-Society (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989) 27; “According to Habermas the 
bourgeois public sphere originated in the middle-class concern with protecting its commercial 
interests through the political regulation of civil society. It mustered little sympathy for proletarian or 
peasant issues. Nonetheless, its discursive standards were not linked to political or economic ideology 
but to Enlightenment ideals of reason and rational opinion from which society forged a public 
understand of matters that were consequential in private relations.” Hauser, Vernacular Voice, 42. 
149 Habermas, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopaedia Article (1964)”, 49-55. 
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Citizens, [sacred or secular] behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted 
fashion – that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association that freedom to 
express and publish their opinion – about matters of general interest. In a large public body 
this kind of communication requires specific means for transmitting information and 
influencing those who receive it. Today, newspapers and magazines, radio and TV are the 
media of the public sphere. We speak of the public sphere in contrast, for instance, to the 
literary one, when public discussion deals with objects connected to the activity of the state.150 
  
In order to assure a more assertive interchange between the sacred and secular an 
integration of the religious voice into the public sphere or (in the case of the USG) political 
debate is required. However, Trigg and others are correct that this application is pertinent, but 
must not be implemented at the expense of allowing one voice to dominate the other.151 
Sustaining “democratic forms”152 ensures that all citizens may contribute to crafting a 
progressive agenda. In order that the American political system accomplishes this task, it will 
need to confront its internal apprehensiveness toward religion manufactured by a historical 
                                                        
150 Ibid., 49-55.  
151 It is uncertain, in my opinion, whether genuine public discussion may take place in parts of 
the US public sphere that rely greatly on mass commercial media outlets. With the decline of the 
traditional bourgeois public sphere, where I suggest that authentic opinions were formed uninfluenced 
by massive commercialisation; today, we discover parts of the US public forum saturated by 
commercialisation, lending an appearance of it being synthetic, but still democratic. The attempt of 
some US public forums to appear synthetic derive from their relationship with media conglomerates 
which generate and dictate a manufactured or “stage-managed” public opinion by filtering what they 
perceive as necessary information to the general public. As for its democratic appearance, as the 
traditional bourgeois sphere, many of these public forums – cyberspace, in particular – are today open 
markets where anyone with a thought can post his opinion without having had any critical debate or 
discourse in forming this opinion. A question can be raised here about whether, in some of these 
newly-created public forums, private citizens are critically thinking about many of these issues or are 
merely regurgitating the commercially-generated public opinions by which they were previously 
bombarded. For example, with advancements in technology and the internet, some public blogs by 
news agencies and private citizens and a rapidly growing online community have contributed to the 
production of synthetic public opinions on international issues, public perceptions of groups and 
political events in society and our obligations as private citizens to address religious publics. Despite 
the formation of some of these opinions in the US public forums and seeing that the public sphere has 
descended from coffeehouses, public discourses in religious institutions in cyberspace to the corridors 
of private facilities, I argue that the general public’s opinions on state affairs and its concerns on state 
issues, despite the descent, deserve recognition within the political realm. See also Al Gore, “Blinding 
the Faithful”, Assault on Reason (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 45-71. 
152 According to Hauser, “Democratic forms rest on opportunities for citizens to discuss issues 
that concern their interests so that they may influence intelligent public opinion. Concomitantly, 
people engaged in every day congress with strangers holding diverse beliefs, traditions, and interests 
have a comparable need for discursive forums in which they may develop a sense of prevailing 
opinion and participate in charting its course.” Hauser, Vernacular Voice, 40.  
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body of Western secular thought. In a post-secular era, this means moving beyond ideologue 
that augments a separation of the sacred and secular voice that will inevitably enhance US 
foreign relations. 
   
2.3. The Western secular vision and American political apprehensiveness 
 
 The strongest attribute of secularism is that it manufactures space for multiple ideals 
and plural relations within the state by dispensing with authoritative rule, which historically 
dominated the agendas of both religion and government in European society before the 
eighteenth century. In a subtle way, through its behaviour and policy the body of secularism 
emphasised within Western society that religious issues are less significant than political 
affairs. Clearly, the practise of secularism triumphs in the West nowadays as the most 
effective social formula for guaranteeing the luxuries of freedom, free-thinking and 
democracy, but at the expense of undervaluing the relevance of religion in the public sphere. 
This is a traditional posture in Western political manoeuvring. Though it is not a singular  
American-centric position, it nevertheless integrated itself into the Bush administration’s 
foreign policy of exceptionalism. This political behaviour, which undervalues religious 
forces, flourishes out of a political history of hierarchy where the secular rejects sitting 
parallel to religion. In turn, the secular argues that it is superior to religion. For centuries the 
secular has dominated the public discourse in affairs relating to issues of politics, economics, 
education and defence. This posture did not only contribute to centuries of violent reactions 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but by the nineteenth century an entire 
exclusion of the reliance on the religious in the public sphere occurred in Europe and the US.  
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George J. Holyoake’s The Principle of Secularism clarifies this study’s reference to 
secularism when he writes: 
 
Secularism is the study of promoting human welfare by material means; measuring human welfare by 
the utilitarian rule and making the service of others a duty of life… Secularism is a series of principles 
intended for the guidance of those who find Theology indefinite, or inadequate, or deem it unreliable. It 
replaces theology, which mainly regards life as a sinful necessity, as a scene of tribulation through 
which we pass to a better world. Secularism rejoices in this life and regards it as the sphere of those 
duties which educate men to fitness for any future and better life, should such transpire.153 
 
Holyoake’s definition of the word indicates that secularism, as a counter to embracing the 
guidance of theology, functions as a better option for the state in sustaining democracy and 
ensuring a society free of religious influences. His view of religion implies that, before the 
nineteenth century, broader issues contributed to Western societies’ unbalanced relationships 
with and political apprehensiveness towards religion. The seventeenth century religious wars, 
tyranny by rulers and “Enlightenment” endeavours by man to elevate reason over divine right 
are three of the greatest social influences in encouraging secularism. In both European and 
US society after the eighteenth century, fear of the first two influences would lead the state to 
steer clear of religion in state affairs. At a deeper level, memories of early seventeenth 
century contentions between the Church and European powers helped, in some ways, to 
shape the posture adopted by many secularists today. Such a posture derives from a historical 
fear among secular officials that their secular influence will be lost if religious ideals prevail 
or are openly expressed within society.  
                                                        
153 George J. Holyoake, The Principles of Secularism, 3rd ed. (London: Austin & Co., 1870) 
11-12.; see also writing from twentieth century writers such as Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: 
Elements of Sociology Theory of Religion (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967). However, it was in 1999 
that Peter Berger shifted his belief in the effectiveness of the secularisation thesis, making the claim 
that “loose assertions were placed on the impact urbanisation would have on Western society”; 
Thomas Luckman, The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society (New York: 
Macmillan, 1967); Harvey Cox, Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological 
Perspective (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in 
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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To explore the concept of secular fear somewhat further, let us take the “Age of 
Enlightenment” and the development of the body of secularism in Europe as an example. The 
fears of secularists rooted themselves in a resolution by the state and the secular citizen not to 
return to an era where affairs were dominated by authoritative institutions or the perversions 
of religion. French, Dutch and English societies emerged, to some degree, out of this indirect 
counter-response taken in the seventeenth century toward Christian religious bodies and 
European powers. Out of the horrors of the Thirty Years’ War (fought initially in Germany 
between the Protestants and Catholics of the Holy Roman Empire) came insurmountable 
tragedy, religious division and the formation of a new religio-political framework with the 
strategic aim of combating both intractable war and religious conflict between European 
powers at the time. In an effort to end the many religious wars and inter-church hostilities, 
two treaties were signed in 1648 (the Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster; recognised as the 
Peace of Westphalia), ending both the Thirty Years War in Germany and the Eighty Years 
War fought between the Netherlands and Spain.154 Through the signing and implementation 
of the Peace of Westphalia, the Western powers pushed back religious tension, bringing 
peace to “the vast lands of the Holy Roman Empire (which included modern Germany, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and parts of Poland and of 
northern Italy). It ratified the existing territorial divisions and required many rulers – 
Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist – to tolerate worship by denominations other than the 
established one, on the basis of the conditions prevailing in each state in 1624.”155 The 
Westphalian state system went on to grossly transcend the resolution of eighty years of 
persistent religious war in Europe: Westphalia helped to establish the modern Western                                                         
154 See C. V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (London: Pimlico, 1992); Geoffrey Parker, 
The Thirty Years’ War (London: Routledge, 1997). 
155 Derek Beales, “Religion and Culture”, The Eighteenth Century, T.C.W. Blanning (Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) 133. 
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nation-state and the concept of state sovereignty, which have contributed to stable relations 
between religion and government in modern Europe.156 
 
The horrors of the seventeenth century were not forgotten in countries such as France, 
where widespread scepticism among the French intelligentsia about the benefits of religion’s 
influence had become rampant. Examples of this scepticism are found in such leading 
philosophes as Voltaire, who acknowledged that the public apprehensiveness about religion 
and its rule was linked to “the evils [that] Christianity had perpetrated through wars of 
religion, burning heretics, executing so-called “witches” as well as restrictions imposed by 
the Vatican and Jesuit communities.”157 Philosophes and encyclopedists Diderot and Baron 
d’ Holbach would echo these sentiments, but would also note absolutism and divine right as 
restrictive forces against free-thinking.158 To demonstrate the possibilities for the state if it 
were more tolerant of religion while endorsing secularity and free-speech, we may cite non-
French despots including Catherine the Great of Russia and Frederick the Great of Prussia, 
two enlightened rulers who set an example of advancing their countries’ social stability by 
endorsing rationality and free-thinking. Frederick’s level of enlightenment would be captured 
by Immanuel Kant in 1784; when answering Rev. Johann Löllher’s enquiry What is 
Enlightenment? Kant exclaimed:  
 
                                                        
156 Daniel Philpott, “The Founding of the Sovereign States System at Westphalia”, 
Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (New Jersey: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 2001), 73-150. 
157 Roy Porter, The Enlightenment, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 29-37; see also 
Kenneth W. Applegate, Voltaire on Religion: Selected Writings (New York: F Ungar Publishing, 
1974). 
158 Dennis Diderot and Russell Goulbourne, The Nun (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005); Patrick W. Byrne, “The Form of Paradox: A Critical Study of Diderot's La Religieuse”, in 
Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (1994): 169-293; Paul Henri Thiry Holbach, Baron d' 
and Jean Meslier, Superstition in All Ages (New York: Arno Press, 1972).  
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Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the 
inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-
imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to 
use it without guidance from another. Sapire Aude! [dare to know] “Have courage to use your 
own understanding!” – that is the motto of the Enlightenment.159 
 
Kant’s conviction of man’s ability to evolve apart from religious authority captured what 
would later become a growing phenomenon in the West. This point is exemplified by the 
decline of religious practices after the eighteenth century in Europe. Affirming this point, 
Joachim Whaley writes, the “Enlightenment saw the decline of religious belief and the 
secularisation of European society. [It] promoted rationalism; new science undermined the 
basis of traditional belief; Christianity was edged out of the central position it occupied in 
Western society by the rise of a new ‘paganism’.”160 This new paganism (free-thinking) 
would later develop into the central pillar which ensured that Western society would remain 
unfettered by religious authority and the confines of princely rule. “By the 1780s, at least 
among the upper classes, dogmatic religion seemed to be giving way among both Catholics 
and Protestants – and even among practising Jews – to a generalised and tolerant benevolence 
uninterested in the ancient ideal of asceticism or in doctrinal precision.”161  
 
But how have sociological theorists come to comprehend this decline in relation to 
society? According to several sociological theorists, the decline in religion in society is 
referred to by the widely ambiguous term “secularisation”, which has taken on numerous 
meanings since Max Weber’s sparing use of it.162 As a leading thinker on the sociology of                                                         
159 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? (1784) [article 
online]; available from http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/kant.html; Internet, accessed 
20 October 2008. 
160 Joachim Whaley, “Religion” A Companion to Eighteenth-Century Europe, ed. Peter H. 
Wilson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 176-177. 
161 Derek Beales, “Religion and Culture”, Short Oxford History of Europe: The Eighteenth 
Century, T.C.W. Blanning, ed. (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 2000), 131-177. 
162 The term “secularisation” was rarely used by Weber, but its meaning was expressed 
greatly throughout much of his seminal work; see Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
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religion, Weber also referred to secularisation as “disenchantment”, (i.e. with religion), 
suggesting, “The fate of our time is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation 
and, above all, by disenchantment of the world.”163 The world, as Weber observed, was  
destined to become more dependent on material progress, reason and science and less on the 
mystical or archaic traditions of religion. Other theorists, such as Durkheim, saw 
secularisation taking its course along two time-scales: “First, over a wide historical spectrum, 
in which secularisation has been in progress for millennia. Second, in more recent times, in 
which there has been an acceleration of the process due to particular circumstances in 
Western society.”164 However, Freud, taking a psychoanalytical position – unlike other social 
theorists during his era – accepted neither urbanisation nor modernisation as being 
responsible for the decline of religion, but rather suggested that it was the instinctual urges of 
human wishes relating to religion which contributed to its decline. Freud regarded the 
mystical urge of religion as the future of an illusion, an event that tore humans away from 
doing what was best for society.165 What we gather is that the social theories of the likes of 
Durkheim and Weber, in particular, emerged out of an era of social transition in Western 
society, which saw the decline in traditional practices and archaic mystical beliefs, and a loss, 
brought on by urbanisation, of relevance of religious influences on the political realm. 
Adding texture to this argument, David Martin contended that the secularisation process, 
“characterised modernity as a scenario in which mankind shifted from the religious mode to 
                                                        
Capitalism (New York: Penguin Books, 2002); Michael W. Hughey, “The Idea of Secularization in 
the Works of Max Weber: A Theoretical Outline”, Qualitative Sociology 2, No. 1 (May 1979): 85-
100. 
163 Max Weber, “The Social Psychology of World Religions”, From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 282. 
164 W.S.F. Pickering, Durkheim’s Sociology of Religion (London: Routledge, 1984), 445; see 
also Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: Free Press, 1965/1915). 
165See Sigmund Freud, The Future of Illusion (New York: Norton, 1975). 
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the secular”166; whereas Gorski and Altinordu satirically acknowledge that secularisation has 
accomplished the extreme task of standing 
 
Christian eschatology on its head, by postulating that the religious darkness will give way to 
secular enlightenment. Similarly, the spatial sense of secularisation anticipates the notion of 
“differentiated spheres” and the monk’s departure from the monastery parallels the 
individual’s exit from the church.167 
 
While theorists have maintained that secularisation relates specifically to a historical shift in 
social and religious activities, others, as Stark and Iannanccone, take a broad analysis to 
assert a decline in religious demand, based upon religious supply, in certain Western 
industrial countries.168 This contemporary argument is regarded as the supply-side/religious 
economics paradigm and makes it clearer why Judeo-Christian faith practices are not as 
pronounced as other non-Judeo Christian practices throughout Western Europe.169 However, 
Jose Casanova takes a different approach in Public Religion in the Modern World by 
suggesting that the social movement in religion seen today is linked specifically to three 
areas: differentiation, privatisation and decline.170 
 
In an effort to escape from the constraints of religion in Europe during the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries, the social process of Western society as it moved from 
a narrow sacred position to that of a broader secular body outlines in clear terms what Swatos 
                                                        
166 David Martin, On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory (England: Ashgate, 
2005), 18. 
167 Phillip S. Gorski and Ates Altinordu, “After Secularization?”, Annual Review of Sociology, 
34 (2008): 55-86. 
168 Rodney Stark and Lawrence R. Iannaccone, “A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the so-
called Secularization of Europe”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 33 (1994): 230-52; see 
also Rodney Stark, “Secularization, RIP”, Sociology of Religion 60 (1999): 249-73. 
169 See Rodney Stark, Discovering God: The Origins of the Great Religions and the Evolution 
of Belief (New York: Harper One, 2007). 
170 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 
1994), 320; see also Jose Casanova, “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective”, 
Hedgehog Review (Spring/Summer, 2006): 7-22. 
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argues: that secularisation is, as this study agrees, “the process by which societies in the 
experience of ‘modernisation’ have created competing institutions for doing better.”171 This 
argument highlights the unique fact that the only continent that has ventured far in distancing 
society from religion, both in practice and in its trust in sacred frameworks, is Europe, but not 
the United States – since no dramatic decline in religious practices and beliefs in the US has 
yet prevailed.172 However, while a decline in practise has not occurred publically, a private 
tension between secular players and sacred affairs is present. In acknowledging this fact, how 
might we apply to the United States Europe’s secular fear of the influence of religion in the 
public sphere? Clearly, the societies of both Europe and the US were influenced by 
Enlightenment secularisation; but, unlike what we see in Europe today of the creations of 
secularisation, the US was founded on Enlightenment principles which sought to establish a 
free society by promoting the separation of Church and State. Like their enlightened 
contemporaries in Europe, the framers of the US Constitution considered it fruitful to 
establish a new republic where tolerance for religious practices, within a secular context, 
could exist in the absence of divine absolutes. Strengthening this vision, such pre-
Enlightenment philosophies found in Locke’s Letters on Tolerance and Hobbes’ proposals 
for a commonwealth of civil law were incorporated into the new republic’s secular vision.173  
 
The architects of the new republic, like their European counterparts, were also 
suspicious of the influence which religion might have on the colonies, but understood the 
                                                        
171 William H. Swatos and KJ Christiano, “Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept”, 
Sociology of Religion, 60, No. 3 (1999): 209-228. 
172 However, the July 2008 Gallup research findings indicate that both faith practices and a 
belief in God in the Western part of the US is lower than in other regions of the country. See Frank 
Newman, “Belief in God Far Lower in Western US ” The Gallup Poll Briefing (July 2008): 103; 
report available online, http://www.gallup.com/poll/109108/Belief-God-Far-Lower-Western-US.aspx. 
173 See John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration, and Early Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006); Aloysius P. Martinich, ed. Leviathan (Ontario: Broadview Press, 
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value of religious tolerance as presented in Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws.174 In 
Religion in Public Life: Must Faith Be Privatized?, Trigg writes that “An unfortunate aspect 
of this was a latent, and sometimes overt, anti-Catholicism, which was itself often the motive 
for the insistence on the separation of Church and State. Particularly after major immigration 
from Catholic countries, there was a fear of the influence of the Catholic hierarchy.”175 In 
addition, he notes that “Lingering distrust of the Church of England, coupled with 
denominational rivalry, led the Founders to be determined that the federal government should 
pursue a policy of neutrality concerning denominations.”176 James Madison, writing in the 
Federalist Papers on the need to safeguard the Union against domestic terrorism, emphasised 
the ills which corroded European society throughout the seventeenth century. He insisted that 
such historical events should not, in any way, plague the new republic.177 In 1779, With the 
support of the statesman, Thomas Jefferson made this case against state-supported religion in 
the Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (passed in 1786).178 This pre-
Constitutional act served as a clause supportive of religious tolerance, giving freedom to all                                                         
174 Montesquieu’s critical perspectives helped to shape the new republic’s idea of tolerance. 
He asserts in The Spirit of Laws (1748), “When the legislator has believed it a duty to permit the 
exercise of many religions, it is necessary that he should enforce also toleration among these religions 
themselves.” Charles de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (1748) [article online]; available from 
http://www.constitution.org/cm/sol-02.htm; Internet, accessed 20 October 2008. 
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176 Ibid., 211. 
177 Isaac Kramnick, eds., The Federalist Papers (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 
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to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous 
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178Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786) [document 
online]; available from http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/vaact.html; Internet, accessed 
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Virginians to practise the religion of their choice. This act prevented the state of Virginia 
from establishing its own state religion and the colony from taxing dissenters to the Anglican 
Church.179 
 
Encouraging the spread of this tolerance throughout the American colonies, Madison 
and Jefferson’s attempts in the Federalist Papers to ensure it, according to the vision of 
Montesquieu and Locke, focused on four points: (i) guarding against domestic and foreign 
rulers; (ii) ensuring that the new government could not establish a national religion 
comparable to the “Church of England”; (iii) protecting the many religious sects of the 
colonies and; (iv) ensuring that religious tolerance was implemented within the new 
republic.180 What is of central importance to this study and in particular to the present chapter 
is the way in which the Virginia case helped to construct a plan for the separation of Church 
and State throughout the American republic. This was established to defend America against 
the ills that once threatened European society, and to ensure an American society of religious 
pluralism and tolerance.181 Madison’s efforts were implemented in Article I of the US 
Constitution (passed 15 December 1791) and are identified as part of the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause, which makes it clear that: 
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Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof…182  
 
As the architect of the Establishment Clause, Madison had a twofold personal aim for the 
Virginia Act: (a) to ensure that the US federal government did not establish a national church 
(or religion); and (b) to ensure that the many religious denominations in the colonies were 
free from discrimination and able to freely practise their chosen religion. However, out of 
Madison and Jefferson’s good political intentions, two disturbing crosscurrents would 
emerge: secularist aims to protect free-thinking and rationalism would, first, set out to push 
the religious voice to the fringe; second, to demonstrate, in retaliation, their exceptionalist 
posture, religious citizens would perversely take advantage of their right to freely practise 
and express themselves in the public sphere by imposing their moral vision on both sacred 
and secular citizens living within society. The most recent occurrence of this was during the 
latter part of the twentieth-century, with evangelical Christians projecting their identity 
politics/and exceptionalist theological views on the American political system (i.e. indicating 
the reluctance of the USG to directly engage domestic religious forces). 
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2.4. Shifting the domestic dynamic 
 
  In the context of this study and US-Muslim world relations, the significant tension of 
post-secularism that emerge from this historical dynamic (between religion and the public 
sphere) materialised in the late twentieth century in the US. This period would usher in a 
different tone in the potential for religio-political engagement. During this era, religion 
politicised itself in order to influence secular legislation and secular institutions. An 
overwhelming shift occurred during the 1970s and ’80s, where right-wing religious advocates 
protested that Evangelical Christian voices deserve recognition in the political arena. This 
case implied that secularism contributed to a great loss in traditional American values –  
attributable to its liberal views – leading to what Christian fundamentalists observed as a 
pervasive moral decay.183 This particular evangelical campaign assumed prominence by 
means of the promising electronic church (the rise of televangelism) and a moral campaign 
which included direct mailers to its twenty million sympathisers (who, by the late 1970s, 
would represent an essential bloc in US domestic politics). The evangelical campaign, led by 
hard-line Christian fundamentalists such as Jerry Falwell, Paul Weyrich and James Robinson, 
televangelists including Pat Robinson and Charles Stanley, and mass communicationists 
(with financial interests) such as James Bakker, progressed from private solicitation to 
outright public awareness against the US liberal political establishment. In addition, the 
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standards of righteousness which they outlined, [the US] would be destroyed from within, and then 
only the End Times could preserve the few Christians who remained.” Erling Jorstad, The Politics of 
Moralism: The New Christian Right in American Life (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House), 15; 
See Patrick Allitt, Religion in America Since 1945: A History (New York: Columbia UP, 2003). 
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campaign became a powerful grassroots movement in US affairs, in which religious activism 
would unconventionally influence liberal-secular political decision-making. 184   
 
Maturing by 1979 into the widely-recognised umbrella organisation, the Moral 
Majority (led by Falwell), this grassroots movement raised substantial financial capital, 
through James Robinson’s recommended “moral report cards” project, for a robust lobbying 
campaign which focused on the voting records of US political officials.185 The project “rated 
the votes of national lawmakers against [Evangelical Christian] standards of what constituted 
a ‘moral’ or ‘immoral’ vote on a key public issue.”186 In doing so, the Moral Majority 
targeted key congressional officials with agendas which it considered too liberal, or rather, 
unchristian. Interrelated crises influenced this project, such as: 
 
The results of the 1973 Supreme Court decision on abortion, demands by homosexuals for 
civil rights, the Supreme Court’s prohibition of religious exercises in public schools, the 
Equal Rights Amendment, the accessibility of pornography, and, in a different realm, the 
alleged decline of American prestige and power abroad due to a weakening military posture 
compared to increasing Soviet might.187 
                                                         
184 As part of this movement an apocalyptic culture war would be waged against the US 
political establishment, with Christian fundamentalism seeking to dictate the direction of US domestic 
and foreign policy. This narrow partisan vision, however, lost momentum and failed to attract many to 
“the politics of doomsday”, forcing what would become the New Christian Right (NCR) (an assembly 
of Christian political action and lobbying organisations in the early 1970s) to restructure itself. Still, 
by the mid-1970s its views would be revived by more Christian action committees, such as the 
Christian Voice, the Religious Roundtable, and the National Conservative Political Action Committee 
(together with other smaller organisations) with ties to the Republican party. The NCR recognised 
that, to effect socio-political change, it could not concentrate on raising mass enthusiasm for its 
concerns and, to shape its characteristic moral vision, it had to put pressure of its own on the US 
political establishment and its leaders. 
185 Erling Jorstad, The Politics of Moralism: The New Christian Right in American Life 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1981), 54; Christian Voice (organisations), Christian Voice 
Congressional Report Card: How Your Congressman Voted on 14 Key Moral Issues, 96th Congress, 
1st Session, January-December, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: Christian Voice, 1980). 
186 Jorstad, The Politics of Moralism, 7; see Robert Webber, The Moral Majority: Right or 
Wrong? (Westchester: Cornerstone Books, 1981). 
187 Jorstad, The Politics of Moralism, 5; Anson D. Shupe and William A. Stacey, “Born Again 
Politics and the Moral Majority: What Social Surveys Really Show”, Studies in American Religion, 
Vol. 5 (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1982). 
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In assessing how the USG engaged this religious force in politics, it seems reasonable 
for it to have had great political apprehensiveness (just as in 2001 it re-engaged with political 
Islam). By taking this apprehensive approach between 1976 and 1980 – and not setting clear 
boundaries for the religious voice in the public sphere or maintaining a secular posture on 
authentic morality – the USG was browbeaten and manipulated by a well-funded grassroots 
religious movement, which planned to pursue its narrow partisan politics of moralism within 
the US political establishment. The USG’s liberal secular position was therefore 
compromised because of two shortcomings: a) its unwillingness to establish a space for 
socio-political discussion, and b) US lawmakers conceding its legislative decision-making 
and power to the religious right. 
 
Take the first shortcoming, for example: given the religio-political vision of the Moral 
Majority and its impact on American voting patterns, the USG never, at either the state or the 
national level, convened representatives of the sacred and secular community in order to 
pursue any constructive form of tolerant engagement, dialogue or discourse within a special 
space. In essence, the religious players were never reminded of the boundaries outlined in the 
Constitution on the influence which religious expression might exert on secular political 
decision-making. The Moral Majority openly suggested social issues relating to affirmative 
action: prohibition on school prayers, secular curriculums in public schools, abortion and 
even the Equal Rights amendment were recognised as concrete issues which US elected 
officials had a “moral” responsibility to correct.188 For evangelical Christians in this 
movement, “Salvation was to be found not only at the altar, but at the ballot box. [Thus, the 
argument ran], with the right man, highly moral men, in public office, America could yet be                                                         
188 Robert Liebman and Robert Wuthnow, The New Christian Right, 16; Steve Bruce, The 
Rise and Fall of the New Christian Right: Conservative Protestant Politics in America, 1978-1988 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 
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redeemed to continue its God-given destiny.”189 Instead of Christian political action 
committees operating in a widely beneficial and coherent space established for unimpeded 
dialogue with US politicians, they instead on the liberty to impose their belief system and 
ideology on public lawmakers.190 
 
The second shortcoming related to the USG’s compromise is linked in part to the first.  
By not establishing a special space where sacred and secular voices might engage within the 
US public sphere to craft consensus between 1976 and 1980, political officials were attacked 
to draft or support US policy in the interests of evangelical Christian voters. A politics of 
moralism became the driving force behind this movement, whose members would transgress 
against the notion of traditional morality enshrined in the Constitution.191 Though the 
founding fathers may have doubted whether the decisions of one group, man, idea or society 
enjoyed “an absolute significance” with regards to right and wrong, the Moral Majority 
thought otherwise. Erling Jorstad points out that traditional morality (as envisioned by the 
founders) and moralism (according to the Moral Majority) differ in three respects: 
 
                                                        
189 Jorstad, The Politics of Moralism, 5. 
190 See Francis A. Schaeffer, A Christian Manifesto (Westchester: Crossway Books, 1981); 
For a contrasting perspective on how this conservative motivation created not only a tension but an 
atmosphere conducive to producing  religious violence, see also Frank Schaeffer, Crazy for God: How 
I Grew Up As One of the Elect, Helped Found the Religious Right, and Lived to Take All (or Almost 
All) of It Back (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2007). 
191 “Morality can be defined as the rights or wrongness of human actions. The centuries-old 
question, of course, is who decides what is wrong or right: professional priests, holy men, sacred 
writings, or trial-and error experience?... But authentic morality hesitates to place too much authority 
in any one person or group of persons because, as Reinhold Niebuhr reminded us, “man is a finite and 
contingent creature, with some sense of universal value transcending his own existence but 
unfortunately inclined to endow the contingent values of his life or culture, of his truth or loyalty, 
with an absolute significant which it does not deserve” Jorstad asserts that moralism “embodies a 
particular world view. It understands that the moral answer to the questions perplexing mankind since 
earliest times are known, that no new or revised moralistic teachings will be forthcoming from the 
Author of morality because all revelation from him is full, complete, and binding” Jorstad, The 
Politics of Moralism, 8-9. 
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(1) it posits only one right moral action to any ethical question because (2) its authority is 
based on that view of Scripture which claims it is inerrant, infallible, and verbally inspired 
entirely without “error” in its original. Those Scriptures yield only one answer to each 
question. Those persons who accept that view of authority are the people qualified to decide 
what action is right and what is wrong, what is moral and what is immoral. (3) They can 
measure in quantifiable terms (such as voting report cards) the degree of morality of a person, 
in this case a public lawmaker, by choosing a select number of public issues and controversies 
on which the lawmaker must vote. Since those who speak with absolute authority have the 
moral answers they turn morality into moralism because they state they have the answers; 
those who disagree with them may not necessarily be “immoral” but they are not “moral”.192 
  
Being cast as “not moral” by an entire political voting bloc was essentially a scare tactic 
which put unforeseen pressure on US lawmakers to acquiesce to the New Christian Right’s 
far-reaching hand in US politics and its public discounting of traditional morality, as set out 
by the founders. This pressure marked the onset of US lawmakers’ concessions of legislative 
power, due to religious pressure from the Christian right.193 This issue was revived in the 
1980s by Robert Billings, with his “Family Issues Voting Index”, which provided a set of key 
social issues and policies voted on or to be voted by liberal lawmakers contributing to 
America’s inevitable moral decay.  
 
Targeting officials in the Senate and the House, the index expressed extreme 
opposition to sex education in public schools and Patricia M. Wald’s confirmation for US 
judgeship. But it would go on to advocate school prayer and a Bible reading amendment in 
the Senate.194 In the House, the index expressed further opposition to “a bill establishing a 
programme to curb domestic violence (and provide aid to its victims) and to the Child Health                                                         
192 Ibid., 9 
193 Some critics have even argued that, as a presidential candidate in 1976, Jimmy Carter’s 
religious conversion as a “born again” Christian was a narrow political appeal to secure the growing 
evangelical voting bloc. But Carter’s liberal policies, for example, toward abortion and equal rights 
and his foreign policy posture toward the Soviet Union were enough to make him a targeted candidate 
by 1979, forfeiting the support of the Moral Majority which preferred Republican candidate Ronald 
Reagan for president. Kenneth Earl Morris, Jimmy Carter, American Moralist (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1996); Arthur Frederick Ide, Idol Worshippers in America: Phyllis Schlafly, Ronald 
Reagan, Jerry Falwell, and the Moral Majority on Women, Work, and Homosexuality (Dallas: 
Monument Press, 1985). 
194 Jorstad, 84. 
  89 
Assurance Act of 1979 – while favouring a bill to balance the budget for fiscal 1980.”195 
These legislative issues became a yard-stick for deciding whether various members of 
Congress were moral or not and if they deserved to remain in office. As Jorstad observed, 
“the moral report card campaign allowed for no explanation by lawmakers, who now stood 
rated as… moral or immoral.”196 Therefore, the religious and non-religious voice could not 
convene to consolidate opposition, for the secular players under pressure were either 
concerned to restore their public image or anxious to align themselves with the Moral 
Majority to maintain their political appeal. This applies to liberal Democratic senators such as 
George McGovern of South Dakota, Frank Church of Idaho, John Culver of Iowa, Alan 
Cranston of California, Birch Bayh of Indiana and Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin, who were 
targeted by the Moral Majority.197  
 
Clearly, a trial of the US Establishment Clause occurred during the latter part of the 
twentieth century. With its popular appeal, the Moral Majority exercised its domestic right to 
religious expression in the public sphere, but US lawmakers would fail to confront its voice 
in fear of losing political support. When the Moral Majority took the US political 
establishment hostage by holding the “Holy Bible” above the head of certain lawmakers to 
promote its social agenda, it only raised doubts as to whether its narrow views were in fact in 
the interest of all Americans. But, by yielding to this extreme Christian movement, the USG 
would only display its unpreparedness at handling emerging religious issues in the public 
sphere.  Doing so would require the USG to  convene sacred-secular dialogue in a special 
                                                        
195 Jorstad, 84-85. 
196 Ibid., 84. 
197 Sharon Linzey Georgianna, The Moral Majority and Fundamentalism: Plausibility and 
Dissonance (Lewiston N.Y.: E. Mellen Press, 1989). 
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forum to engage or even curb the activities of the Moral Majority before US political officials 
compromised the American secular political system.   
 
In thinking critically about the US’s failure at engaging religion and religious issues 
directly, this section has opened up a few challenges the USG faces with addressing religious 
activity in the public sphere.   Its unpreparedness to directly engage the Moral Majority 
movement raises a red flag as to whether this posture of reluctance would surface later in its 
foreign relations.  In comprehending the role the USG might employ to resolve a set of 
emerging post-secular issues on the international stage, let us turn our attention to 
understanding how religion is generally discounted in international relations. Hence, this 
study suspects that the USG’s own loath position at engaging religious issues in a secular 
context (within the domestic arena) could very well lead to it applying a similar approach, as 
opposed to a more engaged response, when addressing the Muslim world.    
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2.5. Discounting religious forces in international relations  
 
In this section, this study will take a step back in order to go beyond the prior 
discussion (the handling of religion in domestic American politics) to argue that broader 
frameworks must be considered. Comprehending that rather than being how the USG deals 
with its own domestic religious movements (with respect to US-Muslim engagement), it is in 
fact about understanding how its political apprehension toward religion is capable of reaching 
into international relations. Jonathan Fox and Samuel Sandler, in the study Bringing Religion 
into International Relations, argue that the contemporary revitalisation of religious concerns 
in public and private space emerged as a result of multiple trends in modernity and a 
discounting of religion, on occasion, by US political and academic sources since the mid-
twentieth-century. Dismissing the secularists’ thesis that a historically admitted rise in 
modernity would eventually lead to “the demise of religion as a significant political and 
social force [in society]”, Fox and Sandler observe that, instead of modernity contributing to 
the demise of religion, it has contributed to its resurgences, citing eight points: 
 
(i) in many parts of the Third World, efforts at modernisation have failed, causing a religious 
backlash against the Western secular ideologies that were the basis for the governments 
which were in charge of these unsuccessful efforts at modernisation; (ii) modernisation has 
undermined traditional lifestyles, community values and morals, which are based in part on 
religion, thus contributing to this religious backlash against modernity; (iii) modernisation has 
allowed both the state and religious institutions to increase their spheres of influence, thus 
resulting in more clashes between the two; (iv) modern political systems allow for mass 
participation in politics, which has allowed the religious sectors of society a means to impose 
their views on others; (v) modern communication has allowed religious groups to export their 
views more easily and the international media has made religious groups aware of the 
activities of other religious groups; (vi) a new trend in the sociology of religion, known as the 
rational choice or economic theory of religion, posits that freedom of choice in many modern 
societies to select one’s own religion has led to an increase in religiosity; (vii) modern 
religious organisations contribute to political activity and; (viii) modernity does cause 
secularisation in some parts of the religious economy in that many mainstream and dominant 
religions become more worldly.198                                                         
198 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 12-13; see also Charles 
Taylor, “The Two Theories of Modernity”, Hastings Center Report, 25, No. 2 (1995): 24-33; Talal 
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In practical terms, what Weber, Comte and others saw during the nineteenth century 
as the growth of anti-religious forces (modernity and a rise in technology) has essentially 
contributed to the resurgence of religion in public life. This study refers to this resurgence as 
religious intensity – aggressive efforts by religious bodies to express their beliefs in actions 
beyond the private arena. “Rather than an inevitable and steady loss of spiritual faith or 
purpose as societies modernise, critics argue that more complex historical and cross-current 
patterns [are present today…For example] religiosity evident in the success of Islamic parties 
in Pakistan, the popularity of evangelicalism in Latin America, outbreaks of ethno-religious 
bloodshed in Nigeria and international conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of 
9/11.”199 Within each scene of intensity there is a diverse pattern of events linked to religious 
concerns, as Andrew Greely points out.200 Even Habermas has taken this concept a step 
further by regarding these new challenges as a “world-wide resurgence of religion”, relating 
directly to: transnational missionary expansion inspired by charismatic leadership; a growing 
fundamentalist radicalisation among Muslims and Pentecostals; and the political 
instrumentalisation of the potential for violence innate in many of the world’s religions.201 
This last factor presents an uncomfortable reason why the USG in particular should take 
religious intensity seriously. The facts are clear: it is impossible for the USG to deny the                                                         
Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 
2003). 
199 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 10. Describing the effect on European states in the 
context of the United States of the intensity of religious issues, Habermas notes, “The movements for 
religious renewal at the heart of Western civilisation are strengthening, at the cultural level, the 
political division of the West that was prompted by the Iraq War. With the abolition of the death 
penalty, with liberal regulations on abortion, with setting homosexual partnerships on a par with 
heterosexual marriages, with an unconditional rejection of torture and generally with the privileging 
of individual rights versus collective good, e.g., national security, the European states seem to be 
moving forward alone down the path they had trodden side by side with the United States”. Jurgen 
Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, European Journal of Philosophy, 14, No. 1 (2006): 1-25. 
200 See Andrew Greely, Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium (New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers, 2003). 
201 See Habermas, Notes on Post-Secularism, 2.  
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evidence that certain events relating to religion have not reshaped the political landscape, 
thereby requiring the political realm to define more direct methods to address these emerging 
issues. 
 
Such traditional political philosophies including political realism, stymie the 
development of sacred-secular engagement. On the one hand, this philosophy influenced 
practitioners in the US political realm where, on occasion, it predetermined the extent of 
political engagement. When reviewing this political philosophy it’s clear why US politicians 
hesitate to engage with the emerging moral ideas within the state (as was the case with the 
Moral Majority).  Political realism is rooted in a Weberian disenchantment with all things 
considered mystical (or religious) and their application to justify social events. Political 
realism contributes, in a way, to constructing a political philosophy which ensures that the 
conversation of what is legitimate to nation-state relations remains in liberal-secular terms 
(i.e. power, economics and strategic defence). Hans Morgenthau, noted pioneer in the field of 
international relations, emphasises this separation, pointing toward the difference between the 
moral and the political; he writes in Politics Among Nations: 
 
Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in 
their abstract universal formulation, but they must be filtered through the concrete 
circumstances of time and place… Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations 
of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes 
between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry.202 
 
In a text that serves as a guide to American diplomacy and international relations theory for 
over a half century, a clear line is drawn between the justification of moral ideals and what 
                                                        
202 Hans Morgenthau, “Six Principles of Political Realism”, Politics Among Nations [article 
online]; available from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm; Internet, assessed 20 
October 2008; see also Hans Morgenthau, eds., Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, 7th ed. Revised (Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education, 2005). 
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political realism defines as sufficient for state action. Morgenthau continues, “[for] realism 
theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that 
the character of a foreign policy [for example] can be ascertained only through the 
examination of the political acts performed and the foreseeable consequences of these 
acts…[it] believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that 
have their roots in human nature.”203 Morgenthau, in this argument, fails to identify that some 
human events cannot be understood by ascertaining its facts on the sole basis of reason. The 
foreseeable consequences of post-secular events encourage us to take another look at the 
relevance of religion in understanding the onset and the direction of certain human events 
that affect society. With respect to Morgenthau’s position, it is clear that the USG, in 
particular, is accustomed to speaking an entirely different language (political) from that used 
in predominantly Muslim countries (with varied exceptions to those countries that utilise 
religio-political frameworks). Consequently, this traditional Western-secular communicative 
framework makes it difficult to appreciate the significance of sacred-secular relations. 
 
Regarding the varied levels in the political academic sphere of discounting the re-
emergence of religion, Elizabeth S. Hurd, from her claim that “Religion is a problem in the 
field of international relations”, makes two points.204 She argues, first, that “religious 
fundamentalism and religious differences have emerged as crucial factors in international 
conflict, national security and foreign policy” and, second, that “the power of this religious 
resurgence in world politics does not fit into existing categories of thought in academic 
                                                        
203 Morgenthau, “Six Principles of Political Realism”, 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm. 
204 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 2007), 1. 
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international relations.”205 A systemic underestimating of religion in international relations  
encourages the tendency of political practitioners to regard religion as non-substantive within 
this arena. By taking this approach and regarding religion as something oddly different from 
the political (and without substance in rising events), this posture inhibits a progressive 
response to reconciling these emerging affairs. Fox and Sandler acknowledge this point in the 
context of the academic political sphere, asserting that: 
 
Religion is rarely included in most major theories of international relations and when it is 
addressed, it is usually through viewing it as a subcategory of some topic that is considered 
more important, such as institutions, terrorists, society, or civilisation…‘This disregard is 
related to the premise that primordial factors such as ethnicity and religion had no part in 
modern society or in rational explanations for the way the world works… because 
international relations is perhaps the most Western-centric of the social science disciplines… 
international relations is heavily influenced by behaviourism and the use of quantitative 
methodology… and… the major theories of international relations are all based on 
assumptions that exclude religion as an important factor.’206 
 
Since religion is traditionally categorised as a non-legitimate source within the US 
political academic sphere, it is clear why political apprehensiveness is so prevalent among 
US lawmakers toward the post-secular affairs on the international stage. However, rejecting 
the view that religion is not a legitimate aspect of statecraft or relevant to the process of                                                         
205 Ibid., 1.; In “Theorizing Religious Resurgence,” Hurd explains, “Since the end of the Cold 
War, most political scientists have seen religion as an inexplicable obstacle on the road to secular 
democracy or as evidence of cultural and civilisational difference in world politics. As Euben argues, 
‘both pessimistic and optimistic prognoses of the post-Cold War world are content implicitly to 
assume and thus reinforce the idea that religio-political movements (among others) stand in relation to 
Western, secular power and international order as the chaos of the particularistic, irrational and 
archaic stand in relation to the universalistic, rational and modern. Two secularist normative 
assumptions have structured attempts to theorise religion in international relations. The first is that 
religion should be expelled from democratic politics; this is laicism. The objective here is to create a 
public life in which religious belief, practices and institutions have lost their political significance, 
fallen below the threshold of political contestation and/or been pushed into the private sphere. Falk 
describes laicists as ‘those who view religion as disposed toward extremism, even terrorism, as soon 
as it abandons its proper modernist role as a matter of private faith and intrudes upon public space, 
especially on governance.” Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “Theorizing Religious Resurgence”, 
International Politics, 33, No. 6 (2007): 647-665.  
206 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 32; see also Vndulka 
Kabalkova, “Towards an International Political Theology”, Millennium, 29, No. 3 (2000): 682-683; 
675-704. 
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political engagement, Jurgensmeyer, Shalieyeh, and Appleby acknowledge the counter-
truism that religion is relevant and capable of bolstering “government and opposition 
legitimacy” within the political realm in times of difficulty.207 “[Regardless] of the legitimacy 
of a state, religious frameworks are capable of providing legitimacy both to the state and to 
its opposition. For that matter, religious frameworks are capable of providing legitimacy to 
just about any group or individual, including violent activities such as terrorism.”208 Instead 
of emphasising the apparent theoretical and philosophical differences between religion and 
the political realm, Craig Calhoun suggests that what should be emphasised is what religion 
may offer the state in times of great difficulty. In Recognising Religion he writes: 
 
Religion appears in liberal theory first and foremost as an occasion for tolerance and 
neutrality. This orientation is reinforced by both the classification of religion as essentially a 
private matter and the view that religion is in some sense a “survival” from an earlier era – 
not a field of vital growth within modernity… [in as much] as Religion, moreover, is a part of 
the genealogy of public reason itself. To attempt to disengage the idea of public reason (or the 
reality of the public sphere) from religion is to disconnect it from a tradition that continues to 
give it life and content.209 
 
While acknowledging religion in the public sphere is imperative to improving 
relations, clearly when a secular official applies their own exclusive religious rhetoric toward 
this religious audience, such posture will push against a potential post-secular engagement.     
Nikos Kokosalakis rightly sees that “though a separation of church and state are present in 
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Emile Sahliyeh, ed., Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World (Albany: Univ. of 
New York Press, 1990); Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and 
Reconciliation (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 
208 Jonathan Fox, “Towards a Dynamic Theory of Ethno-Religious Conflict”, Nations and 
Nationalism, 5, No. 4 (1999): 431-463. 
209 Craig Calhoun, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Recognizing Religion”, Immanent Frame 
SSRC [article online]; available from 
http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/2008/03/24/recognizing-religion/; Internet, accessed 20 
October 2008.  
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Western societies, a separation of religious culture and politics is not”.210   Therefore, one 
may argue that the Christian Right movement would go on, (during the 2000s) to influence 
George W. Bush’s post-9/11 agenda and its reluctance to engage the Muslim world.  While 
its influence would neither be direct nor comparable to the Moral Majority’s influence on 
domestic policy, it would, to say the least, influence the personal faith-based instincts of 
President Bush which persuaded his political decision-making.    Here, an extension between 
the negative language conveyed by the Christian Right movement toward the American 
secular establishment (both in tone and rhetoric) would later find its way into President 
Bush’s public discourse after the attacks on 9/11.   
 
Though the personal Christian beliefs of President Bush do not fit into America’s 
larger secular political framework, when projected into the US’s post-9/11 foreign policy 
agenda, elements of exclusivism (both religious and political) were conveyed to the Muslim 
world.  Bush’s religious rhetoric established an international context for painting a portrait 
that suggested the religion and people of Islam were the “enemy” of the United States.  This 
rhetoric took on a life of its own, shaping Bush’s foreign policy discourse into what is 
recognised as Bush’s “God-talk”.211  This is reflected in the President asserting, for example, 
that:  America is an exceptional nation, referencing the “war on terror” as a crusade, 
indicating as President that he was on a divine mission from God, or that God has led him to 
invade Iraq.212   This Moral Majority inspired language contributed to both severing and even 
(on some occasions) constricting the prospects of post-secular engagement that might very 
                                                        
210 Nikos Kokosalakis, “Legitimation Power and Religion”, Modern Society Sociological 
Analysis, 46, No. 4 (1985): 367-376. 
211 Bruce Lincoln, “Bush’s God Talk”, Political Theologies: Public Religion in a Post-
Secular World, ed. Hent De Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (New York: Fordham UP, 2006), 269 
212 Richard L. Pace, The Role of Religion in the Life and Presidency of George W. Bush, 
USAWC Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: US  Army War College, 2004). 
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well improve or establish functional communicative relations with Muslim audiences in the 
Middle East.  When opportunities for engagement arose that might restore or establish 
functional post-secular relations, they were unfortunately confronted by this exclusive 
religious rhetoric, dimming the USG’s prospects on successfully engaging the Muslim world.  
 
This section has argued there is a specific danger in discounting the perspectives and 
aspirations of religious audiences, especially in the case when a secular player applies 
negative language to an international religious community.  Hence, we see here that it is 
likely to push against post-secular opportunities that will establish a special space where 
religious and secular voices might find expression through social dialogue.  Subsequently, 
within this space, the US secular player might listen and develop more productive avenues 
for dealing with humanity. In this sphere, the secular player may come to terms with a more 
suitable way for addressing the post-secular while challenging its commitment to political 
realism. Despite its representation of various levels of political apprehensiveness toward 
religion (within the domestic and international arenas), a new course must be set where 
relations are managed and both voices are respected beyond the application of negative 
language.  
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2.6. Considering a more engaged response  
 
Reinhold Niebuhr identifies in Moral Man and Immoral Society (1933) that “a too 
consistent political realism would consign society to perpetual warfare.”213 Seemingly, the 
most practical and “enlightened” way of addressing the post-secular, where religion and 
religious events become more pronounced in US domestic and foreign relations, is for the 
USG to consider the relevance of a more engaged response – when approaching post-secular 
affairs. A more engaged response is rooted in an attitude shift by the USG to make political 
apprehensiveness less likely when addressing the post-secular. To a great extent, such a 
response may be easier for citizens than for the state itself; however, this point should not 
rule out the idea that the USG is capable of embracing a more coherent approach, rather than 
clinging to a militarist foreign policy (as endorsed previously by the Bush Administration) 
when addressing international religious affairs. Niebuhr asserts that “individual men are more 
moral than the society where collective egotism hinders the making of a cohesive moral 
society.”214 The challenges we as humans most often face are rooted in the evils and self-
interest of both man and society. In the case of the USG, the last decade its state interests 
were domineering and selfish, especially when dealing with less powerful, predominantly 
religious nations. Such a perverted egotism suggests that a “social ignorance” of this 
magnitude is counter-productive in an age where direct communication is most needed 
                                                        
213 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics 
(Whitefish, Mont.: Kessinger Publishing, 2006). 
214 Ibid., xi.; “There is always, in every nation, a body of citizens more intelligent than the 
average, who see the issues between their own and other nations more clearly than the ignorant 
patriot, and more disinterestedly than the dominant classes who seek special advantages in 
international relations.”, 87. 
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between social groups, nations and between sacred and secular voices.215 Niebuhr affirms this 
point by indicating the need of self-criticism, suggesting that 
 
…the nation is a corporate unity, held together much more by force and emotion, than by 
mind. Since there can be no ethical action without self-criticism and no self-criticism without 
the rational capacity of self-transcendence, it is natural that national attitudes can hardly 
approximate to the ethical. Even those tendencies toward self-criticism in a nation which do 
express themselves are usually thwarted by the governing classes and by a certain instinct for 
unity in society itself. 216 
 
His perspective that nations must desire unity through self-criticism is correct. For 
example, at the (September 2008) CNN/George Washington University forum, The Next 
President: A World of Challenges, five former US Secretaries of State convened to offer 
criticism and advice on the US’s current foreign policy. When questioning former Secretary 
Warren Christopher, Christiane Amanpour asked if, after September 11, “the United States 
could continue to be the demander in the world?” Secretary Christopher responded with an 
emphatic, “No.  I think we have to take a much more cooperative attitude than we have been 
in the past, listening to other countries, recognising our strength, but moving forward in a 
way that makes other countries feel they'd like to be on our side, helping us.”217 Christopher 
has argued that, in a sense, there is validity in Niebuhr’s point that the aim of “the nation” 
should be that of “finding political methods which will offer the most promise for achieving 
                                                        
215 Niebuhr points out, “Such is the social ignorance of peoples, that, far from doing justice to 
a foe or neighbour, they are as yet unable to consider their own interests wisely. Since their ultimate 
interests are always protected best, by at least a measure of fairness toward their neighbours, the 
desire to gain an immediate selfish advantage always imperils their ultimate interest.” Ibid., 86. 
216 Ibid., 87. 
217Frank Sesno and Christiane Amanpour, The Next President: A World of Challenges 
[transcript online]; available from http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0809/20/se.01.html; 
Internet, accessed 20 October 2008; see also Bill Richardson, “New Realism: A Realistic and 
Principled Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs (January/February 2008) [article online]; 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87111/bill-richardson/a-new-realism.html; Internet, 
accessed 20 October 2008.  
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an ethical social goal for society”.218 This point is most relevant to the USG in defining a 
more engaged way to address religious forces, as opposed to becoming overwhelmed by 
them. 
  
 Beyond Niebuhr’s self-criticism (and call for the unity of the nation), it is clear how 
the USG must pursue this unity in a post-secular framework. First, its initial presentation 
must shift and transcend the attitudes of both the sacred and secular within society. In 
essence, to assure the religious voice will not overshadow the secular, and, vice-versa, a 
behavioural shift must initially occur between both citizens. Jürgen Habermas regards this 
cognitive behavioural shift in the post-secular setting as the complementary learning process 
(CLP). The aim of the CLP is to establish, first, that a cognitive level of respect is necessary 
between the sacred and secular in society, by emphasising that neither should consider itself a 
social burden to the other.219 The process emphasises that differences between them will be 
apparent, but that what is gained by joining them derives from their very diversity. The aim is 
to ensure that both voices understand that they each have qualities from which other citizens 
can learn. The CLP ensures that in taking this primary step, citizens aligned to the sacred will 
not have to denounce their sacred beliefs when engaging with the secular, and the secular 
political realm, in return, will maintain its traditional beliefs when addressing the sacred. 
However, it is unlikely that an epistemic learning process of this magnitude will be forced on 
citizens by the state, because the process will first have to be appropriated by the citizens of 
both arenas determined to see the state take a more progressive posture than political 
apprehensiveness toward non-secular groups and the issues they raise. Habermas affirms that, 
“In view of what an ethics of democratic citizenship requires in terms of mentalities, we                                                         
218 Niebuhr, xxiv.; Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Character of National Imperialism”, Nations and 
Empires (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), 201-216. 
219 See Notes on a Post-Secular Society, 8-10; see also Habermas, Religion in the Public 
Sphere, 18-25. 
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come up against the very limits of a normative political theory that can justify only rights and 
duties. Learning processes can be fostered, but not morally or legally stipulated.”220  
 
In making this primary shift toward a more engaged response, a broadening of the 
space for discussion is likely to develop, allowing for more direct public debates and 
deliberations between the public and the private spheres. In addition, a diminution of political 
apprehensiveness is likely to follow, since both citizens will have an idea of the other’s 
current objectives. Even with the progressive aims presented, it would be naive to assume 
that the process will not throw out great cognitive challenges. The problem often identified 
between both mentalities is that each considers the other a “complementary equal” – a 
problem which has persisted in Western society since the eighteenth century at the nation-
state level. With the complementary learning process, a reflexive convocation of learning 
develops, and is imbued with respect in order to encourage the primary adjustment of attitude 
needed to ensure a more engaged response that transcends the post-secular. 221 
 
Second, in encouraging this primary attitude adjustment of citizens and state actors, 
moral-political engagement (assuming the religious voice does not become dominated, but is 
expressed respectfully) comes to the aid of this process. Troy Dostert makes this point clear 
in Beyond Political Liberalism: Toward a Post-secular Ethic of Public Life. In doing so, he                                                         
220 Ibid., 9. 
221 Habermas, Religion and the Public Sphere, 16-17. Habermas reminds us that, “As long as 
the secular citizens perceive religious traditions and religious communities as archaic relics of pre-
modern societies which continue to exist in the present, they will understand freedom of religion as 
the natural preservation of an endangered species. From their viewpoint, religion no longer has any 
intrinsic justification to exist in the present, and thus they will understand freedom of religion in this 
way. From their viewpoint, religion no longer has any intrinsic justification to exist. And the principle 
of the separation of state and church can for them only have the laicist meaning of sparing 
indifference. Citizens who adopt such an epistemic stance toward religion can obviously no longer be 
expected to take religious contributions to contentious political issues seriously or even to help to 
assess them as a substance which can in any way be expressed in a secular language and justified by 
secular arguments.” Ibid., 16-17. 
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presents an opportunity for the nation-state to move beyond the limitations of John Rawls and 
Habermas by presenting an argument that goes beyond tolerance. Dostert makes the case for 
a post-secular moral engagement by challenging John Rawls’s political liberalism, which is 
rooted in John Locke’s separation of power.222 Dostert argues against the tenets of political 
liberalism (“which insist upon utilising secular methods to regulate public discourse”) and for 
a more robust kind of engagement which takes into account religious convictions and public 
reasoning between spokesmen for the sacred and the secular in the public sphere.223 Dostert’s 
proposal emerges as a direct counter to Rawls’s political liberalism, which aims to 
marginalise the convictions of religious citizens. This effort “devalues democratic 
engagement by engineering how religious citizens might express themselves in the public 
sphere toward their secular counterparts.”224 In making this claim he asks: 
 
Are liberal justice and social stability fully desirable if, as a means to those ends, citizens are 
not welcomed in bringing their deepest convictions to bear in negotiating public space or 
defining public purposes? This is not simply a question of fairness to both religious and 
nonreligious citizens. Given the role that religious communities have historically played in 
the American context through shaping public space and public ideals, are we not to look upon 
this involvement as being inherently suspect, something to be carefully controlled or 
monitored? 225 
 
The problem does not lie with any bad case or weak political theory presented by 
Locke or Rawls for religious-state relations, because their philosophical approach to ways for 
the state to engage religious matters is out of date and should be updated. Concurrently, what 
makes Rawl’s argument problematic is that his philosophy is unwilling to reach across the 
aisle to engage the sacred. As Dostert has pointed out, it aims merely to tolerate the sacred                                                         
222 Troy Dostert, Beyond Political Liberalism, 15-32. 
223 Ibid., 165-166. 
224 He states, “…political liberalism envisions a politics more akin to political engineering 
than to political creativity. The ideal of the well-ordered society Rawls champions is one in which the 
most essential questions of justice and rights have been settled. While important political conflicts 
may remain, it is assumed that they will be addressed solely by referring to the political values 
contained in the overlapping consensus.” Dostert, Beyond Political Liberalism, 180. 
225 Ibid., 9. 
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within society, leaving the secular to remain in its space and the sacred isolated in its realm. 
But it is not enough to merely respect the religious model at a time when post-secular events 
are taking place. Although toleration is needed within the state, more cooperation should be 
offered between the sacred and the secular.226  
 
As a colourful remedy for the stubbornness of political liberalism in failing to adapt to 
moral communities, Dostert presents four general qualities which the state should consider if 
it wishes to progressively improve its relations with post-secularism: sincerity, discipline, 
forbearance and, above all, dialogical creativity. The last of these qualities is of great 
importance in understanding a way in which the USG might better engage post-secularism at 
home and abroad (and in formulating effective communication across communal lines). What 
is likely to develop when there is dialogical quality is a conversion of multiple 
communicative frameworks, which creates an inclusive context conducive to engagement 
between the sacred and the secular. “The practice of dialogical creativity presupposes an 
ongoing need for scrutinising our political ideals and adapting them so as to respond to 
changing social, cultural and political realities.”227 Dostert asserts, “We must always seek to 
measure the adequacy of our political understandings and use whatever normative resources 
at our disposal to critique and refashion them when they fall short. This is a process that 
requires imagination and discovery, as well as flexibility and a desire to experiment with 
diverse political approaches.”228 Where a more compassionate approach is taken to function 
within Dostert’s dialogical creativity, it creates what seems to be the most important feature,                                                         
226 “Political liberalism proves a ready-made solution for resolving such conflicts, but at the 
expense of the flexibility and solicitude that might generate more accommodating, less divisive 
outcomes. In situations such as these a more robust kind of engagement, one in which we forge 
political solutions through taking into account the comprehensive views of affected moral 
communities, can afford us possibilities for negotiating our differences which we would not have if 
we relied solely upon an insular set of political values.” Ibid., 166. 
227 Ibid., 180. 
228 Ibid., 180. 
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a communication approach committed to engaging post-secularism to ensure that the voices 
of both sacred and secular citizens are acknowledged and integrated into the public sphere.  
 
2.7. Conclusion 
  
 The act of reaching beyond the secular and into a more engaged response ensures the 
making of a “transformative progressive society”, as identified in Dr. Martin Luther King 
Jr.’s Beloved Community model, which provides flesh to Niebuhr’s notion of national unity.  
A nation open to unifying its many voices is a nation unafraid of embracing post-secularism. 
King’s Beloved Community model speaks of the idea of how to improve relations by 
employing a post-secular framework. By invoking King’s position, both sacred and secular 
players are able to move from the aspirational to the practical by accepting their social duty 
to employ united action. Smith and Zepp acknowledge that “King’s conception of the 
Beloved Community is best described as a transformed and regenerated human [and] 
integrated society wherein brotherhood would be an actuality in every aspect of social 
life.”229 If this concept were taken seriously by the USG from within the domestic arena, a 
growth in shared values between citizens, room for equitable coexistence, cooperation in 
forming practical social solutions and the advancement of sacred-secular relations would 
inevitably result.  This study proposes five vital points for consideration for improving the 
USG’s engagement with the post-secular:  
  
(a) The USG should readily identify that it has embarked upon a post-secular era which warns 
against its apprehensive political posture toward religious issues (both domestic and foreign);  
 
                                                        
229 Kenneth L. Smith and Ira G. Zepp Jr., Searching for the Beloved Community: The 
Thinking of Martin Luther King, Jr. (Pennsylvania: Judson Press, 1974), 120. 
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(b) In maintaining its liberal-secular traditions, the USG must become more accustomed to 
incorporating forms of post-secular political engagement to address moral issues when they 
are linked to religious publics;  
 
(c) The establishment of a special post-secular political forum that encourages public 
deliberation should integrate sacred and secular voices in order to balance the political 
realm’s decision-making process when developing policies relating to post-secular 
international religious affairs;  
 
(d) In this forum, the USG should consider partnerships with international religious leaders to 
reshape failed US foreign policies which over the last decade did not invest in understanding 
the strength of international religious publics and their opinions and;  
 
(e) Ensure that with creative post-secular communicative language the USG rebuilds 
equitable sacred-secular relations with international religious publics and ceases to rely on 
outdated secular measures.  
 
Putting these vital points into practice will provide an opportunity for the USG to improve its 
domestic dynamic to ensure national security by embracing a post-secular framework. This 
means identifying post-secularism as a critical social issue worthy of recognition and direct 
action. Before considering this position, this study will introduce the advantage of interfaith 
dialogue (as a productive form of dialogical creativity), which aids in integrating sacred and 
secular voices for improving post-secular relations. 
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Chapter 3  
 
Interfaith dialogue as a post-secular treatment 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The diverse model of interfaith dialogue is the post-secular strategy which may serve 
to provide a tradition of diversity for the US liberal secular state when engaging in sacred-
secular affairs. Traditionally defined as a multi-religious interaction between citizens of faith, 
the interfaith model characterised in this chapter has two faces:230 one provides a 
conventional method for sacred citizens to communicate with one another within a multi-
religious setting, and the other functions as a treatment by which the US liberal-secular-state 
might: a) utilise a special space for post-secular engagement with international religious 
publics so as to more effectively identify their concerns; and b) learn how to treat post-
secular issues within a diverse public sphere setting. Considering the fact that post-secularism 
is a new agenda where the religious voice has reasserted itself into liberal-secular state 
affairs, it is vital the USG comprehends a treatment capable of handling this resurgence, 
while simultaneously assuring space for both sacred and secular opinions.  
 
What is recognised as the body of interfaith activity (the interfaith sphere) is not a 
particular model as such, but a general tradition characterised here as an all-encompassing 
sphere where numerous activities related to, and modes associated with, the practice of 
interfaith relations exist for the purpose of engagement. The interfaith sphere is grounded in a 
universal diversity that ensures its participants (sacred or secular) may convene to engage                                                         
230 John Gray makes reference to this “two faces” position first in his research on liberal 
toleration, entitled “Two Faces of Liberalism”. We will examine aspects of this study further in 3.4, 
looking specifically at his discussion on modus Vivendi and value pluralism.  
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with one another to address a range of issues relating to theology, spirituality and social 
justice without being stymied by exclusive religious behaviour. When looking specifically at 
the practise of interfaith dialogue (as will be the case in section 3.3.) this study observes that 
it is not a singular practice related to one unitary mode, but in fact belongs to a varied 
arrangement inside a larger sphere, which develops out of a historical tradition of diversity to 
resolve intractable disputes non-violently, aid public deliberations, embrace multi-religious 
opinions to promote mutual understanding and provide a safe space for plural engagement. 
 
This post-secular treatment is not committed to any one religion (in the sense that the 
central focus of interfaith activity is not a religion (or faith) tradition in particular). Interfaith 
activity is inherently a form of religious democracy, in that it convenes persons from diverse 
backgrounds, ideologies and traditions while making sure that particular religious practises 
and specific traditions do not dominate the process of engagement.231 Interfaith activities 
offer possibilities for dialogue and encounter which not only reshape the concept of diversity, 
but also open up an alternative for employing a post-secular framework within both domestic 
and international arenas to ensure a more engaged response. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
231 I will revisit this point later in this chapter in my discussion on the religious behaviour of 
Christian exclusivists toward non-Christian religions and their legitimacy. Regarding the notion of 
religious democracy and the ongoing discussion on how multi-religious conversations are comparable 
to liberal secular activity; see Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004); Jürgen Habermas and Benedict Joseph Ratzinger Dialectics of 
Secularization: On Reason and Religion (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006); and Thomas F. 
Banchoff Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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3.2 The contemporary interfaith movement: Making a tradition 
  
The concept of diversity, over the last century, serves as a centrepiece to the 
contemporary interfaith movement which can be traced to the late 19th century World 
Parliament of Religions (WPR), marking the beginning of the first phase – the gathering.232 
Both historians and researchers in interfaith studies, such as Marcus Braybrooke and Richard 
H. Seager, agree that the origins of this contemporary movement are linked to the significant 
religious exposition which began on 11 September 1893 and welcomed more than 6,000 
religious delegates over the course of seventeen days in Chicago, Illinois. The WPR served 
not only as a significant international event held in conjunction with the “World’s Columbian 
Exposition, Chicago’s great world fair built to celebrate Christopher Columbus’s 
achievement,” but as the first ever structured global interfaith convention.233  
 
                                                        
232 See Marcus Braybrooke, Pilgrimage of Hope: One Hundred Years of Global Interfaith 
Dialogue (London: SCM Press, 1992), 7-54; Richard H. Seager, The World Parliament of Religion: 
the East/West Encounter Chicago 1893 (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1995). 
233 Acknowledging the significance of this event, Seager writes, “The Parliament deserves a 
central place in American and modern religious history. A seventeen-day-long assembly held in 
September 1893, it was considered by its organisers as the most noble expression of the World’s 
Columbian Exposition.” Richard Seager, The World Parliament of Religions, XV; Among the varied 
contentions of the Gilded Age involving the rise in urbanisation, development, Jim Crow and a nation 
readjusting from a Civil War not less than three decades prior, the Parliament sought to carry a set of 
goals that centred on mutual understanding and plural action, as outlined in Charles C. Bonney’s 
(1894) reflection, The Genesis of the World’s Religious Congresses 1893. More specifically, Bonney 
cities the Parliament’s goals were that of “uniting all religion against irreligion and to [setting] forth 
common aims on a common ground of unity”; see Charles Carroll Bonney, “The Genesis of the 
World’s Religious Congresses of 1893”, New-Church Review I (January 1894): 73-100. Adding to 
Bonney’s observation, Braybrooke acknowledges that the objectives, as agreed upon by the General 
Committee of the Parliament in its June 1891 plenary meeting, were that there should be “no desire 
[among any delegate] to create a mood of indifferentism. Rather the hope [of the Parliament] was that 
a friendly conference of eminent men, strong in their personal convictions, would show what are the 
supreme truths and the light that religion could throw on the great problems of the time.” Marcus 
Braybrooke, Pilgrimage of Hope, 11. 
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Among the hundreds of lectures and papers presented at the Parliament, it was the 
theological address by a Hindu delegate, Swami Vivekananda234 (yet to gain prominence) 
which embodied the temperament and concept of pluralism that the contemporary interfaith 
movement would later practise. In his opening remarks, reflecting on the social contentions 
of the age, Vivekananda candidly observed that: 
 
Sectarianism, bigotry and its horrible descendant, fanaticism, have long possessed this 
beautiful earth. They have filled the earth with violence, drenched it often and often with 
human blood, destroyed civilisation and sent whole nations to despair. Had it not been for 
these horrible demons, human society would be far more advanced than it is now. But their 
time is come; and I fervently hope that the bell that tolled this morning in honour of this 
convention may be the death-knell of all fanaticism, of all persecutions with the sword or with 
the pen, and of all uncharitable feelings between persons wending their way to the same 
goal.235 
 
Among the many addresses and lectures presented at this event, which concentrated mainly 
on cooperation and religious diversity, Vivekananda’s closing address on 27 September 1893 
set out the dangers stemming from exclusive religious behaviour which, on a number of 
levels, sought to impede the interfaith process of the time. In his closing address, 
Vivekananda spoke of the need for both cultural and religious assimilation in fostering 
peaceful relations: 
 
                                                        
 234 Richard P. Hayes writes, “The man who came to be known to the world as Swami 
Vivekananda was born on January 12, 1863 into the Datta family, an affluent Bengali family known 
for its philanthropy and contributions to scholarship. His parents named him Narendranath and called 
him Narendra or Naren for short. Like most affluent young Bengali men of his generation, Narendra 
Datta received a well-rounded British-style education in Calcutta. He studied history, science, 
medicine, English literature, European philosophy and especially Western logic. Early influences on 
his thinking included John Stuart Mill’s reflections on scientific method and on religion and ethics. By 
the time he had finished college he was an accomplished musician who could sing and play several 
instruments and was proficient in the Bengali, English, Urdu, Hindi and Persian languages.” Richard 
P. Hayes, Reflections on September 11, 1893 [article online]; available from 
http://www.unm.edu/~rhayes/18930911.pdf; Internet, accessed 20 January 2009. 
235 Swami Vivekananda, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. 1 (Calcutta: 
Advaita Ashrama, 1999) 4; see also Swami Vivekananda and Swami Nikhilananda, The Yogas and 
Other Works (New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1953). 
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If the Parliament of Religions has shown anything to the world, it is this: It has proved to the 
world that holiness, purity and charity are not the exclusive possessions of any church in the 
world, and that every system has produced men and women of the most exalted character. In 
the face of this evidence, if anybody dreams of the exclusive survival of his own religion and 
the destruction of the others, I pity him from the bottom of my heart, and point out to him that 
upon the banner of every religion will soon be written, in spite of resistance: “Help and not 
Fight,” “Assimilation and not Destruction,” “Harmony and Peace and not Dissension.”236 
 
Since this Parliament, the contemporary interfaith movement has matured without a single 
leader; in this way, over a century, it has maintained a dependence upon its multi-faith global 
network, as opposed to one solitary religious tradition. Stephen Fuqua acknowledges that, 
“Since 1893, [this] movement has grown up around the idea that religious people can find 
common ground through dialogue; and while they may not agree on who the mouthpiece of 
God is – or even what to call that Supreme Deity – they are beginning to learn that their 
shared values can be put to use for the betterment of the world.”237  
 
After the gathering of 1893 and a decade of reflection, the second phase, in which 
subsequent movements emerged (1900 to the 1980s) also saw a rise in diverse interfaith 
conferences and forums whose aim was to encourage unity among the world religions (and 
faiths). In addition, this phase centred on motivating interfaith players to take seriously the 
well-being of society by promoting cooperation and harmony (first, among the world’s 
religious players). After delegates and onlookers published histories of the WPR and 
numerous associated papers238, various international conferences and global organisations 
would emerge with diverse agendas (some of which were not reflective of the WPR).239                                                          
236Ibid., 24. 
237 Stephen Fuqua “The Global Interfaith Movement”, Fertile Field [article online]; available 
from http://www.fertilefield.org/articles/archives/000009.html; Internet, accessed 20 January 2009.  
238 C.D. Arnold and H.D. Higinbotham, Official Views of the World Columbian Exposition 
(Chicago: Press Chicago Photo-gravure Co., 1893); John Henry Barrows, The World’s First 
Parliament of Religions: Its Christian Spirit, Historic Greatness, and Manifold Results (Chicago: Hill 
and Shuman, 1895); J.W. Buel, The Magic City: A Massive Portfolio of Original Photographic Views 
of the Great World’s Fair (St. Louis: Historical Publishing Co., 1894); Fredrick, Douglass and Ida 
Wells, The Reason Why the Colored America is Not in the World’s Columbia Exposition, (n.p., 1893); 
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Providing an example of those that proposed a forward thinking project with a distinct 
connection to the 1893 gathering, this study recognises the following  as having a key impact 
on the second phase: the Religion of Empire Conference (1924); The World Fellowship of 
Faiths First International Congress (1933); Sir Francis Younghusband’s World Congress of 
Faiths (founded in 1936); The Temple of Understanding (founded in 1960); and the World 
Conference of Religions for Peace (founded in 1970).240  (These conferences and 
organisations are selected on account of their historical commitment to applying a liberal 
framework led by multifaith players as an alternative to single religious leadership when 
approaching interfaith matters).  Though Christian ecumenical organisations as The World 
Council of Churches (founded in 1937) and the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue 
(founded in 1964) would come into view during this phase--making yet a substantial 
contribution to the fields of dialogue and mutual understanding—this study takes the position 
that these organisations do not reflect the same liberal framework because of its commitment 
to the objectives set out by a particular religion (i.e. Christianity).                                                           
“The First American Congress of Liberal Religious Societies”, Unity 33 (May 1894): 135-36; J.W. 
Hanson, ed. The World’s Congress of Religions: The Addresses and Papers Delivered before the 
Parliament (Chicago: W.B. Conkey, 1894); S. Hecht “The Lessons of the World’s Columbian 
Exposition”, Reform Advocate (11 November 1893): 205-206; Charles Little, “The Parliament of 
Religions”, Methodist Review, 76 (March 1894): 208-220; Lewis P. Mercer “Swendenborg and the 
Harmony of Religions”, The New Jerusalem in the World’s Religious Congresses of 1893 (Chicago: 
Western New-Church Union, 1894): 117-123; Charles Morgan, “Signs of the Times”, World’s Fair 
Sermons by Eminent Divines at Home and Abroad, edited by J.B. McClure (Chicago: Rhodes and 
McClure, 1893); F. Max Müller, “The Real Significance of the Parliament of Religions”, Arena, 61 
(December 1894):1-14; William Pipe “The Parliament of Religions”, The Outlook, 26 (August 1893): 
385; M. M. Trumbull, “The Parliament of Religions”, Monist, 5 (April 1894): 335-54; Henry Van 
Buren, “The Columbian Exposition and American Civilization”, Atlantic Monthly, 71 (May 1893): 
577-88.  
239 Many Christian ecumenical organisations that emerged during the second phase were 
unlikely to carryout a corresponding multi-faith framework as presented at the World Parliament of 
Religions. Though contributions were made in the area of encouraging dialogue, engagement, and 
mutual understanding, religious parameters were set, often constraining multi-faith relations. See 
Marcus Braybrooke, Inter-Faith Organizations, 1893-1979: An Historical Directory (New York: The 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1980) 
240 See Josef Boehle’s doctoral study for a broader discussion on the dynamics of the 
contemporary interfaith movement, with specific emphasis on the works of Martin Buber and Charles 
Wendt within the second era. Josef Boehle, Inter-Religious Co-operation in a Global Age (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Birmingham, 2001).  
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 Assuring  the possibility of broad religious and social engagement (through a liberal 
framework) would be one of the principle objectives taken from the 1893 gathering. Hence, 
maintaining this liberal framework makes certain that interfaith engagement does not become 
congested and interfaith players in both public and private settings may pursue religious 
democracy. The World Conference of Religions for Peace (WCRP) would apply this 
objective broadly in its endeavour to reach beyond conducting general interfaith gatherings 
(in the latter part of the second phase) to addressing projects (of a social nature) that include: 
poverty reduction, advocating for children’s rights, conflict transformation in Central Africa, 
ecological justice, and nuclear disarmament.  The emphasis of organisations as the WCRP on 
expanding its reach beyond general interfaith engagement contributed, during this period, to 
the development of new paths for religious players to comprehend how they might fashion a 
new consensus (among one another) toward a richer interfaith engagement.  
 
Taking this step would contribute, however, to the promotion of a globally 
responsible dialogue committed to addressing broad social issues.   Union Theological 
Seminary professor, Paul F. Knitter, crystallizes this perspective in, One Earth Many 
Religions, writing 
Global responsibility…includes the notion of liberation intended by traditional liberation 
theologians but goes beyond it in seeking not just social justice but eco-human justice and 
well-being; it does so aware that such a project, in order truly to attend to the needs of all the 
globe, must be an effort by the entire globe and all its nations and religions.  A globally 
responsible dialogue is one that is aware that any interfaith encounter is incomplete, perhaps 
even dangerous, if it does not include, somehow a concern for and an attempt to resolve the 
human and ecological suffering prevalent throughout the world.241  
 
                                                        
241 See Paul F. Knitter, One Earth Many Religions: Multifaith Dialogue & Global 
Responsibility (New York: Orbis Boos, 1995), 15. 
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Knitter’s call for interfaith players to take serious global responsibility would introduce into 
the third phase, the prospects of an action-oriented sea change within the contemporary 
interfaith movement.  This occurred both in tone and action to address what Knitter 
references as eco-human suffering.  Completing this task required a new cooperation from 
interfaith players that would include recognizing the voices and concerns of the suffering and 
oppressed which meant reaching beyond stubborn religious debate.  Knitter’s project asserts,  
[The voices of the suffering] are not only to be  heard but understood, if the reality of their 
suffering and ethical concerns are to be felt and not just registered, then somehow all the 
participants in the dialogue need to be actively involved in the praxis of working against eco-
human injustice and promoting more life-giving policies in the structure of governments and 
economics. [Hence] one can hear the message of the suffering only if one is struggling, and 
therefore suffering, with them.242 
  
By the late 1980s and well into the 1990s the unprecedented events of “new wars” 
stemming from ethnic and religious tension contributed greatly to some interfaith 
organisations and its players taking serious the need to promote “interreligious cooperation” 
to assure a globally responsible dialogue.  Since the early 1990s, the third phase has been 
preoccupied with a combination of themes relating to peacemaking and conflict 
transformation.  Josef Boehle of the University of Birmingham has contributed at length, in 
research and discourse, during the third phase, to furthering  “inter-religious cooperation” as 
an imperative to guarantee eco-human justice. (As a widely applied term among many 
interfaith players today, “interreligious cooperation”, is concerned with encouraging 
cooperative relations among religious players that is committed to advancing peace and 
justice by partnering with civil society.)   Reflecting upon the many “new wars” that are 
emerging under this third phase, Boehle writes in the essay, Inter-religious Cooperation and 
Global Change, 
 
                                                        
242 Ibid., 128. 
  115 
In order to avoid major future wars, and being aware of the past terrible history of war and 
violence of humankind, it is now imperative to build bridges of inter-cultural and inter-
religious understanding, dialogue and cooperation, wherever possible, to overcome the social, 
economic, cultural and religious dynamics that increase the rise of war.  It is imperative to 
build cultures of peace and justice.  It is vital to create the international structures needed to 
facilitate and co-ordinate dialogue and co-operative efforts across civilisations, cultures and 
religions.243 
 
The Boehle contribution has challenged opinions as to why an action-oriented dialogue that 
includes (as a first measure) encouraging cooperative relations among interfaith players is 
essential to fostering eco-human justice.  As a consequence, promoting “interreligious 
cooperation” and efforts that lead to a reduction in human injustice and violence has come to 
embody the conduct of the third phase.   
 
For example, the theme of “interreligious cooperation” would become resourceful 
during the 1990s, a key decade, where international organisations such as the United Nations 
(UN), faith-based NGOs and civil society would cooperate together to bring an end to “new 
wars”,  in the wake of many failed diplomatic efforts by nation-states and the UN.244  A shift 
from interstate to intrastate conflict during this period served as a contributing factor in such 
countries as Nicaragua (1989-91), El Salvador (1991-95), Mozambique (1992-94) and                                                         
243Josef Boehle, “Inter-religious Cooperation and Global Change: From a Clash of 
Civilisations to a Dialogue of Civilisations” in Pacifica Review - Peace, Security and Global Change, 
Vol 14, No.3, Oct 2002. 
244 In the third era, contentions related to minority and human rights and sovereignty were at 
the fore of the international agenda by the early 1990s. The chemistry at the UN, during the late 
1980s, was filled with that of understanding how to cope with the shift from interstate to intrastate 
conflicts which would prove to require more alternative styles of engagement toward emerging non-
state actors (and combatants). US interests at this time were placed on protecting the sovereignty of 
Kuwait from Iraq’s invasion. Liberia’s civil war proved tenuous during this era, while the Paris Peace 
Accords, which ended the strife in Cambodia, offered, to a lesser extent, a sigh of relief of what could 
occur. However, the realities during this era of comprehending the best measures to cope with the 
shift in conflict were noted with the spike in more than twenty new UN peacekeeping missions 
between 1988-1993, many of which failed due to traditional responses placed upon new demands. In 
the study Understanding Peacekeeping, researchers Bellemy, Williams and Griffin point out that, 
“During this period the UN conducted more peacekeeping operations than it had undertaken in the 
previous forty years, prompting Boutros Boutros-Ghali to remark that the UN now suffered from 
having too much rather than too little credibility.” See Alex J. Bellemy and Paul Williams, eds., 
Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) 75. 
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Rwanda (1993-96). At the same time, even in the resolving of these “new wars”, the 
mediators felt pressure from the regional-political transitions, religious-based tension and the 
ongoing regional ethnic/(tribal) disputes. All of this encouraged the then Secretary General of 
the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to press for more substantial measures to sustain peace in An 
Agenda for Peace (1992; 1995 addendum), which he presented to the General Assembly and 
Security Council.245 Against a backdrop of failed UN peacekeeping missions, Ghali’s 
proposed Agenda seeks to educate the UN on these new demands with a new set of clear-cut 
recommendations. Alongside UN peacemaking (the task of seeking to prevent conflict and 
keep peace by bringing hostile parties to agreement with peaceful means), a visible 
dependence on NGO peacemaking coupled with interfaith activity soon brought forward this 
form of peacemaking and “interreligious cooperation” as a more formidable option – 
considering its ability to bring hostile parties to agreement by invoking spiritual or traditional 
customs among them which foster peace and mutuality.246 
 
Though “the field of religious peacemaking is yet maturing”, its contributions are 
evidently clear.247 David Smock of the United States Institute of Peace points this out in 
Religious Contributions to Peacemaking:  
                                                        
245 See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: United Nations, 
1995) 39-74. Ghali acknowledged in the (1992) Agenda for Peace that, “As the international climate 
has changed and peacekeeping operations are increasingly fielded to help implement settlements that 
have been negotiated by peacemakers, a new array of demands and problems has emerged regarding 
logistics, equipment, personnel and finance, all of which could be corrected if Member States so 
wished and were ready to make the necessary resources available.” Bellemy and Williams, 80.  
246 Researchers Diamond and McDonald cite in their study at the time that NGO peacemaking 
encompasses: “a number of activities involving unofficial, nongovernmental citizen interactions 
between parties to a conflict, often but not always with the presence and assistance of a third party. 
The ultimate aim of these activities is to help resolve conflict by encouraging communication, 
understanding, and collaboration toward shared problem solving.” Louise Diamond and John W. 
McDonald, Multi-track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace (Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 
1996), 37. 
247 David Smock, ed., Religious Contributions to Peacemaking: When Religion Brings Peace, 
Not War (January 2006) [document online]; available from 
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The World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of Churches mediated the 
short-lived 1972 peace agreement in Sudan. In South Africa, various churches were at the 
vanguard of the struggle against apartheid and the peaceful transition. The most dramatic and 
most frequently cited case is the successful mediation the Rome-based Community of 
Sant’Egidio achieved to help end the civil war in Mozambique in 1992.248 
 
The theme of the third phase, to bring peace through peacemaking, played an equal – 
but unique – role; for example, in the UN’s campaign for a Culture of Peace.249 Over the last 
two decades its search for the best methods to establish this international culture of peace 
resulted in a number of documents produced since the end of the Cold War. In “Religions, 
Civil Society and the UN System” Boehle acknowledges that these include: The Barcelona 
Declaration on the Role of Religion in the Promotion of a Culture of Peace (1994); The 
Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly-Culture of Peace (A/RES/52/13) (1998); The 
Declaration and Program of Action on a Culture of Peace (A/RES53/L79) (1999); The 
Promotion of Interreligious Dialogue (A/RES/59/23) (2004); The Promotion of Religious 
and Cultural Understanding, Harmony, and Cooperation (A/RES/59/142) (2004); and The 
Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance (A/RES/59/199) (2004).250   In the last few 
years, other documents would include: Promotion of Interreligious and Intercultural 
Dialogue, Understanding and Cooperation (A/RES/61/221) (2007); and High-level Dialogue 
on Interreligious Understanding and Cooperation for Peace (A/RES/61/269). 
 
 
                                                         
http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pw55.pdf; Internet, accessed 20 January 2009; see also David 
Smock, ed., Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding (Washington, USIP, 2002), 63-102. 
248 Smock, Religious Contributions to Peacemaking, 1. 
249 See UNESCO, Culture of Peace: What is it? [online site]; available from 
http://www3.unesco.org/iycp/uk/uk_sum_cp.htm; Internet, accessed 20 January 2009. 
250 See Josef Boehle, “Religions, Civil Society and the UN System”, Studies in Interreligious 
Dialogue, Vol. 17, No. 1, Jul 2007. 
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Paralleling the UN’s efforts to make peace by engaging religious forces, the Council 
for a Parliament of the World’s Religions (founded in 1988 by two monks from the 
Vivekananda Vedanta Society of China) brought more than 8,000 participants to Chicago, IL 
in 1993 for a centennial global interfaith rally commemorating a century of interfaith work.251 
The rallying manifesto, Declaration Toward a Global Ethic, was introduced by the Swiss 
theologian, Hans Küng. Promoting the concept of “interreligious cooperation” it maintained 
that all religions share a common ethical ground capable of enhancing the making of peace. 
Its central aim conveys the basic objectives and purposes associated with the 1893 gathering, 
namely the agreement that: 
 
We condemn these blights [armed hostilities] and declare that they need not be. An ethic 
already exists within the religious teachings of the world which can counter the global 
distress. Of course this ethic provides no direct solution for all the immense problems of the 
world, but it does supply the moral foundation for a better individual and global order: A 
vision which can lead women and men away from despair, and society away from chaos.252 
 
Advancing this theme to put forth a global ethic, the United Nation’s Alliance of 
Civilizations (AOC), established in 2005, developed a set of similar objectives that 
transcended the work of the 1993 Parliament by strategically connecting people and 
institutions to consolidate the global networks of the contemporary interfaith movement. The 
AOC serves today as an initiative “which aims to improve understanding and cooperative 
relations among nations and people across cultures and religions, and to help counter the 
forces that fuel polarisation and extremism.”253  These efforts were crystallised further at the 
October 2007 UN High-level Dialogue on Interreligious and Intercultural Understanding and                                                         
251 See Wayne Teasdale and George Cairns, The Community of Religions: Voices and Images 
of the Parliament of the World’s Religions (New York: Continuum Publishing Co., 1996). 
252 Hans Küng, ed. Declaration Toward a Global Ethic: Presented at the Parliament of the 
World’s Religions (1 September 1993, Chicago) available from 
http://www.weltethos.org/pdf_decl/Decl_english.pdf; Internet, accessed 20 January 2009. 
253 See, The Alliance of Civilization [article online]; available from 
http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/39/187/lang,english/; Internet, accessed 20 January 2009.  
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Cooperation for Peace.  In convening two intense panel sessions:  (Challenges of 
Interreligious and Intercultural Cooperation Today) and (Best Practise and Strategies of 
Interreligious and Intercultural Cooperation Going Forward) this conference would go on to 
make a unique contribution by identifying new action-oriented models for Member States to 
advance relations with interfaith organisations.    
 
Such conferences over the last two decades exemplify the depth of diversity linked to 
the contemporary interfaith movement (since 1893) which currently spans the globe.  While 
we will explore the diverse settings for interfaith activity more in  section 3.3., it is vital  to 
mention there is not a “single” type of interfaith organisation or agenda that exist.  Often 
interfaith activity is recognised as a local, regional or interregional effort, but its growing 
association with multilateral bodies concerned with eradicating eco-human injustice as: the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, United Nations (and governments) makes clear 
that its activities are being applied at all levels within society.  
 
For example, the reach of interfaith activity extends beyond promoting conflict 
resolution in war torn regions as the Middle East, teaching American youth about the benefits 
in embracing diversity and religious pluralism, promoting aspects of a global ethic at the 
United Nations, to the social work of local NGOs educating indigenous communities about 
mutual understanding in post-war torn regions.254 This diverse trajectory establishes interfaith 
activity as being multilayered, with a broad geographical scope, whilst also having diverse 
                                                        
254 Regarding the diversity of interfaith activity in the Middle East, see Abu-Nimer, 
Mohammed, Amal Khoury, and Emily Welty. Unity in Diversity: Interfaith Dialogue in the Middle 
East (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007); see also Eboo Patel and Patrice 
Brodeur, Building the Interfaith Youth Movement: Beyond Dialogue to Action (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2006); David Smock, ed., Religious Contributions to Peacemaking: When 
Religion Brings Peace, Not War (January 2006) [document online]; available from 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pw55.pdf; Internet, accessed 20 January 2009 
  120 
activities that encourage its members today to reach across sacred and secular lines. These 
specific contributions of the interfaith tradition allow for a better understanding of the role 
which interfaith activity (as a mode of communication) is likely to contribute to US 
diplomacy if it were to engage international religious publics directly.255  In understanding 
the trajectory of this concept, let us establish a foundation that explores exactly how interfaith 
participation inevitably leads to dialogue.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
255 See S. Wesley Ariarajah, Not without My Neighbour: Issues in Interfaith Relations 
(Geneva: WCC Publications, 1999) 11-25. 
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3.3. The manifestation of interfaith dialogue 
 
In their study Death or Dialogue?: From the Age of Monologue to the Age of 
Dialogue, researchers Leonard Swidler256, John B. Cobb Jr.257, Paul Knitter258 and Monika 
Hellwig259 tackle the notion of interfaith dealings and the importance of encounter. The study 
sets out to address the shift in human society between the “Age of Monologue” (dominated 
by competing religious and traditional ideals) to the present “Age of Dialogue” (an era which 
has begun to accommodate different religious and cultural norms). However, for argument’s 
sake, it may sometimes be conceded that the earlier age is not yet dead in Western society. 
Since post-secular norms appear more frequently in US domestic and foreign affairs, it is safe 
to assume that “the future offers two [clear] alternatives: death or dialogue”, indicating that a 
more engaged response must be applied.260   
 
 The tradition of the interfaith movement contributes greatly to promoting dialogue 
between religions, ideologies, and traditions. But how does interfaith participation become 
manifest in dialogue? The physical practice of interfaith dialogue, according to Leonard                                                         
256 Leonard Swidler, Death or Dialogue?: From the Age of Monologue to the Age of Dialogue 
(London: SCM Press, 1990); see also Leonard Swidler and Paul Mojzes, The Study of Religion in an 
Age of Global Dialogue (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000); Leonard Swidler, Theoria to 
Praxis: How Jews, Christians and Muslims Can Together Move from Theory to Practice 
(Connecticut: The David Brown Book Co., 1999).  
257 John B. Cobb and Abe Masao. et al., The Emptying God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian 
Conversation (New York: Orbis Books, 1990); John B. Cobb and John Boswell, Beyond Dialogue: 
Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982).  
258 Paul Knitter, The Myth of Religious Superiority: Multifaith Explorations of Religious 
Pluralism (New York: Orbis Books, 2005); see also Paul Knitter, Introducing Theologies of Religion 
(New York, Orbis Books, 2002) and Paul Knitter, One Earth Many Religions: Multifaith Dialogue & 
Global Responsibility (New York: Orbis Books, 1995). 
259 Monika K. Hellwig, “An Evolving Vision of the Church”, Horizons, 34, No. 1 (2007): 96; 
Monika K. Hellwig, Understanding Catholicism (New York: Paulist Press, 1981). 
260 Swidler, Death or Dialogue, vii; Sherbok’s text offers a definitive introduction into the 
many theological positions contributing to the development of the interfaith practice as an academic 
discipline and communal activity. See Dan Cohn-Sherbok, Interfaith Theology (Oxford: Oneworld 
Publication, 2001). 
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Swidler et al, “is related in the broadest sense to dialogue on religious subjects by persons 
who understand themselves to be in different religious traditions and communities.”261 He 
asserts, “In this context, of course, we are speaking about a particular kind of dialogue, 
namely, interreligious dialogue in the broadest sense, that is, dialogue on a religious subject 
by persons who understand themselves to be in different religious traditions and 
communities.”262 Swidler’s understanding of the practise of interfaith dialogue in this context 
is a narrow reading; in fact, it obstructs the traditional aims and purposes of the first phase of 
the interfaith movement, as introduced by the General Committee of the Parliament in its 
June 1891 plenary meeting: 
 
There [should be no] desire to create a mood of indifferentism. Rather the hope was that a 
friendly conference of eminent men, strong in their personal convictions, would show what 
are the supreme truths and the light that religion could throw on the great problems of the 
time.263 
 
In this context, interfaith dialogue is a multivalent practise which is not limited to 
convening religious citizens within the state, but is open to all – religious and non-religious 
citizens alike – to examine and resolve “the great problems of our time”. In addition, we must                                                         
261 Swidler, Death or Dialogue, 57 
262 Ibid., 57; see also Stephen Neil, Crisis of Belief (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984) 9-
33. 
263 Braybrooke, Pilgrimage of Hope, 11. As a side-note to women’s rights in context to the 
aims and purposes of the early interfaith movement, the World Parliament of Religions, despite being 
led by a largely male populous, allowed for the contemporary interfaith movement to ensure 
opportunities for women to incorporate their marginalised voice within an interfaith context at the 
turn of the century. Seager’s study observes that the Parliament welcomed twenty-three women to 
present papers at the 1893 Parliament. This is noted especially with the groundbreaking work of 
Universalist Unitarian minister and educator, Augusta Chapin, who presented at the Parliament, later 
going on to become a religious pioneer at the turn of the century. See Phlox Laucher, “For a woman 
to speak in church: The Proud Calling of Augusta Jane Chapin”, Unitarian Universalist Women's 
Heritage Society, Occasional Paper #17 (1997). It is clear, however, that a deep cultural and racial 
disparity was present at the Parliament beyond these progressive opportunities provided for women. 
Of the twenty-two women asked to present, only one of Asian heritage, Jeanne Sorabji, presented a 
paper as a Christian convert from Zoroastrianism. To understand the dynamics of race and cultural 
indifference at the World Parliament of Religions (1893), as illustrated between “The Magic and 
White City”, see Richard H. Seager, The World Parliament of Religion: the East/West Encounter 
Chicago 1893 (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1995), 24-42. 
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understand that, “Conversation in this sense has an expansive definition, and is not limited to 
verbal exchange [between religious citizens] alone… The notion of interfaith dialogue 
encompasses many different types of conversations, settings, goals and formats.”264 
However, when looking into the interfaith sphere we comprehend that the potential for 
sacred-secular engagement is present but is often thwarted by tension within Western 
Christian circles that are opposed to the notion of shared objectives and interest. For 
Christians concerned primarily with Christian religious themes related to legitimacy, 
salvation and revelation, the notion of religious encounter often directs attention away from 
the core aims of interfaith dialogue, which are to convene all players for the sake of mutual 
understanding. Therefore, the limitations of this practise generally centre around the 
limitations employed by conservative Christians toward other religious traditions. 
 
This particular posture that focuses an attention on these specific themes of major 
importance to Christianity is acknowledged as Christian exclusivism. This paradigm gained 
acclaim first by the conservative theology of Karl Barth. Hendrik Kraemer and Emil 
Brunner’s positions followed, with doctrines that Christianity is “the revelation of God and 
faith to all mankind”, therefore influencing the debate on Christianity’s social relevance and 
superiority above other world religions.265 Their perspectives during the early part of the 
                                                        
264 Renne Garfinkel and United States Institute of Peace, What Works?: Evaluating Interfaith 
Dialogue Programs (July 2004) Special Report 123 [article online]; available from 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr123.pdf; Internet, accessed 20 January 2009.  
265 See Hendrik Kraemer, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World (New York: 
Harper, 1938); Kraemer, Religion and the Christian Faith (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957); 
H. Kraemer, Why Christianity of All Religions (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962); H. Kraemer, 
World Cultures and World Religion: The Coming Dialogue (London: Lutterworth Press, 1960); See 
also, Emil Brunner and Olive Wyon, Revelation and Reason; The Christian Doctrine of Faith and 
Knowledge (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1946); Emil Brunner The Christian Doctrine of 
Creation and Redemption: Dogmatics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952). 
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twentieth century were grounded in the school of neo-orthodoxy.266 Barth’s position, for 
example, on Christian faith, and the salvation, revelation and legitimacy of non-Christian 
religions, is argued clearly in the multi-volume study Church Dogmatics.267 The exclusivist 
paradigm rests with the emphasis that God’s revelation is an event that occurs with the 
impartation of spirit and the knowledge of God given to man directly by God.268 Alan Race 
observes in his study Christianity and Religious Pluralism that “Undoubtedly, the 
predominate attitude of the church through Christian history has been to regard the outsider 
as in-error or darkness, beyond the realm of truth and light.”269 According to Barth’s 
argument, however, any religion apart from revelation is regarded  as an activity of unbelief 
(i.e. paganism, or any religion outside of Christianity). Race affirms: 
 
…the Christian gospel belongs with ‘revelation’, and the other faiths are the product of 
‘religion’. This radical separation, it is necessary to stress, is not the result of an exercise in 
comparative religion, but arises out of Barth’s understanding of the Christian revelation… It                                                         
266 “The central theological motifs of the neo-orthodox movement stem from this basic drive 
toward discontinuity and separation of religion from culture. In place of the liberal emphasis on the 
immanence of God in the life of nature and human society came the vigorous affirmation of the 
transcendence of God – of God’s unknowableness and consequent difference from all thoughts about 
God in cultural terms. In the place of the liberal faith in the inherent goodness of human beings 
appeared the categorical insistence that salvation must come to humans from beyond themselves. 
Thus the liberal conception of history as a gradual, progressive development of human powers toward 
a fulfilled good life was transformed into a view of history that is “dialectical” and “catastrophic” in 
character. Men and women are and remain sinners in both their personal and their social existence; 
thus history exists in a tension between God’s judgement on human sin and God’s grace, which alone 
can redeem this situation. The only hope for women and men, therefore, lies not so much in the liberal 
programme of education and enlargement of human benevolent powers, but rather in the “crisis” of 
faith when men and women repent before God, live in a new state of forgiveness, humility, and 
obedience, and look to the final fulfillment of God’s purposes beyond history.” Donald W. Musser 
and Joseph L. Price, eds., A New Hand-Book of Christian Theology (Nashville: Abingdon Books, 
1992) 334. 
267 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vols. 1&2, (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1956); and Karl 
Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vols. 3&4 (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1962). 
268 Barth argues, “This share is given as God unveils Himself to us in that other, second 
objectivity, that is to say, in the objectivity of His works and signs in our creaturely sphere, before the 
eyes and ears and in the hearts which as such and of themselves alone are quite incapable of knowing 
Him. But the heart of it all is that it is He Himself, the one, supreme and true Lord, who thus unveils 
Himself to us; that in revelation we have to do with His action as the triune God, and therefore with 
Himself in every creaturely work and sign that He uses. On this basis and only on this basis can there 
be real knowledge of God.” Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol.1, 39. 
269 Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of 
Religions (London: SCM Press, 1983) 10, 10-37. 
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follows from this that Christianity alone has received authority to be the missionary religion, 
and it has a duty to summon men and women from the world of the religions to follow the 
Christian gospel.270 
 
Such a striking position places strain on the potential of the dialogical process with other 
religions when encountered by the Christian exclusivist – thereby congesting dialogue 
opportunities between Christians and non-Christians. 
 
But Swidler is correct on this occasion that “the term dialogue [in recent years] has 
become faddish, and is sometimes, like charity, used to cover a multitude of sins. For 
example, it is sometimes used by those who are persuaded that they have all the truth on a 
subject, but feel that in today’s climate, with “dialogue” in vogue, a less aggressive style will 
be more effective in communicating to the ignorant the truth that they already possess in 
full.”271 This theological position led many within the interfaith community to unknowingly 
become sceptical about those who hold it. Unfortunately, many Western Christian 
participants contribute to this position, both knowingly and unknowingly.  
 
For example, over the last fifty years this internal theological debate has 
overshadowed the larger message attributed to the interfaith movement, which of course has 
nothing to do with exclusive religious behaviour. Looking more closely at factors 
contributing to this tension experienced within Christian circles, relations are further 
suffocated with Karl Rahner’s inclusivist model, which proposes that the conversation begin 
at the centre of Christianity where one should present an invitation to non-Christians to 
                                                        
270 Ibid., 13; For further sources on Christanity as a missionary religion, see Orlando E. 
Costas, Christ Outside the Gate: Mission Beyond Christendom (New York: Oribis, 1982) 71-99, 117-
194.; and Timothy Yates, Christian Mission in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: CUP, 1994). 
271 Swidler, Dialogue or Death, 57. 
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follow or embrace the teachings of Christianity before real encounter can occur.272 Rahner 
tries to substantiate this claim by asserting that “Christianity understands itself as the absolute 
religion intended for all men, and does not recognise any other religion beside itself as of 
equal right. This proposition is self-evident and basic for Christianity’s understanding of 
itself.”273 This inclusivist argument, which straddles the fence on how to engage the non-
Christian Other, is not far from the exclusivist position held (at one time) by the early 
Catholic Church (Extra ecclesiam nulla salus), which contributed to the decay of all intra- 
and inter-religious relations with persons outside the Catholic church.274 Rahner’s invitation 
to non-Christians (presented in his theological debate as “Anonymous Christianity”) is an 
unreasonable argument.275 It puts non-Christians into a situation to which they have not 
consented in order that Christians may regard them as legitimate equals. 
 
However, a perspective that sets out to counter exclusivism and its obstruction to the 
dialogical process is John Hick’s pluralist theology. In examining how the notion of 
pluralism may contribute to promoting effective inter-religious relations by beating back 
religious superiority, Hick uses his “astronomical analogy”. Paralleling Copernicus’ 
revolution of Ptolemy’s theory, Hick makes the same claim in theological terms by 
demonstrating how important it is for Christians (in particular) who want to encounter the 
non-Christian Other to overthrow traditional paradigms which set out to place their religion 
                                                        
272 See, Karl Rahner, “Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions”, John Hick and Brian 
Hebbletwaite, eds. Christianity and other Religions (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001); see also Karl Rahner, 
Theological Investigations, Vols. 4&9 (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1979). 
273 Rahner, “Christianity and Non Christian Religions”, 56. 
274 Robert B. Sheard, “Inter-religious Dialogue in the Catholic Church Since Vatican II: An 
Historical and Theological Study”, Vol. 31, Toronto Studies in Theology (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 1987) 39-52. 
275 Rahner, “Christianity and Non Christian Religions”, 75. 
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above others.276 Hick’s counter to religious exclusivism echoes Thomas Kuhn’s call for a 
paradigm shift from the “conventional way”, which leads him to the following conclusion: 
“there comes a point when new information about a scientific subject or area forces a 
scientist [or theorist] to give up old models and find new ones to describe how things now 
look.”277 He alludes to the belief that the blinkered vision of the notion of encounter among 
many Christian theologians and exclusivist players has been the main reason for stifling the 
potential of interfaith dialogue and misleading others about what it could achieve. 
 
The many contributions by Christian theologians on the subject of Western religious 
encounter may easily lead people outside the body of interfaith activity to believe that 
Christian theology, in particular, has something of a preverbal lock on how best to practise 
inter-religious relations or even encounter the religious Other. However, one might easily be 
left with the impression that the only persons likely to help the interfaith process substantially 
are religious citizens – if one accepted as persuasive the contributions by Christian 
theologians (or the Swidler argument above) on the practice of interfaith encounter. Having 
reviewed the activities of the third phase and taken part in a number of interfaith events and 
workshops, and even working for the Interfaith Center of New York and Interfaith Worker                                                         
276 “Ptolemaic astronomers saw the earth at the centre of the universe and explained the 
movement of planets (which did not conform to the theory) by postulating ‘epicycles’. The growing 
number of epicycles rendered the Ptolemaic view less and less plausible. Finally, the Copernican view 
in its simple explanation of the facts by the theory that the sun, rather than the earth, was at the centre 
of the universe, replaced the Ptolemaic cosmology. In an analogous manner, Hick thinks that the old 
Ptolemaic theology (represented by Kraemer and others) and its recent epicycles (represented by 
Rahner and others), prop up an increasingly implausible system with the Church/Christianity/Christ at 
the centre of the universe of faith.” Gavin D’Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism: The Challenge 
of Other Religions (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 23. Pertaining to inclusivism “Hick calls these 
inclusivist developments Ptolemaic ‘epicycles’. They attempt to accommodate new situations (with 
difficulty) without modifying their basic presuppositions. Furthermore, Hick argues that trusting and 
credible dialogue is manifestly unsatisfactory when a partner is designated an ‘honorary Christian’ – 
and this even though they do not so regard themselves and even though they may insist they are not 
Christians but Muslims, Jews, Hindu, etc.” Ibid., 25. 
277 Martin Forward, Inter-religious Dialogue: A Short Introduction (Oxford: Oneworld, 
2001), 39. 
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Justice (Chicago, IL), my experience indicates that there are numerous modes that are 
associated with the practice of interfaith dialogue, rather than a unitary method which 
convenes only religious citizens. The shift to convening both religious and non-religious 
citizens within the interfaith sphere is attributed greatly to the watershed event of 1893 and 
the objectives of the interfaith tradition: to resolve intractable disputes non-violently, aid 
public deliberations, embrace multi-religious opinions to promote mutual understanding and 
provide a safe space for plural engagement. These varied modes of interfaith dialogue 
generally fall into one of three brands: 
 
a) spiritually-centred interfaith dialogue. This often occurs in a religious setting, where 
faith practitioners convene mostly religious citizens to practise the liturgies of their faith. 
This may be recognised in the practice of Buddhist-Christian meditation carried out by 
adherents of either faith in a private setting, for instance a pagoda or church.278  
  
b)  religio-comparative interfaith dialogue, often led by religious scholars, in either a sacred 
or a secular setting to examine and compare the theologies or traditions associated with 
various religious/faith practices.279 A conversation within this mode may, for example, 
centre on Surahs taken from the Holy Qur’an and placed alongside passages from the 
Torah for theological examination within a seminary setting. The conversation generated 
at the end of this examination generally turns into religio-comparative interfaith 
dialogue; and  
                                                         
278 See Thich Nhat Hahn and Daniel Berrigan, The Raft is not the Shore: Conversations 
Toward a Buddhist-Christian Awareness (New York: Orbis Book, 2001). 
279 See Roger Eastman, The Ways of Religion: An Introduction to the Major Traditions, 3rd ed. 
(New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999); Michael Molloy, Experiencing the World’s Religions: 
Tradition, Challenge, and Change, 2nd ed. (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Press, 2002).  
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c) socio-political interfaith dialogue280, which is by far the most important presented to the 
liberal-secular state. This form of interfaith dialogue is generally prompted by social 
conditions or post-secular affairs which encourage religious and non-religious citizens to 
convene for the sake of dialogue, for example, between civilisations, to produce 
integrated approaches to resolving critical social issues.281 While the two previous modes 
of interfaith dialogue are geared toward spirituality and theological education, the last 
deals more with the traditional aims of the interfaith movement: to convene both 
religious and non-religious parties with the purpose of promoting shared objectives in 
dialogue and peaceful coexistence. 282 
 
The third mode stands as a true form of dialogical creativity in that it illuminates Küng’s 
Global Ethic by convening diverse parties for the purpose of assuring shared objectives. 
Within this brand players enter into a special space for diverse engagement and dialogue, not 
with intentions to employ their traditional secular or sacred (faith claims) – in order to create                                                         
280 This study has chosen the term “socio-political interfaith dialogue” which it believes is 
reflective to the argument that interfaith dialogue is a post-secular treatment. However, a point of 
clarification must be considered that the term “socio-political interfaith dialogue” shares resemblances 
with the term “interreligious cooperation” which is widely expressed by interfaith players.  As 
indicated above, “interreligious cooperation” is concerned with (at the outset before engaging secular 
players) encouraging cooperative relations between religious players within an interfaith setting.  In 
contrast, the term “socio-political interfaith dialogue” refers specifically to the activity of existing 
relationships between interfaith players and non-religious bodies, NGOs, civil society (and most 
especially), secular officials in the public sphere. Nonetheless, the term “socio-political interfaith 
dialogue” is encouraging to the prospects of liberal-secular relationship-making between U.S. 
Department of State officials and religious leadership.  The likelihood of this relationship will be 
explored further in Chapter 9. 
281 See Kaveh Frasiabi, “Conversation with Mohammad Khatami on the Dialogue Among 
Civilizations”. UN Chronicle, 43, No. 4 (2006): 69. Fred R. Dallmayr and Abbas Manoochehri, 
Civilizational Dialogue and Political Thought: Tehran Papers, Lanham, (Maryland: Lexington 
Books, 2007). 
282 See studies by David Smock, Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding (Washington, USIP 
Press, 2002); Mohammed Abu Nimer, Nonviolence And Peace Building In Islam: Theory And 
Practice (Gainesville: UP Florida 2003); Marc Gopin, Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can 
Bring Peace to the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002); Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan C. Funk and 
Ayse S. Kadayifci, eds. Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam: Precept and Practice (Maryland: UP 
of America, 2001) Paul Salem, ed, Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays. 
(Washington: American UP, 1997).  
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division – but to enter into an arena mindful that the cultivation of plural ideals must be 
established in order to reconcile contemporary social affairs. The answer to the question of 
whether religious players should bring their “faith claims” into the socio-political arena is 
simple: they should not. Taking a step back here to challenge the pragmatist Richard Rorty, it 
is not true that religion is likely to “bring a potentially productive democratic conversation to 
a grinding halt”283; when practising socio-political interfaith dialogue, the fact that this is 
unlikely is based upon one single fact – which relates to typical religio-political activity 
within this brand. Here, the interjection of a “faith-claim” (an authorisation by religious 
players, often found in the first two modes where players clarify why they have taken on a 
religion/faith and why other players should take it on) is generally unnecessary and thus is 
unlikely to occur in this setting. (This practise of social dialogue is manifest in the work by 
international bodies such as, for example, the UN Alliance of Civilizations, and work by the 
United States Institute of Peace, the Tanenbaum Centre of Interreligious Understanding and 
the International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy.) 
   
 Dialogue that is used for the purpose of conversion has often congested interfaith 
relations, as opposed to a dialogue accommodating shared values and objectives. This study 
acknowledges that the true concept of interfaith dialogue is made manifest in practise when 
sacred or secular players set out to employ Hans Küng’s theory of dialogue, which focuses on 
assuring a Global Ethic through shared values.284 Küng’s progressive recommendation moves 
beyond exclusivism and rather toward a shared ethical interest that exists between religious 
and political citizens. When taking up Küng’s position, dialogical participation shifts from 
communicative interaction to a focus on the power of relations between players and                                                         
283 Regarding the notion of “faith claims” see Richard Rortry, “Religion as a Conversation-
Stopper,”, Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 168-74. 
284 Küng defends the notion that salvation may occur in one’s own religious tradition, unlike 
the constraints of Rahner’s “Anonymous Christianity”.  
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institutions to improve society. Küng identifies that it is more sensible to focus on similarities 
which may create a Global Ethic than on the many differences which might impede the 
engagement process. In doing so, he asks, “…what can religions contribute to the furthering 
of an ethic [of this kind], despite their very different systems of dogmas and symbols?”285  
Clearly, if the interfaith community desires to move beyond tolerance and into a more real 
form of dialogue grounded in assuring shared objectives and values, sacred-secular players 
have no other choice but to employ Küng’s Global Ethics. 
 
Consequently, activities related to socio-political interfaith dialogue are likely to be of 
interest to the US liberal-secular state, because it is less assertive of religious claims, thus 
making it more appealing to both sacred and secular players to carry out the diverse traditions 
associated with the contemporary interfaith movement. Its comprehensive arena provides a 
place where the US liberal secular state might advance diversity and peaceful coexistence 
through a religious narrative. Unlike in the previous two modes, the conviction in this setting 
by the religious players centres not on conversion, religiosity, theological claims or rash 
discussion of religious legitimacy, but on restoring contemporary social relations, reasoning 
with secular players on how best to re-establish political systems, and ensuring social justice 
within a pluralist arena. In returning to the study’s central theme on comprehending the 
possibility of a post-secular framework for engagement, how then does the conception of 
pluralism relate to the US liberal-secular agenda as a diverse practise beneficial to growing 
sacred-secular relations?  
 
                                                         
285 Hans Küng, Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic (London: SCM Press, 
1990), 55-60; see also Hans Küng “Global Ethic: Development and Goals”, War and Peace in World 
Religions, ed. Perry Schmidt-Leukel (London: SCM Press, 1989), 183-198. 
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3.4. On a “non-conventional way” 
 
Obviously, the notion of pluralism serves as a core component to the body of the 
interfaith sphere and the diverse tradition of the contemporary interfaith movement. In 
addition, it performs a similar function within the liberal secular state, under the name of 
liberal toleration (liberalism).286 This section draws attention to the influence of “political” 
pluralism in shaping non-conventional state positions and approaches when confronting post-
secular issues. In the text Two Faces of Liberalism, the noted London School of Economics 
political theorist, John Gray, sets out to assess the relationship of the liberal secular state to 
pluralism by taking on the notion of liberal toleration and its associated themes.287 
Recommending broader steps to incorporate the new themes to effectively address the needs 
of society, Gray contends that “Liberalism has always had two faces; from one side, 
toleration is the pursuit of an ideal form of life. From the other, it is the search for terms of 
peace among different ways of life. In the former view, liberal institutions are seen as 
applications of universal principles. In the latter, they are a means to peaceful 
coexistence.”288 The former view may easily be associated with the conventional attitude 
taken by traditionalists that a “single” way of thinking leads to the best outcome. The latter is 
willing to accept that differences do exist within society and believes that bringing these 
differences together may contribute to reaching peaceful ends. As soon as we recognise that 
we live in a complex world which “harbours many ways of life,” Gray’s argument turns from 
theory to a recommendation to consider non-conventional alternatives in approaching the 
emerging issues and belief systems of our time. 
                                                         
286 John Gray, Liberalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995); John Gray, Post-
Liberalism: Studies in Political-thought (London: Routledge, 1996).  
287 John Gray, The Two Faces of Liberalism (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing, 2002). 
288 Ibid., 2. 
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Gray’s description of the first form of liberalism is regarded as the “conventional 
way”, and can apply to the views of Locke and Immanuel Kant’s “liberal project”; it can also 
apply to John Rawls’s concept of political liberalism.289 Each thinker, however, sets out to 
find a rational universal consensus about ways to reach the good through ideals related to 
justice and tolerance.290 Shifting the emphasis by looking at what effect the notion of liberal 
toleration might have on a pluralistic society, Gray’s views ally themselves with those of 
Hobbes,291 Isaiah Berlin,292 and Michael Oakeshott,293 drawing on the idea that “human 
beings may flourish peacefully in many different ways of life,” not necessarily a single 
“conventional way” under a canopy of universal principles.294 The notion of the plural as an 
alternative to conventionalism offers (in the context of US-Muslim world engagement) a 
fresh way to use new matrices which would be effective in addressing the emerging tensions 
of the post-secular world. The discovery that society can contain many different modes is 
attributed to Isaiah Berlin in his study of positive and negative liberties, entitled The Two 
Concepts of Liberty (1958).295 From this basis, Gray goes on to explore this social/political 
pluralism, drawing attention to its two core components: value pluralism (the ethical ideal 
that there are many modes to life relating to different values) and the search for a modus 
vivendi (the ideal of finding the terms on which different ways of life may live together).296                                                         
289 See Ross J. Corbett, The Lockean Commonwealth (Albany: State UP New York, 2009); 
Karl Ameriks and Otfried Hoeffe, Kant's Moral and Legal Philosophy (New York: Cambridge UP, 
2009); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia UP, 1993). 
290 Maureen Ramsay, “What’s Wrong with Liberalism?”: A Radical Critique of Liberal 
Political Philosophy (London: Leicester UP, 1997), 38-67. 
291 George Herbert Wright and Thomas Hobbes, Religion, Politics and Thomas Hobbes. 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2006). 
292 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1969). 
293 Elizabeth Campbell Corey, Michael Oakeshott on Religion, Aesthetics, and Politics 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006). 
294 Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, 5. 
295 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty [article online]; available from 
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/twoconcepts.pdf; Internet, accessed 20 January 2009.  
296 In the field of international politics and diplomacy, the term modus vivendi is generally 
regarded, according to the UN, as “an instrument recording an international agreement of temporary 
or provisional nature, intended to be replaced by an arrangement of a more permanent and detailed 
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The latter search will be the central focus in the remainder of this chapter because it parallels 
the traditions of the contemporary interfaith movement, that of finding common ground 
among divergent ways of life that seek to assure shared values and objectives. 
 
In making sense of this position, Gray implies that if the overall conception of liberal 
toleration (an essential paradigm within the Western liberal-secular state) can survive in this 
age, its “future lies in turning its face away from the ideal of rational consensus and looking 
instead toward modus vivendi.”297 He writes: 
 
Modus vivendi expresses the belief that there are many forms of life in which humans can 
thrive… For the predominate ideal of liberal toleration, the best life may be unattainable, but 
it is the same for all. From a standpoint of modus vivendi, no kind of life can be the best for 
everyone. The human good is too diverse to be realised in any life. [In this case] our inherited 
ideal of toleration accepts with regret the fact that there are many ways of life.298 
 
This position means that, to some extent, the possibility of reaching a peaceful end is greater 
if, from the start, we do not put overwhelming emphasis on the “conventional way”. The 
modus vivendi approach, however, has a greater ideal in mind, acknowledging that a variety 
of ways beyond the traditional offer non-conventional alternatives for engaging different 
parties (i.e. the Muslim world). Though interfaith dialogue may not be a leading option at this 
point, in this study the benefit of realising its the varied option beyond the “conventional                                                         
character. It is usually made in an informal way, and never requires ratification.” See United Nations 
Treaty Collection (website online) available from http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.asp#modus; 
Internet, accessed 20 January 2009. However, this chapter will look at the philosophical definition 
related to this term, thereby opening up the concept of modus vivendi wider to make sense of how US 
diplomacy might draw from this perspective a better way in which to engage international religious 
publics through a non-conventional means. 
297 Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, 105; As a side-note, see Bill Krystal’s January 2009 Op-ed 
piece that engages the posture of contemporary liberalism under the newly-formed Obama-Biden 
administration. Critics ponder the nature of liberalism’s survival in the US under President Obama’s 
administration and if critical values will be ensured amid his transition. William Crystal, Will Obama 
Save Liberalism? (26 January 2009) [article online]; available from 
http://mobile.nytimes.com/article?a=304978&fd=28; Internet, accessed 29 January 2009. 
298 John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, 5.  
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way” is likely to allow the US Department of State to consider its potential as a post-secular 
treatment. 
 
 3.5. Part one conclusion  
 
Summarily, two verifiable facts are presented. First, the USG must make a formal 
public recognition (politically and diplomatically) that it has entered an era of post-
secularism. While not as dominant as it once was, religion is not completely detached from 
the emerging international affairs that US foreign policy is today forced to confront. And 
second, notions of the post-secular are presently bound up with the Lewis-Huntington Clash 
of Civilizations and confrontationalist-inspired arguments convincing US policymakers that 
religion is essentially a problem. This posture makes it difficult for US lawmakers to 
acknowledge the potential and relevance of the post-secular and its contribution to a world-
wide resurgence of religion when drafting US foreign policy and when engaging the Muslim 
world. Caught within a body of political apprehensiveness toward religion (linked to 
historical aspirations to assure religious tolerance within the public sphere), America’s too-
consistent political realism has not only distorted US-Muslim world engagement but stymied 
the debate as to where exactly, with whom and when this communicative engagement must  
begin. In calling for a consideration to improve US-Muslim world relations, it is vital that the 
five formal recommendations presented in Chapter 2 are reintroduced in order to progress 
with a clear understanding of how the USG must embrace Muslim publics if it desires to 
make any attempt at improving relations. They include at this point: 
  
 (i) The USG should readily identify that it has embarked upon a post-secular era which 
warns against its apprehensive political posture toward religious issues (both domestic and 
foreign);  
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(ii) In maintaining its liberal-secular traditions, the USG must become more accustomed to 
incorporating forms of post-secular political engagement to address religious and tribal 
issues when linked to Muslim publics;  
 
(iii) The establishment of a special post-secular political forum that encourages public 
deliberation should integrate the sacred and secular voices in order to balance the political 
realm’s decision-making process when developing policies relating to post-secular 
international religious affairs;  
 
(iv) In this forum, the USG should consider partnerships with critical academic, political, 
religious and private infrastructures in Muslim publics to reshape failed US foreign policies 
which over the last decade did not invest in understanding the shared objectives and values of 
Islamic society, and;  
 
(v) Ensure that there is creative post-secular interfaith communicative language the USG is 
able to employ in its effort to rebuild equitable sacred-secular relations with international 
Muslim publics and cease to rely on outdated secular measures. 
  
If the USG is willing to comprehend how to utilise the various traditions of the contemporary 
interfaith movement, it will be able to transcend the post-secular to engage in sacred-secular 
dialogue (not limiting itself to post-secular domestic issues but those beyond the United 
States relating to current foreign affairs). These recommendations will become solidified 
when the USG seeks to employ a more engaged response to include a post-secular treatment 
drawing on characteristics from the interfaith tradition that employ religious pluralism and 
the contemporary movement’s use of the socio-political interfaith dialogue forum.  
 
The challenges taken up in this chapter have centred on comprehending interfaith 
activity and how this concept is manifest in dialogue. In light of these five recommendations 
this study will take a turn here to explore how the Bush Administration engaged the vast 
majority of the Muslim world in the absence of a post-secular framework. Based on the 
USG’s narrow three-fold fixation between 2001 and 2008 to comprehend the religion of 
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Islam as the problem, Islamic fundamentalism as the source, and the Islamic militant as the 
extreme combatant, we observe how an American history of political apprehensiveness 
toward engaging religious forces in the domestic arena hampered US-Muslim world 
engagement. Apart from examining the lacklustre approaches employed by the Bush 
administration, Part 2 makes a viable contribution by challenging previous US-Muslim world 
engagement practises by exploring the question of communication as considered, developed 
and even pursued (at the diplomatic level) within the US Department of State between 2001 
and 2008. In carrying out this analysis, attention is given to the Bush administration’s 
application of corporate logic to address emerging post-9/11 religious forces in the public 
sphere.299 
                                                        
299 Naomi Klein, No Logo (New York: Harper Collins, 2009). 
  138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 2 
 
 
PRACTISES IN US-MUSLIM WORLD ENGAGEMENT 
(2001-2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
  139 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
CRUSADING US NATIONAL SECURITY  
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
Part 1 outlined various objectives (and possibilities) for improving contemporary US-
Muslim world engagement through socio-political communicative dialogue. However, the 
most pronounced challenge hindering the USG from taking this progressive step surrounds 
the American political system’s inability to readily identify that it has embarked upon a post-
secular era, which warns against its present posture for engaging in broad international 
religious affairs. Making this post-secular recognition goes beyond a realisation that religious 
issues are rapidly resurging to establishing policies that engage these critical issues by 
building trusted sacred-secular relationships. America’s apprehensive posture toward the very 
subject of religion relates to its historic fear that religion’s influence may become more 
persuasive than political ideals within the public sphere – thus lessening the authority of the 
secular on society. Part 1 makes a unique contribution by outlining a conception of this 
political apprehensiveness and its effect within Western and American society; but how did 
this fear mature within the US foreign policy environment after September 11, 2001?  
 
To answer this question, national security documents provide answers of where 
America’s distorted communication message to the Muslim world would emerge, creating 
lacklustre policies and practices throughout the Near East region.300   In handling this                                                         
300 See Melvin Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006); Robert Gordon Kaufman, In Defense of the Bush 
Doctrine (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007); Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, The 
Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences (London: 
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question, Chapter 4 explores how an American foreign policy agenda centred on expanding 
America’s  political and ideological beliefs constricted the prospects for post-secular 
engagement opportunities between the US and Muslim world.  This assessment identifies 
how this post-9/11 foreign policy posture provided a context for the development of 
lacklustre policies and communication practices projected at international Muslim 
communities.   Thus, when looking at the political and ideological framework that inspired 
America’s post-9/11 foreign policy, it is clear why a complementary communication process 
is today imperative, but was quite unlikely after 9/11, considering the highly influential 
neoconservative inspired  “Bush Doctrine”. 
 
Recognised as a new conservative advocacy during the late 1970’s (by liberals turned 
conservative), neoconservatism would soon emerge and cast itself into American politics 
after  the Cold War as a staunch supporter of an aggressive US foreign policy in the Middle 
East and within other regions around the world.  Three principal convictions apply to the 
overall neoconservative agenda which include: a.) Giving credence to the   American 
Century,  “ that moment when US power has no competition and US purposes are fully 
realizable”301; b.) America’s values are “universal” and should be installed with democracy 
around the world; and c.) Regarding America as an exceptional nation.  Charles 
Krauthammer captures this post-Cold War vision in the essay, The Unipolar Moment (1990), 
identifying the contemporary “neocon” agenda.     Krauthammer reflected that the latter part 
of the twentieth century were an ideal period for America to seize global domination 
considering the centre of the world’s power was unchallenged—since the fall of the Soviet 
Union.  In expanding America’s preeminence across the globe would therefore mean                                                         
Routledge, 2006). 
301  See Melvin Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 35 .  
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standing isolated from multilateral alignment (unless with a coalition unified behind 
America’s foreign policy agenda).  In convincing his readers on the value of spreading an 
American hegemony, he writes, 
 
International stability is never a given.  It is never the norm.  When achieved, it is the product 
of self-conscious action by the great powers, and most particularly of the greatest power, 
which now and for the foreseeable future is the United States.  If America wants stability, it 
will have to create it…[Hence], we are in for abnormal times.  Our best hope for safety in 
such times, as in difficult times past, is an American strength and will–the strength and will to 
lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared 
to enforce them.302 
 
Leading   with force meant applying a unilateral foreign policy to ensure America’s 
security while extending its predominance to defend against what some “neocons” regard as 
“new threats” (i.e. suspected Weapon States).303  Prominent neoconservatives as William 
Kristol and Robert Kagan later shaped Krauthammer’s position, identifying that in order to 
bring this foreign policy vision into being requires the use of force “unilaterally” and 
“preemptively” in the essay, Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy (1996).  This 
motivation (and terminology) later re-emerged in many of America’s post-9/11 strategies 
drafted to win its war against terror by extending an American hegemony.  Kristol and Kagan 
insists 
Having defeated the “evil empire,”  the United States enjoys strategic and ideological 
predominance.  The first objective of US foreign policy should be to preserve and enhance 
that predominance by strengthening America’s security, supporting its friends, advancing its 
interests, and standing up for its principles around the world.  The aspiration to benevolent 
hegemony might strike some as either hubristic or morally suspect.  But a hegemon is nothing 
more or less than a leader with preponderant influence and authority over all other in its 
domain.304 
                                                         
302 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment” in Foreign Affairs no. 1 (1990): 29, 33. 
303 Ibid., 30-31; See also Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited” in The 
National Interest (Winter 2002/2003):5-17. 
304 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy" in Foreign 
Affairs, no. 4: (1996):18-32; See also Thomas Donnelly, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, 
Forces and Resources for a New Century (2001) [document online]; available from 
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Clearly, the political and security agenda of neoconservatives to install an American 
hegemony across the globe is rather exclusive in its framework and in interpretation of 
America’s power and values.  This interpretation, as laid out in the Kristol and Kagan essay  
constricts  the prospects of integrating the perspectives of others in the dialogue setting to 
advance multilateral objectives on the global stage.   Hence, the imperial context in which 
this vision functions sets out to sever ties with persons or nations that appear in opposition to 
America’s foreign policy agenda—shrinking the prospects of the US entering into a global 
dialogue of civilisations to address pertinent issues after 9/11.  Working its way into the Bush 
administration via prominent “neocons” in the National Security Council and the Department 
of Defense, its agenda (after 9/11) meant looking past varied opportunities to understand the 
Muslim world and the objections raised by Muslims who were not at odds with America.305   
This posture shaped itself into a vision that would be one-way in ensuring the goals and 
success of American preeminence.   
 
  This new conservative advocacy and President Bush’s personal religious aspirations 
converged. Though projecting religious (i.e. Christian) ideals into American politics does not 
stand as a major agenda for neoconservatives, objections by leading “neocons” toward 
President Bush’s application of personal religious rhetoric were not objected—considering 
the dual agenda of both  in winning a war against terror--at all cost.  “Two foreign policy 
implications flow from Bush’s moralism.  One is a faith-based certainty in the rightness of 
his actions and a strong tendency to ignore facts that get in the way of decisions already                                                         
305 “During Bush’s 2000 presidential campaign, his eight primary foreign policy advisers, 
nicked named the Vulcans, included two neocons, Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle.  All of them 
had reputations as defense hardliners, and all but one went on to serve in Bush’s first administration, 
including his chief mentor on foreign affairs, Condoleezza Rice.  Bush’s other top-level appointments 
in the Defense and State Departments were likewise veterans of the two previous Republican 
administrations—and again, all but Powell were well-known hardliners.”   Melvin Gurtov, 
Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006);  
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made.  Another is his belief in the oneness of God’s and US purposes”.306 Bush’s agenda, 
nonetheless, meant carrying out his duties as President while adhering to his own personal 
convictions.  In effect, Bush’s projection of religious rhetoric in US public discourse 
complimented a rigid neoconservative agenda that insisted after 9/11 on capturing America’s 
enemies and installing more effective forms of governance around the world.   
 
Mel Gurtov makes clear, “Moral certainty and religiously informed devotion to the 
national interest are a dangerous combination.  They create a sense of destiny that mirrors the 
vision of fundamentalist regimes and movements.  In the hands of a leader with awesome 
military and economic power at his disposal, they have the potential to convert US 
exceptionalism into US adventurism.”307  Though Bush’s   projection of religious rhetoric 
into the American foreign policy environment does not fit into America’s overall secular 
political tradition, it facilitated in both complementing and assisting the larger 
neoconservative vision to define America’s new enemy and galvanize the fear of American’s 
against the religion of Islam.  Looking at President Bush’s religious rhetoric (and the origin 
of Bush’s faith-based instinct) as it stands complementary to the contemporary “neocon” 
vision, 4.2. explores briefly the nature of this rhetoric and instinct,  as it facilitated in 
installing an American hegemony and democracy after 9/11.    
  
 
 
 
 
                                                         
306 Ibid., 36. 
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  4.2. Selling an American war rhetoric  
 
It is often argued that President Bush’s major policies were influenced by his 
Christian faith, which was newly-found during the 1980s.308 Unlike previous American 
presidents who were reluctant to wear their religion on their sleeves, Bush was not perturbed 
by the idea of publically acknowledging the impact Christianity had on his mid-life 
development and that evangelical Christians had a religious partner in the White House.309 In 
Bush’s campaign biography, A Charge to Keep: My Journey to the Whitehouse, the president 
lays out a written account of his commitment to the Christian faith and dedication to 
compassionately-lead America, identifying this task as “God’s calling and a sacred 
opportunity to improve history”.310 He recognised it not only as his duty but as the duty of all 
Christians, as citizens, to improve America. Comparably, the same Moral Majority rhetoric 
that flirted with an America on the brink of “moral decay” during the 1970s and ’80s would 
be  reintroduced by President Bush (who experienced a former liaison with the religious right 
during his father’s campaign bid between 1988-89), thus asserting the need for a more 
compassionate America.311 In doing so, Bush would take a page out of the Moral Majority’s 
playbook, as written by the likes of Jerry Farwell, Jim Bakker and Paul Weyrich, to assert in 
his campaign biography: 
 
During more than half a century of my life, we have seen an unprecedented decay in our                                                         
308 See, Stephen Mansfield, The Faith of George W. Bush (New York: Penguin Books, 2003); 
Mark J. Rozell and Gleaves Whitney, Religion and the Bush Presidency (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007); Esther Kaplan, With God on Their Side: How Christian Fundamentalists Trampled 
Science, Policy, and Democracy in George W. Bush's White House (New York: New Press, 2004). 
309 Richard L. Pace, The Role of Religion in the Life and Presidency of George W. Bush, 
USAWC Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: US  Army War College, 2004). 
310 See, George W. Bush, A Charge to Keep: My Journey to the White House (New York, 
NY: Perennial, 2001). 
311 See, Bruce Lincoln, “Bush’s God Talk”, Political Theologies: Public Religion in a Post-
Secular World, ed. Hent De Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (New York: Fordham UP, 2006), 269. 
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American culture, a decay that has eroded the foundations of our collective values and moral 
standards of conduct. Our sense of personal responsibility has declined dramatically, just as 
the role and responsibility of the federal government have increased… We can now say, 
without question, that the belief that government could solve people’s problems instead of 
people solving people’s problems was wrong and misguided.312 
 
As with the Moral Majority, when influencing new members and public policy 
decisions, President Bush would go on to identify America’s decay as arising from  “big 
government and liberal influence” – stating that to improve such an ill would require a moral 
solution. The moral solution, compassionate conservatism, as Bush calculated, included 
limiting the influence of government while outsourcing the addressing of social affairs to 
private organisations.313 As Naomi Shaefer Riley writes, “Compassionate conservatism is the 
theory that the government should encourage the effective provision of social services 
without providing the service itself.”314 Thus, this would include issues related to health care, 
poverty and even immigration. But how did this perspective go on to shape Bush’s position 
toward engaging the post-secular? In a real sense, Bush’s compassionate conservatism 
campaign would shift the context of how US policy would address both domestic and foreign 
issues after 9/11.  
  Bruce Lincoln acknowledges in Bush’s God Talk that President Bush “Understands 
compassion to be quality of spirit that characterises (religious) individuals and groups, but is 
categorically different from the soulless, bureaucratic nature of the state.”315 (This position  
                                                        
312 George W. Bush, A Charge to Keep, 229-230. 
313 See, George W. Bush, “Compassionate Conservatism”, Vital Speeches of the Day, 66 
(2000): 642-646; Marvin N. Olasky Compassionate Conservatism: What It Is, What It Does, and How 
It Can Transform America (New York: Free Press, 2000). 
314 Naomi Shaefer Riley, Mr. Compassionate Conservatism (October 21 2006) [article 
online]; available from http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110009135; Internet, 
accessed 20 October 2009. See Joe Conason “Where is the Compassion?” (August 2003) The Nation 
[article online]; available from http://www.thenation.com/doc/20030915/conason/3; Internet, accessed 
20 October 2009.  
315 Bruce Lincoln, “Bush’s God Talk”, 272. 
  146 
provides clarity into the nature of Bush’s faith-based instincts that underpins his religious 
rhetoric.  In addition, it explains why the State Department would outsource religious 
outreach and peacemaking activities to NGOs as opposed to having on-hand trained USG 
officials.) Lincoln would acknowledge of Bush,  
 
When government attempts to care for the needy, it does so for practical and political, but not 
moral and spiritual, reasons. And in doing so, it obscures and inhibits the compassion of 
godly individuals, thereby compounding the problem… Since compassion is a spiritual 
quality, according to this perspective, social welfare and justice are best left to religious 
institutions, whence the specialised form of privatisation (and patronage) that is the 
President’s “faith-based initiative.316  
 
 
As President, Bush would not shy away from interjecting his religious beliefs into his 
compassionate conservatism campaign and the overall establishment of his political theology 
on social and international affairs. Bush identified his role as President as a calling to bring 
America out of its proverbial “moral decay”, which meant making government smaller and 
invoking laws that were not always  influenced by the secular, but rather by his faith-based 
instincts.317 In Bush’s view, the USG was a “soulless bureaucracy”, deserving of 
compassionate leadership that would restore the soul of the nation by employing conservative  
ideals. In communicating this view, Bush created a “discourse of evil” expressed through his 
application of religious rhetoric to contextualise the events of 9/11, affirming that America 
was an exceptional nation that would defend its cause by taking up staunch force against any 
enemy.  
 
 
                                                         
316 Ibid.,272. See Jo Renee Formicola, Mary C. Segers, and Paul J. Weber ed., The Bush 
Faith-Based Initiative: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
317 See Guy Lawson, “George W.’s Personal Jesus”, Gentleman’s Quarterly (September 
2003): 394. 
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Aspects of Bush’s god-talk that would influence US foreign policymaking after 9/11 
is acknowledged further by Lincoln as including: an evangelical theology of “born again” 
conversion; a theology of American exceptionalism as grounded in the virtue of compassion; 
a Calvinist theology of vocation; and a Manichean dualism of good and evil.318 9/11 provided  
a stage for Bush to invoke his faith-based instincts against an ideological enemy by selling an 
American war rhetoric to the foreign public with regards to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 
Though he speculated as to whether America’s war on terror was really a war on Islam, 
Lincoln implies that, unlike influential evangelicals such as Franklin Graham and Pat 
Roberson, and scholars like Bernard Lewis and Samuel P. Huntington or General William G. 
Boykin, the White House never publically shared this position. What is clear, however, is that 
Bush never publically rebuked his fellow associates and their persuasive rhetoric that the 
religion of Islam was in fact America’s true enemy.319 
On September 16, Bush stated in haste to a journalist that: “This crusade, this war on 
terrorism is gonna take awhile. And the American people must be patient. I’m gonna be 
patient… We haven’t seen this kind of barbarism in a long period of time… This is a new 
kind of evil”.320 Bush’s use of the term “crusade” sparked attention in the Muslim world and 
among key Muslim leaders in Europe. Soheib Bensheikh (Grand Mufti in Marseille, France) 
noted of Bush’s unfortunate choice of language: “it recalled the unjust history and military 
operations of the Western world against the Muslim world.”321  James Carroll takes this point 
a step further in The Bush Crusade: 
                                                        
318 Bruce Lincoln, “Bush’s God Talk”, 275 
319 Ibid., 273. 
320 Manuel Perez-Rivas, Bush Vows to Rid the World of Evil Doers (CNN September 16, 
2001) [article online]; available from http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.bush.terrorism/; 
Internet, accessed 20 August 2009. 
321 Lamont Colucci, Crusading Realism: The Bush Doctrine and American Core Values After 
9/11 (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008); see James Carroll, Crusade: Chronicles of an 
Unjust War (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004). 
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For George W. Bush, [the term] crusade was an offhand reference. But all the more 
powerfully for that, it was an accidental probing of unintended but nevertheless real meaning. 
That the president used the word inadvertently suggests how it expressed his exact truth, an 
unmasking of his most deeply felt purpose… He defined crusade as war. Even offhandedly, 
he had said exactly what he meant… A coherent set of political, economic, social and even 
mythological traditions of the Eurasian continent, from the British Isles to the far side of 
Arabia, grew out of the transformations wrought by the Crusades. And it is far from 
incidental still, both that those campaigns were conducted by Christians against Muslims, and 
that they, too, were attached to the irrationalities of millennial fever.322 
 
By using the term “crusade” Bush invoked a new rhetoric, inciting a level of fear 
among non-conservatives towards his political to “rid the world of evil.”323 In order to sell 
this new war rhetoric, an environment susceptible to this message was created. In this case, 
new laws such as The USA Patriot Act were hurried through congress (allowing American 
law enforcement unauthorised power to defend America against suspected terrorist activity 
by providing enhanced surveillance capabilities, interagency cooperation, abilities to update 
US laws to reflect new terrorist threats and increased penalties for suspected terrorists).324 To 
reaffirm this, Bush announced on September 23 that “There could be no neutrality in the 
coming struggle. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make,” adding that 
“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorist.”325 For  example, after 9/11, this tone 
would resurface in Egypt at the Israeli-Palestinian Sharm el-Sheikh summit in 2005 with the 
President incoherently stating: 
I am driven with a mission from God, God would tell me, ‘George go and fight these terrorist 
in Afghanistan’. And I did. And then God would tell me ‘George, go and end the tyranny in 
Iraq’. And I did… And now, again, I feel God’s word coming to me, ‘Go get the Palestinians                                                         
322 James Carroll, The Bush Crusade [article online]; available from 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040920/carroll; Internet, accessed 20 August 2009. 
323 See, Charles Babington, Bush: US Must Rid the World of Evil (September 14, 2001) 
Washington Post [article online]; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A30485-2001Sep14; Internet, accessed 20 August 2009; 
James Carroll, Bush’s War Against Evil [article online]; available from 
http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0708-03.htm; Internet, accessed 20 August 2009. 
324 USA Patriot Act [document online]; available from 
http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.pdf; Internet, accessed 20 August 2009. 
325 Bruce Lincoln, Bush’s God Talk, 273 
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their state and get the Israelis their security, and get peace in the Middle East’. And, by God, 
I’m gonna do it.326 
 
Hence, this brief reflection on Bush’s “God-talk” answers the question as to why America’s 
principle foreign policy position reflected an overall tone of exclusivism, rather than one of 
multilateral peacemaking.  Regrettably, Bush’s affirmation toward the Muslim world did not 
translate into a strategic plan to communicate and rebuild relations through peacemaking or 
by incorporating large support from the international community.  His personal faith-based 
agenda succeeded, at best, at projecting elements of exclusivism to Muslims in order to 
destroy an existing “evil”, thereby advancing American security and power.    Integrated with 
a neo-conservative national security agenda, the world witnessed after 9/11 a new doctrine 
emerge to assure the installation of American power and democracy to win the US’s war on 
terror.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
326 Ewen MacAskill, George Bush: God told me to end the tyranny in Iraq [article online]; 
available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/oct/07/iraq.usa; Internet, accessed 20 August 
2009. 
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 4.3. Shaping the Bush Doctrine     
 
 Prior to George W. Bush assuming office in 2001, many American neoconservatives 
and foreign policy interest groups were consumed with defining the right post-Cold War 
moment to project its influence into shaping America’s national security agenda.  Some, for 
example, included, the US Committee on NATO, the Committee on the Present Danger, 
Clifford May’s Foundation for Defense of Democracies (2001), and the Committee for the 
Liberation of Iraq (2002).  But, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), founded 
in 1997 by prominent neoconservatives and chaired by neo-Reaganite, William Kristol, led in 
shaping America’s foreign policy after 9/11.   With support from leading neoconservatives 
as: Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Robert Kagan, Frank Gaffney, Fred 
Iklé, Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard Perle, Elliot Abrams, Francis Fukuyama, and Peter W. 
Rodman, one might assume, given the right opportunity, PNAC’s influence could soon 
become a driving force in twenty-first century American foreign policy.   Given the events of 
9/11, its influence was in fact relentless in its pursuit to seize control of the world’s power by 
confronting what Krauthammer a decade earlier regarded as purported “Weapon States”.  In 
doing so meant shaping and providing the political agenda for the development of a new 
doctrine. 
 
PNAC’s inflexible realist agenda conveyed a seriousness toward installing US global 
leadership throughout the world by applying a foreign policy built on the successes of the 
Reagan Administration: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future 
challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles 
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abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities.327  
Recognised in the first line of PNAC’s statement and principles, is   that American foreign 
policy had fallen adrift during the late twentieth century, due in part to the Clinton 
administration’s commitment to multilateralism and its resistance to “isolationist impulses 
from within its ranks”.328 Thus, “Cuts in foreign affairs and defense spending, inattention to 
the tools of statecraft, and inconstant leadership” contribute to what the organization regards 
as opportunities that were making it “increasingly difficult to sustain American influence 
around the world”.329   In defending America’s proposed new role in international relations 
meant taking serious the need to increase US defense spending, strengthening ties to 
democratic allies, spreading American values, and promoting economic and political 
freedom, and expanding US military primacy.  
 
In crafting this agenda, this study acknowledges that both the election of George W. 
Bush (an American President who would rely on faith-based instincts) and the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 provided the political context and ideological underpinning to promote 
PNAC’s neo-Reaganite national security agenda.  Acknowledging Gurtov, the terrorist 
attacks had three transforming effects on American foreign policy.   
First, it elevated neocon thinking—a vigour US nationalism—to the intellectual 
center…Second, 9/11 downgraded the particularities of traditional realism and globalism in 
favor of a new crusade akin to the Cold War crusade that fused anticommunism with an open-
door world economy…[and] Third, 9/11 crystallized two simple but very expansive strategic 
objectives:  winning the war on terror and undermining rogue states that possess, or might 
possess, weapons of mass destruction.330 
 
                                                        
327 See PNAC Statement of Principles (3 June 1997) [article online] available from 
http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm; Internet, accessed 20 April 2010.  
328 Ibid. 
329 Ibid 
330 Melvin Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006); 37. 
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In addition, PNAC’s September 20, 2001 open letter to President Bush marked  the beginning 
of neoconservatives having a hand in shaping America’s national security agenda that would 
pursue many of the objectives laid out in either Krauthamer’s The Unipolar Moment, 
Wolfowitz’s Defense Planning Guidance (1992),  or the Kristol & Kagan essay, Toward a 
Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy.  Hence, PNAC’s statement and principles in collaboration 
with the political and ideological framework set out in these and other essays/documents 
resulted in the “Bush Doctrine”, as mainly expressed in the 2002 and 2006 US National 
Security Strategy.   
 
The core principles of the “Bush Doctrine” (introduced by “neocons” in the late 
1990s) that were enacted in the 2002 National Security Strategy included: a) the endorsement 
of pre-emptive strikes against potential targets linked to terrorist activity; b) advancing 
military primacy; c) supporting a new multilateralism by establishing a coalition of the 
willing; and d) the spread of democracy to combat terrorist ideology within the Middle 
East.331 The overall conception of this doctrine may be condensed into a concise statement as 
captured in the 2002 National Security Strategy: 
 
The security environment confronting the United States today is radically different from what 
we have faced before. Yet the first duty of the United States Government remains what it 
always has been: to protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring 
American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, 
using all elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage. The greater the 
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking 
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of 
the enemy’s attack. There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD. 
To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if 
necessary, act pre-emptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defence. The United 
States will not resort to force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats. Our preference is that                                                         
331 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
September 2002 (New York: Morgan James Pub, 2009). See Brad Roberts, American Primacy and 
Major Power Concert: A Critique of the 2002 National Security Strategy (Alexandria: Institute for 
Defense Analyses, 2002). 
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nonmilitary actions succeed. And no country should ever use pre-emption as a pretext for 
aggression.332 
 
In pursuing an aggressive national security agenda in its war against terror, numerous 
strategies – including the National Security Strategy in 2002 – were introduced by   the Bush 
administration. However, an accompanying strategy to promote the “neocon” agenda to 
address “new threats” linked to suspected “Weapon States” (as Iraq and Iran) is the National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCWMD).   This strategy highlights the 
depth of the neoconservative agenda to seize American predominance throughout Central and 
South Asia by identifying three specific pillars to deter WMDs from falling into the hands of 
terrorists. They include: Counterproliferation to combat WMD use; Strengthening 
nonproliferation to combat WMD proliferation; and Establishing a consequence management 
unit to respond to WMD use.  
 
When considering the NSCWMD’s impact on a more nuanced level, its first pillar 
highlights counterproliferation to offset the flow of WMDs from reaching the hands of 
Islamic extremists (involved directly or indirectly with the Taliban or Al-Qaeda). Countering 
the development of nuclear arms by interdiction was essential to the President’s national 
security plan and to the White House for assuring counterproliferation. Efforts to counter 
WMDs were assured by US military and intelligence capabilities at the Department of 
Defense, the CIA, the National Security Agency and National Intelligence Council, to deter 
cross-border transaction of arms proliferation and the financing of terrorist cells. (Tactics 
                                                        
332 George Bush, The 2002 National Security Strategy [document online] available from 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/print/sectionV.html; Internet, accessed 20 
August 2009.  
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involved pre-emptive measures, and analysation of these agencies’ “capabilities of detecting 
and destroying an adversary’s WMD assets before these weapons [were] used.”)333  
 
The second pillar centred on “diplomatic approaches in bilateral and multilateral 
settings in pursuit of [US] nonproliferation goals.”334 Suppressing terrorist organisations and 
countries which purportedly posed an eminent threat to US national security interests by the 
development and selling of nuclear arms, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic 
missiles, were to be carried out under this pillar, therefore setting, to a degree, the foreign 
policy and diplomatic agenda. In doing so, the Bush administration proposed measures that 
openly supported the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency’s objectives on a number of levels, including UN sanctions against foes.335 The 
selling of chemical and biological weapons was halted through a USG alliance with the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Conversely, in its pursuit to halt 
missile production by rival states and international terrorist organisations, the US was able to 
reinforce its position in the Missile Technology Control Regime by offering strategic 
“support for universal adherence to the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic 
Missile Proliferation.”336 
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334 Ibid. 
335 Since 2002, CIA and National Intelligence Estimate reports have concluded that neither 
country, Iraq or Iran, posed a nuclear threat; and nor did Iraq have WMDs, as implied by US  
President George W. Bush in his 29 January 2002 State of the Union Address; see Central 
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The final pillar to this strategy provided a central outline which specified how the 
USG would defend the “American homeland” in the event of future terrorist attacks, by 
establishing a Department of Homeland Security. The objectives of the National Strategy of 
Homeland Security (which fell under the third pillar) addressed the role of the White House 
Office of Homeland Security first in “[coordinating] all federal efforts to prepare for and 
mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks within the United States, including those 
involving WMDs”; and, second, committing the Office of Homeland Security to “also work 
closely with state and local governments to ensure their planning, training and equipment 
requirements [were] addressed”337 in the event of another terrorist attack.  
 
In establishing these three pillars to combat WMDs, an additional US National 
Security Strategy was introduced (in March 2006), shifting the global war on terror’s focus 
from combat and weaponry to nation building, spreading democracy and supporting 
democratic regime change in order that predominantly Muslim countries such as Afghanistan 
and Iraq might combat Islamic extremism. Bush’s 2006 National Security Strategy set out to 
ensure that the Middle East would no longer be a breeding ground that contributed to the 
recruitment of terrorist activity. In doing so, the administration would implement an 
alternative ideology rooted in democratic ideals and American values. To carry out this 
vision meant vehemently encouraging the spread of democracy and American values by 
publically affirming:   
 
The long-term solution for winning the War on Terror is the advancement of freedom and 
human dignity through effective democracy. Elections are the most viable sign of a free 
society and can play a critical role in advancing effective democracy. But elections alone are 
not enough… They are responsive to their citizens, submitting to the will of the people. 
Effective democracies exercise effective sovereignty and maintain order within their own 
borders; address causes of conflict peacefully, protect independent and impartial systems of                                                         
337 Ibid., 5. 
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justice, punish crime, embrace the rule of law and resist corruption. Effective democracies 
limit the reach of government, protecting the institutions of civil society. In effective 
democracies, freedom is indivisible.338 
 
A tone of American predominance is asserted in the notion that any nation (or non-state 
combatant) should and would not be allowed (in any way) to present a threat to America’s 
governance capabilities or national security (at home or abroad). The best way to ensure this 
would be through the spread of democracy, which would mean that allies and foes alike 
understood the value of a democratic society. Regime change (among other important 
objectives) became an essential component of the new paradigm. The 2006 NSS 
accomplished, on the surface, two specific goals: i) identifying in clear terms America’s new 
enemy (extreme Islamic ideology, terrorists and rogue states) that the USG planned to defend 
against at all costs militarily; and ii) it included the course of action for rebuilding key 
nations in an effort to promote effective democracies within countries identified as failed 
states. 
  
While these strategies which underpin the Bush Doctrine focused on installing US 
global leadership to ensure American security—by applying unilateral policies—the fact 
stands that  they inevitably cut off prospective opportunities to recognise the interests of 
allies an foes alike.   Between President Bush conveying exclusive religious rhetoric and a 
hard-line neoconservative agenda, space would not exist for promoting a post-secular 
engagement with the Muslim world.  For the Bush administration, endorsing this post-secular 
                                                        
338George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy 2006 [document online] available from 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/nss.pdf; Internet, accessed 20 August 2009; “It 
is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every 
nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In the world today, the 
fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal 
of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs 
of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way 
to provide enduring security for the American people.” NSS 2006. 
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engagement would in effect work counter to any aims it previously set for projecting 
exceptionalism and an American hegemony throughout the world.  Taking such a progressive 
stance would require President Bush stepping back from his faith-based instincts and the 
Bush administration endorsing multilateralism over isolationism.  Unfortunately, this would 
not be the case.  
 
The truth stands that by sticking to its “hard-headed” realism posture  (to expand 
American dominance politically and militarily) America would not become safer as 
suspected, but a more arrogant nation.  Promoting this aggressive realism has inevitably cost 
America its reputation throughout the Muslim world and including varied opportunities to 
restore trusted relations with Muslims (who were not at odds with America after September 
11). These events occurred in a culminated effort to maintain the Bush Doctrine’s principle 
objectives to: Endorse preemptive strikes against purported terrorist sites, Build an alliance 
with the “coalition of the willing” or   Endorse (legal/illegal) regime change in support of 
spreading democracy throughout the Middle East.339  Applying these measures essentially 
meant restricting the prospects of making America a safer nation. In effect, it ensured the 
USG would have a narrow   post-9/11 doctrine that promoted a rigid form of imperialism, as 
oppose to a broad multilateral doctrine that assured peace through constructive 
peacemaking.340     
 
                                                         
339 Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy 
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4.4. The limitations of the Bush Doctrine 
 
The aim of the Bush Doctrine was extending America’s exceptionalism and 
democracy into the Muslim world in order to assure the “expansion of material capability” 
and “the presence of a US domestic ideology cultivated by fear.”341  Jonathan Monten states, 
in the essay Roots of the Bush Doctrine: 
In an approach variously characterised as “democratic realism”, “national security 
liberalism”, democratic globalism” and “messianic universalism” the Bush administration’s 
national security policy [centred] on the direct application of US military and political power 
to promote democracy in strategic areas... More broadly, the Bush administration [proposed] 
a liberal international order grounded in US military and political power, as its 2002 National 
Security Strategy (NSS) contends, the unparalleled US position of primacy creates a moment 
of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe… [to] actively work to 
bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the 
world.”342  
 
Bush’s Charge to pursue a liberal international order to meet then US national security 
objectives contributed greatly (to the surprise of the USG) to: distorting US-Muslim World 
communication, ensuring the spread of American values within Muslim publics, and  
replacing the spread of political Islamic ideology with Western democratic ideals. Bush’s 
unilateralist policies, on the whole, “produced quick victories in Afghanistan and Iraq but 
have yet fractured the nation’s alliances causing the world system to be more chaotic and 
unfriendly and the United States to be less secure.”343   
 
As with both the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines, the Bush Doctrine reintroduced 
a staunch agenda which also distinguished the American political system from its enemy (in 
Bush’s case  the Taliban/Al-Qaeda’s or  non-democratic system on the international stage).                                                         
341 Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy 
Promotion in US  Strategy”, International Security, 29 (2005): 112-156. 
342 Ibid.  
343 Joshua Micha Marshall, “Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives”, Foreign 
Affairs, 82 (November/December 2003): 142. 
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While promoting policies that identified America as an exceptional nation, the prospects for a 
global dialogue (with foes and enemies alike) were severed.  After reviewing the most vital 
aspects of this doctrine, it is apparent that there is a missing dimension to its framework, 
which centres on its inability to acknowledge the importance of engaging both the religious 
and cultural dimensions of Islamic society through constructive peacemaking efforts. Its 
limitations are as follows:   
 
 i) While the Bush Doctrine served as the principle national security and foreign policy 
strategy after 9/11, influencing the entire USG system, this thesis finds that the doctrine is 
reluctant to make a post-secular recognition that moves beyond identifying the religion of 
Islam as a potential threat to US national security (as opposed to it serving as a potential 
peacemaking instrument to combat WMDs);  
 
ii) The Bush Doctrine outlines a strategy to combat terror and Islamic extremism through 
staunch military force, but fails to outline an equal but strategic communicative plan of action 
to directly engage the vast majority of the Muslim world (to establish formidable social 
relations that contribute to direct peacemaking efforts); and  
  
iii) The doctrine stands as a hyper–defence agenda which downplays political peacemaking 
efforts while placing more emphasis on expediting results achievable through staunch 
military force. 
 
To a great extent, it is clear why the USG overlooked the important dimension of 
comprehending the religion of Islam as a potential partner and avenue to combat WMDs and 
terror after 9/11. The realist agenda held by key Bush administration “neocons” would not 
recognise nor take serious the dynamics of religion in its overall foreign policy equation.  Its 
success-over-understanding agenda, nonetheless, limited this productive form of engagement.  
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For leading “neocons” in the Bush administration as Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Wolfowitz, 
engaging with religious elements to promote peacemaking ran counter, however, to its 
agenda to seize power in Afghanistan and Iraq.   
 
Downplaying the post-secular or impact of religious issues on US foreign policy 
would coincide with President Bush’s political agenda to shrink the USG’s capacity to handle 
critical issues related to social welfare. Most religious, tribal and cultural affairs on the 
international stage would fall into this category, with exceptions given to issues related to 
religious freedom and religious tolerance. In Bush’s compassionate conservatism campaign, 
America’s bureaucratic system, according to the President, was not moral or spiritual enough 
to understand with complete measure the concept of religion, and therefore should not engage 
in the American political system; such matters should instead be outsourced to faith-based 
organisations or private NGOs.344 This position gained traction within the White House and 
later made its way into key USG departments and agencies. Carrying out the Bush Doctrine’s 
objective could only be upheld if the religio-political dimension of the Muslim world were 
overlooked and traditional components such as economy, security, governance, political 
realism and defence-related issues were on the table. Washington made it clear that 
dedication to analysing broad international religious affairs would be overlooked in order  to 
execute this hyper-defence agenda. But why would key USG departments/agencies and its 
officials be reluctant to counter this position? Numerous issues relate to this hesitation.  
  
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies 2007 report, Mixed 
Blessings: US Government Engagement with Religion in Conflict-Prone Settings, three                                                         
344 See Naomi Shaefer Riley, Mr. Compassionate Conservatism (October 21 2006) [article 
online]; available from http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110009135; Internet, 
accessed 20 October 2009. 
  161 
obstacles to the above are put forth.345 The first obstacle would relate (as noted in Chapter 2) 
to their misunderstanding of the  US Establishment Clause and the parameters identified 
within it. Misunderstanding this significant clause, in effect, created an administration 
publically apprehensive toward challenging the Bush administration or integrating any form 
of religious analysis or sacred-secular engagement (with critical Muslim infrastructures) into 
its overall policy discussion. When various USG department and agency officials were 
interviewed by CSIS:  
 
Some officials said they believe the Establishment Clause categorically limits government 
activities related to religion, while others said they were not sure of the specific ways the clause 
should shape their actions and decisions. This lack of clarity on the rules regarding religion can 
hinder proactive engagement. Some government officials said they are sensitive about 
approaching religion because they fear being personally attacked – via litigation or public 
opprobrium – for possibly violating the Establishment Clause. Although usually unclear on the 
legal parameters of this engagement, government officials are often certain of the political risks 
involved.346  
 
 This level of scepticism cultivated a USG system that would become hesitant at addressing 
religion within the public sphere. Considering the reluctance of the Bush Doctrine to engage 
the religious and cultural dimensions of the Muslim world indicates clearly that the Bush 
administration “[saw] religion as a dangerous or divisive issue best left out of analysis.”347   
With key USG departments and agencies adhering to this approach it, in effect, limited the 
possibility for concrete formidable US-Muslim world relations. 
 
The second obstacle relates to the USG’s contemporary framework for “approaching” 
religious issues. This CSIS report indicates that the USG’s framework was too narrow and                                                         
345 Liora Danan and Alice Hunt, “Mixed Blessings: US  Government Engagement with 
Religion in Conflict-Prone Settings.” CSIS Report. (Washington: CSIS Press, 2007). 
346 Ibid., 39. 
347 Ibid., 41;  Hence, it appears further discussion between USG agencies on its parameters 
and its gathering a definitive understanding of the Establishment Clause deserves greater attention. 
This discussion is one that would initially broaden the conversation on how the administration could 
possibly engage religion to employ strategic non-violent peacemaking as a first option. 
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generally lacking a progressive focus when confronted with engaging post-secular issues, 
hence the Bush administration’s narrow view toward the religion of Islam and Islamic 
fundamentalism. This narrow vision translated itself into a tapered tone that overemphasised 
the violent aspects associated with the religion of Islam as the problem, and consequently 
created an insular US government culture that was sceptical of both potential US-Islamic 
engagement and religious analysis.  
 
Despite the fact that religion is seen as powerful enough to fuel conflict, policymakers less 
often [engaged] with its peacemaking potential. The current focus on extremism… skewed 
official US  policy toward viewing Islam through a threat lens, rather than as a community of 
actors who may also be able to play a positive role in international relations.348 
 
  The final, but most important, obstacle identified recounts how the Bush Doctrine 
influenced the overall framework of the USG system whereby officials reduced the concept 
of religion to that of a non-substantive topic in international relations. In this case, it is clear 
how a principal foreign policy position created in the White House would later influence key 
departments and agencies. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense (since 9/11) were often limited to their 
personal engagement efforts as set forth by the doctrine and its influence on its approach. If 
and when the topic of religion was introduced into USG affairs in such agencies, however, 
officials approached these topics nonchalantly as “broad cultural issues rather than religion 
specifically.”349 In taking this approach, officials, in the case of the State Department, 
stripped away the theological significance of critical post-secular matters – reducing them to 
cultural affairs issues. Thus CSIS’s research notes: 
 
                                                        
348 Ibid., 41. 
349 Ibid. 45. 
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Although mainstreaming religious awareness across the government will be critical to 
improving engagement abroad, many government officials mentioned the lack of religious 
experts as a particular problem. Hiring of religious experts has recently been emphasised by 
some government officials, but their use has been ad hoc and resource-constrained and there 
is often a lack of incentive for these experts to join the government.350 
 
Harvard University professor J. Bryan Hehir points out in Religion, Realism and Just 
Intervention, “The separation of religion from political discourse and the broader assumption 
that religion may be treated as a “private phenomenon,” significant in the lives of individuals 
but not a force of public consequence, has been treated as a given in the discipline of 
international relation and in the discourse of [American foreign policymaking after 9/11].”351  
 
Thus, the three obstacles identified by the CSIS (a misunderstanding of the 
Establishment clause, the USG’s narrow framework for engaging religion, and the incapacity 
of the USG to engage the topic of religion substantively) indicate why USG officials 
would/could not effectively employ an alternative approach to addressing broad international 
religious issues.   “U.S. foreign policy, in recent decades, has often misread the importance of 
religion as a factor in the national politics and international behaviour of some countries and 
regions. This has sometimes led to incorrect analysis and erroneous policy responses which 
have proven quite costly.”352 For example, this was the case with the NSS 2006 and its 
speculative statement on how the USG proposed it would address the vast majority of the 
Muslim world.  Ad hoc approaches would be employed by the USG’s key diplomatic agency, 
the State Department, and these approaches would advocate the NSS 2006 support of 
“political reforms which (should) empower peaceful Muslims to practice and interpret their 
                                                        
350 Ibid, 44. 
351 Bryan Hehir, “Religion, Realism and Just Intervention”, Liberty and Power: A Dialogue 
on Religion & US  Foreign Policy, ed E.J. Dionne, Jean Bethke Elshtain and Kayla Drogosz 
(Washington: Brooking Institute Press, 2004), 13. 
352 Barry Rubin, “Religion and International Affairs”, Religion the Missing Dimension of 
Statecraft, ed. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1994), 20. 
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faith [while the USG works] to undermine the ideological underpinnings of violent Islamic 
extremism and gain the support of non-violent Muslims around the world.”353 However, this 
lacklustre approach, coupled by unilateral foreign policies, would in effect achieve the 
opposite, thus to promote American predominance in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
     
4.5. Conclusion 
 
After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Doctrine served as the principal foreign 
policy position for the USG to combat terrorism and WMDs. This doctrine, which adamantly 
set out to defend the Bush administration’s objectives to: carry out pre-emptive strikes, 
advance military primacy, endorse a coalition of the willing, and the spread of democracy, 
had an overwhelming influence on US foreign policy formation from the executive branch to 
key US departments and agencies. This doctrine overhauled the possibility of diplomatic and 
peacemaking initiatives to serve as a first option to engage the Muslim world after 9/11. Its 
central focus to reaching its objectives was based entirely on employing staunch military 
force in order to install an American hegemony in throughout Central and South Asia. In 
taking this approach, the Bush administration would forgo making a post-secular recognition 
that a) recognised the emergence of religious issues in international affairs and b) went as far 
as to setup a socio-political forum that incorporated the religious voice in order to welcome 
its perspectives into the US policymaking discussion. In its 2007 recommendation on how the 
USG system might improve its relations with the post-secular to enhance peacemaking 
opportunities, the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ researchers suggested that 
the USG:  
                                                         
353 National Security Strategy 2006, 11. 
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i) Create a policy imperative that encourages broad public discussion; 
ii) Provide clarity and give legal guidance for engaging with religion; 
iii) Increase knowledge of religious dynamics; and 
iv) Sensitise programming to religious realities. 
 
In considering the CSIS’ suggestions, this thesis will shift here to examine how the doctrine 
(absent of making a post-secular recognition) influenced US diplomatic practises and the 
development of key foreign policies irrespective of Muslim publics. In making this review, 
Chapter 5 will answer two additional questions: “What often occurs within the foreign policy 
environment when broad international religious affairs are not taken seriously?” and “What is 
the outcome when a post-secular communication approach is not implemented to directly 
engage the vast majority of the Muslim world within a diplomatic setting?” In such cases, ad-
hoc communication resources such as public diplomacy and nation-branding with respect to 
the USG between 2001 and 2008 serve as the principal options. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
 
STATE DEPARTMENT OUTREACH TO THE  
MUSLIM-WORLD AFTER 9/11  
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
  
Months before September 11 programming efforts by the US Department of State (State) 
were implemented to raise US favourability ratings in the Muslim world. None, however, 
included employing direct communication approaches between religious and political 
officials to restore relations at a grassroots-level. As a key department, State’s approach after 
9/11 was to assure the implementation of the Bush Doctrine by reintroducing a pre-existing 
public diplomacy and nation-branding campaign, which effectively succeeded at:  
 
a) Attempting to raise  US favourability throughout the Muslim-world; 
 
b) Selling US foreign policy and the ‘American Story’ through public diplomacy and nation-
branding programs; and 
 
c)  Ensuring the overall objectives of the Bush administration to disrupt and dismantle the 
extreme minority segment of the Muslim world by containing the spread of political Islam 
through third-party programming initiatives and foreign aid. 
 
 Chapter 5 uncovers the chosen communication practises by the State Department to 
engage the Muslim world. In doing so, this chapter will clear up two points: i)  the likely 
outcome when neither an office or trained professionals are employed to analyse or engage 
broad international religious affairs that stress US-Muslim world relations, and ii) the 
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importance behind a strategic communication approach that directly engages the religious 
voice of the Muslim world. In establishing this case, a review of how State has historically 
addressed religious affairs is made, in order to determine why its initial efforts were unable to 
touch the core of Islamic society.     
  
 5.2. Limited appeal: The Office of International Religious Freedom 
 
So often, the USG misses the mark when religious issues are central in international 
affairs. Since the latter part of the twentieth-century, especially during the Iranian revolution, 
failed American foreign policies would lead to poor decision-making. This setback also 
occurred during the 1990s with America’s reluctance to recognise the ethnic impact between 
Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, and is even still relevant with regards to present-day cross-border 
religio-tribal relations and political systems across the continent of Africa. However, attempts 
at addressing specific issues in international affairs are somewhat of a new phenomenon for 
the US Department of State. Thus, the State Department’s most notable office with a narrow 
agenda to address specific religious concerns is located in the Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor.  
 
The International Religious Freedom Act,354 passed in 1998, “established the 
promotion of religious freedom as a US foreign policy objective [and mandated] the creation 
of an Office of International Religious Freedom (IRF).”355 Further responsibilities of the 
office have included mandating all US embassies to produce a comprehensive final report on                                                         
354 See, The US International Religious Freedom Act [document online]; available from 
http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=349&Itemid=1; Internet, 
accessed 20 August 2009.  
355 Ibid., 12. See, Office of International Religious Freedom [online website]; available from 
www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/; Internet, accessed 20 February 2008. 
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the status of religious freedom, which, along with the United States Commission on 
International Religious Freedom, provides foreign policy insight to the President and USG 
key agencies on Countries of Particular Concern.356 
 
The religious freedom agenda was promoted in the mid-1990s by activists who focused on the 
importance of preventing Christian persecution abroad and a broader coalition of faith-based 
and human rights groups rallied around the larger religious freedom issue. The original bill 
introduced in the House was entitled the “Freedom from Religious Persecution Act”… 
[However] many in the government affirmed that current religious freedom activities remain 
overly focused on addressing religious persecution and that the religious freedom policy has 
sometimes been viewed as Christian-biased.357 
 
Since the mid 1990s, the USG has created programmes or initiatives whose titles have 
included the term “religion” or “faith”, but their agenda has often fallen short of reaching 
toward a forward-thinking project supportive of inter-religious relations, religio-political 
analysis, conflict resolution or staffing and training key personnel within the USG system to 
address critical international religious affairs. For example, this was the case with President 
Bush’s White House Faith-based and Community Initiatives (and currently with President 
Obama’s White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships). Both have 
served as hubs for American faith-based organisations while providing public funding to 
improve social welfare initiatives across America. Thus, neither office has committed itself to  
critical analysis on religious and political affairs that influence US foreign policymaking (as 
private Washington think-tanks). Of the fifteen US cabinet-level departments in the executive 
branch with inter-agency specific foreign policy agendas, to date neither has a mission 
centred on the research and development of religious and political affairs – in an era where                                                         
356For example, in the 2006 Annual Report on Religious Freedom, eight countries 
(Myanmar/Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia and Sudan) were re-listed and 
Uzbekistan was listed for the first time as a CPC; Final Report on International Religious Freedom 
(2006) [document online]; available from www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt; Internet, accessed 20 February 
2008; see also The 2009 Report on International Religious Freedom [document online] available from 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/index.htm Internet; 2 November 2009. 
357 Liora Danan and Alice Hunt, “Mixed Blessings: US  Government Engagement with 
Religion in Conflict-Prone Settings.” CSIS Report. (Washington: CSIS Press, 2007), 11, 35. 
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religious violence is a chief concern to US foreign relations. Nor has the executive branch of 
government taken up the challenge to build an office or department focused on these issues 
and consider the approach taken by the Departments of Labor, Treasure, Energy or Defence 
which recruits, trains and deploys inter-agency attachments to US embassies to carry out 
agency-specific tasks.  
 
However, if the USG were earnest about peacemaking, conflict resolution and 
religious analysis issues, researchers suggest, it would consider the H.R. 808 Congressional 
Bill for the establishment of a Department of Peace and Non-violence (DOP).358 Setting up a 
US Department of Peace (S. 1756) was first proposed in the US Senate by Senator Mark 
Dayton (D-MN) on September 22, 2005, (but returned to the House; on February 7, 2007: 
Congressional Representative Dennis Kucinich reintroduced it (H.R. 808) where it is 
currently gathering legislative support). H.R. 808, as a ground-breaking Congressional 
proposal, concentrates on the cornerstones of promoting peace and non-violence in 
establishing a comprehensive Peace Department. (Such a department was first proposed more 
than two centuries ago (in 1792) by Benjamin Rush and Benjamin Banneker. Rush’s 
proposal, published in Banneker’s Almanac, was seen as an additional executive branch                                                         
358 “Department of Peace and Nonviolence Act – Establishes a Department of Peace and 
Nonviolence, which shall be headed by a Secretary of Peace and Nonviolence appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Sets forth the mission of the Department, 
including to: (1) hold peace as an organising principle; (2) endeavor to promote justice and 
democratic principles to expand human rights; and (3) develop policies that promote national and 
international conflict prevention, nonviolent intervention, mediation, peaceful resolution of conflict, 
and structured mediation of conflict. Establishes in the Department the Intergovernmental Advisory 
Council on Peace and Nonviolence, which shall provide assistance and make recommendations to the 
Secretary and the President concerning intergovernmental policies relating to peace and nonviolent 
conflict resolution. Transfers to the Department the functions, assets, and personnel of various federal 
agencies. Establishes a Federal Interagency Committee on Peace and Nonviolence. Establishes Peace 
Day. Urges all citizens to observe and celebrate the blessings of peace and endeavor to create peace 
on such day.” H.R. 808 – 110th Congress (2007): Department of Peace and Nonviolence Act, 
GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation) [article online]; available from 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-808&tab=summary; Internet, accessed 20 
August 2008. 
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department to juxtapose with the then-newly constructed War Department (Department of 
Defence)).359 H.R. 808 proposes that the DOP should be led by a Secretary of Peace, who 
must set its tactical agenda. This agenda includes: working proactively and interactively with 
each branch of the USG on all policy matters relating to conditions of peace; serving as a 
delegate to the National Security Council; drawing from the intellectual and spiritual wealth 
of the US private, public and non-governmental sectors for the development of coherent 
policy; and monitoring and analysing the causative principles of conflict while making policy 
recommendations for developing and maintaining peaceful international conduct.360  
 
  Despite having an office of International Religious Freedom which serves as the only 
outlet at the State Department to address international religious concerns, IRF has met 
criticism from within and from former administrators about the way that it prioritises 
concerns. US diplomats, on occasion, have suggested that “the issue of [religious freedom] 
has often been limited conceptually and structurally.”361 As indicated in the IRF mandate, the 
primary goal of the office is to promote religious freedom as a core objective of US foreign 
policy. However, in recent years, with international attention placed on human rights and the 
Abu Graib and Guantanamo Bay prisons torture issues, additional focus has been placed on 
religious persecution and support for freeing religious prisoners. Critics of the IRF suggest 
that this redirection currently limits and narrows the attention available for meeting the initial 
IRF goal of promoting religious freedom and places it on more formidable issues for the 
present international community. Alarmed by the current direction taken by the IRF, former                                                         
359 It was meant to encourage – as both agreed – a “conscientious study for peace” in an age 
preoccupied by slavery and emerging internal strife. Unfortunately, the Rush-Banneker proposal lay 
dormant for two centuries; see the 1792 proposal for a Department of Peace in Chapter Appendix. 
360 H.R. 808 – 110th Congress (2007): Department of Peace and Nonviolence Act, 
GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation) [article online]; available from 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-808; Internet, accessed 20 August 2008.  
361 Liora Danan and Alice Hunt, Mixed Blessings: US  Government Engagement with 
Religion, 12. 
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director Thomas Farr suggested in a 2006 lecture on Religion & Public Life that “Over the 
long term, this almost exclusive focus on persecution and prisoners puts all three goals at 
risk.”362 While ongoing internal debate on IRF is taking place, there is still the concern that 
within the USG system one agency or department capable of communicating directly to 
religious (and tribal) communities on behalf of the USG today does not exist.   
 
The IRF’s limited appeal brings up a unique tension. Not having on board resources, a 
department, agency, or office to deal with broad international religious affairs, beyond those 
of religious freedom, contributes to potential communicative failure, considering the fact that 
most predominantly-Muslim countries (and those with significant religious populations) have 
a Ministry of Religious Affairs with trained diplomats that deal with broad international 
religious issues. This is the case today, for example, with countries such as: Turkey, Pakistan, 
Oman, Burma, Myanmar, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Greece, Iraq, 
Brunei and Saudi Arabia – all of which have Ministries of Religion led by a Minister of 
Religious Affairs to address religious issues on the international stage. Not having a forward-
thinking body or Ministry to deal with inter-religious relations, peacemaking or religio-
political analysis, in effect stifles USG outreach capabilities within the Muslim world 
(especially after 2001). If most Muslim countries have Ministries with specific departments 
to address these issues with trained officials in inter-religious relations, conflict resolution, 
and religio-political analysis, what equivalence would this have within the State 
Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom (whose officials are generally 
cultural affairs officers limited in resources, and are based solely in Washington, DC)? None. 
Hence, acknowledging this limitation, and realising its inability to thoroughly engage the 
Muslim world on a nuanced-level, post-9/11 efforts by the State Department to communicate                                                         
362 Thomas F. Farr, “Legislating International Religious Freedom” event transcript, The Pew 
Forum on Religion & Public Life (November 20, 2006). 
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with Muslim audiences were solely centred on raising favourability by employing public 
diplomacy and nation-branding resources through a pre-existing programme introduced by 
the  Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.   
  
5.3. Reintroducing a pre-existing plan: The “Brand America” campaign 
 
In carrying out the agenda of the Bush administration, ad-hoc communication 
approaches were employed at the State Department as a benchmark for engaging the Muslim 
world prior to 9/11. A strategic programme geared toward facilitating US-Muslim world 
relations did not exist at the time, nor was there a separate department, agency, or office 
equipped with highly-trained USG officials that dealt specifically with conflict resolution, 
inter-religious relations or with broad religious affairs. Thus, five months prior to September 
11, State Department efforts were implemented by then Secretary of State Colin Powell to 
employ a robust foreign policy option to raise US favourability ratings throughout the 
Muslim world. This robust effort was the Brand America campaign – a government-run 
marketing campaign to bolster America’s image among international Muslim audiences.363   
 
According to Powell in 2001, this Brand America campaign was not about “just 
selling [U.S. foreign policy] in the old USIA way” but was about “branding foreign policy, 
marketing the [State Department], marketing American values to the world – and not just 
                                                        
363 See Simon Anholt and Jeremy Hildreth, Brand America: The Mother of all Brands (United 
Kingdom: Cyan Books, 2004); Dick Martin, Rebuilding Brand America: What we Must Do to Restore 
our Reputation and Safeguard the Future of American Business Abroad (New York: AMACOM 
Books, 2007); Since 2001, most marketing or public diplomacy campaigns which focus attention on 
making America more appealing or improving the image of an American-based consumer product is 
as well referred to as Branding America.  
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putting out pamphlets.”364 Unfortunately, the events of September 11, 2001 would inevitably 
change the course of US-Muslim world engagement; attention would shift from 1) simply 
making attempts at raising US favourability ratings among Muslim publics to 2) selling 
American foreign policy and American values in order to pacify the vast majority of the 
Muslim world after 9/11. It is clear that a strategic long-term plan of action was not assessed, 
nor was serious analysis on how critical religious infrastructures in the Muslim world could 
serve as resources to improve foreign relations given. This would be the case, in part, because 
of the Bush Doctrine’s influence (regarding exemption to take up a post-secular recognition). 
In this case, Cold War, nation-branding and public diplomacy resources would serve as 
State’s new communication practises. Regarding public diplomacy as a communication 
resource, 
  
[it would go on to deal] with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution 
of foreign policies. [It would encompass] dimensions of international relation beyond 
traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by government of public opinion in other countries; the 
interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of 
foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is 
communication, such as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of 
intercultural communications.365 
 
Unlike traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy goes beyond general conversation 
with nation-state officials and diplomats to establishing a broader conversation with foreign 
audiences to implement the art of persuasion. America’s public diplomacy machine has 
utilised this force in many areas, whether by working with private sector groups or 
                                                        
364 Jami A. Fullerton and Alice G. Kendrick, Advertising War on Terror: The Story of the US  
State Department’s Shared Values Initiative (Washington: Marquette Books, 2006), 20. 
365 Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy before Gullion”, The Routledge Handbook of Public 
Diplomacy, ed. Nancy Snow and Phillip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 19; see also United 
States Information Agency Alumni Association, What is Public Diplomacy?, [document online]; 
available from www.publicdiplomacy.org/1htm; Internet, accessed 1 March 2008.   
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implementing its message through exchange programmes or in an effort to shape public 
opinion. With respect to nation-branding and public diplomacy together,  
 
Both concepts have been defined and conceptualised as communication with a strong 
emphasis on the nation as the unit of analysis. As two-way communication is replacing one-
way communication, relationship building is often mentioned as a means to achieve two-way 
communication or as an element of public diplomacy or nation-branding. Instead of 
communication (in the case of public diplomacy) and image creation (in the case of nation-
branding), relationship building should be the central concept and ultimate goal of both public 
diplomacy and nation-branding whereas communication would be only a means – albeit very 
vital – to build and maintain relationships rather than an end in itself.366  
 
Thus, neither communicative resource has existed without criticism. Sue Curry Jansen 
 
criticises nation-branding for its raison d’être, which is commercial ambition as it transforms 
civic space into calculative space, constituted by marketing data and decision making rather 
than conceived in terms of social relations or governance. In her critical article she described 
nation-branding as a risky business which can easily backfire, since its success and 
effectiveness depends on the intuitive knowledge of industry ‘creatives’ and its calculative 
and manipulative approach and reductive logic ‘dumbs down’ public discourse. Jensen argues 
that nation-branding is the engine of neo-liberalism and its methodology is anti-democratic, 
even fascist [sic!].367 
  
However, this fierce attack would not sway Powell’s new choice to appoint Charlotte Beers 
as Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. In taking steps to employ this  
“Brand America” campaign, the approach of Beers – the “Queen of Madison Avenue” and a 
former commercial advertising executive with Ogilvy & Mather advertising agency, New 
York – would be to integrate brand management applications with public diplomacy and                                                         
 366 Gyrogy Szondi, Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and 
Differences [article online] available from 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20081022_pap_in_dip_nation_branding.pdf; Internet, 
accessed 9 April 2009. 27. “Many countries’ public diplomacy, however, relies on two-way 
communication, where country A’s public diplomacy efforts in country B are as important as country 
B’s public diplomacy in country A. This symmetrical approach enables dialogue to take place and can 
result in cooperation and mutual understanding rather than competition.” Ibid.,16. 
367 Gyrogy Szondi, Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and 
Differences [article online] available from 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20081022_pap_in_dip_nation_branding.pdf; Internet, 
accessed 9 April 2009. 31; see also Sue Curry Jansen “Designer Nations: Neo-liberal Nation Branding 
– Brand Estonia”, Social Identities, 14, No. 1 (2008): 121-142. 
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nation-branding resources to foster mass programming efforts to approach Muslim publics to 
improve America’s image. As did her predecessor Evelyn Lieberman (under the Clinton 
Administration), Beers used her assumed authority of three public diplomacy bureaus – the 
Bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), International Information Programs (IIP) 
and Public Affairs – to carry out this task. Five points are clear as we move forward to 
examine Beers’s and Karen P. Hughes’s numerous (but failed) programming attempts:  
 
i) The State Department’s Brand America campaign would exist months prior to 9/11;  
 
ii) The campaign served as a pre-existing programme to raise US favourability ratings among 
Muslim audiences;  
 
iii) After 9/11 a reluctance to re-evaluate/and reorganise the current public diplomacy 
campaign to address the Muslim world more directly and strategically was not considered;  
 
iv) This reluctance would result in the State Department taking a pre-existing plan and 
employing it to a new problem; and  
 
v) The State Department’s employment of the pre-existing Brand America campaign 
contributed to the formation of a two-way communication problem between the US 
government and its foreign policy approach toward international Muslim audiences.  
 
By reviewing the communicative programmes and practises introduced by Charlotte 
Beers and Karen P. Hughes, we are able to better understand how efforts between 2001-2008 
were structurally and communicatively limited. In effect, their approaches would result in a  
far deeper decline of America’s image and favourability rating by 2008. 
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 5.3.1. Programming attempts: Charlotte Beers 
 
During her brief service of one year as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy 
and Public Affairs at the State Department, Charlotte Beers introduced three public 
diplomacy programmes to aid the US State Department’s efforts to connect with Muslim 
audiences in order to raise US favourability.  They included the Shared Values Initiative 
(SVI) (a mass media public diplomacy and nation-branding campaign); the Hi youth 
magazine (directed at Arab young people in the Middle East and North Africa); and the 
Partnership for Leadership, (a teen exchange programme for young adults). While having a 
unique potential to reach Muslim audiences, these three campaigns were eventually 
terminated and replaced with similar programming initiatives by former Undersecretary 
Karen P. Hughes in 2003. The task of setting up widespread brand management campaigns to 
market American values and foreign policy to Muslims was  not an easy sell for Beers to 
State Department diplomats (aside from Secretary Powell). Many of Beers’ campaigns were 
criticised by US diplomats for their use of brand management approaches in addressing a 
large, culturally-based audience comprised of a traditional value system that carried mixed 
reviews of America after 9/11.  Defending Beers in simplistic terms while addressing critics, 
Powell satirically implied, “[she] got me to buy Uncle Ben’s rice, so what’s wrong with 
getting somebody who knows how to sell something… we (the State Department) are selling 
a product. We need someone who can re-brand American foreign policy [and] re-brand 
American diplomacy.” 368 
 
Beers’ first major programming attempt was the Shared Values Initiative media 
campaign, which cost $15 million. The objectives of the SVI media campaign were to                                                         
368 Jami A. Fullerton and Alice G. Kendrick, Advertising War on Terror, 24. 
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“highlight the common values and beliefs shared by Muslims and Americans, demonstrate 
that America is not at war with Islam and stimulate dialogue between the United States and 
the Muslim world.”369 Despite State’s attempts to reach a broad Muslim audience by 
emphasising common values between American society and the Muslim world, the SVI 
media campaign and “television advertisement turned into embarrassments when countries 
such as Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan refused to air them.”370 For example, SVI’s centrepiece 
television campaign, which it hoped would be broadcast on multiple occasions, turned out to 
have lacklustre appeal and was only aired briefly through the winter months of 2002-2003. 
 
This multimedia campaign also included a booklet on Muslim life in America, speaker tours, 
an interactive Web site to promote dialogue between Muslims in the United States and abroad 
and other informational programs. The initial phase of the Shared Values Initiative was aired 
in six languages in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Kuwait, as well as on pan-Arab media. 
The State estimates that 288 million people were exposed to these messages, but television 
stations in several countries, including Egypt and Lebanon, refused to air them for political 
and other reasons. 371 
 
After the SVI media campaign failure, additional initiatives were introduced. With a budget 
of $4.5 million, Beers launched Hi magazine throughout the Middle East and North Africa.  
Hi publications were produced by a private sector firm, with the State Department estimating 
its “circulation to be about 50,000 in the Arab world. One official in Egypt, however, said 
that of 2,500 copies the embassy distributed monthly to newsstands in Cairo, often as many 
as 2,000 copies were returned unsold.”372 In effect, the Hi publication, according to Middle 
Eastern critics, lacked substance and meaningful content. While the magazine, “focused on                                                         
369 US  Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Science, the Departments of State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies, House Committee 
on Appropriations, US  Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences 
Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges, GAO-06-535 (May 2006), 
11. 
370 Liam Kennedy and Scott Lucas, “Enduring Freedom: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign 
Policy” in American Quarterly. 2 (2005):320. 
371 GAO, Report to the Chairman, US  Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage 
Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges, 11. 
372 Ibid, 12. 
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articles with subjects like internet dating, snowboarding and yoga [its content was] criticised 
at home and abroad.”373 Religious leadership and academics within Muslim publics regarded 
the magazine as an insult. The magazine went on to dampen the fact that critical social issues 
between the US and the Muslim world were occurring, and, in addition, it overlooked 
consideration to both the religious and cultural dimensions of the Muslim world by 
presenting a Western portrait to Middle Eastern youth. The third and final initiative Beers 
implemented (the $150 million Partner for Leadership Program) was eventually suspended 
after three years while avenues were investigated as to how the State Department might reach 
more young adults, while lowering the cost of operations. 
  
In defence of Beers’s public diplomacy and nation-branding approach to raise US 
favourability, researchers Fullerton and Kendrick affirm, in the text Advertising the War on 
Terror, “We needed to let people know that the idea of using advertising-based 
communication and other modern marketing techniques might be an appropriate and effective 
strategy in the war on terror after all.”374 On the contrary, a May 2006 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report indicated later that “U.S. embassies involved in outreach 
to Muslim audiences lacked some of the vital communication elements used in the private 
sector to engage Muslim communities.” Regardless of the State Department’s ability to 
employ brand management communication approaches and its willingness to engage Muslim 
publics, such efforts proved unreliable, creating a unique space today for varied alternatives. 
Such alternatives might include engaging post-secular resources and critical religious 
infrastructures. Of GAO’s pressing results, the office recommended that while the State                                                         
373 Liora Danan and Alice Hunt, Mixed Blessings, 16; see also, Elliott Colla and Chris 
Toensing, “Never Too Soon to Say Goodbye,” Middle East Report Online, (September 2003), [online 
article]; available from http://www.merip.org/mero/interventions/colla_interv.html; Internet, accessed 
20 February 2008. 
374 Jami A. Fullerton and Alice G. Kendrick, Advertising the War on Terror, 14. 
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Department incorporated communication elements used by the private sector, these elements 
should include “having core messages, segmented target audiences, detailed strategies and 
tactics, in-depth research and analysis to monitor and evaluate results and a communication 
plan which brings it all together.”375 To a degree, Mary Tutwiler would contribute to State 
efforts to reach Muslim audiences after Beers’s resignation in October 2003 (in her half-year 
stint as Undersecretary), and similar efforts would be made later by Karen P. Hughes, who 
would replace Tutwiler in July 2005.  
  
5.3.2. Programming attempts: Karen P. Hughes 
 
To date, Karen P. Hughes (former director of communications for George Bush as 
Governor) has served the longest term as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and 
Public Affairs (September 2005-July 2007). Hughes would contribute to the State 
Department’s development of numerous brand management programmes during her term. 
Like Beers and Tutwiler, Hughes would continue the attempts to carry out the Brand America 
campaign to raise US favourability by persuading Muslim audiences that American foreign 
policy was in the best interest of the Muslim world. To reach this goal, pre-existing State 
Department academic and professional exchange programmes were expanded and massive 
communication efforts geared toward international Muslim publics were implemented. As 
Undersecretary of State, Hughes introduced three imperatives to ensure the success of her 
attempt at this process. They were set up to introduce to Muslim publics the values found in 
the US: freedom, justice and respect for all. The three areas Hughes primarily focused on 
were “expanding academic and professional exchange programmes, modernising State and 
                                                        
375 GAO, Report to the Chairman, US  Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage 
Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges, 4. 
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inter-government agency communication efforts and expanding US foreign assistance by 
placing a direct emphasis on promoting a ‘diplomacy of deeds’’. 376 
 
To ensure that efforts were being made to meet these three goals, the Policy 
Coordinating Committee (PCC) was created in April 2006 and headed by Hughes. The high-
level PCC was responsible for convening senior-level USG officials from all agencies for the 
strategic planning of new US  programmes in predominantly Muslim countries. Similar sub-
programmes were also developed, including the Rapid Response Unit, which monitors the 
coverage of US policies and anti-American propaganda on foreign media outlets; the 
establishment of three international Media hubs located in London, Brussels and Dubai, 
which gives US government officials easy access to foreign audiences via television or radio; 
and the Counterterrorism Communication Center (CTCC), set up in 2007, which aims to 
counter terrorist messaging which may hinder international support for US national 
objectives. In reviewing the State Department’s practices and programme areas implemented 
by Hughes, this section will consider four specific areas of service: academic and 
professional exchange programmes; reform through foreign aid; and Hughes’s attempt to 
approach the religious dimension.  
  
 
 
                                                        
376 In a June 2007 address at the Washington Foreign Press Center, Hughes implied that a 
“‘diplomacy of deeds’ was [a] concrete [way] in which we [the US] are partnering with people around 
the world to help them improve their lives, particularly in the areas of education and health and 
economic opportunity.” Karen Hughes, “Foreign Press Center Briefing: Expanding Outreach to the 
Muslim World,” Remarks to the Washington Foreign Press Center (June 27, 2007) [document 
online]; available from http://2002-2009-fpc.state.gov/87485.htm; Internet, accessed 20 February 
2009.  
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(a) Academic and Professional Exchange Programmes 
 
 According to Giles Scott-Smith of the Roosevelt Study Centre, “The ability of 
individuals to cross national boundaries has been a matter of major consequence since the 
arrival of the nation-state, and exchanges are naturally no exception. Even the most 
politically neutral of exchanges, such as those between high schools, have either political 
intent behind their creation or are promoted from the purpose of developing cross-border 
relations that can subsequently lead to political outcomes, such as a reduction in conflict.”377 
In the case we are considering here, the first programme attempt introduced by Hughes was 
set to expand pre-existing academic and professional exchanges (often referred to as people-
to-people programming). Historically, many of State’s professional exchanges have serviced 
the State Department by promoting US foreign policy while targeting specific audiences. 
Two specific programming initiatives that were expanded to target academic, religious and 
professional leadership throughout the Muslim world (sponsored through ECA and IIP) were 
the International Visitor Leadership Program378 and the flagship US Fulbright Scholars 
programme.379 To ensure Powell’s Brand America campaign was carried out, much of 
                                                        
377 Giles Scott-Smith, “Exchange Programs and Public Diplomacy”, The Routledge Handbook 
of Public Diplomacy, ed. Nancy Snow and Phillip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 50. 
378 See the US Department of State Educational Exchanges [online website]; available from 
http://exchanges.state.gov/education/ivp/; Internet, accessed 20 February 2008. See also International 
Visitor Leadership Program [online website]; available from http://www.nciv.org/; Internet, accessed 
20 February 2008. 
379 “Since 2006, enrollment in State affiliated programs for academics, professionals and 
cultural exchanges has expanded in the last three years from 27,000 participants to 40,000 with an 
estimation of 50,000 in late 2008.” Karen Hughes, Foreign Press Center Briefing: Outreach to the 
Muslim World, (June 27 2007). Emphasising this recent effort, the Office of Public Diplomacy and 
Public Affairs points out that “The US issued a record number of 591,000 student and exchange visas 
in 2006 and is actively partnering with America’s higher education community to send a clear 
message.” US Department of State, “Major Accomplishments 2005-2007,” Office of Public 
Diplomacy & Public Affairs, (Washington D.C.: July 2008). This clear message is linked to the 
overall strategic imperative outlined by the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, whose aim 
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Hughes’ time as Undersecretary was given to launching programmes geared toward teenage 
Muslim audiences. Other major academic and professional exchanges launched under her 
tenure were:  
 
 The Youth Exchange and Study Program380, launched in 2003 (after Charlotte Beers’s 
resignation) was set up to give high school students from predominantly Muslim countries an 
opportunity to spend up to two years on academic exchange in the US.  
 The English ACCESS Micro Scholarship381, launched in 2004, centres on teaching English 
to ‘non-elite’ Muslim teenagers in over 50 countries and has a current base of over 32,000 
participants.  
 The National Security Language Initiative382, launched in 2006, is an exchange programme 
between American students and foreign teachers to teach and/or study critical foreign 
languages.  
 The Community College Initiative383, launched in 2006 by Dina Habib Powell384, which (in 
2007) aimed to bring 1,000 Egyptian students to study in US community colleges for up to 
one year. 
 The Global Cultural Initiative385, launched in 2006, has contributed to promoting ‘cultural 
diplomacy’ by advancing cultural partnerships between American and foreign artists. 
                                                        
here is to promote core US values and foreign policy to young people, women, academics and 
professionals in the Muslim world. 
380 See also Youth Exchange and Study Program [official online website]; available from 
http://www.yesprograms.org/; Internet, accessed 17 February 2008. 
381 See The English Access Microscholarship Program [online website]; available from 
http://exchanges.state.gov/englishteaching/eam.html; Internet, accessed 21 August 2009.  
382 US  Department of State National Security Language Initiative [website]; available from 
http://exchanges.state.gov/nsli.html; Internet, accessed 1 September 2009. 
383 Office of the Spokesman, State Department Launches Community College Scholarship 
Exchange Initiative with Egypt (12 December 2006) [online article]; from 
http://www.communitycollegetimes.com/article.cfm?TopicId=35&ArticleId=38; Internet, accessed 13 
March 2008. 
384 Dina Habib Powell, is the former Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Education 
and Cultural Affairs. 
385 Bureau of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet: The Global Cultural Initiative (22 September 2006) 
[online article]; from http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
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 The Iraqi Young Leaders Exchange Program386, launched in 2006, facilitated the 
recruitment of 200 Iraqi students to the US between 2007 and 2008 for educational exchanges 
centred around leadership development and educational training. 
 
(b) Mass Communication 
 
Secondly, Hughes focused on meeting strategic State Department imperatives to raise 
favourability and connect with Muslims, by expanding mass communication efforts that 
included implementing brand management resources. In an effort to reach a broader, but 
much younger audience (in multiple languages), Hughes introduced communication projects 
that included utilising cyber-activity, television, radio and multimedia resources. (In keeping 
with this transition, to date, US ambassadors and diplomats are provided with media training 
through the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) to promote pro-American sentiments in the 
Muslim world.) For example: 
 
In May 2007, [State officials in Europe] did 45 media interviews and top officials such as 
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried, 
Assistant Secretary David Welch, Undersecretary Hughes, as well as Secretary Rice, 
appeared in multiple overseas media interviews. In June 2007, USG officials made 89 
appearances on Middle East media, including Al Hurra, Radio Sawa, BBC Arabic, Al Jazeera 
English, Al Jazeera Arabic, VOA Persian and Al Arabiya.387 
 
Introducing key State officials to the international eye became a public diplomacy 
tactic widely practiced by Hughes in her attempt at combating Anti Americanism toward US 
                                                        
english/2006/September/20060925152441jmnamdeirf0.3944361.html; Internet, accessed 20 February 
2009; See also “US Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Global Cultural 
Initiative” [website]; from http://exchanges.state.gov/; Internet, accessed 20 May 2009. 
386 See the Office of the Spokesman, President Bush Announces Iraqi Young Leaders 
Exchange Program (25 July 2006) [online article] available from 
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/iraq/State/69492.pdf; Internet, accessed 14 March 2008. 
387 US Department of State, “Major Accomplishments 2005-2007,” Office of Public 
Diplomacy & Public Affairs, (Washington D.C.: July 2008),14. 
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policy.388 In addition, this method was used to prompt dialogue between State officials and 
international media outlets.  
 
However, the majority of Hughes’s brand management efforts were given to younger 
audiences and women within the Muslim world. Efforts grew tremendously between 2006 
and 2007 with the creation of a flagship website, America.gov. This and other sites targeting 
Muslim youth provide an in-depth look at American life, international news from a US 
perspective, foreign policy and the benefits of practising democracy. Continuing the attempt 
to plant a seed in younger audiences, the research finds that Hughes and her team placed 
significantly more emphasis on targeting Muslim youth and female audiences. This approach  
was employed with the hope of developing a younger generation of Muslims who would be 
more accepting to US foreign policy and America’s value system. For example, today this 
implemented in Greetings from America (GFA)389, a cultural exchange and youth-based 
radio programme which charts the experiences of both Pakistani and Indonesian foreign 
exchange students who participate in the exchange. Launched in 2005, it continues to 
encourage Muslim teens to communicate their story to younger audiences in their home 
country. GFA, at present, reaches “24 million 15-25 year old radio listeners in seven 
Indonesian media markets… [and] three million 15-25 year old listeners in Islamabad, 
Rawalpindi, Karachi and Lahore.”390 
 
 
                                                         
388 Ali S. Wyne, “Public Opinion and Power”, The Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, 
ed. Nancy Snow and Phillip M. Taylor (New York: Routledge, 2009), 39. 
389 See, Greetings from America [online website] available from 
http://www.greetingsfromamerica.org/; Internet, accessed 22 March 2008. 
390 US Department of State, “Major Accomplishments 2005-2007”, 16. 
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(c) Reform through foreign aid 
 
The third goal in Branding America included Hughes’s “diplomacy of deeds” 
programme. In remarks given on June 2007 at the Washington Foreign Press Center, she 
noted that a “diplomacy of deeds” would be one of “the concrete ways in which [the US 
would partner] with people around the world to help them improve their lives, particularly in 
the areas of education and health and economic opportunity.”391 Promoting a “diplomacy of 
deeds” is indicated by the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs as a premiere area 
of US public diplomacy; but, considering its impact of reforming Muslim countries through 
foreign aid, it is the most important. Most efforts during Bush’s presidency were made 
possible by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and private 
sector outlets. Each year, USAID manages around $10 billion in US foreign aid, which 
supports USAID and State Department projects. 
 
A range of projects which sought to reshape America’s image and bolster US 
favourability through foreign assistance were: the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief392, the US Middle East Breast Cancer Awareness and Research Partnership393, the US 
Malaria Initiative394 and the use of Navy Hospital Ships395 (for disaster relief after the                                                         
391 Karen Hughes, “Foreign Press Center Briefing: Outreach to the Muslim World” (June 27, 
2007). 
392 Office of the Secretary, Fact Sheet: The President’s Emergency Plan on AIDS Relief (29 
January 2003) [online article]; from http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030129-1.html; Internet, accessed 20 February 
2009.  
393 Office of the Spokesman, US -Middle East Partnership for Breast Cancer Awareness and 
Research (12 June 2006) [online article]; http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2006/June/20060612155002hmnietsua0.6990473.html; Internet, accessed 20 February 2009. 
394 See Fact Sheet: President’s Malaria Initiative [online article]; from http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/malaria/; Internet, accessed 12 February 2009. 
395 See Admiral Gary Roughead, Commander, US Pacific Fleet Hospital Ship Mercy 
Deployment/Current Pacific Command Operations [online article]; available from http://2002-2009-
fpc.state.gov/73140.htm; Internet, accessed 12 February 2008. See also, Jane A. Morse, U.S. Navy 
  186 
Tsunami). As a USG agency, USAID does not allocate funding according to a country’s 
religion, but according to acting USAID Deputy Administrator James Kunder, “Over 50 
percent of total US foreign assistance managed by USAID [in recent years] goes to countries 
with Muslim majority populations.”396 Take, for instance, the Middle East Partnership 
Initiative (MEPI), which was set up in December 2005 as a platform to oversee the vast 
majority of American foreign aid to be distributed throughout the Middle East. Its founding 
objectives were to ensure fair disbursement of funds across the Middle East region, while 
promoting within each country political, economic, educational and women’s empowerment 
reform. “From the 1950s through 2001, US bilateral economic assistance to the Middle East 
and North Africa focused on promoting regional stability by providing funding for large 
bilateral military and economic programmes, chiefly in Egypt, Israel and Jordan and by 
fostering development.”397 Under this third goal to raise US favourability ratings, billions of 
US dollars in funding have gone towards restoring US confidence among Muslim audiences 
by working with NGO and private sector outlets which attempted to strengthen the ties 
between Muslim audiences and the USG through political and social reform.    
 
Maintaining Bush’s compassionate conservatism campaign to outsource social 
welfare initiatives, in the fiscal year 2002-2003 MEPI reported distributing 33 percent of 
$129 million to Middle Eastern NGO and private sector organisations to disburse grants to 
local companies. “According to MEPI, their grants are intended to support innovative ideas 
which can be implemented quickly to produce concrete results, such as increasing women’s                                                         
Hospital Ships Sail to Aid Tsunami Victims [online article]; available from 
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/January/20050124151320ajesrom0.1452753.html; 
Internet, accessed 12 February 2008. 
396 Karen Hughes, “Foreign Press Center Briefing: Outreach to the Muslim World” (June 27, 
2007). 
397 US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to Congressional Requesters, 
Middle East Partnership Initiative Offers Tools for Supporting Reform, but Project Monitoring Needs 
Improvement, GAO-05-711 (August 2005), 6. 
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political participation”.398 Since 2002, sources indicate that over $430 million to over 350 
projects in 17 countries was distributed.399 However, the clear finding thus far suggests that 
such projects by the State Department and USAID during this period failed at any rate to 
raise US favourability ratings (or touch the core of Muslim publics by engaging critical 
religious infrastructures to influence serious change). In making up for this lacklustre appeal 
through massive foreign aid donations, how then would Hughes and others make an attempt 
at raising America’s morale? This would occur through erratic engagement efforts that would 
not ease US-Muslim world relations after 9/11, but further escalate tension and thereby serve 
to distort America’s image.   
 
(d) Approaching the religious dimension 
 
Hughes’s attempts at approaching the religious dimension of the Muslim world can be 
understood more clearly when with reference to the terms “direct approach” and “indirect 
approach”. To clarify these terms, “direct approach” is identified here as relationship building 
underpinned by a strategic project to incorporate the ideals, perspectives and voices of both 
sacred and secular players in the public sphere. Direct approaches are not public diplomacy 
inspired, neither are they outsourced to private third party organisations or NGOs; they are 
carried out directly by USG officials and sacred players within a socio-political forum. On 
the contrary, “indirect approach” refers to attempts to address religious establishments by 
constructing symbolic relationships to shore up attraction to critical public issues. An indirect 
approach provides limited attention to these critical issues – especially when public 
appearances are complete. Employing indirect approaches with Muslim publics was an                                                         
398 Ibid, 14. 
399 See Middle East Partnership [online website]; available from http://mepi.state.gov/; 
Internet, accessed 20 February 2008. 
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essential part of Hughes’s September 2005 Middle East tour to raise US morale after US 
favourability ratings dwindled following the US’s entering Iraq in 2003. 
 
  On her 2005 Middle East public diplomacy tour, Hughes would visit Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey and Indonesia. What was envisioned as an opportunity to trumpet American 
exceptionalism only illustrated the deep contrast between US foreign policy and the 
perspectives held in Islamic society. The tour was more of an assault on Islamic traditions 
and a public diplomacy embarrassment than the teachable moment for Muslims it was 
intended to be. Most of the 2005 tour included public speaking appearances with large 
crowds of elite Muslim women (as in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on September 27). In Jeddah, 
Hughes would introduce American public diplomacy rhetoric by implying to an auditorium 
of 500 that Saudi women should one day be able to drive as American women and “fully 
participate in society.”400 Countering Hughes’s position, the university auditorium erupted 
when one woman stood and stated “The general image of the Arab woman is that she isn’t 
happy… well, we’re all pretty happy.”401 This points out Hughes’s mistake of employing 
indirect approaches as opposed to first listening and then cultivating a direct and sustainable 
relationship based on perspectives drawn from this particular venue. The same outcry would 
follow the next day in Ankara, Turkey with a group of twenty Turkish feminist leaders: when 
explaining the benefits of the Iraq war, Hughes’ stated  "I can appreciate your concern about 
war. No one likes war [but]…It is impossible to say that the rights of women were better 
under Saddam Hussein than they are today.”402 This same approach would follow in Istanbul, 
                                                        
400 Steven R. Weisman Saudi Women Have Message for US Envoy [article online] available 
from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/28/international/middleeast/28hughes.html?ex=1187409600&en=2
53f58b29eb5383f&ei=5070; Internet accessed 20 February 2008. 
401 Ibid. 
402 Steven R. Weisman Turkish Women, Too, Have Words with US Envoy (On Iraq War) 
[article online]; available from 
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Turkey while conducting a makeshift interfaith dialogue (after touring Istanbul’s Topaki 
Palace) with Muslim, Eastern Orthodox, Jewish and Roman Catholic religious officials. 
Without addressing critical social issues, Hughes’s interfaith efforts would only serve as a 
symbolic gesture that would “emphasise that countries with large Muslim populations should 
understand that many Americans are also guided by religious convictions” – and thus 
reducing post secular matters to simplistic cross-cultural affairs.403 This event did not produce 
a critical dialogue session which centred on peacemaking or on how to employ conflict 
resolution issues, but rather served as a symbolic gesture to display America’s position on 
religious tolerance and religious freedom. 
 
e) The State Department on interfaith (2005-2007) 
 
While holding a doctoral placement with the State Department in 2007 to conduct 
research on UN peacekeeping, sanctions and counter-terrorism issues with the Bureau of 
International Organizational Affairs (Washington, DC), an opportunity was presented to 
question various retired and active US ambassadors, diplomats and the Secretary of State (on 
US diplomatic engagement and broad international religious affairs). A respectful level of 
both senior-level diplomats and US ambassadors (in an informal setting) agreed that 
international issues had become a major factor which US foreign policy and US diplomacy, if 
given adequate training, should address. Most also agreed that encouraging direct approaches 
with religious leadership at overseas embassies – “though it would not be likely under the 
Bush Administration”  – would be a practical step towards more direct approaches with 
religious infrastructures. However, in a more formal setting, the view of then Secretary of                                                         
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/29/international/europe/29hughes.html; Internet, accessed 20 
February 2008. 
403 Ibid. 
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State Condoleezza Rice differed from those of fellow diplomats on the notion of direct 
approaches when engaging critical religious infrastructures in the Muslim world.  
 
When asked, “Should scholars of theology and inter-religious relations engage 
channels of US diplomacy to resolve religious-based conflict in the 21st century?” Secretary 
Rice agreed that international religious affairs had become an important factor which must be 
addressed. However, her answer revealed hesitation in publically acknowledging that US 
diplomats and Ambassadors shared a specific role to directly approach religious leadership to 
promote peacemaking initiatives. Endorsing an indirect plan, Rice commented: 
 
I don’t think the US Government has much to add to this discussion, but I think that we can 
facilitate others doing it… It is not something the US government can do principally, but we 
need to be loud spokespeople for the importance of interfaith dialogue, for the importance of 
research in these areas and for the importance of opening channels in which people can talk 
about their differences. If they don’t talk about their differences, they will not overcome 
them. If we can’t work to overcome some of the prejudices and myths that are sometimes at 
the bottom of religious differences and violence, then it’s going to be very difficult to build a 
political foundation on a very weak foundation of tolerance.404 
 
The secretary’s position is grounded in a conservative posture to outsource social welfare 
issues relating to religion to NGOs and private third-party organisations (as with the MEPI).   
Rice ends by stating: 
 
The United States is a place in which, I think, our particular history has led to, over time, 
tolerance and religious difference. That’s really the message that we should send as a US 
government; beyond that, we should send a message that the people of good faith, or 
whatever that faith is, and even if people are not of any particular faith, need to work together 
on issues of tolerance.405 
 
                                                        
404 Condoleezza Rice, informal Interview/Student Question and Answer Session by Darrell 
Ezell, 3 April 2007, transcript provided by BNET Broadcasting, US Department of State Television 
Service, Washington, D.C.; see appendix for full question and answer. 
405 Ibid. 
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Rice does not imply that there are critical post-secular issues affecting international affairs 
that deserve direct application, but reduces the matter of whether scholars of theology and 
inter-religious relations should engage channels of US diplomacy to resolve religious-based 
conflict to an issue of culture to be regulated by tolerance. In effect, Rice’s position suggests 
why indirect makeshift interfaith efforts would take precedence towards the end of Hughes’s 
term as undersecretary.  
 
Since 2007, the State Department’s efforts to “encourage” or “facilitate” interfaith 
activity have taken place through the Bureaus of Education and Cultural Affairs, the 
International Information Programs and the International Visitor Leadership Program. Many 
of these initiatives support academic and professional exchanges and also Muslim outreach, 
however some have employed the proverbial phrase “interfaith dialogue” in order to gather 
religious leadership for symbolic “meet and greets” to bolster US morale. Unfortunately, 
neither of these initiatives directly engage religious elements within a socio-political forum to 
build sacred-secular relations, beyond symbolic presentations, or promote conflict resolution 
through peacemaking initiatives. Many of these staged events are associated with ECA and 
IIP bureau-sponsored programmes such as the new Fulbright Interfaith Community Action 
Program406, which has convened nearly 600 Muslim clerics in the US with the central aim of 
providing a remote forum where religious scholars and academics might converse with US 
religious leaders. The principal objectives as one exchange programme indicates, is “to                                                         
406 According to the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs, “The Fulbright Interfaith 
Dialogue and Community Action Program provides a group of ten scholars/religious leaders from 
diverse religious communities in countries with significant Muslim populations with the opportunity 
for discussion, debate and collaborative learning centred on interfaith dialogue and community action. 
Drawing on the knowledge and experience gained from this programme, participants are asked to 
promote tolerance and community building with different faith communities.” See Fulbright 
Newsletter for Community Representatives, Interfaith Dialogue and Community Action Program 
Announced [document online]; available from 
http://www.cies.org/hud/fulbrightweb/nl/CREP/2006_winter/inter.htm; Internet, accessed 12 March 
2008. 
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engage in inter-religious dialogue with both lay and clerical counterparts from the broader 
American community of believers and to observe the compatibility of religious belief and 
practice in democratically oriented social and political structures.”407  
 
Between 2005-2007 Undersecretary Hughes was successful in encouraging interfaith 
relations but failed significantly at devising a strategic long-term plan as to how interfaith 
relations would eventually open constructive foreign policy conversations between US 
diplomats and religious officials on issues relating to, for example, counter-terrorism and 
how to improve US-Muslim world relations beyond public diplomacy initiatives. Impressions 
were given that America might consider this option. While addressing the UN High Level 
Dialogue on Interreligious and Intercultural Understanding and Cooperation for Peace, she 
indicated that having a deep respect for and knowledge of other cultures advances mutual 
understanding.408 Despite the impact of her speech and the need for the US to attend the high-
level panel at the UN, Hughes did not indicate to panel members that US officials would 
participate in addressing religious leaders directly in a hosted partnership with representatives 
from the Alliance of Civilizations (AOC). After reviewing Hughes’s address, at first glance, 
one is led to believe that the US would fully cooperate with the AOC agenda to employ non-
violent tactics for finding peace through sacred-secular interfaith practises. However, she 
does not suggest that the US will employ direct religious approaches with the Muslim world, 
but that the USG is currently conducting its own engagement efforts (though indirectly) 
which do not require stipulations or requirements which are often imposed by transnational 
organisations such as the UN:                                                           
407 US Department of State, “Major Accomplishments 2005-2007”, 21 
408 Karen P. Hughes, “Encouraging Inter-faith Dialogues and Conversations Between 
Cultures”, Presentation to the UN High Level Dialogue on Inter-religious and Intercultural and 
Cooperation for Peace (October 4, 2007) [article online]; available from http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/us/2007/93259.htm; Internet, accessed 20 Ocotober 2009. 
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We all have a role. America wants to partner in this dialogue. Through websites and 
communication alerts, we are working to highlight the many voices speaking out against 
terrorist violence and of greater inter-faith understanding. We are encouraging inter-faith 
dialogue and conversations between cultures. Through a new programme called “Citizen 
Dialogue”, we’ve sent Muslim American citizens across the world to engage with grassroots 
citizens in Muslim communities. We’ve brought clerics here and sent American clerics 
abroad. We’ve sponsored programmes for young people, teaching respect for diversity.409 
 
Months before, Hughes’s last robust public diplomacy attempt was encouraging US 
ambassadors to conduct personal outreach in local Muslim communities by hosting Iftaar 
dinners at US embassies, which today still serves as an opportunity to encourage direct 
diplomatic engagement with religious officials.410 In 2005 and 2006, Iftaar dinners were held 
at US embassies in: Burkina Fasso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Mozambique, 
Montenegro, Azerbijan, in the Kyrgyz Republic, Syria, Kosovo and India.411 While providing 
a safe space for Muslim participants, Iftaar gatherings held by US embassies, by State 
Department standards have “encouraged” mutual understanding and “facilitated” dialogue 
among representatives of local faiths. They provide interfaith panels (as in the Gambia) to 
discuss topics on religious tolerance. However, no instances of direct engagement between 
US diplomats and religious leadership have taken place to further peacemaking where 
intractable conflicts of a religious nature are present. 
  
                                                        
409 Ibid. 
410 The hosting of annual Iftaar dinners within the White House and State Department 
community under the Bush Administration is not uncommon. Since 2001, President Bush has hosted 
an annual Iftaar dinner to demonstrate that the US is not at war with Islam and to celebrate the Islamic 
faith and acknowledge the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. In recent years, Iftaar dinners at many 
US embassies have provided an opportunity for many Muslim-American employees to share stories 
and experiences of their faith. See also Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Attends Iftaar 
Dinner at the White House (October 4, 2007) [article online]; available from http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080917-11.html; Internet, accessed 17 October 
2009. 
411 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Supporting Human Rights and 
Democracy: The US Record 2005-2006”, US Department of State (2006) [document online]; 
available from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2005/; Internet, accessed 12 March 2008. 
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In Tanzania, US Ambassador Mark Green hosted two Iftaar celebrations. At the first he and 
the US Embassy in Tanzania’s Public Affairs Section provided foodstuffs to the Fiy-sabili-
llahi Tabligh Markaz community and orphanage, distributing sports equipment and joining 
the community on woven mats after the evening prayers to enjoy traditional Swahili cooking. 
At an event later in the month, Ambassador Green shared an Iftaar meal with the 
Mwinyibaraka Islamic Foundation’s orphanage, pledging to provide bed nets to combat the 
high rate of malaria among the orphans.412 
 
However, one of the closest attempts, where direct engagement by a US ambassador 
could have contributed greatly to initiating direct approaches to improve religio-political 
relations, was made in 2005 in Nigeria, with the hosting of annual Iftaar dinners in Abuja, 
Lagos and the Kawara State to encourage post-conflict peace-building efforts between 
Christians and Muslims.413  
  
5.4. Conclusion: Assessing State’s outreach in the Muslim world  
  
As with any executive-level foreign policy, the Bush Doctrine, after 9/11, influenced 
the entire USG system as the principal position carried out by all departments and agencies. 
Without recognising that religious, tribal and cultural themes would be of great influence in 
both combating terror and improving US-Muslim world relations, the Bush Doctrine 
bypassed, publically and privately, the overall engagement of the concept of religion (or the 
religious voice) for the purpose of peacemaking. Hence, this position influenced the US 
Department of State’s outreach practices throughout the Muslim world (between 2001 and 
2008). A parallel between the doctrine’s failure to recognise the impact of post-secularism in 
US-Muslim world affairs after 9/11 and the State Department’s reluctance to address critical 
international religious affairs (beyond matters of religious freedom and religious tolerance) is                                                         
412 “U.S. Embassies Host Iftaar Dinners”, Public Diplomacy Update, Vol. 2, Issue 4 
(December 2007). 
413 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Supporting Human Rights and 
Democracy: The US  Record 2005-2006”, US Department of State (2006) [document online]; 
available from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2005/; Internet, accessed 12 March 2008, 45-47.  
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present. On both ends, an encouragement to develop projects geared towards religious 
analysis, peacemaking or direct engagement with key religious players to meet America’s 
national security objectives, did not take precedence. Nor would the White House or State 
Department design a strategic plan focused specifically on communication that was 
comparable to the Bush Doctrine for effectively engaging the vast majority of the Muslim 
world.   
 
Coincidentally, State’s pre-existing programme, the “Brand America” campaign 
(employed specifically for raising America’s favourability ratings) was reintroduced after 
9/11 to conduct outreach to key Muslim publics. Though results were devastating, State 
officials would consider this project to be a feasible alternative to peaceful engagement in 
order to bolster US credibility in the Muslim world. Despite contributing to a distortion in 
US-Muslim world communication, the State Department prolonged this lacklustre process by 
employing brand management resources to sell US foreign policy (through mass academic 
and professional programmes). In effect, three fundamental shortcomings are present with 
regards to the State Department’s outreach practises in the Muslim world. These relate 
specifically to: inconsistent leadership, its use of brand management resources to 
communicate to Muslim publics, and State’s inability to employ suitable approaches.   
 
First, the State Department’s organisational structure, and its inability to retain a 
committed Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs between 2001 
and 2008, contributed greatly to various setbacks. Since 1998, the Office of International 
Religious Freedom remains State’s principle office that publically addresses specific 
religious issues – as opposed to broad international religious affairs. Unlike Ministries of 
Religious Affairs throughout the Muslim world with government officials who are trained at 
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carrying out religio-political analysis, peacemaking and conflict resolution, the State 
Department (after 9/11) was forced to redirect efforts to conduct Muslim world outreach 
through the office of Public Diplomacy and Public relations. Adopting a pre-existing 
programme and its indirect efforts clearly indicates the limits of the State Department’s 
organisational structure.  
 
Table 5 
 
US Undersecretaries of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 
 
 
For the first time in the State Department’s history it would bear the responsibility for 
rebuilding America’s image among foreign publics since terminating the United States 
Information Agency in 1998 and President Clinton’s creation of a new undersecretary 
position for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. By Bush’s term, the trend would be to 
nominate former Madison Avenue marketing executives to the post, convinced that brand 
management approaches would resolve a longstanding image problem that affected American 
foreign policy over the next few years. Throughout Bush’s term in office this post would be 
held by four different undersecretaries, three of which would resign at the height of State’s 
Undersecretary Term in Office Administration 
Evelyn Lieberman October 1, 1999 – January 19, 2001 Bill Clinton 
Charlotte Beers October 2, 2001 – March 28, 2003 George W. Bush 
Margaret D. Tutwiler December 16, 2003 – June 30, 2004 George W. Bush 
Karen P. Hughes September 9, 2005 – December 14, 2007 George W. Bush 
Position Open (1yr) December 14, 2007-June10, 2008 George W. Bush 
James K. Glassman June 10, 2008 – January 15, 2009 George W. Bush 
Judith McHale May 26, 2009-Present Barack Obama 
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Muslim world outreach campaign: Charlotte Beers would unexpectedly resign after a year, 
today serving as Director of Martha Stewart’s Living Omnimedia Inc.; Martha D. Tutwiler 
resigned after six months of service to take a post with the New York Stock Exchange 
Euronext; and Karen P. Hughes would resign after two years of service, taking the position of 
Vice Chairman with the Burson-Marsteller PR firm. Between 2007 and 2008, the 
undersecretary position would remain unfilled until James K. Glassman (former business 
journalist) would serve a short-term of seven months before resigning. For this office to bear 
the responsibility of crafting America’s communicative message to the Muslim world, the 
Bush administration’s inability to nominate committed professionals demonstrated a lack of 
total attention to, and an inconsistency with, leading US-Muslim world relations.  
 
The second fundamental shortcoming relates to the State Department’s robust Brand 
America campaign, which would be remarkably unsuccessful at reaching its principal goal to 
improve America’s image abroad and raise its favourability rating throughout the Muslim 
world. As its primary communication resource, public diplomacy and nation-branding, 
coupled by the Bush Administration’s staunch military policies, contributed greatly to this 
decline after 9/11. Findings would prove this point true in Muslim countries polled in 2008, 
which displayed ratings below 50% that included: Turkey (12%), Egypt (22%), Jordan 
(19%), Indonesia (37%), and Pakistan (19%).  State’s inability to raise favourability ratings 
over the course of eight years indicates that a much deeper problem (relating to America’s 
foreign policy decisions and communicative practises) fuelled this tension – not to mention 
its failure to employ direct approaches in critical settings. 
 
 
 
  198 
Finally, the third shortcoming is associated with the State Department’s inability to 
take seriously various US-Muslim world engagement opportunities (such as employing direct 
approaches and capitalising on interfaith dialogue opportunities at US embassies). Between 
2005 and 2007, efforts by the State to employ direct communicative approaches between 
USG officials and Islamic leadership to encourage peacemaking, conflict resolution or 
religio-political analysis serve as valuable opportunities that were not employed. If the Office 
of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs were serious about employing direct approaches, it is 
likely that a more challenging communication approach would have been applied by State 
officials within these settings. Taking this direct communicative approach seriously could 
have inevitably contributed to the convening of US political officials with religious players in 
an effort to introduce the perspectives of Muslim publics into the US policymaking 
discussion. The State Department instead chose to employ brand management resources, and 
end results therefore culminated with diplomats and Ambassadors at annual Iftaar dinners, in 
professional exchange settings, and with Karen P. Hughes’s Middle East tour, for example, 
turning a constructive environment into a public diplomacy stage to sell the “American 
Story”.    
  
Considering these three shortcomings, is it likely that the State Department genuinely 
wanted to improve US-Muslim world relations after 9/11? The seriousness and consistency 
needed to make an improvement was not a top priority. When key opportunities were 
presented, State chose to employ brand management resources; and, considering the 
frequency with which there arose a need to fill the undersecretary position, it seems clear that 
their Madison Avenue approaches to Brand America did not work, but served as a limitation 
that neither Beers, Tutwiler, Hughes or Glassman were trained to address. Chapter 6  
considers a number of recommendations that call for direct approaches when State officials 
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engage broad international religious affairs – as opposed to  brand management campaigns 
that prove beneficial in other circumstances, but, often lack the substance needed to establish 
long-term trusted relations at a grassroots level.    
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CHAPTER 6 
 
SUPPORTING A MORE DIRECT APPROACH  
 
 
6.1. Introduction: Premature efforts 
 
After making a critical review of the impact of the State Department’s Brand America 
campaign, the question is what affect, if any, would this strategy have on the body of US-
Muslim world relations? The inability of the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 
to restore US favourability ratings and improve America’s image throughout the Muslim 
world clearly indicates that employing the communicative tools of public diplomacy and 
nation-branding was ineffective at selling US foreign policy to Muslims after 9/11. Taking 
this communicative approach to use brand management tools as entry points to engage 
Muslim audiences to peddle the “American Story” perhaps contributed more to damaging 
US-Muslim relations. Therefore, spending over $1 billion in programming and foreign aid 
efforts (over the last decade) to make America and US foreign policy appealing to Muslims 
would be highly ineffectual – considering the Bush administration’s defence strategy in 
South Asia and the abuse and torture of Muslims held at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, 
which served to spread a message of fear throughout these audiences.  
 
Though the State Department’s programming attempts (the “Brand America” 
campaign and the Shared Values Initiative, etc.) at reaching this audience were reasonable, 
the argument still remains that its initial approach after 9/11 to sell an incoherent foreign 
policy, driven by fear and ideology, would contribute to a backlash in public opinion toward 
America. Hence, this thesis questions the State Department’s prematurity in employing its 
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nation-branding and public diplomacy machine, especially before gathering the perspectives, 
understanding the beliefs and ideologies, or comprehending the religious, tribal, and cultural 
dimensions of the Muslim world.   
 
The Gallup World Poll consistently confirms that the crucial issues in improving relations are 
the beliefs and perceptions of “the other,” which affect and need to inform foreign policies. 
The war against global terrorism has been fought on three major fronts: military, economic, 
and diplomatic. As military experts have noted, while the military can capture and kill 
terrorists, it is not equipped to win the struggle for minds and hearts.414 
 
This is the job of the State Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, but 
the strategic planning necessary to understand its target audience was foregone. Hence, “If 
Public diplomacy centres on influencing public attitudes about the formation and execution 
of foreign policies,” why then use brand management resources to engage Muslim publics if 
the views of Muslims would not be utilised in foreign policymaking?415 In their 16 June 2004 
official statement on the dwindling of America’s popularity, Diplomats and Military 
Commanders for Change (twenty-seven retired US ambassadors, undersecretaries, and 
military officials) did confirm this premature step – due in part to Bush’s extreme position for 
restoring US-Muslim relations:  
From the outset, President George W. Bush adopted an overbearing approach to America's 
role in the world, relying upon military might and righteousness, insensitive to the concerns 
of traditional friends and allies, and disdainful of the United Nations. Instead of building upon 
America's great economic and moral strength to lead other nations in a coordinated campaign 
to address the causes of terrorism and to stifle its resources, the Administration, motivated 
more by ideology than by reasoned analysis, struck out on its own. It led the United States 
into an ill-planned and costly war from which exit is uncertain. It justified the invasion of Iraq 
by manipulation of uncertain intelligence about weapons of mass destruction, and by a 
cynical campaign to persuade the public that Saddam Hussein was linked to Al Qaeda and the 
                                                        
414 John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam?: What a Billion Muslims 
Really Think (New York, NY: Gallup Press, 2007). 
415 Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, What is Public Diplomacy [article online] 
available from http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm; Internet, accessed 20 August 2009. 
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attacks of September 11. The evidence did not support this argument.416 
 
If the State Department acted prematurely in employing public diplomacy and nation-
branding as a first option, then what other possibility for direct engagement is available? The 
outcry of Bush’s foreign policy and leadership on Middle East affairs and the global war on 
terror have encouraged seasoned diplomats and military commanders to urge a reorganisation 
of America’s foreign policies and a strategic emphasis on communication as a serious first 
step. To improve non-military US-Muslim relations (at the diplomatic level) will include 
rethinking the practise of communication in order to restore overall relations. Joe S. Nye Jr. 
indicates in, Making Great Communicators, “communicating with distant audiences, leaders 
need the ability to communicate one-on-one or in small groups. In some cases, the close 
communication is more important than public rhetoric. Organisational skill – ability to attract 
and inspire an effective inner circle of followers – can compensate for rhetorical deficiencies, 
just as effective public rhetoric can partly compensate for low  organisational skills.”417 
 
This perspective opens up the possibility to think critically about a new alternative 
approach to foster direct communication at a grassroots-level with Muslim publics. This 
approach embraces socio-political interchange and direct communicative relations with key 
religious, tribal and cultural infrastructures to restore trusted relations (before brand 
management resources such as “Brand America” are considered). To develop this idea, 
consider the following four perspectives. These perspectives break new ground in that they 
challenge traditional State Department communication practises and its efforts to handle                                                         
416 Diplomats  and Military Commanders for Change, Official Statement [document  online] 
available from http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2004/06/16_diplomats-military-
commanders.htm; Internet, accessed 20 August 2009.  
417 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Making of Great Communicators”, The Korea Times (August 12, 
2009). 
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religion: the recommendations of Barry Rubin418, Ambassador John McDonald419, former 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright420, and Edward Luttwak421, when integrated, establish a 
firm position on why the State Department must consider a more direct approach with 
religious audiences. Their recommendations push beyond the State Department’s secular 
agenda of handling religion (which centres on religious freedom and religious tolerance 
issues). However, they are not without limitations. These four recommendations will focus on 
four unique topics: religious analysis as an imperative; NGO practises; a new cadre to 
support these new efforts; and the establishing of a new State Department actor. 
Consideration to a potential alternative to foster direct communication will include the 
acknowledgment in this thesis of the value of a new State Department actor who is willing to 
implement a “dangerously unselfish” communication platform which promotes sacred-
secular cooperation for restoring US-Muslim world relations. 422                                                         
418 Barry Rubin, “Religion and International Affairs”, Religion: the Missing Dimension of 
Statecraft, Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
20-37. 
419 Louise Diamond and Amb. John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach 
to Peace. 3rd ed. (Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1996). 
420 Madeline Albright and Bill Woodward, The Mighty & The Almighty: Reflections on 
Power, God, and World Affairs (London: MacMillian, 2006). 
421 Edward Luttwak, “The Missing Dimension”, Religion: The Mission Dimension of 
Statecraft, Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (Oxford Press: Oxford, 1994), 8-20. 
422See Martin Luther King Jr., The Stanford University Martin Luther King Jr. Papers Project: 
“I’ve Been to the Mountaintop” (3 April 1968), [online document]; available from 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/mlkpapers/; Internet, accessed 22 March 2008. 
To further King’s position on the need for a “dangerous unselfishness” in public behaviour when 
considering one’s moral responsibility in the world, this position may be related to the notion of 
“costly grace” over “cheap grace” as perceived by Dietrich Bonhoeffer. In the Christian theological 
sense, “Cheap grace means grace as a bargain-basement goods, cut-rate forgiveness, cut-rate comfort, 
cut-rate sacrament; grace as the church’s inexhaustible pantry room in which it is doled out by 
careless hands without hesitation or limit. It is grace without a price, without costs. It is said that the 
essence of grace is that the bill for it is paid in advance for all time. Everything can be had for free, 
courtesy of that paid bill. The price paid is infinitely great and, therefore, the possibilities of taking 
advantage of and wasting grace are also infinitely great.” For Bonhoeffer, this argument is related to 
the “advanced” suffering of Jesus Christ and his intimation that many recipients of the Christian faith 
may fail to understand the impact of Jesus’s teaching, message, and death because grace has been 
easily bestowed upon them. Bonhoeffer presses this position further to argue, “What would grace be, 
if it were not cheap grace?” He states that, “Costly grace is the hidden treasure in the field, for the 
sake of which people go and sell with joy everything they have. It is the costly pearl, for whose price 
the merchant sells all that he has; it is Christ’s sovereignty, for the sake which you tear out an eye if it 
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6.2. Rubin: Utilising religious analysis 
 
Though a staunch opponent to US-Middle East foreign policy and possibly to this 
thesis’s position on US-Muslim world relations, Barry Rubin (foreign policy analyst and 
director of the Global Research in International Affairs Centre, Herzliya, Israel)423 has a 
unique recommendation for improving America’s foreign policymaking. His 
recommendation includes integrating an analysis of religious issues into US decision-making 
which allows US officials to have a greater insight into the emerging post-secular climate. In 
presenting this case, Rubin opens up the secular modernisation thesis, debating why State 
Department officials, in this era, must be reluctant to bypass directly engaging broad 
international religious affairs, though uncommon to US foreign policymaking.424 In the essay 
                                                        
causes you to stumble… Above all, grace is costly, because it was costly to God, because it costs God 
the life of God’s Son – ‘you were bought with a price’ – and because nothing can be cheap to us 
which is costly to God”. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2003). 57-63. See Geffrey B. Kelley and F. Burton Nelson, The Cost of Moral Leadership: The 
Spirituality of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2003), 51-82. 
This argument is not meant to suggest that persons of world faith must take up Christian values in 
order to engage the Other effectively. The aim of presenting Bonhoeffer’s perception is to 
demonstrate that a counteracting posture or alternative behaviour must be employed in order to 
encourage the needed shift from baseline tolerance to a radical, but needed, acceptance of 
cooperation between the state and religious communities. 
423 See the Global Research Centre in International Affairs (Israel), 
http://www.gloriacenter.org/  
424 “The secularisation thesis provided one of the major principles on which the eighteenth-
century philosopher Auguste Comte founded the field of sociology – which, he predicted, would 
eventually supplant religion as the future source of major judgments. Quite often, the reaction against 
Western modernisation is framed in religious terms. This is a valid characterisation when one 
considers the modern, secularised, and rather compartmentalised approach to life standing in sharp 
contrast to and threatening the organic mixture of religious, political, and socioeconomic values and 
actors in so-called traditional societies. In addition to whatever instructional interest may exist on the 
part of religious authorities to preserve their prominent social role, the strict division between the 
sacred and the secular observed in the West is a relatively recent innovation – and is foreign to much 
of the rest of the world.” Douglas Johnston and Brian Cox, “Faith-based Diplomacy and Preventative 
Engagement”, Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik, Douglas Johnston, ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2003), 11. 
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Religion and International Affairs, Rubin introduces three essential errors which contribute to  
incorrect analysis and policy responses by American foreign policymakers.425   
In examining the second error only, Rubin draws our attention to the secular 
modernisation thesis prior to 9/11, and its general impact on the American foreign policy 
environment. He recalls: 
 
The expectation that religion would inevitably decline in the process of Third World 
modernisation was wrong. Noting the secularisation process in most of the West during the 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, some observers have assumed that the rest of 
the world would follow the same pattern. It was expected that modern ideas, such as science, 
technology, secularism, and humanism, would overcome the religious concept of the universe 
that dominated pre-modern society.426 
 
This historical view, as indicated in Chapter 2, holds a serious place within the State 
Department and other foreign policy agencies. However, Rubin identifies the downfall in this 
position, acknowledging that:  
                                                         
425The second principal error is identified above. The two remaining errors that Rubin covers 
in Religion and International Affairs address: i) The argument that religion belongs to theology not 
politics, in the Western world: this point, which is drawn upon by intellectuals, inhibits religion from 
being taken seriously at the political level. Rubin says, “In modern times religion has increasingly 
been seen in the West as a theological set of issues rather than as a profoundly political influence in 
public life… Rather, religion plays its role as an important defining characteristic of politically 
contending communities. Yet, in the absence of a heated theological debate – or on the assumption by 
some modern Western scholars that such debates are trivial and abstracted from real consideration of 
power – religion as the primate communal identity has, until recently, been too often neglected.” iii) 
Rubin’s third principle addresses the misapplication of the Marxian thesis on the impact that religion 
may have on society. He argues, “The West – including the communist regimes – tended to misapply 
Marx’s concept, accepted widely in some quarters of the Western intellectual tradition, that religion is 
the opiate of the masses. This concept was taken to mean that religion was a distraction from the 
important things of life and that the chance to improve one’s existence in this world would obviate the 
need for a system that could only promise rewards in the world to come. Marx himself and many 
others neglected the point that opiates are addictive. Heroin addicts usually can be weaned from their 
drug only by the use of methadone, and equally addictive drugs which are dispensed by government 
authorities and provide no ‘high’. This is analogous to the role of the comprehensive secular 
ideologies which revolutionary regimes often try to push onto the masses from above in lieu of 
religion. They must be imposed continually and bring relatively little satisfaction. Moreover, the 
substratum of religious belief often continues to exist underground, awaiting some opportunity to 
reassert itself as an ideology.” Barry Rubin, “Religion and International Affairs”, Religion: the 
Missing Dimension of Statecraft, Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 20-21. 
426 Ibid., 21. 
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For several decades, the prevailing school of thought underlying US foreign policy has 
assumed that religion would be a declining factor in the life of the state and in international 
affairs. However, experience has shown and projections indicate that the exact opposite is 
increasingly true. To neglect religious institutions and thinking would be to render 
incomprehensible some of the key issues and crises in the world today.427 
 
Though not agreeing totally with the position of this thesis on US-Muslim world relations, 
Rubin’s fundamental argument, which supports advancing religious analysis, assures the 
incorporation of critical social elements in the State Department’s examination. Hence, it is 
correct that when concepts of religion (tribal, cultural, and social components) are not 
included in the analysis, vital communicative sources in US foreign policy are often 
bypassed.  This often includes critical elements as Jewish and Islamic fundamentalist social 
behaviour or the elements of post-modern terror which suggest the appropriate 
communicative position that US officials should take in most cases.428 Agreeing with Rubin, 
not reflecting on the ethics and principles of these traditional audiences in US foreign policy 
efforts does more than just limit the possibilities for good decision-making; it ensures their 
failure.429 For example, considering the political climate in Iran during the late 1970s, the 
State Department left out the communal element of religion, which proved to be fatal.430 
“The Iranian case raises a larger question about the difficulty that many members of the 
foreign policy community in the United States have in comprehending the role of religion in 
international affairs. Although religion is generally concerned with the problem of evil in the                                                         
427 Ibid., 33. 
428 See Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious 
Violence (Los Angeles: UC Press, 2003), 45-53, 219-243. 
429 In the Middle East, national identification is still largely a function of religious affiliation. 
One’s community is either Sunni, Shiite Muslim, Alawite, Druze, Christian (Roman Catholic, 
Maronite, Copt, Eastern Orthodox, or Greek Catholic), or Jewish. Iran’s Islamic revolution and 
Lebanon’s civil war are only the most obvious and salient examples of this phenomenon, which is 
present in many other situations. The Arab attitude toward the conflict with Israel is heavily 
conditioned by religion. Pakistan’s raison d’être is its Islamic composition. Religion is also a 
fundamental political issue in defining community in Sudan, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
elsewhere. In sub-Saharan Africa, the Protestant and Catholic divisions have often manifested 
themselves along political lines as well. Ibid., 33. 
430 See, John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1981). 
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world, secular US diplomatic thought differs. Holding the rationale that national interests are 
the root of human and state motivation, many playmakers and diplomats have become 
incapable of understanding certain phenomena.”431  
  
In essence, Rubin concludes that even though secular ideals have often been central to 
US foreign policymaking today, a more accommodating approach that integrates the 
perspectives of religious audiences must be incorporated. This recommendation corresponds, 
to a degree, with Habermas’s post-secular position, which suggests that secular officials 
within the nation-state encourage public awareness and respect between the religious ethos of 
the liberal secular state and secular society. Philosophically, both arguments aim to invoke a 
mutual respect, which allows for cooperation between the two worlds. Thus, Habermas’s 
argument parallels Rubin’s thesis, encouraging the view that within a post-secular society 
“there is an increasing consensus that certain phases of the ‘modernisation of the public 
consciousness’ involve the assimilation and the reflexive transformation of both religious and 
secular mentalities.”432 Hence, “If both sides agree to understand the secularisation of society 
as a complementary learning process, they will also have cognitive reasons to take seriously 
each other’s contribution to controversial subjects in the public debate.”433 When considering 
the fact that two mentalities will continue to exist within the public sphere for some time that 
will pose a major concern to American foreign policy, Rubin is correct to argue that taking a                                                         
431 Barry Rubin, “Religion and International Affairs”, 27.  
432 According to Jürgen Habermas, post secular society “refers not only to the fact that 
religion is holding its own in an increasingly secular environment and that society must assume that 
religious fellowships will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. The expression ‘post secular’ 
does more than give public recognition to religious fellowships in view of the functional contribution 
they make to the reproduction of motivation and attitudes that are societally desirable. The public 
awareness of a post-secular society also reflects a normative insight that has consequences for the 
political dealings of unbelieving citizens with believing citizens… If both sides agree to understand 
the secularisation of society as a complementary learning process, then they will also have cognitive 
reasons to take seriously each other’s contribution to controversial subjects in the public debate.”  
Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and 
Religion (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 46-47. 
433 Ibid., 47. 
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proactive stance to embrace the potential in religious analysis may inevitably prove 
rewarding to US sacred-secular relations. 
  
6.3. McDonald: Integrating peacemaking tools 
 
During a 19 April 2007 interview, Ambassador John McDonald (co-founder and 
chairman of the Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy (IMTD)) identified two specific 
proposals for improving the US Department of State’s communication practices.434 
McDonald’s first proposal advised US diplomats to recognise and incorporate the 
contributions and approaches made by Track 2 (NGO) actors in its diplomatic efforts when in 
conflict-prone settings – thus supporting conflict transformation (see Figure below).435 
According to McDonald and IMTD co-founder, Louise Diamond, “Track II work is based on 
the assumption that unofficial discussions provide a latitude that is not available in formal 
settings. This freedom provides the opportunity to examine the root causes of and the 
underlying human needs in conflicts, to explore possible solutions out of public view, to 
identify obstacles to better relations, and to look ahead at issues not yet on the official 
agenda.”436 McDonald referenced Track 2 practises and that many of its accomplishments in 
international peacemaking could provide a deeper analysis and more personable interaction 
                                                        
434 While working at the US Department of State, I informally met former US Ambassador 
John McDonald in Arlington, Virginia on April 19 2007 at the Institute of Multi-track Diplomacy. I 
am grateful for this interview and the insight McDonald provided to this study. 
435 In this study, the term conflict transformation refers specifically to the systematic 
transformation of conflict situations to “peace systems”. My position towards the usage of this term 
parallels that of Notter and Diamond, who state that, “Conflict transformation refers to the process of 
moving from conflict habituated systems to peace systems. This process is distinguished from the 
more common term of conflict resolution because of its focus on systematic change… Transforming 
deep rooted conflicts is only partly about ‘resolving’ the issues of the conflict – the central issue is 
systematic change or transformation. Systems cannot be ‘resolved,’ but they can be transformed.” 
Notter and Diamond, “Building Peace and Transforming Conflict”, 4. 
436 Louise Diamond and Amb. John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach 
to Peace, 34. 
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between US diplomats and civil society in conflict prone-settings. These alternatives include 
non-violent and mutually empowering peacemaking methods which bring together religious, 
tribal, and political leadership on a grassroots level.  
 
In taking this approach, the diplomat can tap into a host of what this thesis regards as 
transformational elements that are often at the disposal of Track 2 actors. These 
transformational elements focus on establishing peaceful networks which promote 
cooperation and strategic relationship-building through direct inter-personal, inter-cultural, 
and in some cases inter-religious engagement. 
 
Table 6 
Tracks of the Multi-Track Diplomacy System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Track 1: Government – Peacemaking through Diplomacy 
Track 2: Non-government/ Professional – Peacemaking through 
Professional Conflict Resolution 
Track 3: Business – Peacemaking through Commerce 
Track 4: Private Citizens – Peacemaking through Personal Involvement 
Track 5: Research, Training and Education – Peacemaking through 
Learning 
Track 6: Activism – Peacemaking through Advocacy 
Track 7: Religion – Peacemaking through Faith in Action 
Track 8: Funding – Peacemaking through Providing Resources 
Track 9: Communications and the Media – Peacemaking through 
Information 
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In order for the State Department to improve its communication practices, McDonald 
proposed secondly that, as a department, it should consider the value of taking a multi-track 
systems approach that encourages and helps to assist peacemaking efforts in conflict-prone 
settings. This multi-track diplomacy system is comprised of nine individual tracks which 
operate on separate levels, but, when integrated, formulate a system integral to the 
peacemaking process. Diamond and McDonald’s (1996) research findings indicate that when 
this systems approach is taken, a systematic way to reaching peace occurs with actors 
becoming more accommodating to the mutual interests of a society in order to resolve 
conflict issues.437 
 
To improve actors’ relations in conflict-prone settings, McDonald advised the State 
Department to seriously consider this systems approach. In doing so, he noted that “diplomats 
must focus on preserving three areas: bridge-building, capacity-building, and institution 
building.” 
 
                                                        
437 Louise Diamond and Amb. John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach 
to Peace. 3rd ed. (Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1996); “The term multi-track diplomacy is based on 
the original distinction made by Joseph Montville in 1981 between official, governmental actions to 
resolve conflicts (track one) and unofficial efforts by nongovernmental professionals to resolve 
conflicts within and between states (track two). Later, Louise Diamond coined the phrase ‘multi-track 
diplomacy’, recognising that to lump all track two activities under one label did not capture the 
complexity or breadth of unofficial diplomacy. Ambassador John McDonald then wrote an article 
expanding track two into four separate tracks: conflict resolution professionals, business, private 
citizens, and the media. This framework, however, still had the four unofficial tracks operating with 
the exclusive purpose of affecting or changing the direction of track one. In 1991, Diamond and 
McDonald expanded the number of tracks to nine. They added four new tracks: religion; activism; 
research, training and education; and philanthropy, or the funding community. More importantly, 
however, they reorganised the relationship between the various tracks. Instead of putting track one at 
the top of the hierarchy, with all the ‘unofficial’ tracks poised to change the direction of track one, 
Diamond and McDonald redesigned the diagram and placed the tracks with each connected to the 
others in a circle. No one track is more important than the other, and no one track is independent from 
the others. They operate together as a system. Each track has its own resources, values, and approach, 
but since they are all linked, they can operate more powerfully when they are coordinated.” James 
Notter and Louise Diamond, “Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-track Diplomacy in 
Practice”, Occasional Paper – The Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy, No. 7 (October 1996): 6-8. 
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1. Bridge Building – efforts to bring together parties in conflict to create mutual 
understanding, rebuild trust, and examine together the root causes, needs and interests 
that underlie each side’s stated positions.438 
 
Communication practices, according to McDonald, are key in this area; however, 
stepping outside of employing traditional diplomatic approaches is necessary. Under this 
strategy the diplomat will shift from its traditional secular posture to an inclusive position 
which seeks to directly engage the interest of all actors in conflict by listening to the concerns 
of all parties (preferably by employing dialogue). 
 
2. Capacity Building – efforts to develop skills in conflict resolution and reconciliation 
within a group of local peace builders who can then use these skills within and between 
their own communities. These skills include a creative blend of both the local, 
indigenous, traditional methods of addressing conflicts and Western-based methods… 
Capacity building is a key component of the social peace building process, which is about 
building a human infrastructure.439 
 
This point suggests that diplomats should consider the value in blend approaches. 
This means that, when in a conflict-prone setting, diplomats become comfortable with 
combining some traditional State department methods with indigenous (or traditional) 
approaches. Many diplomatic failures in the past were a result of State officials not 
understanding how to engage critical indigenous practices, social infrastructures and 
hierarchy within cultures. If blend approaches were considered in most cases, US diplomats 
                                                        
438 Notter and Louise Diamond, “Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-track 
Diplomacy in Practice”, Occasional Paper – The Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy, No. 7 (October 
1996): 14. 
439 Ibid, 15. 
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would not have to rely as much on outsourcing social engagement efforts to NGOs and 
private organisations (as in the case of the Bush administration).  
 
3. Institution Building – efforts to help the local peace builders develop sustainable 
institutions – organisations, alliances, working groups, university programmes, etc. – that 
can further the work of peace building theory and practice in the conflict system and the 
broader region.440 
 
This last position implies that US diplomats must work to maintain trusted and cooperative 
relations by constructing critical infrastructures within these regions. Hence, there are 
numerous post-conflict peace-building reform efforts currently underway (in the Middle East 
and South Asia), but the elements of trust and confidence among Muslim publics toward 
American leadership are generally low – contributing to setbacks and false starts. McDonald 
agrees with this point by acknowledging that the USG is overwhelmingly political and 
bureaucratic as well as deeply engaged in meeting secular demands rather than the mutual 
concerns of the “other”. In this case, “The negative potential [of the USG] is its rigidity, 
exclusivity, elitism, and potential abuse of power. Its institutes and thinking are strongly 
embedded in the state-centric mode of power politics, and its [resistance to] change.”441 
 
This state-centric behaviour is what McDonald has essentially argued against thus far 
in his recommendations; he sees it as the key problem as to why the State Department and its 
senior officials are reluctant to recognise or even incorporate the many key methods offered 
by Track 2 actors. For the US diplomat, McDonald advises that a globally interdependent 
                                                        
440 Notter and Diamond, “Building Peace and Transforming Conflict”, 16-17. 
441 Louise Diamond and Amb. John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach 
to Peace, 3rd ed. (Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1996), 33. 
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methodology will, in fact, aid the outcome of State foreign policymaking, but it will also help 
US diplomats to develop mutually empowered responses while in the foreign sector. 
Embracing this perspective broadens the discussion to consider Madeline Albright’s position, 
which integrates both Rubin’s and McDonald’s theses that push toward sacred-secular 
engagement within conflict-prone settings, thus employing a special diplomat within the US 
Department of State.   
  
6.4. Albright: Improving religious relations 
 
  Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright framed the third recommendation. The 
Albright thesis acknowledges that since living in a world without religion is highly unlikely, 
the neighbouring alternative should be that of dealing directly with religion to comprehend its 
methods and contributions to the world in which we live. The secretary puts forth that, “The 
challenge for [US] policymakers is to harness the unifying potential of faith, while containing 
its capacity to divide.” Hence, “This requires, at a minimum, that we see spiritual matters as a 
subject worth studying.”442 Assuring the State Department’s establishment of a course                                                         
442Madeline Albright and Bill Woodward, The Mighty & The Almighty: Reflections on Power, 
God, and World Affairs (London: McMillan, 2006), 64.The Albright thesis complements the earlier 
Rubin-Habermasian argument which calls for a dual integration and respectful fellowship between the 
sacred and secular mentalities. This benefits the US Track 1 level. Such a dual integration between 
these two mentalities supports Max Horkheimer’s claim that interdisciplinary analysis and “a critical 
theory” encourage practical responses over theoretical remedies. See Max Horkheimer, Critical 
Theory (New York: Seabury Press,1982); Max Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (New York: Seabury, 1972). As will be discussed later in this study, a critical theory, 
as indicated by Horkheimer, encourages a sense of “human emancipation” and liberation away from 
the otherwise oppressive views imposed by society, men, or institutions. Generally emerging in the 
face of many social movements (feminism, black and liberation theology, post-colonial race theory), a 
critical theory encourages alternative space and an alternative argument which allows what 
Horkheimer regards as “human emancipation” to emerge. In a larger sense, a critical theory moves 
from traditional examination to the alternative investigation and application of social ideas. In short, a 
critical theory of investigation is a radical expression which helps to formulate broader thinking on 
social issues; Max Horkheimer, director and leading architect of the Institute of Social Research, in 
Frankfurt, Germany (in the 1930s) agrees that “bringing different disciplines together would yield 
insights that [are] unobtainable by working within narrow and increasingly specialised academic 
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whereby broad international religious affairs are of central concern, four proposals are 
provided in The Mighty and Almighty: Reflections of Power, God, and World Affairs (2006). 
 
Albright’s first proposal (in parallel with Barry Rubin’s recommendation) affirms 
“that US diplomats and foreign policymakers should critically study religious matters and 
incorporate their findings into progressive strategies for peacemaking at the US Department 
of State.” Albright refers to J. Bryan Heir, Harvard University professor of Religion and 
Public Life and his indication that “there is an assumption that you do not have to understand 
religion in order to understand the world. You need to understand politics, strategy, 
economics and law, but you do not need to understand religion.”443 Taking this secular 
assumption a step further to comprehend the limitation of both political and religious 
leadership, international relations expert Walter McDougall of the University of Pennsylvania 
acknowledges that “very few scholars, much less pundits, theologians, or diplomats, display 
expertise in both fields. Some have a profound understanding of one or more religious 
traditions, perhaps also a personal faith, but lack knowledge or experience of the rough and 
tumble of politics. Others are wise in the ways of statecraft either from analysis or practice, 
but confess to being out of their depth in spiritual matters.”444 McDougall’s argument 
emphasises Albright’s point that an integration of sacred and secular mentalities and 
disciplines would support US diplomats when confronting religious issues. Albright states 
that: 
 
                                                        
domains.” James Gordon Finlayson, Habermas: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2005), 3. 
443 Ibid., 65. 
444 Walter A. McDougall Religion in Diplomatic History, Orbis, Vol. 6, No. 3 (March 
1998) [article online]; available from http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2001_10-
12/mcdougall_religion/mcdougall_religion.html; Internet, accessed 22 March 2008. 
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To anticipate events rather than merely respond to them, American diplomats will need to 
take Heir’s advice and think more expansively about the role of religion in foreign policy and 
about their own need for expertise. They should develop the ability to recognise where and 
how religious beliefs contribute to conflicts and when religious principles might be invoked 
to ease strife... To lead internationally, American policymakers must learn as much as 
possible about religion, and then incorporate that knowledge in their strategies.445 
 
 (This position has the potential to encourage senior State Department officials such as the 
Secretary of State, the Director General of the Foreign Service, Undersecretaries of State for 
Political Affairs, Democracy and Global Affairs, and Public Diplomacy & Public Affairs to 
consider encompassing this directive. If this recommendation is not implemented from the 
top down, it is likely that diplomats will not take it seriously and will interpret it as 
insignificant and lightweight).  
 
Albright’s second proposal recommends the State Department to consider the use of 
religious negotiators to encourage conflict reconciliation in high-level discussions at the State 
Department. Drawing upon past experience she notes, “When participants in a conflict claim 
to be people of faith, a negotiator who has the credentials and credibility to do so might wish 
to call their bluff.”446 This suggests that, in most cases, and with the President of the United 
States, the Secretary of State, and senior State officials, a knowledgeable representative in 
international religious affairs should be available to convene parties to carry out conflict 
reconciliation. Often, a representative who carries “street credibility” among conflicting 
parties can make a special appeal at a much deeper (or spiritual) level than the traditional US 
diplomat. The traditional diplomat’s diplomacy is most often rooted in game theory, 
promoting national interest, and decision-making. The appeal made by the religious 
negotiator may be along spiritual, cultural, or – in some cases – tribal lines, making a two-
                                                        
445 Albright, The Mighty and the Almighty, 64-72. 
446 Ibid., 72. 
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way connection between the negotiator and the communal leadership of these communities.  
She acknowledges: 
 
If I were secretary of state today, I would not seek to mediate disputes on the basis of 
religious principles any more than I would try to negotiate along the more intricate details of a 
trade agreement or a pact on arms control. In each case, I would ask people more expert than I 
to begin the process of identifying key issues, exploring the possibilities, and suggesting a 
course of action. It might be well that my involvement, or the president’s, would be necessary 
to close a deal, but the outlines would be drawn by those who knew every nuance of the 
issues at hand.447 
 
In the third proposal Albright recalls that US diplomats and ambassadors should not 
allow assumptions regarding the Establishment Clause to condone an ignorance which may 
hinder their understanding of religious matters. As identified in Chapter 2 with the  
“crosscutting obstacles” presented by the CSIS 2007 report, a high level of scepticism by 
USG officials, with special regard to a misreading of the Establishment Clause, is linked to 
policymakers’ reluctance to engage religious matters and audiences directly – if at all.  
 
If diplomacy is the art of persuading others to act as we would wish, effective foreign policy 
requires that we comprehend why others act as they do. Fortunately, the constitutional 
requirement that separates state from church in the United States does not also insist that the 
state be ignorant of the church, mosque, synagogue, pagoda, and temple. In the future, no 
American ambassador should be assigned to a country where religious feelings are strong 
unless he or she has a deep understanding of the faith commonly practiced there. 
Ambassadors and their representatives, wherever they are assigned, should establish 
relationships with local religious leaders.448 
 
This fear and misreading of the Establishment Clause, has, in effect, created a wave of 
reluctance among senior State officials, in particular-diplomats and ambassadors, toward 
                                                        
447 Ibid., 73; Albright further states, “When I was Secretary of State, I had an entire bureau of 
economic experts I could turn to, and a cadre of experts on nonproliferation and arms control whose 
mastery of technical jargon earned them a nickname, ‘the priesthood’. With the notable exception of 
Ambassador [Bob] Seiple, I did not have similar expertise available for integrating religious 
principles into our efforts at diplomacy. Given the nature of today’s world, knowledge of this type is 
essential.” Ibid., 73. 
448 Ibid., 73. 
  217 
directly engaging religious matters and audiences and incorporating direct approaches when 
necessary. 
 
The final but most important proposal presented by the Secretary suggests that the 
“State Department should hire or train a core of specialists in religion to be deployed both in 
Washington and in key embassies overseas.”449 This recommendation comes as no surprise, 
considering the former US secretary’s familiarity with Track 2 NGO peacemakers and their 
influence in resolving intractable conflict during her administration.450 (Many US-based 
Track 2 NGOs, such as the United States Institute of Peace, the Institute for Multi-track 
Diplomacy, the Institute for Religion and Foreign Policy, the International Center for 
Religion and Diplomacy and even the Carter Center have for years employed highly-trained 
staff to address high-priority conflicts with religious dimensions). Taking note of the many 
positive results by Track 2 actors and their organisations, Albright adds that a reading from 
US diplomats and academics like Douglas Johnston and Brian Cox’s “faith-based diplomacy” 
would help rebuild and improve certain aspects of the State Department’s peacemaking 
efforts and the future development of a core of “Religious Specialists”.451 
 
                                                        
449 Ibid., 73. 
450 For example, Albright acknowledges this impact in the Track 2 sector in these words, 
“Over a period of years, Sant’Egidio usefully brokered negotiations ending a long and bloody civil 
war in Mozambique. It has also played a constructive role in, among other places, Kosovo, Algeria, 
Burundi, and Congo. The community sees prayer, service to the poor, ecumenism, and dialogue as the 
building blocks of interreligious cooperation and problem solving. Numerous other faith-based  
organisations, representing every major religion, are in operation. They are most effective when they 
function cooperatively, pooling their resources and finding areas in which to specialise. Some are 
most skilled at mediation; others are best at helping former combatants readjust to civilian life. Still 
others emphasise prevention, addressing a problem before it can explode into violence... Together, 
these activists have more resources, more skilled personnel, a longer attention span, more experience, 
more dedication, and more success in fostering reconciliation than any government.” Ibid., 75.  
451 See, Albright, The Mighty and the Almighty, 76. 
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According to Johnston and Cox’s research, “Faith-based diplomacy, while 
conceptually new to the field of international relations, is a form of Track 2 (unofficial) 
diplomacy that integrates the dynamics of religious faith with the conduct of international 
peacemaking. As such, it is more about reconciliation than it is conflict resolution.”452 
Albright’s recommendation for a core of specialists in religion indicates that State 
Department officials will more than likely benefit from having an understanding of NGO 
intermediary approaches. The faith-based diplomacy that Albright refers to notes, “The peace 
that it pursues is not the mere absence of conflict but rather a restoration of healthy and 
respectful relationships between the parties.”453 Johnston asserts that reconciliation rather 
than resolution of a conflict should be the general aim. This requires then that Albright’s 
Religion Specialist should have an in-depth knowledge of the core groups involved. 
However, the issue today is that US diplomats recruited to the Economic, Political, Public 
Diplomacy, Consular, or Management tracks within the US Foreign Service (as McDougall 
noted above), have little or no training in the areas of international religious affairs, conflict 
transformation or international relations, which suggests a critical need by the State 
Department to address Albright’s final recommendation.454  
 
This thesis argues that what may have prompted Albright’s concern for the 
development of this future specialist may be the five characteristics of the “faith-based 
intermediary” which Johnston and Cox identify: (a) be endowed with an ability to utilise 
spiritual principles in peacemaking; (b) operate with spiritual authority in times of crisis; (c) 
be able to respect the essence of other religious traditions; (d) understand the impact of                                                         
452 Douglas Johnston and Brian Cox, “Faith-based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement”, 
Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003), 15. 
453 Ibid.,15. 
454 For more on the various tracks associated with the US Foreign Service, see Shawn 
Dorman, ed. Inside a US Embassy: How the Foreign Service Works for America (Washington: 
American Foreign Service Association Press, 2005).  
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utilising spiritual texts to connect with religious audiences at a deeper level and; (e) be 
recognised as having a spiritual perseverance which is grounded in their own faith 
tradition.455 Scott Appleby, director of the University of Notre Dame – Joan G. Kroc Institute 
for International Peace Studies, takes the Johnston-Cox position a step further, suggesting 
that (in addition to these five characteristics) the faith-based intermediary should also 
reconsider the use of traditional conflict resolution approaches, which most often overlook 
vital cultural and religious tenets beneficial to the conflict transformation process.  
 
Faith-based diplomacy, therefore, is the work, at least in part, of insiders with expertise in the 
religious tradition(s) whose meaning and relevance for the contemporary conflict is being 
contested… Proponents of faith-based diplomacy are well advised to invite and honour the 
first-order discourse spoken by jurists, sages, gurus, bishops, theologians, and ethicists who 
elicit the concrete language of ‘diplomacy’ not from the conflict resolution textbooks and 
tradition of the West but from the vernacular of the religious and ethnic communities they 
represent… The faith-based [intermediary] is challenged to negotiate these psychodynamics, 
imbedded as they are in the social relations of the religious community, and to evoke the 
peacemaking option within that community.456 
 
Drawing from Appleby’s argument, it appears that the faith-based intermediary must 
either come from or resonate with the conflict-habituated community. This action allows time 
and space for the intermediary to listen before dictating an unreasonable position. In addition, 
this is what Albright has envisioned of this future core of specialists on religious matters – a 
core respective of multi-religious beliefs, capable of engaging religious analysis while 
promoting sustainable US foreign policy; and individuals who are well prepared to engage 
religious audiences and leadership by invoking non-violent peacemaking options. Albright’s 
recommendation prepares a way for the research to think critically about a new type of US 
Foreign Service Officer or core of specialists for handling broad international religious 
                                                        
455 Johnston and Cox, “Faith-based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement”, 16-18. 
456 Scott R. Appleby, “Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the 
Service of Peacebuilding”, Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik (New York: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2003), 231-258. 
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affairs, which, in effect, improves State’s communication practices. Her proposals (in favour 
of religious analysis, utilising religious negotiators, comprehending the limitations of the 
Establishment Clause, and a cadre of Religion Specialists) create an opportunity to review a 
more practical proposal than has taken this position seriously prior to her administration. In 
1994, Edward Luttwak would make a similar case, but when integrated here with Albright’s 
argument the vision of this potential player within the State Department becomes more 
apparent, thus allowing for a deeper exploration. 
  
6.5. Luttwak: An underdeveloped alternative 
 
Edward Luttwak, military strategist and former State and Defense Department 
analyst, offers the final recommendation on the role religious analysis shall contribute to US 
foreign policymaking when employing a special actor. As with Rubin’s theory, the Luttwak 
thesis confronts the secularist modernisation argument (called secular reductivism457), adding 
that post-Kantian Enlightenment established a predisposition in the liberal-secular state 
against religion, which is often held by both US foreign policymakers and politicians.458 Its 
                                                        
457 This term is synonymous with the traditional secularist modernisation position, which 
suggests that the influences of religion and religious issues are becoming reduced in international 
affairs. The secular reductivism premise, we know thus far, is unwarranted and is regarded in this 
study as insignificant to the promotion of religious analysis and peacemaking efforts, which involve 
direct engagement with religious audiences. 
458 Kant suggests that if man were to separate his thoughts, which were created by “the self” 
away from those of the sacred, then true enlightenment might emerge. In Kant’s view, enlightenment 
emerged when man freed himself from the authority of the sacred. Since the 18th century, this 
philosophy has spanned the ages and is present in the formation of Western civil law, Western 
political decision making, and in US liberal secular reasoning. Kant argues in What is Enlightenment, 
“Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to 
use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its 
cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of 
another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own 
understanding!” Since the 18th century in Western society, this philosophy remains central in 
encouraging the separation of sacred and secular thought in the public arena. See also Paul Guyer, ed. 
The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006). 
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position also suggests that religion be discarded and pushed to the fringe (considering its non-
essential place in international affairs). Luttwak states: 
 
Policymakers, diplomats, journalists, and scholars who are ready to over-interpret economic 
causality, who are apt to dissect social differentiations most finely, and who will minutely 
categorise political affiliations are still in the habit of disregarding the role of religion, 
religious institutions, and religious motivations in explaining politics and conflict, and even in 
reporting their concrete modalities. Equally, the role of religious leaders, religious 
institutions, and religiously motivated lay figures in conflict resolution has been disregarded – 
or treated as a marginal phenomenon hardly worth noting.459 
 
The marginalisation of religious issues, according to Luttwak, is often the most 
important factor contributing to failure in both the US diplomatic and intelligence 
communities when they are at stake. He adds, “one should not perpetuate administratively the 
misconception that religion, with its institutions and leaders, is necessarily a marginal factor, 
or necessarily a diminishing force, or necessarily a purely political (or social, or economic, or 
ethnic) phenomenon in religious guise.”460 In this situation, the challenge for the US foreign 
policymaker is to close the gap between sacred-secular relations and encourage the raw 
analysis of religion in international affairs to emerge within US foreign policymaking circles 
when needed. 
 
Luttwak’s position comprehends the stakes and has seriously considered the vital 
contribution which religion, its actors, and its institution are likely to make in securing peace 
in conflict-prone settings. The absurdities of secular reductivism, related to the discarding of 
religion and evasion of direct religious engagement, are what Luttwak adds as further causes 
of the USG failure, especially in cases like the 1979 Iranian revolution. Secular reductivism 
intervened on numerous occasions during the decision-making process on Iran, distorting US                                                         
459 Edward N. Luttwak, “The Missing Dimension”, Religion: The Mission Dimension of  
Statecraft, eds. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press: 1994), 9. 
460 Ibid., 16. 
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policy decisions and analysis relating to the impact of prominent Iranian leaders and the 
socio-religious factions posing a threat to Tehran and US national interests within the region. 
Overlooking the voice of “actual participants” within the Iranian revolt, US policymakers 
refused to include vital analysis to verify how, at the time, religion assumed a much larger 
role than the political or social ones which were suspected.461 
 
Pushing the potential of religion analysis to the fringe during the foreign 
policymaking process reaffirms a much greater assumption: clearly, US foreign policymakers 
and diplomats today, as in 1979, are simply unaware of how to address or engage either the 
concept of religion, or religious audiences, effectively during hostile situations. Missed 
opportunities by US intelligence officers of the CIA to assess key religious dimensions linked 
to the Iranian revolution indicate that it is easier to overlook the role of religion in 
international affairs than it is for policymakers, intelligence officers or diplomats to 
concretely engage with it directly (as was the case under the Bush administration).  
 
US monitoring of Iranian politics should always have included their religious dimension, at 
the very least to keep abreast of the attitudes and activities of the more prominent religious 
leaders. But in a particular dogmatic example of secular reductivism, the one-recorded 
attempt to do just that within the Central Intelligence Agency before the revolution was 
vetoed on the grounds that it would amount to mere ‘sociology’, a term used in intelligence 
circles to mean the time-wasting study of factors deemed politically irrelevant.462 
 
                                                        
461 The US, Luttwak argues, subsequently emphasises the following secular motives as root 
causes of the Iranian revolution, stronger than the impact of religion: a) political/constitutional 
opposition to autocracy; b) economic resentment at wealth inequalities, especially on the part of the 
newly urbanised masses; c) anger at the regime’s corruption; d) the specific social resentment of the 
traditional (Bazaari) merchant class at the rise of a new class of large-scale entrepreneurs; and e) 
“normal” repression. Ibid., 12. 
462 Edward N. Luttwak, “The Missing Dimension”, 12.; For further research into the missed 
opportunity of the CIA to analyse Iranian religious dimensions before its revolution see James E. Bill, 
The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 
1988). 
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  With the impact of religion, its institutions and audiences on international affairs, it is 
clear that it would be nonsensical for US policymakers to see it as politically irrelevant. In an 
effort to provide an effective alternative to secular reductivism toward international religious 
affairs, Luttwak recommends that a different posture is taken immediately within the US 
Department of State attending to direct religious engagement and religious analysis. He 
solidifies his claim by making what this thesis regards as the chief recommendation of those 
considered so far: “religious attachés should be assigned to diplomatic missions and US 
intelligence agencies should recruit religious specialists to remedy US diplomatic and 
intelligence failures linked to their secular reductivist assumptions.”463 But what role might 
this religious attaché play within the diplomatic environment? Should we assume that this 
player will be capable of engaging religious audiences directly, and, if so, will it resort to 
employing public diplomacy and nation-branding communication resources to engage these 
publics?   
  
6.6. Section conclusion  
 
Despite the Bush administration’s reluctance to comprehend the impact of making a 
post-secular recognition, it is certain that, in order to counteract tension caused by the US-
Muslim world communication problem, this recognition must be employed. Thus, between 
2001 and 2008, the influence of the Bush Doctrine would dissuade any efforts for USG 
officials in making this recognition because of its confrontationalist posture to: promote 
preemptive strikes, advance military primacy, support a coalition of the willing, and 
encourage the spread of democracy to combat terror and weapons of mass destruction. In 
moving forward, the recommendations presented by Rubin, McDonald, Albright and Luttwak                                                         
463 Ibid., 16. 
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give attention to post-secularism by providing structural recommendations. These include 
modifying America’s foreign policy/diplomatic landscape or recruiting a physical player into 
an already static system. As with various other proposals presented by leading American 
think-tanks (such as the Brookings Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations and the 
Heritage Foundation), the following recommendations have also omitted giving attention to 
the dynamics of communication between US diplomats and religious audiences.   
 
Together, Barry Rubin and former Secretary of State Madeline Albright establish 
clearly that the only limitation the USG set toward engaging broad religious affairs is not put 
forth in the US Establishment Clause, but rather is located in partisan political assumptions 
that prolong public ignorance toward critical post-secular affairs. Their call to invite religious 
analysis or even religious negotiation within the national security/policymaking forum is 
bold, but limiting in that it falls short at linking this ambition to a communication path. To 
assure that permanent infrastructures are in place, McDonald acknowledges that trusted 
relations between the US and religious audiences must be established at a grassroots level to 
assure critical partnerships. His seasoned recommendation establishes a starting point, but 
does not go beyond a reliance on NGO partnerships and providing a structural system to 
work within. Conversely, what is missing is serious attention in their recommendations to 
clarifying how US players might apply a more engaged approach, that focuses specifically on 
communication, when addressing religious audiences.  
 
Two points are made clear from these recommendations: a) improving US-Muslim 
world relations should not be entirely about raising favourability; and b) if the State 
Department is serious about improving present relations, critical attention shall be given to 
comprehending the value of building trusted partnerships (at a grassroots level) with key 
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players throughout the Muslim world. Carrying out these two points will more than likely 
require amplification of Luttwak’s structural recommendation to demonstrate how either a 
religion specialist or religion attaché shall engage religious audiences communicatively. 
Considering the recent shift in the American political system, this study makes an invaluable 
contribution in Part 3 by introducing new methods to improve US-Muslim world 
communication under a new presidential administration. Hence, we will evaluate whether it 
is necessary to modify the current State Department’s communication practices, thereby 
considering new ways to engage Islamic society directly. This will require taking Luttwak’s 
recommendation a step further by exploring in detail the 2004 follow-up proposal by Douglas 
Johnston which called for a religion attaché to serve at a more concrete level in the US 
Foreign Service. 
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PART 3 
 
WHEN POSSIBLITY MEETS PRACTISE
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CHAPTER 7 
 
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION UNDER A NEW PRESIDENCY 
 
7.1. Introduction: A transition of power  
   
On November 4, 2008, the United States of America embarked upon a historical and 
political transition which presented a fresh signal to the international community by its 
election of the first African-American President, Barack Hussein Obama.464 This transition 
did not, by any means, occur in a straightforward manner. Arguably, it came into being in 
part due to the Obama campaign’s grassroots stand in opposition to the failing Bush-Cheney 
White House and its consistent effort to restore confidence and hope to the US general 
electorate.465 Some have even suggested that it was Obama’s persuasive political rhetoric, re-
emphasising to the American public the economic and foreign policy setbacks over the last 
eight years, that secured him the presidency.466 It seems more probably to have been his 
clear-eyed, direct communicative approach to the US general electorate that embodied the 
power of the nation and convinced it that effective change came not from the top down, but 
from the bottom up. Therefore, if the electors were to embrace this change in course and elect 
a new administration, an Obama presidency would openly seek to restore American values at                                                         
464 See Mark Curtis, Age of Obama: a reporter's journey with Clinton, McCain and Obama in 
the Making of the President 2008 (Ann Arbor: Nimble Books, 2009); Tim J. Wise, Between Barack 
and a Hard Place: Racism and White Denial in the Age of Obama (San Francisco: City Light Books, 
2009). 
465 Michael D. Shear and Kevin Sullivan, Obama Portrays Another Side of US [article 
online]; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/07/AR2009040701405.html; Internet, accessed 5 April 2009. 
466 See Jann S. Wenner, How Obama Won: Two leading political experts on the historic 
election – and how it could usher in ‘a brand-new nation’ (27 November 2008) [article online]; 
available from http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/24200780/how_obama_won/print; Internet, 
accessed 5 April 2009.  
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home, promote transparent domestic and foreign policies and restore both America’s 
international standing in the world and its ailing economy.467 Since the presidential election 
and the electing of a Democratic Congressional majority, a newly kindled political spirit is 
present in the country. The fear of a unilateral US government engrossed in securing its own 
ends appears, to some degree, to be on the wane, and a renewed sense of hope for 
collaborative, global engagement is replacing it. But how will this significant transition affect 
the future of communicative relations between the US and the Muslim world? 
 
As a US presidential hopeful, Obama publicly observed that an enlightened 
alternative to engaging US allies and foes alike deserved consideration for making and 
sustaining peace in the Near East.468 This new position acknowledged a possible US response 
beyond total reliance on military might.469 It also meant that a preliminary option of directly                                                         
467 Barack Obama, Transparency and Open Government (21 January 2009) [document 
online]; available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Transparency_and_Open_Government/; Internet, 
accessed 5 April 2009. 
468 See Barack Obama, The Blueprint for Change: Barack Obama’s Plan for America [online 
document]; available from www.barackobama.com/pdf/ObamaBlueprintForChange.pdf; Internet, 
accessed 5 April 2009. 
469 Looking back at how the USG, under the Bush Demonstration, sought to extend US 
military might in the Muslim world through congressional support is recognised with the Kyl-
Lieberman Amendment (H.R. 1585) (S. Amdt. 3017). The resolution, in effect, set out to provide a 
pretext for the USG to extend its military presence from the Iraq war into Iran. The resolution is 
drawn from compounded sources that suggest an Iran-Iraq connection and the extent of Iran’s support 
of Shi’a militia extremists in Iraq. The amendment suggests that the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is involved with turning “Shi’a extremists into an armed faction that services its 
interest by providing a ‘proxy’ war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces.” To make this case, 
testimonies and research were collected from Gen. David Petraeus (then Commander of the Multi-
national Force Iraq), US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Cocker, National Intelligence Estimates on Iraq 
(August 2007), The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (September 
6, 2007), General James Jones (Ret.), President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, and the Department of 
Defense’s report to Congress (Measuring the Stability in Iran, September 18, 2007). Under the Kyl-
Lieberman amendment, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran is designated as being a 
foreign terrorist organisation, padding its argument to extend a US military presence in Iran. This 
decision is criticised as having the potential to undermine US security interests, which otherwise 
possibly allowing for full de facto authorisation of USG forces to enter Iran in an effort to “roll-back” 
its alleged influence in Iraq. This amendment passed, 76-22, in September 2007 with democratic 
leadership with then Senator Barack Obama abstaining support or voting against the amendment. See, 
H.R. 1585 – “Kyl-Liberman Amendment” Roll-call (26 September 2007) [article online]; available 
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engaging international Muslim audiences in an effort to curb terrorist activities and sectarian 
violence, especially throughout Afghanistan and Iraq, should be employed.470 During the 
campaign, it was less popular foreign policy to reject, as Obama did, the conservative Bush-
Cheney posture of engaging US foes, like Syria and Iran, of the Muslim world. For example, 
in The Blueprint for Change: Obama’s Plan for America, Obama outlines three major 
platforms regarding the government of the Islamic State of Iran. If given the opportunity, he 
would: a) exhaust the non-military peacemaking option in confronting potential threats; b) 
oppose any effort to extend the present Iraq war into Iran; and c) employ direct presidential 
diplomacy with Iran without preconditions.471 This challenging blueprint presents an 
opportunity to rethink future US-Muslim world engagement by placing greater emphasis on 
the grassroots level472. 
 
 
                                                         
from 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=110&session=
1&vote=00349; Internet, accessed 5 April 2009. 
470 Pondering why further efforts beyond direct Oval Office engagement are vital, see Juan 
Cole, Engaging the Muslim World (New York, Palgrave MacMillian, 2009); Stephen R. Grand and 
Kristin M. Lord, To Rebuild US-Muslim World Relations Obama is Not Enough [article online] 
available from http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0326_muslim_world_relations_grand.aspx; 
Internet, accessed 9 April 2009. 
471 Ibid; see Scott Lucas, (15 April 2009) US-Iran Engagement: Washington to Drop Nuclear 
Precondition on Talks? [article online] available from http://enduringamerica.com/2009/04/15/us-
iran-engagement-washington-to-drop-nuclear-precondition-on-talks/; Internet, accessed 15 April 
2009. 
472 My reference to this grassroots level refers specifically to the re-establishment of direct 
human-to-human engagement within predominantly Muslim publics where a restoration of US-
Muslim world relations must first begin. My communication strategy (as we will discuss further in 
this chapter) shall be employed at this level when a key player engages critical infrastructures in the 
Muslim world to restore these relations. These key infrastructures relate specially to: religious and 
academic institutions, civic officials, religious and tribal leadership and, most importantly, the general 
public. The communication strategy this study finds most fitting must not resemble the 
communication approach that the USG will use to engage governments in the Muslim world (i.e. 
traditional diplomacy). This re-establishment of US-Muslim world relations calls, in effect, for an 
alternative communication strategy that ensures direct human-to-human interactivity that draws on 
specific tools to enhance relationship building. 
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 However, many political and diplomatic developments have occurred since President 
Obama took office.473 From the onset, the question: Will Obama translate what scholar 
Deborah P. Atwater has called a “Political Rhetoric of Hope”474 into specific occasions of 
engagement between secular diplomats from his administration and key religious players 
within Muslim audiences? If his rhetoric does not connect with practise then there will 
probably be a gap between Obama’s political rhetoric of hope (which transcends US borders) 
and any diplomatic solution that attempts to satisfy international Muslim audiences.  
 
The facts are clear: the communicative practises employed within the US Department 
of State between 2001 and 2008 to conduct Muslim outreach are, today, not credible 
resources for restoring trusted relations. The Obama administration must consider more 
formidable approaches that recognise the impact the emergence of post-secularism is having 
on US foreign affairs, thus creating policies reflective of these events and incorporating the 
                                                        
473 Many pressing developments since Obama’s January 2009 inauguration have centred 
around reshaping US multilateralism with the UN, US-China relations and most of all future US 
relations with Pakistan and Iran (its nuclear capabilities and the role it is likely to play in curbing 
terrorist activity in both South and Central Asia). See Johanna Mendeson Forman, Investing in a New 
Multilateralism: A Smart Power Approach to the United Nations (January 2009) [online document]; 
available from 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090128_mendelsonforman_un_smartpower_web.pdf; Internet, 
accessed 9 April 2009; William S. Cohen and Maurice R. Greenberg, Smart Power in US-China 
Relations: A Report of the CSIS Commission on China (March 2009) [online document]; available 
from http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf; Internet, 
accessed 9 April 2009; Daniel Markey, Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt (Council Special Report No.6, 
August 2008) [online document]; available from 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Pakistan_CSR36.pdf; Internet, accessed 9 April 
2009; Michael Makovsky, et al., Meeting the Challenge: US Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear 
Development (September 2008) [online document]; available from 
http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/8448; Internet, accessed 9 April 2009;  
Robert Satloff and Patrick Clawson, et al., Preventing a Cascade of Instability: US Engagement to 
Check Iranian Nuclear Progress (March 2009) [online document]; available from 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PTF-Iran.pdf; Internet, accessed 9 April 2009. 
474 See, Deborah P. Atwater, “Senator Barack Obama: The Rhetoric of Hope and the 
American Dream”, Journal of Black Studies, 38, No. 2 (2007): 121-129; see also Barack Obama, 
“The World Beyond our Boarders”, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American 
Dream (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 320-382; Barack Obama, Change We Can Believe In: 
Barack Obama’s Plan to Renew America’s Promise (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2008). 
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perspectives of moderate Muslims and Islamic scholars into the US foreign policy debate. To 
bombard international Muslim audiences with a robust propaganda campaign, as taken during 
the Bush era, only weakens America’s popularity.  
 
Chapter 7 will establish a new discourse on how the Obama administration may 
advance its communicative practises during this new era. While the international community 
will possibly become fatigued to Obama’s newness, their scepticism toward US-Muslim 
world relations will remain. Not withstanding the stockpile of policy options that will evolve 
during Obama’s presidency, the most vital policy of this thesis is the restoring of trusted 
relations by the USG with international Muslim publics. This dubious task will require the 
State Department to rethink how past communicative resources (to “Brand America”) 
seriously damaged US-Muslim world relations, and how a more engaged approach may 
possibly restore these relations. 
  
7.2. Treating communication under an Obama administration 
  
What the Obama administration should recall is that, for some time, the US 
Department of State has felt tension over its communication efforts with the Muslim world. 
In the last decade, excessive dependence on a robust public diplomacy campaign to placate 
Muslim publics by promoting outreach, while the Bush White House trumpeted a Realpolitik 
throughout Afghanistan, Iraq and northern-Pakistan, has exacerbated the tension. Since 2001, 
many governments in Muslim countries have become sceptical of the political inconsistencies 
in US-Muslim world relations.475 The US-Muslim Engagement Project, comprising thirty-                                                        
475 See, Meg Bortin, Global Poll Shows Wide Distrust of the United States [article online] 
available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/challenges/general/2007/0627polldistrust.htm; 
Internet, accessed 9 April 2009.  
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four American leaders and led by former Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage, have acknowledged that: 
 
During the past several years, it has become clear that military force may be necessary, but is 
not sufficient, to defeat violent extremism in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, or to prevent 
attacks elsewhere. Moreover, military action has significant costs to US standing in the world, 
and to our ability to gain the cooperation of other countries in counterterrorism, and 
counterinsurgency operations. Senior US defence and military leaders have recognised the 
primary importance of diplomatic, political, economic, and cultural initiatives in combating 
extremism.476 
 
According to the project, they maintain that the US military option should not be 
employed to support a unilateral agenda, but only as a last resort to sustain peace in hostile 
regions. In addition, they indicate that secular resources should be pooled with religious, 
political, cultural and economic resources to reconcile the deep-seated tension that often 
overflow with such hostile factions as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorist networks in 
Central and South Asia. In essence, the Obama administration has agreed with this 
recommendation that US diplomacy serve as a first option, as opposed to military force, in 
future cases. 
 
As indicated above, efforts to revitalise the State Department’s communicative 
practises are not a new set of concerns. The GAO addressed them during State’s Muslim 
world outreach campaign in their 2005 report, US Public Diplomacy: Interagency 
Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of National Communication Strategy, and in 
2006, in State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain 
Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges. The latter report identified clear                                                         
476 Report of the Leadership Group on US-Muslim Engagement, Changing Course: A New 
Direction for US Relations with the Muslim World [online document] available from 
http://www.usmuslimengagement.org/storage/usme/documents/Changing_Course_-
_A_New_Direction_for_US_Relations_with_the_Muslim_World.pdf; Internet, accessed 9 April 
2009, 2. 
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observations for the State Department, that it should: a) implement guidance modelled on 
private sector best practices for its public diplomacy strategy; b) establish a sample country-
level communication plan that could be adapted for local use by posts; and c) set up a 
systematic mechanism for sharing best practice data to address long-standing programme 
challenges. Near the end of Bush’s term, the findings conclude that the State Department 
communicated with the GAO, by sending follow-up reports indicating that it would correct 
these practises – but no concrete efforts were implemented.477  
 
In addition to this appeal, the US-Muslim Engagement Project has, since 2008, called for 
a new strategy to advance four specific goals: 
 
a. The elevation of diplomacy as the primary tool for resolving key conflicts involving Muslim 
countries by engaging both allies and adversaries in dialogue;  
 
b. Support of efforts to improve governance and promote civic participation in Muslim 
countries;  
 
c. Help to catalyse job-creating growth in Muslim countries to benefit both them and the US; 
and, 
                                                         
477 “In May 2006, GAO reported (U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage 
Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges) that 
State Department efforts to communicate with the Muslim audiences faced challenges related to 
staffing and security at posts in the Muslim world and that State lacked a systematic mechanism for 
sharing best practices, which could help address these challenges. GAO recommended that State 
strengthen existing systems of sharing best practices in order to more systematically transfer 
knowledge among embassies around the world. In response, State expanded its INFOCENTRAL Web 
site for public diplomacy practitioners; this site now prominently features a link to a best practices 
database intended for public diplomacy staff to share ideas and find information on managing 
programs. In addition, in January 2007 State held a worldwide Public Affairs Officer conference, 
which, according to the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, was intended for 
officers to share best practices and to hear updates from State Department and interagency colleagues 
from the field and in Washington.” GAO Report (GAO-06-535 May 3, 2006) U.S. Public Diplomacy: 
State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and 
Face Significant Challenges [online document] available from http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
06-535; Internet, accessed 9 April 2009. 
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d. Improve mutual respect and understanding between Americans and Muslims around the 
world.  
 
The symptoms of insufficient and indirect US communication with the Muslim world 
have developed into what appears to be a labyrinth of miscommunication. Causes behind 
these symptoms relate, in part, to the many grievances held by hostile parties over American 
leadership and its foreign policies within/toward predominantly Muslim countries and 
America’s political realism posture to overlook religious and cultural elements within the 
foreign affairs debate. In seeking a new way forward, first, it is necessary to review recent 
suggestions made by Obama’s administration to employ proactive measures to treat 
communicative relations with international Muslim audiences. To attain the fourth goal of the 
US-Muslim Engagement Project, to improve mutual respect and understanding between 
American and Muslims around the world, this position warrants meaningful consideration. 
 
Since taking office, Obama has committed himself to direct Oval Office engagement 
with the Muslim world – raising suspicion among conservative leadership in Washington.478 
Within Obama’s first 100 days as President, his administration put forth a robust domestic 
and foreign policy balancing act, giving equal attention to the global economic meltdown 
and foreign affairs associated with drawing down troops in Iraq and potentially increasing 
troops in Afghanistan to address escalating tension along the North-West Frontier Province                                                         
478 While speculation grew around Obama’s limited foreign policy experience and his 
evolving foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian debacle, Robert Dreyfuss of The Nation notes of 
other foreign policy matters that were of concern to conservatives and liberals alike: “In some 
important areas, Obama would alter or reverse course: he'd draw down forces in Iraq; open talks with 
adversaries such as Iran, Syria and Cuba; end torture and close Guantánamo; renounce unilateralism 
and preventive wars; rebuild ties with allies; and re-engage with the Kyoto climate change initiative. 
He’s also pledged to halt the development of and to seek a ‘world without nuclear weapons.’ In sharp 
contrast to presumptive GOP nominee John McCain, Obama would start to put the threat of terrorism 
in its proper perspective, elevating the importance of other threats to security, from poverty to 
pandemic disease to global warming.” Robert Dreyfuss Obama’s Evolving Foreign Policy [article 
online] available from http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080721/dreyfuss; Internet, accessed 9 April 
2009. 
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(SWAT Valley). In an initial effort to treat communication differently in the Middle East, 
both Senator George Mitchell and Richard Holbrooke were sent as special envoys to the 
Middle East and South Asia. Their tasks included rebooting the Middle East peace process 
and addressing the USG’s tough stance against a nuclear Iran while reviving US relations 
with key regional players such as Syria and Pakistan, and Afghanis (i.e. key Pashtun 
tribesmen and moderate Taliban leaders). As head of state, Obama publically pledged that his 
administration would directly engage the Muslim world (adopting a set of similar proposals 
comparable to the US-Muslim Engagement Project) upon taking office. Emphasising the role 
of the US to usher in a new era of peace, President Obama stated in his inaugural address 
(January 20, 2009): 
 
To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual 
respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict or blame their society’s 
ills on the West, know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you 
destroy… To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of 
dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you 
are willing to unclench your fist.479 
 
 The Obama Doctrine on engaging the Muslim world starkly contrasts with that of the 
Bush Doctrine, which states, “The strategy to counter the lies behind the terrorists’ ideology 
is to empower the very people the terrorists most want to exploit: the faithful followers of 
Islam.” Thus the Bush administration, “will continue to support political reforms that 
empower peaceful Muslims to practice and interpret their faith.”480 As a first option on this 
issue, it appears the Obama Doctrine stands “to empower moderate Muslims,” while also 
incorporating aspects of religious discourse into US foreign policymaking.  
                                                        
479 Barack Obama, President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address [document online] 
available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/; Internet, accessed 9 April 2009. 
480 “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (March 2006) [online 
document] available from http://www.marforres.usmc.mil/docs/nss2006.pdf; Internet, accessed 9 
April 2009, 11. 
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 In setting a new tone (only seven days into the presidency), Obama affirmed this stance 
in his first prime-time interview. Rather than addressing the Muslim world via a US news 
agency (CNN, NBC or CBS), surprising both the Muslim world and the American public, the 
Dubai-based (and part Saudi owned) Arabic and Farsi language news agency, Al-Arabiya 
syndicated this White House interview. As an initial step in treating communication 
differently, the President emphasised what activities were already under way. In the active 
and aggressive US peacemaking efforts between the Israelis and Palestinians (and the 
administration’s call for a two-state solution), Obama noted of his recent envoy, led by 
Senator George Mitchell: 
 
He is one of the few people who has international experience brokering peace deals. And so 
what I told him is start by listening, because all too often the United States starts by dictating 
– in the past on some of these issues – and we don't always know all the factors that are 
involved. So let's listen. He’s going to be speaking to all the major parties involved. And he 
will then report back to me. From there we will formulate a response. Ultimately, we cannot tell 
either the Israelis or the Palestinians what’s best for them. They’re going to have to make some 
decisions.481 
 
 Unlike previous cabinets, the Obama administration has taken early measures to 
address the Middle East crisis. Steps have included taking a broad and holistic approach to 
the region, thus comprehending that the Israeli-Palestinian crisis is not a solitary event, but 
more accurately an “interrelated” activity which fuels intractable conflicts in Pakistan, Syria, 
Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq.482 Efforts to end these widespread events will demand                                                         
481 Obama further states, “He’s going to be speaking to all the major parties involved. And he 
will then report back to me. From there we will formulate a specific response. Ultimately, we cannot 
tell either the Israelis or the Palestinians what’s best for them. They're going to have to make some 
decisions. But I do believe that the moment is ripe for both sides to realise that the path that they are 
on is one that is not going to result in prosperity and security for their people. And that instead, it’s 
time to return to the negotiating table.”  Hisham Melhem (27 January 2009) President Gives First 
Interview Since Taking Office to Arab TV: “Obama Tells Al Arabiya Peace Talks Should Resume” 
[online transcript] available from http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/01/27/65087.html; Internet, 
accessed 9 April 2009. 
482 Acknowledging the importance of taking a holistic approach to the region, Obama, in 
agreement with Melhem, asserted, “I do think that it is impossible for us to think only in terms of the 
  237 
an Obama administration that is diplomatically prepared from the outset to acknowledge (as 
Esposito claims) the turmoil of the Israeli-Palestinian debacle and the necessity of a new 
change in course.483  
 
 In introducing an alternative approach to treating US-Muslim world communicative 
practises, as nominee to become Secretary of State Senator Hillary Clinton disclosed in her 
senate confirmation hearing that the State Department would move to employ from the start a 
strategy of smart power. Clinton stated: 
 
As we focus on Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, we must also actively pursue a strategy of 
smart power in the Middle East that addresses the security needs of Israel and the legitimate 
political and economic aspirations of the Palestinians; that effectively challenges Iran to end 
its nuclear weapons program and sponsorship of terror, and persuades both Iran and Syria to 
abandon their dangerous behavior and become constructive regional actors; that strengthens 
                                                        
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and not think in terms of what’s happening with Syria or Iran or Lebanon 
or Afghanistan and Pakistan. These things are interrelated. And what I’ve said, and I think Hillary 
Clinton has expressed this in her confirmation, is that if we are looking at the region as a whole and 
communicating a message to the Arab world and the Muslim world, that we are ready to initiate a 
new partnership based on mutual respect and mutual interest, then I think that we can make 
significant progress.” Ibid. 
483 See John Esposito, (28 January 2008) Obama and the Muslim World: Building a New Way 
Forward [article online] available from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-l-esposito/obama-and-
the-muslim-worl_b_160392.html; Internet, accessed 9 April 2009. Reaffirming his administration’s 
commitment to taking a holistic approach and embracing direct engagement was again made clear 
when answering a question posed by Caren Bohan of Reuters at the White House on 10 February 
2009 regarding the White House’s proposed strategy for engaging Iran (whilst addressing the need for 
congress passing the 2009 Stimulus Bill). In his acknowledgement of the US taking a new course, 
Obama affirmed, “…[Even] as we engage in this direct diplomacy, we are very clear about certain 
deep concerns that we have as a country, that Iran understands that we find the funding of terrorist  
organisations unacceptable, that we’re clear about the fact that a nuclear Iran could set off a nuclear 
arms race in the region that would be profoundly destabilising. So there are going to be a set of 
objectives that we have in these conversations, but I think that there’s the possibility, at least, of a 
relationship of mutual respect and progress. And I think that if you look at how we’ve approached the 
Middle East, my designation of George Mitchell as a special envoy to help deal with the Arab-Israeli 
situation, some of the interviews that I’ve given, it indicates the degree to which we want to do things 
differently in the region.” CBS News, Transcript: First Obama Press Conference [online transcript] 
available from http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/10/politics/100days/main4789627.shtml; 
Internet, accessed 9 April 2009. 
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our relationships with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, other Arab states, with Turkey, and with 
our partners in the Gulf to involve them in securing a lasting peace in the region.484   
Coined by distinguished Harvard University professor Joseph S. Nye Jr., “smart power” is a 
relevant term which highlights a much-needed global partnership.485 Instead of relying too 
long on hard power “to ensure America’s place as a strategic player on the world stage, both 
hard and soft power must be incorporated to assure that a complex interdependence is 
established.”486 The 2006 CSIS Commission on Smart Power led by Armitage and Nye 
recognises this:  
 
Smart power is neither hard nor soft – it is the skilful combination of both. Smart power means 
developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool-kit to achieve American objectives, 
drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a 
strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to 
expand American influences and establish the legitimacy of American action.487  
 
 In this early phase of the administration, uncertainties abound as to how the cabinet will 
implement this smart power approach, and the effects which its pre-established hard power 
might have (in Afghanistan and Iraq) before seeking a balance. Yet, the Obama 
administration has concisely stated what form its diplomacy, comprised of direct approaches, 
will take, thus sending a clear signal, in contrast to the USG’s previous Realpolitik which 
takes no account of the moral, religious or cultural dimensions of predominately Muslim 
publics.                                                         
484 See, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Nomination Hearing to be Secretary of State (13 January 
2009) [online transcript] available from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/01/115196.htm; 
Internet, accessed 9 April 2009. 
485 For additional literature on Nye’s research on smart power and governance, see Joseph S. 
Nye, The Power to Lead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The 
Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2004); Joseph S. Nye and 
Robert Keohne, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown, 
1977). 
486 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, ed. CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A 
smarter, more secure America (Washington, The CSIS Press, 2007); Document [available online] 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf; Internet, accessed 5 April 
2009. 
487 Ibid., 5. 
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 Two additional challenges warrant further consideration from the Obama 
administration, apart from the five critical areas proposed by the CSIS Commissions on Smart 
Power: rebuilding the foundation for responding to global challenges; developing a more 
unified approach through global development; improving access to international knowledge 
and learning; increasing the benefits of trade for all people; and addressing climate change 
and energy insecurity.488 Consideration must be given to these two additional concerns:  
 
a) The USG must not only see the Muslim world as a set of countries where the practice of 
Islam is central to the culture, but as a world comprised of multiple socially constructed 
worlds and traditional frameworks that have to be engaged as a whole; and,  
 
b) The employment of smart power (if it is to be effective in this task) must be accompanied 
by a strategy of smart communication, which successfully convenes critical religious and 
political players into a socio-political forum.   
 
 Given this information, the Obama administration must factor more lengthy variables 
into its process with the Muslim world. Apart from Obama’s direct Oval Office engagement 
and the sending of special envoys to the region, the current administration must review, 
before implementing a new strategy, the application and failure of Brand America, thus 
realising that today this is not an applicable first option in improving America’s image in the 
Muslim world. Some administrators often make the mistake of believing that already-created 
foreign policies are so productive that they are sellable to any audience – despite the 
downturn in previous relations. To bypass more extensive damage to America’s image in the 
                                                        
488 Ibid. 
  240 
Muslim world, no consideration should be given to the Brand America option, but emphasis 
should be placed on employing more direct, grassroots approaches. 
  
 7.3. The limitations of the “Brand America” campaign in the Muslim world     
 
As covered in Chapter 6, the State Department’s employment of brand management 
communicative resources (public diplomacy and nation-branding), to date, offer a shallow 
occasion for a more engaged opportunity at improving US-Muslim world relations. 
According to Nye and Armitage, the history of this failure is traceable to 1999 when the 
Clinton administration merged the public diplomacy apparatus USIA into the US Department 
of State.489 The reasons behind many of the public diplomacy failures in the Muslim world 
relate, to some degree, to US budgetary shortfalls in spending and even failed programming 
efforts (as suggested by high-ranking State officials and according to Assistant Secretary of 
State for Central and South Asian Affairs, Richard A Boucher).490 Even though these are the 
primary reasons for public diplomacy failures, additional variables are contributing factors 
(i.e. foreign policy and indirect approaches). First, American public diplomacy efforts were 
waning significantly before September 11; and secondly, after USIA Cold War public 
diplomacy resources would lose their appeal State officials would falter in making the 
required transition to critically comprehend the vital dimensions of the Muslim world.491  
                                                        
489 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, ed. CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A 
smarter, more secure America (Washington, The CSIS Press, 2007) 47; Document [available online] 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf; Internet, accessed 5 April 
2009. 
489 Ibid. 
490 Former State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher made note of these failures in his 
27 August 2007 press conference, see The US Department of State, Boucher Reviews US Public 
Diplomacy to the Muslim World [article online] available from http://www.usembassy-
israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2002/august/082804.html; Internet, accessed 9 April 2009. 
491 In Nancy El-Girdy’s essay, Why US Public Diplomacy Failed in the Arab World, she 
makes note of the direction US public diplomacy must reach if it is to be successful in connecting 
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However, referencing the financial impact, Nye and Armitage would argue that:  
 
Although the Clinton administration created a new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy in 
1999 and overall spending on information and educational and cultural affairs rebounded in 
2001 under the Bush administration, spending has remained at levels well below the USIA 
budgets at the start of the 1990s. Current annual public diplomacy spending is just under $1.5 
billion – comparable to what France and Britain each spend annually on public diplomacy 
efforts [See Figure 1].492  
 
Though it is vital to ensure a robust financial package when courting foreign approval 
through the practice of public diplomacy, it is questionable as to what use this is vis-à-vis the 
Muslim world if US foreign policymakers and State officials know too little of, or do not 
want to engage directly with, key infrastructures in the Muslim world. In this case, it appears 
that the shift from an extensive American public diplomacy campaign throughout Europe to 
one throughout the Arab, African and Asian world would be met with unsuspected resistance.  
 
                                                        
with the Muslim world. She writes, “If the US intends to make another attempt at strengthening its 
public diplomacy efforts, possibly the best strategy would be to restructure the State Department's 
efforts so they reach the lower classes through the use of respected and trusted religious leaders and 
authority figures in small towns to spread moderate teachings of Islam and denounce the use of 
violence for political ends.” Nancy El-Girdy, Why US Public Diplomacy Failed in the Arab World 
(August 2005) [article online] available from 
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=7&paper=2433; Internet, accessed 9 April 
2009. 
492 Armitage and Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart Power, 47. However, The American 
Academy of Diplomacy (AAD) in its 2008 proposal Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness put 
forth seven recommendations aside from increasing budgetary spending to advance US public 
diplomacy efforts. They are: a) Increase employment shortfalls and workload increases, expand 
academic and professional exchanges; b) Incorporate internet and other modern technology 
infrastructures through public diplomacy output, c) Establish or re-establish at least 40 American 
culture centers; d) Reinvigorate Binational Centre operations in Latin America; e) Increase the 
strategic speaker series; f) Enhance programme and activity evaluations; and, g) Expand Media Hubs 
to Latin America and Asia. These seven recommendations put forth manageable opportunities to 
invigorate US public diplomacy, thus ensuring foreign audiences of interest become knowledgeable 
about the US. The American Academy of Diplomacy, A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future 
(October 2008) [online document] available from 
http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/FAB_report_2008.pdf; Internet, accessed 9 April 
2009. 
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During the 1980s and 1990s, American public diplomacy consisted of a political 
action-centred message which directly connected European publics with US policy to shape 
the image of America “behind the Iron Curtain.” For at least a quarter of a century, USIA’s 
central message was to make new ties and build foreign relations with European countries 
which had values in common (either culturally or politically); this may have made its public 
diplomacy efforts less tenuous today. Thus, the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union saw 
the establishment of twenty-plus US embassies throughout the Balkans and in Central and 
Eastern Europe, which still serves as a source of today’s deficit in foreign service staffing.493  
 
Figure 1:  
US Public Diplomacy Spending, 1994-2008494 
 
 
 
                                                        
493 Nicholas John Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American 
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008); see also 
Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (Pennsylvania: PSU 
Press, 2003). 
494 Provided by US Office of Management and Budget; see Armitage and Nye, Commission 
on Smart Power, 48. 
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In 1994 an annual budget nearing $1.4 billion was spent (mainly) on targeting former 
Soviet nations.495 By 2001, there was funding to support American public diplomacy under 
the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative programme of Secretary of  State, Colin Powell and with 
the Shared Values Initiative of Undersecretary Charlotte Beers it was hopeful that US 
favourability would rise throughout the Muslim world. However, it is arguable that nothing 
could have prepared the State Department for what it would face after the transition from 
behind the Iron Curtain to approach the Muslim world. Its failure to raise Muslim approval 
for the US and the reluctance of Muslim audiences to “buy into” the American public 
diplomacy message (alongside its questionable foreign policy) relates back to the USG’s 
failure to consider the many perspectives held throughout the Muslim world. It should not be 
assumed that the same methodology used to engage foreign publics behind the Iron Curtain is 
realistic or sufficient for Muslim audiences as a first option.496 
 
The American Academy of Diplomacy acknowledged recently, 
 
…the Secretary of State lacks the tools – people, competencies, authorities, programmes and 
funding – to execute the President’s foreign policies. The status quo cannot continue without 
serious damage to our vital interests. We must invest on an urgent basis in our capabilities in 
the State Department, USAID, and related organisations to ensure we can meet our foreign 
policy and national security objectives. There must be enough diplomatic, public diplomacy, 
and foreign assistance professionals equipped and trained to be out, engaged with the 
populace and, where needed, working closely with the nation’s military forces to advance 
America’s interests and goals.497                                                         
495 See also, Appendix to Armitage-Nye Joint Testimony before US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee: A Smart Funding Strategy? (April 24) [online document] available from 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/congress/ts0804024Armitage-Nye_Appendix.pdf; Internet, accessed 9 
April 2009. 
496 See Nancy Snow and Phillip M. Taylor, Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New 
York: Routledge Press, 2009); Nancy Snow, The Arrogance of American Power: What US leaders 
are Doing Wrong and Why it’s Our Duty to Dissent (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 
2007).  
497 The American Academy of Diplomacy, A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future (October 
2008) [online document] available from 
http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/FAB_report_2008.pdf; Internet, accessed 9 April 
2009. 
  244 
 
 While public diplomacy is a constructive tool in which nation states may address foreign 
audiences through programming initiatives and mass communication, this thesis disagrees 
that it should be implemented as a first option to engage the Muslim world. In the case of the 
State Department’s outreach to the Muslim world, its efforts are equivalent to applying a 
sponge to a gaping wound. In addition to monetary shortfalls and the inability to engage 
directly, the State Department’s addiction to employing brand management commercial 
resources greatly contributed to its failure. Nation-branding and public diplomacy, when 
combined, are formidable options for strengthening the US’s credibility and image in 
particular regions (such as Europe and Latin America). Gyrogy Szondi comments, “Branding 
is very much image-driven, with the aim of creating positive country images. It is largely 
one-way communication where the communicator has control over the message, which tends 
to be simple and concise and leaves little space for dialogue and interactions.”498  Thus, the 
communicative practise taken by the USG to engage audiences behind the Iron Curtain are 
today ineffective and lack the ability to mobilise Muslim publics. While quick-fix advertising 
approaches are common within American society and are often customary for selling 
consumer goods, there is an undeniable sense of unease in Muslim circles toward the selling 
of American values and foreign policy to Muslim publics. This is the essential reason why 
the Obama administration must put forth a smarter form of communication in order to restore 
relations that assure US national security goals. Taking the ineffective brand management 
resources position a step further, if the Obama administration seeks to employ such practices 
it must only look at the dynamic of what generally occurs when outside elements attempt to 
indirectly engage socially constructed publics to see the potential failure of such an approach.  
                                                         
498 Ibid., 16. 
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7.4. Comprehending social construction to employ direct engagement  
 
 Based on our findings, it is clear why an alternative to engaging the Muslim world is 
necessary. In addition to this point, it is important for America to comprehend why the Brand  
America campaign should serve as the State Department’s last resort (as a communication 
option) when approaching international Muslim audiences. Since the Muslim world (often 
less discussed by scholars) is socially constructed, any form of communication with this 
environment will require a more direct, grassroots approach to restoring relations and trust 
between the USG and the Muslim world. Quick fixes (such as “marketing” America to 
Muslims) are clearly unreliable. Thus, it is important that the Obama administration 
recognises that if it employs or reintroduces the Brand America campaign as a first option of 
addressing Muslim publics on any level,  it is unlikely to attain positive results because of the 
impact that social constructionism has on the composition of this audience.  
 
According to social theorists Mary and Kenneth Gergen, social constructionism as a 
way of looking at traditional societies (in our case religious-, tribal- and ethnically-based 
publics), as found throughout the Muslim world, has multiple roots deriving from many 
conversations that “span the humanities and the sciences. In this sense, social constructionism 
is not a singular and unified position. Rather, it is better seen as an unfolding dialogue among 
participants who vary considerably in their logics, values, and visions.”499 In their change of 
course, it is vital that State officials today try to better understand traditional societies and 
what it will, in fact, take to penetrate its core when formulating relations. This posture shift in                                                         
499 Mary Gergen and Kenneth J. Gergen, Social Construction: A Reader (London: Sage 
Publications, 2003), 3.; see also Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, “The Social Construction of 
Reality”, Craig Calhoun, et al., Contemporary Sociological Theory (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2002), 42-50; Robert Heiner, Social Problems: An Introduction to Critical Constructionism (Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), 1-19; Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method 
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall Press, 1969). 
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American politics goes into understanding exactly how the Obama administration will attract 
the Muslim world to its politics to attain a mutually respective outcome.  
  
Vivien Burr notes that the knowledge of these audiences “is sustained by social 
processes. It is through daily interactions between people in the course of social life that our 
version of knowledge becomes fabricated.”500 As socially linguistic creatures, we come to 
understand what is regarded as social reality on the basis of the many events that we 
encounter through our positive or negative relations with other groups and (in this case) 
nations.501 In their study Moral Conflict: When Social Worlds Collide, W. Barnett Pearce and 
Stephen Littlejohn take this point a step further, noting:  
 
Social reality has been described as a production in which a group’s ‘resources’, or meanings 
and assumptions, are tightly intertwined with its practices. Doing and thinking cannot really 
be separated. Our ways of thinking (our resources) are affected by our practices, and our 
practices are affected by our ways of thinking. A moral order, then, which is at the root of a 
group’s resources, is constructed and reconstructed in what that group says and does.502 
 
This piece of simple fabric within groups is what audiences outside the society often interpret 
as a complex network or complex custom (as in the case of the Muslim world, which is 
comprised of 57 different nations with predominantly Muslim populations). Given this 
structure in the context of most Muslim countries, it is clear that specific sets of assumptions                                                         
500 Viven Burr, Introduction to Social Constructionism (London: Routledge, 1995), 2-5. 
501 Burr draws attention to this by pointing out what she regards as micro and macro social 
constructionism. Macro social constructionism “acknowledges the constructive power of language but 
sees it as something derived from, or at least related to, material or social structures, social relations 
and institutionalised practices. The concept of power is therefore at the heart of this form of social 
constructionism.” On the other hand, micro “sees social construction taking place within everyday 
discourse between people in interaction. It includes those who refer to themselves as discourse 
psychologists. For micro social constructionism, multiple versions of the world are potentially 
available through this discursive, constructive work, and there is no sense in which one can be said to 
be more real or true than others.” In essence, I would agree with Burr that neither macro nor micro 
social constructionism are mutually exclusive of one another. Ibid., 21-22. 
502 Barnett Pearce and Stephen Littlejohn, Moral Conflict: When Social Worlds Collide 
(California, Sage Publications, 1997), 51-52. 
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exist which comprise a moral order by which a specific group “understands its experience 
and makes judgments about proper and improper actions”; it is based upon the social 
experiences and laws that emerge out of this group’s religious traditions.503 As in many non-
secular Muslim countries, the practice and principles of the Islamic faith determine what is 
politically and socially appropriate and inappropriate. This is the case in countries where 
political Islam is widespread, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yemen and Sudan. There, 
religion (within the umma) is interconnected and centralised, spanning every level of society 
and binding communal, social, political, and economic activities together. Though not as 
robust in such secular Muslim countries as Turkey, Senegal, Indonesia, Albania or 
Azerbaijan, the residue of religion, to a degree, is present, but not as prominent.  
  
As covered in Chapter 1, America’s foreign policy episodes of containment and 
intervention between 1950 and 2001 have contributed to threatening the socially-constructed 
core (moral order) of predominantly Muslim societies.504 In addition, many of these impasses 
result from a breakdown in communication among groups, players, and state powers during 
the engagement process or from the lack of direct engagement creating what Pearce and 
Littlejohn refer to as moral conflict: “vexing disputes that ordinary discourse will not[and 
cannot] resolve.”505 In these traditional societies, the disputes are often culturally-based and 
value-defined, originating from the way in which these audiences interpret the actions, 
beliefs, and behaviour of outside players and systems. 
Moral conflicts – sometimes termed cultural wars, ethnic conflicts, ideological conflicts, and 
intractable conflicts – occur [in the context of US domestic affairs] on issues such as which 
textbooks to use in elementary schools, whether creation science should be taught, whether 
abortion should be legal, how the environment should be protected, which rights gays and                                                         
503Ibid., 51. 
504 Monte Palmer and Princess Palmer, “Islam, Muslim Extremism and Anti-Americanism”, 
At the Heart of Terror: Islam, Jihadist and America’s War on Terror (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publisher, 2004), 9-38. 
505 Ibid., 5. 
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lesbians should have, what the roles of women and men should be, what place religion should 
take in society, and how justice should be served.506  
 
Presently, throughout the Muslim world (in the Near East and South Asia), these 
conflicts are more intense, igniting violent hostilities and political and social setbacks. This is 
present in the growing revivalist movement of political Islam in Iran, Wahabism’s 
conservative Sunni influence in Saudi Arabia, or with the stateless extremists associated with 
former Tehrik-i-Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud and current amir Hakimullah Mehsud in 
South Waziristan.507 Some will argue that this is the very reason for needing brand 
management – to defend against political Islamist ideologies. But if the American policy 
designed is sellable neither at home nor abroad, or seeks to threaten the core of Islamic 
society, then such a communication practise will inevitably fail. This thesis argues that if 
direct relations are not established, as indicated, at the grassroots level, a tension between 
Muslim publics and State actors will continue to exist. 
 
How do such groups endure when their socially-constructed ideas are challenged? Jim 
Kenney of the Inter-religious Engagement Project supports similar cases by looking at similar 
problems through the lens of cultural coexistence, with new ideas and outside policies and the 
problems which often materialise. Discussing the impact of cultural coexistence upon and 
within predominantly religious societies, Kenney acknowledges that cultural evolution from 
within a society can become the leading agent in setting off moral conflict (or what he refers 
to as crossings). He writes: 
                                                         
506 Ibid., 6. 
507 See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the 
Future (New York: Norton, 2006); Juan Cole, “Combating Muslim Extremism”, The Nation, 285, No. 
16 (2006): 26. See also Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 2002); Mohammed Ayoob and Hasan Kosebalaban, Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: 
Wahbism and the State (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2009). 
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In a time of major evolutionary cultural exchange, when prevailing patterns are challenged 
and disrupted, the life experience of individuals and groups are disturbed in a deeply felt 
‘emptying’ of the familiar and ‘filling’ with the new. If the perturbation affects a sufficient 
number of persons or groups or challenges significant concentrations of power, a major 
counterflow – an eddy – can form. In culture, as in nature, there is no change without 
resistance.508 
 
Paying attention to the impact that social constructionism has on Islamic society 
proves vital in this case. The many crossings made daily are what key players in the Obama 
State Department will have to come to grips with if they are to directly engage with Muslim 
audiences at a grassroots level to resolve conflict and restore relations. What is clear in this 
case is that smart power, according to Secretary of State Clinton, will be at the forefront of 
future US foreign relations. But to comprehend the impact that social construction will have 
on US-Muslim world relations, it is plausible to argue that smart power will have to be 
accompanied by smart communication. Clinton adds:  
 
With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy… One need only look to 
North Korea, Iran, the Middle East, and the Balkans to appreciate the absolute necessity of 
tough-minded, intelligent diplomacy – the failures that result when that kind of diplomatic 
effort is absent. And one need only consider the assortment of problems we must tackle in 
2009 – from fighting terrorism to climate change to global financial crises – to understand the 
importance of cooperative engagement.509 
 
Clinton’s willingness to employ smart power and the emerging contentions directly related to 
post-secularism illustrates why direct engagement will be the Obama administration’s sole 
option to assure positive results. Taking this more engaged approach assures positive results 
by building upon direct human-to-human relations. However, acting upon this sophisticated                                                         
508 Jim Kenney, Cultural Evolution and Religious Change, notes presented at the 70th 
Anniversary Conference of the World Congress of Faiths in association with the University of 
Birmingham (Birmingham, England), 23-24 October 2006; see Jim Kenney, Sea Change: Cultural 
Evolution in the Early 21st Century (July 2004) [online article] available from 
http://www.interreligiousinsight.org/July2004/July04Kenney.pdf; Internet, accessed 9 April 2009.  
509 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Nomination Hearing to be Secretary of State (13 January 2009) 
[online transcript] available from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/01/115196.htm; Internet, 
accessed 9 April 2009. 
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opportunity will require taking seriously the Edward Luttwak (1994) CSIS recommendation, 
which inevitably calls for the recruitment of US religion attachés to be placed in US 
embassies in order to facilitate direct engagement with critical infrastructures throughout the 
Muslim world.  
    
7.5. Conclusion: Assuring a more specific administrative measure  
 
Today, in an increasingly political environment where Americans are more cognisant 
than before of US foreign policy and international affairs, many await the next approach by 
the US Department of State toward the Muslim world, and its outcome. Two factors are clear: 
first, President Obama’s direct Oval Office approach  since January 2009 will become 
insufficient if he wishes to engage the Muslim world beyond interest-based affairs. Utilising 
executive-level engagement on these specific occasions is sufficient (i.e. when addressing 
Israeli/Palestinian settlement issues or when engaging Iran’s nuclear capabilities). However, 
this form of engagement will not be as beneficial if his administration wishes to broadly 
engage Islamic societies. Thus, the second factor clearly becomes that the Obama 
administration must recognise that reintroducing the Brand America campaign to engage the 
Muslim world will add to already damaged relations.  Data provided by numerous research 
groups affirm that honest, direct forms of interaction between religious and political players 
at a grassroots level is acknowledged as the most reliable form of restoring trusted relations.   
 
Recently, Walter R. Roberts of the Public Diplomacy Alumni Association counted 
“More than thirty reports… issued since 9/11 by reputable foreign affairs organisations and 
think-tanks recommending actions and reorganisation to strengthen American public 
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diplomacy.”510 However, not enough of these think-tanks have stressed the importance of 
teaching communication or employing direct communication approaches between State 
Department officials and critical infrastructures in the Muslim world. Many side-step this 
difficult task, placing an  emphasis on upgrading programming, youth and entrepreneurship, 
rather than recognising that the entry point into Muslim communities depends on establishing 
and restoring effective communication between sacred and secular players. Today, the 
Obama administration must face the harsh reality of winning a war on terror (or defeating 
terrorism per se). And while doing so it is also confronted with addressing a post-secular 
cataclysm, which will arise from the most disturbing international affairs over the last decade 
and the future, and will be linked to religious activity. Aside from keeping with its liberal 
secular posture, the Obama administration must strengthen its ability to incorporate some 
religious perspectives that may contribute to deterring religious violence, which means 
employing a more specific administrative measure. 
 
International religious activity has become more potent (due in part to American 
policy) than most hard-line secularists are willing to credit. Instead of casting aside the sacred 
or pushing its contribution to the fringe, USG foreign policymaking, in today’s escalating 
climate, must embrace Troy Dostert’s position to strengthen its communication capabilities. 
This framework is represented by Dostert’s observation on the potential of what he regards as 
dialogical creativity. Instead of embracing the Rawlsian position that secular resources 
should be used in dialogues to control the religious voice, dialogical creativity assures sacred 
and secular players the ability to employ more fluid and diverse approaches, and integrates 
                                                        
510 Walter R. Roberts, Rebooting America’s Image Abroad [article online] available from 
http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/105.htm; Internet, accessed 9 April 2009. 
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religious convictions and public debate between one another.511 Efforts to improve present 
US-Muslim world engagement hinge on communication training and strengthening US 
relations in the public sphere at a grassroots level which can only be indentified and 
facilitated by an alternative diplomatic player. This in turn requires Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton to implement a specific administrative measure that includes employing trained 
professionals to carry out this communicative task. 
 
  
                                                        
511 See Troy Dostert, Beyond Political Liberalism: Toward a Post-Secular Ethics of Public 
Life (Notre Dame, Notre Dame Univ. Press, 2006), 180. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
REVISITING THE RELIGION ATTACHE  
 
8.1. Introduction  
 
Diplomatic opportunities that push beyond the traditional which seek to invite the 
religious voice into the political arena (at both the executive and grassroots levels) are 
appropriate measures for restoring US-Muslim world relations. On June 23, 2009, Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton appointed Farah Anwar Pandith as the US’s first Special 
Representative to Muslim Communities. Pandith (an American Muslim born in Kashmir, 
India) would be sworn in on September 15, 2009, bringing attention to President Obama’s 
inaugural call to put forth a new strategy to engage Muslims around the world. As Special 
Representative, her office is responsible for executing Clinton’s vision to engage Muslim 
communities (especially younger audiences) at a “people-to-people and organisational-level.” 
However, Pandith is not a new face but was hired in 2007 to serve as former President 
George W. Bush’s senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
Eurasian affairs on Muslim Outreach in the region. A part of Hughes’s public diplomacy 
machine, it is questionable as to whether Pandith’s token role will differ from that of any 
other high-profile State Department official working on Muslim world outreach on the 
international stage.  
 
Considering the ongoing development of Clinton’s official plan to engage Muslim 
publics at this early stage, Pandith opened her recent address with the remark that,  
 
[Clinton] has asked me to find ways to build strong partnerships and create new connections 
and joining together with grassroots organisations to effect positive change. Under the 
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leadership of Secretary Clinton, the Department of State is recalibrating the way in which we 
work with Muslim communities around the World. Guided by her passion, leadership and 
dedication to an issue that is not new to her – she has been active on these issues for decades 
– this office will advise her and the Department on issues related to Muslim engagement. 
Through this office we will engage Muslim communities to solve collaboratively the most 
pressing problems facing these communities around the world.”512  
 
In a vague description, Pandith asserts (in so many words) that a top-down approach is likely. 
Considering the Obama administration’s first steps to enhance State Department 
programming efforts, the administration must be cautious that it does not return to the clutch 
of rebranding America by overemphasising public diplomacy geared toward youth and 
women as a first option, by implementing top-down approaches. Unfortunately, State’s move 
to hire Pandith brings with it two specific concerns:   
  
a) State’s unwillingness to implement broad post-secular approaches to engage Muslim 
publics directly and;  
 
b) The Pandith/Clinton posture which is currently not in step with leading recommendations 
(by Albright, McDonald and Johnston) on approaching predominantly religious publics.   
 
Pandith begins her post by presenting a strategy that is workable from the top down, 
but is not communicatively sound for reaching the core of Islamic society. Her approach 
(within its first few months) fails at recognising the importance of building America’s 
credibility from the ground in the Muslim world, which begins with publically assuring less 
arrogant policies and that State Department diplomats will directly engage specific networks 
to revitalise and restore relations.  
                                                         
512 See Swearing-in Ceremony for Frarah Pandith Special Representative to Muslim 
Communities (September 15, 2009) [article online] available from 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/09/129209.htm; Internet, accessed 10 November 2009. 
  255 
As of late, Secretary Hillary Clinton has proposed applying smart power when 
engaging the Muslim world. At the “Forum for the Future”, held in Marrakesh, Morocco on 
November 3, 2009, Clinton opened up  by indicating three uniquely secular but broad areas 
that the administration, in the coming year, will gear its attention toward: i) An emphasis on 
job creation in the Muslim world, ii) Advancing science and technology, and iii) Promoting 
wide-spread educational opportunities. None of these broad approaches have factored in the 
dynamics of communication and the role US diplomats will need to play in restoring relations 
with Muslims. Though these networks are target audiences with regards to shifting the focus 
of America’s image in the Muslim world, broader approaches that include multiple direct 
engagement efforts by trained officials deserve consideration at the grassroots level in order 
to restore pre-existing relations. While State is taking positive strides, it must comprehend 
that though the issue is in part an image problem, it is, more sufficiently and historically, a 
communication problem that exists between America and Islamic society. Four points are 
clear: 
 
i) The approaches presented by Pandith and Clinton are in no way in step with those of 
former State official recommendations by Douglas Johnston and Edward Luttwak, 
but offer a similar proposal to Karen P. Hughes that looks to reintroduce a token 
public diplomacy approach geared toward a single player system (i.e. a special 
representative at the executive-level implementing the Secretary’s strategy); 
 
ii) State’s move to hire Pandith does not strengthen America’s engagement with the 
Muslim world at the grassroots level; it merely strengthens its executive-level 
capabilities. This presses the issue Clinton must comprehend that what is really 
needed is a cadre of Foreign Service Officers dedicated to restoring US-Muslim 
relations at a grassroots level; 
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iii) In essence, this will require Clinton to shift State’s focus from upgrading public 
diplomacy programmes to communication-building; and 
 
iv) This will require Clinton to place an emphasis on training a special cadre of FSOs in 
a new communication approach to aid in restoring relations. 
  
Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen is correct in his 2009 
analysis, Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics. He acknowledges that America 
is not facing a horrific problem of capturing men in caves, but it is faced with defeating a 
longstanding credibility problem which is linked to the USG’s unwillingness to deliver on its 
promises within the Muslim world. In effect, Mullen has picked up on what Clinton and 
Pandith, recently, have overlooked – the importance of employing effective communication 
which hinges on communication training. In contrast to State’s weak public diplomacy appeal 
between 2001 and 2008, Mullen writes that:  
 
The irony here is that we know better. For all the instant polling, market analysis, and focus 
groups we employ today, we could learn a lot by looking to our own past. No other people on 
Earth have proven more capable at establishing trust and credibility in more places than we 
have. And we’ve done it primarily through the power of our example… And make no mistake 
– there has been a certain arrogance to our ‘strat comm’ efforts. We’ve come to believe that 
messages are something we can launch down range like a rocket, something we can fire for 
effect. They are not. Good communication runs both ways. It’s not about telling our story. We 
must also be better listeners. [In effect] We cannot capture hearts and minds. We must engage 
them; we must listen to them one heart and one mind at time – over time.513 
 
Credibility, as Mullen identifies, is not earned by establishing an executive-level 
single player system. It is created when trained professionals are dispersed through the                                                         
513 Michael G. Mullen, “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics”  (28 August 
2009) [article online] available from 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/28/strategic_communication_getting_back_to_basics 
Internet; accesed 1 February 2009. 
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Muslim world. This would include their communicating a respectful US foreign policy 
message by integrating the voices of both sacred and secular players. Establishing an 
executive monopoly on US-Muslim world engagement over time will distort the restoration 
of future relations and the potential in rebuilding current ties. After addressing The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy in August 2009, Pandith demonstrated her limited 
ability as a single executive player in approaching the vortex of US-Muslim world relations.  
As Rami Khouri stated, in a nutshell,   
 
Everything that Pandith said is exactly what Adm. Mullen seemed to criticise in his article. 
She listed an impressive list of activities to engage Muslim communities worldwide on the 
basis of “mutual interest and mutual respect” – break down stereotypes, work with youth at 
the grassroots level, and build new partnerships via education, technology, business, sports 
and culture. None of Pandith’s rhetoric has a chance in hell of going anywhere, while the 
majority of Muslims, Arabs and others in our region broadly perceive American foreign 
policy as being tilted toward Israeli priorities or the incumbency of Arab autocrats, as has 
been the case for about four decades now. Tough American patriots like Gen. Petraeus and 
Adm. Mullen seem to grasp this, probably because they have escaped the diversionary lunacy 
of American ‘public diplomacy’ and the choke-hold of single-interest lobby groups in 
Washington.514 
  
If Secretary of State Clinton wishes to get this right, her agenda must include 
approaches broad enough to integrate the perspectives of Muslims which may add fuel to the 
larger foreign policymaking discussion, but must be direct enough to reach the core of 
Islamic society. In addition, Clinton must wrestle with the real picture that is currently 
disfigured due to an ongoing communication breakdown. As opposed to simply enhancing 
America’s executive-level public diplomacy capabilities (foreign aid and programming 
initiatives), it is apparent that real attention is needed at a grassroots-level in the US Foreign 
Service which will include recruiting, training and deploying highly skilled diplomats versed 
in communication theory and broad international religious and political affairs. Giving 
                                                        
514 Rami G. Khouri, “Sensible US Courage and Hapless US Imbecility”, Agence Global 
(August 31, 2009).  
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consideration to this position, Chapter 8 commences by revisiting the basic components of an 
inevitable religion attaché model, and the dynamics that are currently missing in making it an 
applicable resource. 
   
8.2. Johnston’s religion attaché model  
 
If Clinton observes Edward Luttwaks’ (1994) chief recommendation to enhance State 
Department relations with international Muslim audiences, it is likely that major 
consideration will be given to recruiting a new Foreign Service Officer (FSO). Luttwak’s 
recommendation, in calling for a religion attaché, attempts to assure the availability of trained 
actors at the State Department for i) providing adequate assistance in analysing international 
religious affairs, ii) honing capabilities to perform multiple tasks to improve direct 
engagement; and iii) employing foundational skills to make clear emerging religious matters 
that are of particular interest to US national security.515 Douglas Johnston (founder of the 
International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy) revitalised Luttwak’s recommendation. In 
the 2002 Foreign Service Journal article, The Case for a Religion Attaché, Johnston, nearly a 
decade later, reintroduces Luttwak’s recommendation as a practical model. He acknowledges, 
“Consideration of religious factors within US foreign policy would be considerably enhanced 
by the creation of new religion attaché positions within the Foreign Service. These attachés 
would be assigned to those [diplomatic] missions in countries where religion has particular 
salience in order to deal more effectively with complex religious issues.”516  
  
                                                        
515 Edward N. Luttwak, “The Missing Dimension”, Religion: The Mission Dimension of  
Statecraft, eds. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press: 1994). 
516 Douglas Johnston, Faith-based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2004), 24-25.  
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Considering the State Department’s structural limitations in addressing broad 
international religious affairs, it is likely that a religion attaché may be recruited from outside 
the ranks of the foreign service. Candidates with a shared background in religion and politics 
deserve consideration, since such recruits are able to analyse broad international religious 
affairs. “Obvious places to search for recruits who would have such qualifications would be 
from among seminary graduates or religion majors as well as from within ranks of the 
Foreign Service itself (where those already possessing such skills might welcome the new 
challenges). With the necessary skills and strong support from the top, the religion attaché 
could go far in closing the existing gap in religious understanding.”517  
 
The attaché’s responsibilities would include building partnerships and restoring 
trusted relations with groups. With these tasks, the attaché would be able to re-establish 
embassy contacts that will inevitably go toward drafting the annual report on International 
Religious Freedom.518 In addition, an attaché could obtain “additional insight into new 
developments in the critical arena at both the grassroots and national levels, and become 
attuned to concerns that local religious leaders may have about numerous interests, ranging 
from actions that the West may be taking or contemplating to schemes of local or national 
demagogues who may be seeking to manipulate religion for their political ends.”519 To make 
this connection requires that the attaché be familiar with the groups’ foreign language, which 
requires the State Department to either recruit or train pre-existing diplomats in critical 
languages (e.g. Arabic and Farsi).  
                                                         
517 Douglas M. Johnston, “The Case for a Religion Attaché”, Foreign Service Journal 
(February 2002), 36. 
518 See, The 2009 Report on International Religious Freedom [document online] available 
from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/index.htm; Internet, 2 November 2009. 
519 Douglas M. Johnston, “The Case for a Religion Attaché”, 36.  
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Today, many students attending American seminaries and interdisciplinary programs 
often have these language capabilities. Taking these foreign languages requires that the 
attaché be culturally astute – meaning she/he needs to be aware of and sensitive to these 
cultural settings and the general concerns of its members. Addressing broad international 
religious affairs and comprehending local tribal issues in a diplomatic context are critical.  
While this thesis regards Johnston’s religion attaché recommendation as the most 
undervalued proposal in the American foreign policy arena, it is only appropriate that 
Secretary of State Clinton considers the depth of this recommendation along with the benefits 
in financing and deploying this new diplomat.   
 
8.2.1. Financing the attaché  
  
Since 2001, the United States Congress has approved over $700 billion for defence-
related activities such as Operation Enduring Freedom520, Operation Noble Eagle521 and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom522, which includes base security, reconstruction, foreign aid and 
embassy costs.523 Further resources of $250 billion were approved with the passing by the US 
Senate of H.R. 2642, The Supplemental Appropriations Act,524 on June 30, 2008, bringing the 
estimated total for the fiscal year 2009 to $857.3 billion. To date, the USG has spent an 
estimated $656 billion on the Iraq war, $173 billion on the war in Afghanistan and $29 billion                                                         
520 Operation Enduring Freedom is the official name for the USG’s contribution to the Global 
War on Terror. This contribution is executed through its umbrella operations in: Afghanistan, the 
Philippines, the Horn of Africa, Trans Sahara, and Kyrgyzstan. 
521 Launched on September 14, 2001, Operation Noble Eagle services US territory through its 
defense patrol of US airspace. 
522 Launched on March 19, 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom is the official name representing 
the US-western/ally-led invasion of Iraq. 
523 Amy Belasco, ed., “Congressional Research Service: The Cost of the Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11”, CRS Report for Congress (June 23, 2008). 
524 H.R. 2642 – 110th Congress (2007): Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008, GovTrack.us 
(database of federal legislation) [article online]; available from 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-2642; Internet, accessed 20 August 2008. 
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on enhanced security in the South Asian region.525 Johnston makes the reasonable argument 
that funding a cadre of religion attachés is unlikely to reach half of US defence spending by 
some top departments/agencies.526  
 
For example, “A conservative estimate of global requirements suggests the need for a 
cadre of 30 such attachés at an initial total of $10 million. The figure is based on a State 
Department budget office estimate of $250,000 to $300,000 per year to field a person in a 
new position (including salary, benefits, transportation to and from the post, shipping of 
household effects, outfitting of a new office and any allowances for hardship, danger pay, 
cost of living adjustment and housing).”527 Since 2002, a slight rise in funding 30 or more 
attaches is a potential but non-threatening concern: a conservative estimate of $11-15 million 
per year, taking into account inflation and a rise in the State Department’s budget, might fund 
30 or more attachés. It is suspected that $300,000–$350,000 per attaché would suffice to 
ensure their deployment, whether or not they are serving at a hardship embassy post in a 
conflict-prone setting. Despite this minimum cost adjustment, the cost for assuring peace 
through peacemaking is not comparable to the surmounting cost (nearly $1 trillion by 2010) 
of maintaining an American military presence in both Afghanistan and Iraq, that is unable to 
resolve intractable religious violence in the regions.   
 
 
                                                        
525 See Anup Shah, World Military Spending (September 13, 2009) [article online] from 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending; Internet, accessed 20 October 19, 
2009. 
526 Douglas M. Johnston, Faith-based Diplomacy: Trumpeting Realpolitik (Oxford, Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2002), 24-25. 
527 “The total also includes an increment for the added training that would be required. Annual 
recurring costs would be somewhat less, so even a slight shift from the reactive to preventive side of 
the ledger in our budget priorities would more than suffice to fund this initiative.” Johnston, “A Case 
for the Religion Attaché”, 36.  
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8.2.2. Attaché deployment 
 
Johnston indicates in his proposal that nine regions warrant the presence of a religious 
attaché. In 2002, he recommended that the State Department deploy at least 30 attaché 
through these regions, which included three in the Arab world and Turkey, three in South 
Asia, one-two in Central Asia, four in China and Southeast Asia, one in Russia, five in Latin 
America, four in Sub-Saharan Africa, four in the Balkans and one in Central and Eastern 
Europe. With a rise in religious violence in many of these regions and an escalation in anti-
Americanism, the case for additional attachés is advisable. Additionally, considering the 
constant ebb and flow of intractable disputes in many of these regions, the need for an attaché 
presence will be a constant concern. If the Clinton State Department were to take this 
position into account, a number of adjustments due to emerging international events should 
also be factored in, thereby slightly increasing attaché deployment. For example: 
 
 In each of the five regions (China and Southeast Asia; Latin America; Russia; and Sub-
Saharan Africa), there needs to remain, as Johnston recommends, four to five attachés.  
 
  Emerging intractable events and the pressures of political Islam’s influence throughout the 
Arab worlds and Turkey suggest deployment be increased from three to eleven attachés. 
Johnston is correct in saying that “Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, and 
Turkey would all benefit from a full-time religion attaché”528 
 
 In South Asia (especially in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan), where approximately 1.5 
billion Muslims reside, increased tension between non-state combatants, such as the Taliban 
                                                        
528 Ibid. 
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and Al-Qaeda, presents new threats. From three to approximately seven attachés are 
recommended.   
 
 Johnston argues that religious fundamentalism is a growing concern throughout the Central 
Asian region. This may potentially influence Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgystan, and Kazakhstan, which suggest that preventive measures should be employed. 
This increases the required attaché presence from one-two attachés to approximately four. 
 
 Today, religious peacemaking continues to play a crucial role in sustaining peace within the 
Balkans. Considering the diverse religious composition of the region and the undercurrent of 
tension, relations remain fragile. Attaché presence should be increased from four to seven in 
this region. 
 
In order to address emerging religio-political conflicts throughout Central and Eastern 
Europe, this thesis argues that this discussion should be expanded to include Western Europe. 
In Johnston’s 2002 assessment, he failed to recognise emerging post-secular affairs in 
Western Europe, and included only one attaché to serve through Central and Eastern Europe. 
Unfortunately, emerging activities relating to a surge in Islamic sleeper-cells throughout the 
UK, Germany and France, tension in Northern Ireland and religio-political tension in France, 
encourage a deployment of five attachés across Western, Central and Eastern Europe. With 
this adjustment, instead of Johnston’s 30 religion attaches, approximately 50 are considered 
suitable. Making this adjustment to Johnston’s proposal raises the proposed $10 million to 
roughly $16.2 million to fund the project.  
 
Taking into account the recommendations of Rubin, McDonald, Albright and Luttwak, 
Douglas Johnston’s proposal does not fall short at covering the basic composition of this 
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model, which include giving attention to the attachés’ diplomatic responsibilities, cost 
assessment, embassy deployment, and recruitment plan. As important as these surface-level 
matters are, a perceptible shortcoming is present: often, plans to engage the Muslim world or 
religious audiences are met by the State Department when projecting America’s image upon 
these communities, as opposed to USG officials using communicative approaches to gather 
varied perspectives before implementing policies. If Johnston’s religion attaché model were 
endorsed by Secretary of State Clinton, a focus on enhancing human-to-human interactivity 
deserves critical consideration beyond the executive level. This means taking seriously the 
communication functions of the attaché, and in fact forcing them to be able to communicate 
with both the sacred and secular players in specific settings. With regards to the Muslim 
world, a much broader approach which seeks to engage the core of Islamic society must be 
implemented. This implementation needs to include ways to i) comprehend better vital 
aspects within Islamic society by depending more on its diplomatic infrastructures; ii) build 
direct relations with Muslim audiences, in doing so, which pay due heed to the traditional 
voice of Islam; and iii) restore relations at a grassroots level which build on mutual 
understanding and mutual interests, extending the voice of key religious players within 
Islamic society. In order for this to occur, communication procedures must be top priority. 
This forces the reluctant question,  “What strategic communication approach is most effective 
for US State officials when engaging religious audiences?”  
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8.3. Conclusion: Reshaping the communicative context 
  
In order for the US Department of State to improve future relations with international 
Muslim audiences, it must invest in reshaping the current communicative context, which will 
include teaching communication. This is a three-fold process which will include a) 
employing a religion attaché at key US embassies, b) providing attaché training in direct 
communication, and c) encouraging the attaché to employ post-secular communication 
practices that are capable of restoring sacred-secular relations. If the Clinton State 
Department were to employ Johnston’s religion attaché model, its perceptible shortcoming 
must be addressed. To do this, State must decide how the attaché will function and 
communicate with religious audiences, which requires it to employ a more strategic plan of 
communication. This means incorporating religious and political voices within a diverse 
setting. Instead of projecting a commercial message (in order to receive positive results), the 
paradigm must shift in this setting. Besides carrying out its embassy responsibilities, the 
attaché, when in the public sphere, will practise human-to-human communication differently. 
With Muslim publics the attaché will be able to engage the core of these social worlds more 
effectively. By communicating effectively, according to W. Barnett Pearce and Stephen 
Littlejohn, the actor will be able to “express moral difference eloquently in ways that build 
understanding and respect.”529 In negotiating settings, the actor must encounter a new 
language in which each side can understand the moral order of the other” – thus, this will 
mean treating emerging post-secular issues with a post-secular treatment.530 
 
                                                        
529 Barnett Pearce and Stephen Littlejohn, Moral Conflict: When Social Worlds Collide 
(California, Sage Publications, 1997), 122. 
530 Ibid., 122-123. 
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In dealing with the Muslim world, the attaché must embrace a new mindset which 
will probably benefit not only State’s foreign agenda but Islamic society as a whole. Taking 
this posture means that the attaché will be capable of working between the many stories and 
constructed realities present in Islamic society.531 In a sense, this transcendent posture is 
really a form of post-secular communication in that it seeks to assure diversity between 
sacred and secular voices while recognising the emerging religious voice in the public sphere. 
It is designed to evaluate the entire paradigm that confronts US foreign affairs and Islamic 
society, rather than blithely looking through these emerging issues. Pearce refers this 
communicative procedure as taking a communication perspective, something often 
overlooked in the field of public diplomacy. “The communication perspective demonstrates 
that by looking into the process of communication rather than through it, we treat 
communication itself as substantial and consequential.”532  
 
This is somewhat troubling, in the sense that, though Albright and others have 
presented breakthrough research on why creating a new FSO position is important, their 
research fails to explore the dynamic of communication and the usage of this new officer (the 
attaché). Communication is power and power is essential to the potential and life of US 
foreign policy. If this is true, then we may agree that communication is the backbone of 
foreign policy and the vehicle that ensures foreign policymaking. Paraphrasing Pearce, “if the 
attaché adopts a post-secular communication approach she/he will understand what most 
FSOs already know, rather than the other way around. Communicating in a way that 
embraces the sacred-secular and taking into consideration the entire paradigm allow wise                                                         
531 Ibid., 122. 
532 See W. Barnett Pearce, Claiming Our Birthright: Social Constructionism and the 
Discipline of Communication, Essay presented in conjunction with The National Communication 
Association and The Crooked Timbers Project (Albuquerque, New Mexico, August 1-4, 2006, 
photocopied), 7. 
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decisions to be made on constructing the best USG foreign policy for predominantly Muslim 
audiences.”533 If the State Department were to consider Johnston’s religion attaché model as 
a practical alternative, employable at a grassroots level for improving US-Muslim world 
relations, it will immediately recognise the missing dimension – a communication approach. 
In the final chapter, the communication strategy of interfaith diplomacy will be delved into in 
order to comprehend the benefits of integrating sacred and secular voices to improve US-
Muslim world relations when employing religion attachés.  
 
                                                        
533 Pearce first indicates this idea in a communication context to examine what he considers 
the importance of “bifurcation points” within a conversation. According to Pearce, these bifurcation 
points are vital points within the conversation that have the potential to sway the direction of it, 
leading to either a positive or negative end. He writes of this matter while suggesting, “The 
communication perspective is the knack of looking at communication rather than through it, but this 
isn’t enough. In a real sense, we see what we know rather than the other way around, and our ability 
to discern bifurcation points and to make wise decisions about how to act into them requires some 
sharper conceptual tool for understanding communication.” W. Barnett Pearce, Communication and 
the Making of Social Worlds (Santa Barbra, California: Field Graduate University, date unknown, 
photocopied essay), 2. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
TOWARD A POST-SECULAR COMMUNICATION STRATEGY OF 
INTERFAITH DIPLOMACY (IFD2) 
 
9.1. The concept of interfaith diplomacy  
 
This study has focused on what occurs when the US Department of State applies 
corporate logic to resolve America’s communication problem with the Muslim world. The 
study hypothesises that robust American public diplomacy resources were employed 
prematurely between 2001 and 2008 to engage the Muslim world. Islamic society, like other 
predominantly religious communities, are socially-constructed worlds which require more 
direct grassroots engagement by the USG. The USGs failure to evaluate this critical finding is 
primarily linked to an American history of political apprehensiveness toward religion. Its 
blatant disregard toward analysing Islam as a religion and the Muslim world as a socially 
constructed body (as opposed to a social problem) contributes to numerous setbacks in US-
Muslim world communicative relations.   
 
Among the many scholars with research dedicated to the field of Religion and US 
Diplomacy, none provide an examination which illustrates the strategic benefits of training 
diplomats in a post-secular communication strategy. Post-secular political engagement is 
useful for diplomats: when working in predominantly religious settings, diplomats benefit by 
having knowledge of religious tolerance and diversity. And they are likely to improve 
relations if they adopt aspects of the contemporary interfaith movement as socio-political 
interfaith dialogue. While religious issues and the voices/perspectives of Muslims will remain 
principal to US foreign affairs throughout President Obama’s first term in office, it is vital for 
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the State Department to take learning communication seriously. This means ensuring that the 
new Foreign Service officers, like the religion attaché, are trained to communicate effectively 
to apply a foreign policy that sets out to restore relations at a core grassroots level. In order 
for the State Department to accomplish these tasks, it must observe the Post-Secular 
Communication Strategy of Interfaith Diplomacy (IFD2) when training religion attaché in the 
Foreign Service.   
 
This communication strategy is not considered the last word on communication, but 
rather an academic and practical starting point for communication to be applied by the 
religion attaché. As a treatment to both a rise in post-secular affairs and the US-Muslim 
world communication problem, IFD2 is committed to enhancing sacred-secular relations; it is 
communication-centred; it incorporates key elements of religious pluralism (diversity) and 
helps secular players build relations of shared interests and mutual understanding with the 
support of critical religious infrastructures. 
 
This more direct communicative way of engaging religious publics is distinguished as 
IFD2. To comprehend this communication strategy requires taking a step back to appraise 
specific aspects of communication theory and the conceptual framework of interfaith 
diplomacy. In doing so, let us take a look at the figure below to comprehend the three steps to 
practicing this communication strategy.   
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 Figure 2  
Components of IFD2 
 
 
 
This communicative strategy is represented by a funnel comprised of three steps the 
attaché must learn in order to successfully practice interfaith diplomacy. 
 
The first step, before entering into the dialogue situation, begins with the attaché 
making a post-secular recognition. The second step requires the attaché’s entrance into an 
atmosphere accommodating to sacred-secular dialogue, which produces integrated 
approaches of resolving critical social issues confronting religious audiences. The third step, 
which is the most valuable, requires the attaché to integrate aspects of the communication 
theory into the SPIFD setting in order to present the USG’s core foreign policy message 
directly. This takes place through the medium of language. As a communication strategy, 
IFD2 is activated once the attaché integrates the steps. The variables of this theoretical formula 
are represented by RA for the religion attaché, PSR for post-secular recognition, SPIFD for 
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socio-political interfaith dialogue, and CT for aspects of communication theory. When the 
religion attaché integrates itself with each step the end result is IFD2 interfaith diplomacy.   
 
 Figure 3  
Theoretical Expression of Interfaith Diplomacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Interfaith diplomacy is a post-secular communication strategy which emerges out of 
the practise of SPIFD. Recalling information outlined in Chapter 2, SPIFD is one of three 
modes of interfaith dialogue prompted by the rise of religious forces in the public sphere 
which has encouraged both religious and nonreligious players to enter into communication to 
address critical post-secular issues affecting society. SPIFD provides an arena where US 
liberal secular state officials can advance diverse sacred-secular relations through a religious 
narrative in order to promote peaceful coexistence. This ability is what establishes IFD2 as a 
formal post-secular treatment. As a communicative strategy, it sets out to assure that the 
attaché will recognise post-secular issues, while ensuring a unique way of restoring 
communicative relations.   
 
Considering the present communication problem which has persisted between the US 
and the Near East, as a pragmatic communication strategy IFD2 provides a robust 
Religion Attaché = RA 
Post-Secular Recognition = PSR 
Socio-Political Interfaith Dialogue = SPIFD 
Aspects of Communication Theory = CT 
Interfaith Diplomacy = IFD2 
 
Theoretical Expression 
 
RA(PSR + SPIFD + CT) = IFD2  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communicative framework whereby the core US foreign policy message may be transmitted 
directly and coherently to Muslim audiences. 
 
Figure 4 
Transporting Interfaith Diplomacy 
 
Interfaith diplomacy as it protects the core foreign policy message to ensure that direct communicative 
engagement occurs between the secular State Department player and the players belonging to key opinion-
formers within Muslim publics. 
 
Between presenting a substantive core message and building formidable relations 
with sacred and secular players, it is important to keep a communication balance. This system 
of balance is sacred-secular equilibrium.534 This equilibrium requires the assurance of the 
                                                        
534 The structure of my sacred-secular equilibrium is drawn in part from the Nash Equilibrium 
designed by John F. Nash (Princeton, May 1950). Nash’s doctoral research on the equilibrium point 
acknowledges that “Each player’s mixed strategy maximises his payoff if the strategies of the others 
are held fixed. Thus each player’s strategy is optimal against those of the others.” In this sense, 
interfaith diplomacy borrows here from Nash findings of the two-person bargaining problem to 
develop the sacred-secular equilibrium which subsequently requires both (religious and non religious) 
players in the dialogue setting to take into consideration the strategy/decision-making of the other 
player so as to establish a mutually beneficial outcome. Nash writes of the two-person bargaining 
situation that it “involves two individuals who have the opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit 
in more than one way. In the simpler case… no action taken by one of the individuals without the 
consent of the other can affect the well-being of the other one.” John F. Nash, “Non-Cooperative 
Games”, The Essential John Nash (Oxford: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002), 85-87; John F. Nash, “The 
Bargaining Problem”, The Essential John Nash (Oxford: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002), 37. 
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parties in dialogue that relationship-building, negotiations and agreements will be pursued.  It 
is vital we understand that a sacred-secular equilibrium is based on altruism; it is objective in 
character and far removed from the teleological actions which traditional secular US 
diplomatic relations draw upon in non-cooperative game theory. This is where the aim is to 
manipulate one’s opponent to reach a predetermined end – which is often the case with public 
diplomacy or when resorting to brand management resources. Whilst assuring an equal 
system between sacred-secular players, IFD2 is capable, in this respect, of elevating mutual 
understanding above success, maintaining joint relations, securing long-term partnerships and 
cooperating through communicative talks in the pursuit of sacred-secular relations. However, 
what allows the Post-Secular Communication Strategy of Interfaith Diplomacy to move from 
a set of theoretical principals to a practical exercise is its reliance upon a key player. The key 
player deployed in this game scenario is the Johnston religious attaché model – which is 
devoid of a communication practise. In this final chapter, let us fill the perceptible gap in this 
model with IFD2, displaying the communicative training necessary (in three steps) for 
indicating how US-Muslim world relations may be enhanced at a grassroots level.  
  
9.2. Step one: Making a post-secular recognition 
 
The first step to practising IFD2 commences with the attaché making a post-secular 
recognition. Trends relating to post-secular activity have been seen over the last two decades 
as: the re-emergence of religion in public life and a rise in domestic and broad international 
religious affairs. Academics studying post-secular activity and what is called the “post-
secular age” conclude that politicised religious activity is reappearing in international 
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relations and must be taken seriously by USG officials.535 If the US liberal secular state is to 
make a substantive contribution to US-Muslim world engagement, it cannot push the 
religious voice and broad international religious affairs to the fringe; it must allow this voice 
to demonstrate its perspective in the public sphere by encouraging dialogue. But levels of 
political apprehensiveness have deterred this integration. In this sense, a Morgenthau-led 
political debate over the last four decades has strongly affected contemporary US political 
willingness to engage with international religious audiences based on what American 
political elites consider legitimate.536  
 
In taking this step, the attaché must not look at current post-secular issues related to 
religion as the “clash of civilisations” perspective presents them. Instead, she/he will 
reconsider the potential of religion as a progressive narrative in understanding the re-
emergence of politicised religious events, in understanding the concerns of religious 
audiences and how best to approach their concerns. In this step, the attaché rejects political 
apprehensiveness which has deterred many hard-line secularists from integrating the religious 
voice into political discourse. The best partnership for establishing direct communication is 
rooted in inclusion, not the reverse. This in turn requires the attaché to be aware that, in cases 
with international religious audiences, the innovation of sacred-secular discourse is more 
beneficial than exclusive political realism. So, to practise the first step, the religion attaché 
must: a) be mentally prepared to make a post-secular recognition, including becoming                                                         
535 Roger Trigg, Religion in Public Life: Must Faith be Privatized (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2007); Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 1994), 320. See also Jose Casanova, “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative 
Perspective”, Hedgehog Review (Spring/Summer, 2006): 7-22; Phillip S. Gorski and Ates Altinordu, 
“After Secularization?”, Annual Review of Sociology, 34 (2008), 55-86. 
536 See, Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, “Overlooked Dimensions”, Bringing Religion into 
International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 9-34. See also, Jonathan Fox, “Religion, politics 
and International Relations: The rise of religion and the fall of the civilization paradigm as 
explanation for intra-state conflict”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20, No. 3 (September 
2007). 
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familiar with the complex relationship of emerging international religious affairs with US 
foreign relations; b) make critical decisions away from an American history of political 
apprehensiveness; and c) prepare to accept entering into a diverse dialogue situation where 
both  sacred and secular players shall convene. (See Figure 5.) 
 
Figure 5 
The Cycle of Making a Post-Secular Recognition  
 
 
 
 
It is towards the end of this phase that the attaché moves from recognition of what is 
to preparing to enter into a diverse arena of what can be, where substantive dialogue may 
connect with sacred players.  At this next level, a central base (or arena for engagement) is 
established and the integration of ideas and philosophies develops to allow full dialogue.  
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 9.3. Step two: Entering an arena of socio-political IFD 
 
Ingredients taken from the contemporary interfaith movement aid the attaché’s 
training in reaching a sacred-secular equilibrium. Contrary to academic opinions that the 
practice of interfaith dialogue is exclusively for multi-religious interaction, its overall 
objectives are in fact two-fold. The practice of IFD not only presents a conventional arena for 
religious players to communicate with one another within a multi-religious setting, but 
functions as a secular outlet to which the attaché in our case may: 
   
i) Engage international religious audiences  more effectively to build relations; and  
ii) Become better informed on the emergence of post-secular events.  
 
The historical objectives presented by the World Parliament of Religion on September 
11, 1893 have matured today into what is widely acknowledged as a contemporary interfaith 
movement (encompassing a global network). This vastly popular movement offers the US 
liberal secular state four concrete reasons why its efforts are beneficial. Over the last century, 
its actions within the private sphere are to: resolve intractable disputes non-violently, aid 
public deliberations, embrace multi-religious opinions by promoting mutual understanding 
and provide a safe space for plural engagement. 
  
Communicative training shifts in this step from recognition to action. Recalling the 
interfaith sphere, in this step, the attaché learns that socio-political interfaith dialogue, as 
opposed to spiritually-centred or religio-comparative IFD, is more accommodating in terms of 
enhancing sacred-secular negotiation and restoring communicative relations. Generated by 
social conditions or post-secular events, SPIFD offers a base to convene sacred and secular 
players in a public setting. SPIFD is more influential in this case than other modes, as it is less 
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religious and more accommodating to both players.  
  
Table 7 
  Three Steps to Practising Socio-political IFD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Activities and forums held by the United States Institute of Peace, the Alliance of 
Civilisations, and, for example, between US military commanders and moderate members of 
the Taliban or with members of the Sons of Iraq, often fall into the category of SPIFD. For the 
religious attaché to successfully practise the official language of IFD2 – real-talk – it must set 
out to integrate its core foreign policy message into this proposed communication strategy. 
This language is not success-oriented or dominated by either player’s coercive behaviour of 
manipulating the other player, as with traditional game theory. In this case, the religion 
attaché’s actions, in this second step, are largely non-verbal. Even the practice of real-talk 
does not officially take place in step two. Both players should anticipate it as a major 
component of IFD2 in step three. In assessing IFD2, it is easy to misread that if the religious 
attaché attains only the first two steps, it will still be able to engage international religious 
audiences directly. This is not so. The religion attaché’s presence alone will suggest failure to 
religious audiences unless step three, the most essential, is integrated with the previous two.  
 
1. Initial step Draw on key ingredients from the IF 
movement. 
2. Secondary step Bring both sacred and secular players 
into a diverse arena. 
3. Final step Aspire to employ “real-talk” while in 
the plural dialogue setting. 
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9.4. Step three: Practising post-secular communication 
 
Over the last decade, scholars in both the academic and NGO communities (working 
on conflict resolution, peacemaking and diplomatic issues) have written extensively on the 
need to improve engagement, but have overlooked researching the value that political 
communication has on enhancing US-Muslim world relations. This is the case with numerous 
reports and study groups in recent years, which fail to acknowledge or incorporate aspects of 
communication theory or demonstrate pragmatically how secular players might successfully 
engage with international religious audiences.537 In reviewing many of these reports, it 
appears that more than a few have taken for granted that direct communication is vital outside 
of brand management resources that are often employed by the USG. As this study, makes 
clear, communication is a learning process which requires understanding one’s targeted 
audience or society. To say the least, a detailed plan of why the USG should engage the 
                                                        
 537 This point is taken up with the “grand strategy” put forth by The Princeton Project on 
National Security (2006). While the project had it correct that greater forms of communication are 
needed to connect with Muslim publics in particular, I argue that the project falls short in its proposal 
that US public diplomacy officers employ a public relations technique to “sell” US foreign policy and 
its message to these audiences. The Princeton Project states, “In addition, the United States should 
shift its public diplomacy efforts from a public relations approach to a sales approach. While public 
relations involves one-way communication strategies, a sales-based approach requires understanding 
what motivates the recipient of a message to ‘buy’ or inhibits the recipient from accepting and 
embracing the ideas being proffered. The United States could improve its understanding of foreign 
populations and the effectiveness of its sales pitch by conducting face-to-face meetings with 
communities overseas, recruiting more Muslim-Americans to participate in public diplomacy efforts, 
evaluating foreign service officers and military personnel based on their public diplomacy record, 
promoting greater education in Arabic and other strategic languages, and providing scholarships to 
encourage young Americans to study in the Middle East.” I agree that one-way communication is 
ineffective and understanding over success is reasonable. However, their recommendation on 
engagement and communication is somewhat entrenched in ambiguity and sits between a want to 
embrace direct diplomacy through face-to-face meetings and (on the other end) selling the US’s core 
foreign policy message. This thesis has indentified thus far that both positions cannot reside in the 
same space to ensure an authentic impact when engaging socially-constructed religious and tribal 
publics. A more direct and candid form of engagement will be respected in these settings. G. John 
Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ed., Forging a New World of Liberty Under Law: US National 
Security in the 21st Century (Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security) [online 
document]; available from http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf; Internet, accessed 
9 April 2009. 
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Muslim world sounds impressive in theory when it comes from a popular think-tank, but it 
may subsequently prove insufficient or fail for other reasons if a special emphasis on 
communication training and practise are not observed.  
 
In taking up this missed opportunity, it is important we look at this shortcoming. 
Many readers may not be as familiar with such communication terms as coordination, 
communicative action, bifurcation points and the importance of making a validity claim in 
dialogue situations. However, these are key variables in the science of communication theory. 
Step three is the most important step in this strategy for the attaché, for it is here that she/he 
learns about communication theory and how direct communication at a grassroots level can 
yield productive results.   
 
However, what is clear is that game theory functions in most liberal-secular state 
scenarios as the central practice wherever decisions in the public sphere are generally made – 
suggesting that the secular player approaches these issues with an attitude which prefers 
success over understanding. What this makes clear is that logic, in most cases, rules the 
political decision-making process and that this in turn makes it hard to engage with socially-
constructed societies. The Post-Secular Communication Strategy of Interfaith Diplomacy 
proposes something different as a way for the player to communicate with these religious 
audiences, and places a major emphasis on communication theory. The last step begins with 
the attaché understanding the nature of strategic communication. Drawing on Jürgen 
Habermas’s pragmatic theory on communication, in this step the attaché must observe that 
strategic communication focuses, in a profound way, “not on what language says, but on 
what language does; it is a theory of language in use” – hence, it is the missing link in the 
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USG’s engagement with the Muslim world over the last decade.538 
  
Figure 6 
Practising Communication in IFD2 
 
 
  
So, how should this new Foreign Service Officer understand communication? Take 
Karl Bühler’s position on language, for example:539 “Buhler [sets out to] assign three 
functions to language corresponding to the perspective of the first, second, and third person 
respectively: the ‘cognitive’ function of representing a state of affairs; the ‘appeal’ function 
of directing requests to addressees; and the ‘expressive’ function of disclosing the 
experiences of the speaker.”540 Bühler’s model, though seemingly congested when first read, 
is in fact clear-cut. James Finalyson of the University of Sussex says that Bühler is 
contending “that any instance of language-use involves a triangle comprising speaker, hearer, 
                                                        
538 James Gordon Finlayson, Habermas: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2005), 32; see also John G Oetzel and Stella Ting-Toomey, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict 
Communication: Integrating theory, research, and practice (Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications 
2006). 
539 See Karl Bühler, Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language 
(Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Publishing, 1990). 
540 Ibid., 32. 
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and world, and that the theory of language must do justice to them all.”541 Doing justice to 
language means that directness takes precedence over indirectness. The attaché, in this case, 
is unlikely to convey a substantive (or what she/he perceives as a substantive) message if it is 
not perceived as direct or coherent during human-to-human engagement. “Habermas argues 
that the primary function of speech is to coordinate the action of a plurality of individual 
agents and to provide the indivisible tracks along which interaction can unfold in an orderly 
and conflict-free manner.”542 Step three is comprised of two sub-components. To understand 
the value in communication, component one offers a re-reading of Habermas’s Theory of 
Communicative Action, which consist of four sociological concepts expressed by players as 
actions which are either teleological, normatively regulated, dramaturgical or 
communicative. The attaché may understand here how a particular concept has either 
dampened US-Muslim world relations or, in the case of communicative action, seeks to 
enrich it. 
 
9.4.1. Component One: Theory of Communicative Action   
 
(a) The attaché learns that the first concept, teleological action, is a form of “indirect 
encounter” displayed by the player to the world. In this case, “[player A] attains an end or 
brings about the occurrence of a desired state by choosing means that have promise of being 
successful in the given situation and applying them in a suitable manner.”543 This action by 
player A is what Habermas refers to as being “interest-based”. It is a method in which player 
A sets out to achieve an interest-based aim through “indirect relations” with player B (or B’s 
audience). In order to do so, player A looks to bring about its own preconceived end by                                                         
541 Ibid., 33. 
542 Ibid., 34. 
543 Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, 85. 
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controlling player B’s outcome in a given encounter which is solely in A’s best interest. “It is 
this model of action that lies behind decision-theoretic and game-theoretic approaches in 
economics, sociology, and social psychology.”544 Habermas further acknowledges that, in the 
success-oriented culture of teleological action, “Success in action is also dependent on other 
actors, each of whom is oriented to his own success and behaves cooperatively only to the 
degree that this fits with his egocentric calculus of utility.”545 Teleological activity goes 
beyond implementation by a select player to the power-complex of  US foreign relation in the 
Near East since 1945. 
 
(b) Normatively regulated action refers in part to player interactivity, where a player 
seeks to relate to “members of a social group [by orienting its actions] to common values… 
[Here, the player] does not have the cognitive sense of expecting a predicted event, but the 
normative sense that members are entitled to expect a certain behaviour. This normative 
model of action lies behind the role theory that is widespread in sociology.”546 In a sense, it is 
culturally-based and allows a player to enter other people’s social settings, thus transforming 
the player’s character to suit the dominant public through indirect means. Roger Bolton 
acknowledges “that often this action is performed almost automatically, in rote fashion, from 
second nature, out of deeply extended shared habits and regarded as unproblematic by the 
actors, rather than in a calculated instrumental way.”547 This point applies to US public 
diplomacy initiatives which encourage audiences in the Muslim world to participate (i.e. in 
                                                        
544 Ibid., 87. “With regard to ontological presuppositions, we can classify teleological action 
as a concept that presupposes one world, namely the objective world. The same holds for the concept 
of strategic action. Here we start with at least two goal-directed acting subjects who achieve their 
ends by way of an orientation to, and influence on, the decisions of other actors.” Ibid., 87. 
545 Ibid., 87-88.  
546 Ibid., 85. 
547 Roger Bolton, Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action and the Theory of Social 
Capital [article online] available from http://www.williams.edu/Economics/papers/Habermas.pdf; 
Internet, accessed 9 April 2009. 
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professional and academic exchanges) in settings constructed by USG officials, entailing 
rules and objectives established by secular players.  
 
(c) Unlike teleological and normatively regulated action, the attaché must recognise 
that dramaturgical action is slightly different, in that it employs indirect player relations with 
a mass audience. It relates “neither to the solitary actor nor to the member of a social group, 
but to participants in interaction constituting a public for one another, before whom they 
present themselves.”548 Though indirect in his/her actions, “[the player] has privileged access 
to his own intentions, desires, etc., but can monitor public access to them.”549 Habermas adds, 
“This, the central concept of the presentation of self does not signify spontaneous expressive 
behaviour but stylising the expression of one’s own experiences with a view to the 
audience.”550 Player A, within this context, presents a set of rehearsed or well-expressed 
actions to a public which may in fact be categorised as stereotypical, indirect and stylised. 
 
(d) The last, but yet most important, social concept offered by Habermas is 
communicative action. Unlike the “indirect encounter” presented by the previous concepts 
(relating to the release of perlocutionary effects, our attaché understands the limits entailed in 
the previous concepts surrounding indirect encounter. Here, the establishment of 
interpersonal relations, and the expression of subjective experiences is vital), communicative 
action, juxtaposed with the others, refers “to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of 
speech and action who establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or by extra-verbal 
means). In this case, [players A and B]… seek to reach an understanding about the action 
situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their action by way of agreement.                                                         
548 Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, 85. 
549 Roger Bolton, “Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action and the Theory of Social 
Capital”. 
550 Habermas, 86. 
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The central concept of interpretation refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of 
the situation which admit of consensus.”551 Within this last concept, the presupposition of the 
linguistic medium of language reflects that actor-world relations is given a prominent 
place.552 Unlike teleological, dramaturgical and normatively regulated action – which clearly 
take a one-sided and indirect approach to communal relations – communicative action 
ensures directness and even-handedness through player accountability. Within this specific 
concept lies an opportunity for the attaché, who is the hearer, to raise, for example, a validity 
claim553; or even to fall back on the fact that rules of discourse exist which may keep both the 
speaker and hearer candid throughout their verbal engagement. 
 
Communicative action is concerned primarily with building direct human-to-human 
relations. Teleological concerns are present in all of the four actions identified by Habermas. 
Teleological concerns, led by subjectivity and egotism, are present in all social and indeed 
human activity. Though direct relations are more likely to be set up at this level, it is almost 
impossible to eliminate the human desire to exercise one’s will in this special situation. The 
difference with communicative action is that it makes subjectivity and egotism easy to 
identify (and most likely to be challenged by the hearer), unlike the previous situations which 
are less structured. 
 
For example, parallels exist between Habermas’ first three concepts of action and the 
indirect broad management communicative resources employed by the State Department 
between 2001 and 2008.  “The one-sidedness [in communication] of the first three concepts 
of language can be seen in the fact that the corresponding types of communication singled out                                                         
551 Ibid. 
552 Ibid., 94. 
553 Finlayson, Habermas: A Very Short Introduction, 34-39. 
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by them prove to be limited cases of communicative action.”554 If we place the TCA in 
context with previously-defined diplomatic efforts to connect with Muslim publics, we are 
able to see the potential of communicative action and its benefit to the attaché. 
 
 a) Teleological action 
 
In an international effort to combat terror and stop WMDs from falling into the hands 
of terrorist organisations, a unilateral foreign policy agenda was set by the Bush 
administration to insure US national security interests. The Bush doctrine’s central focus on 
weaponry, defence and engaging an extreme segment of the Muslim world influenced State’s 
outreach efforts, which were teleological. In addition, they were non-cooperative (to a great 
extent) and zero-sum (i.e. allowing one player to win only at the expense of the other), as 
illustrated by its “Brand America” marketing campaign, which hinged on commercial 
marketing efforts. Its diplomatic efforts were generally indirect. Evidence supporting this 
claim include: a) the Bush Doctrine’s pre-emptive military strategy toward and within the 
Muslim world; b) its mass public diplomacy campaign, involving an increase in US foreign 
aid to predominantly Muslim countries; and c) its academic and social programming, which 
intended to build US credibility among Muslim audiences by overtly selling the American 
Story in order to reach a predetermined end. Such efforts were teleological. 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
554 Ibid., 94. 
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b) Normatively regulated action  
 
This is recognised within State’s Muslim world outreach programme that employed 
the “Brand America” option. Among Muslim audiences in certain venues, key players of the 
Muslim world oriented their actions to fit into models predesigned by State officials in the 
form of professional and academic exchanges. Instead of the USG (as the uninvited party) 
transforming its behaviour to accommodate the cultural norms of the Muslim world, the 
normative action was reversed. Players in the Muslim world were persuaded to enter into a 
predesigned public diplomacy sphere created by the State Department and controlled by State 
diplomats. Under the Bush administration selected key players, by participating, would 
contribute indirectly to an exchange relating to shared values (in particular), and would 
unknowingly contribute to the dominant public (the US) reaching a predetermined ends. 
 
These normatively regulated activities by the State Department included, for example, 
Charlotte Beers’s Shared Values Initiative (a mass media campaign), Hi youth magazine 
(directed at Arab young people in the Middle East and North Africa), the Partnership for 
Leadership (an exchange programme aimed at young people in the Muslim world), the 
Global Cultural Initiative, Greetings from America, and even the Middle East Partnership 
Initiative. To build upon these branding efforts during her tenure, Karen P. Hughes 
underwrote this normative action by mainly focusing on what she saw as three strategic 
imperatives: to ‘expand academic and professional programs, modernise state and 
intergovernmental agency communication efforts and expand US foreign assistance’. Each 
imperative contributed to bringing players in the Muslim world into the US public diplomacy 
sphere (as opposed to a mutually defined pluralist arena) so that the USG might attain its 
predetermined ends. 
  287 
c) Dramaturgical actions  
 
Dramaturgical actions were most evident in the way in which the stylised image that 
key government officials and Muslim audiences were on board with the Bush administration 
was maintained. In an orchestrated effort to gain legitimacy among both US and Muslim 
audiences, USG officials including Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Karen P. Hughes, Michael 
Chertoff, David Welch and numerous ambassadors and diplomats, for example, participated 
in commercialised communication projects linked to cyber-activity, multimedia programming 
and radio and television appearances. These were employed in order to raise attention and 
public support for US policies in the Muslim world (without directly engaging critical issues 
or concerns). A strong emphasis may be placed on symbolism, in the sense that while on the 
surface it seemed that high-ranking US players and key officials in predominantly Muslim 
countries were building a partnership, it is arguable that there was a central failure to 
establish substantive policies for the benefit of the audiences.  
 
Examples of dramaturgical efforts in action would be officials’ public displays in 
five-minute press conferences with, for example, then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf 
and Secretary Rice; or the countless meetings between Iraqi Prime Minster Nouri-al-Malaki 
and President Bush in press conferences to shore up support for US-Iraqi relations and in  
quieting sectarian tension within the region. At embassies, actions included ambassadors 
addressing Muslim audiences by holding civic Iftaar dinners in countries such as Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Syria and India.555 These actions were not in the least a form of “symbolic                                                         
555 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Supporting Human Rights and 
Democracy: The US  Record 2005-2006,” US  Department of State (2006) [document online]; 
available from http://www.state.gov/documents/ organisation/64057.pdf; Internet, accessed 12 March 
2008; “U.S. Embassies Host Iftaar Dinners”, Public Diplomacy Update, Vol. 2, Issue 4 (December 
2007).  
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interaction”, as acknowledged by the social theorist Herbert Blumer, since players “did not 
act toward things on the basis of the meaning which those things had for them.”556  US 
player’s actions  were performed to an audience, again, to reach a predetermined end.  
 
d) Communicative action 
 
Based on past findings, we know today that just as secular US establishments are 
apprehensive about their tradition being assaulted by the sacred, socially-constructed 
religious and tribal communities are nervous about the reverse. In communicative relations, a 
sacred-secular equilibrium is important between the two. Hence, the State Department had 
not fully assessed the Muslim world before employing its high-brow “Madison Avenue” 
“Brand America” campaign, and therefore was more success-oriented and less concerned 
with the key opinion-formers in Islamic society. Habermas stresses that these actions 
generally fit into what is described as an instrumental action model, which is success-
oriented. The attaché must recognise that success-oriented approaches, when geared toward 
socially-constructed worlds, end in failure.  
 
Here, “Success is defined as the appearance in the world of a desired state, which can, 
in a given situation, be causally produced through goal-oriented action or omission.”557 The 
effects of action comprise both the results of action (which the player foresaw and intended, 
                                                        
556 In the essay, Symbolic Interactionism, Blumer identifies that, “Symbolic Interactionism 
rests on three primary premises. First, that human beings act towards things on the basis of the 
meanings those things have for them, second that such meanings arise out of the interaction of the 
individual with others, and third, that an interpretive process is used by the person in each instance in 
which he must deal with things in his environment.” Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism [article 
online] available from http://www.cdharris.net/text/blumer.html; Internet, accessed 9 April 2009; See 
also Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (Englewood Cliff: Prentice-
Hall, 1969).  
557 Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, 285. 
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or made allowance for) and the side-effects (which the player did not foresee).558 Habermas 
makes clear that it benefits players more to gear their actions toward understanding, and what 
he calls a strategic action model is typified by its preference for understanding over success. 
The German language helps in comprehending this point: he notes that the act of reaching 
understanding is Verständigung, while the interaction between actors is Einigung. The like-
mindedness which these two players should reach is Gleichgestimmtheit, which occurs as a 
part of the strategic (but not instrumental) action model. This is formed by our fourth social 
concept, communicative action, where direct human-to-human action between players is 
“under the aspect of following rules of rational choice and assessing the efficacy of 
influencing the decisions of a rational opponent.”559  
 
Here, the religion attaché discovers a formidable way to improve USG human-to-
human capabilities at a grassroots-level: when learning this first component the religion 
attaché realises that she/he should not seek an end which is motivated by success over mutual 
understanding. We gather that the attaché must be willing, in future US-Muslim world 
engagement, to use: i) constructive engagement with Muslim audiences through language; ii) 
communicative relationship-building through agreed rules of engagement; iii) direct 
communication which allows players in Muslim audiences to keep the religion attaché’s 
message candid by raising validity claims about the core US foreign policy message; and, iv) 
in this case, an understanding-over-success model for social engagement when interacting 
with Muslim audiences.  
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9.4.2. Component Two: Coordinated Management of Meaning  
 
The second component that contributes to enriching the attaché’s communicative 
development is integrated with the Habermasian theory of communicative action, which 
focuses on the medium of language. This integration introduces into the Post-Secular 
Communication Strategy of Interfaith Diplomacy an avenue for the religion attaché to 
practise direct communication. An alternative action of this kind would make it easier for 
both parties in dialogue to allow understanding to trump success-oriented models. Given the 
nature of the communication action to be performed by the religious attaché, how can the 
player integrate this action in its language when directly engaging key players within Muslim 
publics? The answer lies in the second integral component at this level, W. Barnett Pearce’s 
practical theory of the coordinated management of meaning (CMM).  
 
Pearce’s theory lifts IFD2 by informing the attaché that there are “two concepts” in 
comprehending the general purpose of communication. The two models which reveal the 
relevance of communication are the transmission and social construction models. “[First, the] 
transmission model defines the purpose of communication as the transfer of information from 
one mind or place to another… [which] works best when messages clearly and accurately 
represent the meaning in the mind of the person who says, writes, draws, or performs 
them.”560 From a simple but basic form of ordinary communication – human interaction –  
Pearce suggests that the participants (in our case the religion attaché and sacred player) must 
aspire to a more substantive and detailed form of exchange. This brings us to the, “…social 
construction model [which] is more of a way of making the social world rather than talking 
about it, and this is always done with other people. Rather than, ‘What did [the Muslim                                                         
560 W. Barnett Pearce, Making Social Worlds: A Communication Perspective (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 30. 
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clerics] mean by that?’ the relevant questions are ‘How are we making it?’ and ‘How can we 
make better social worlds?’”561 These are critical queries which must be asked by the 
practitioners of interfaith diplomacy when engaging with religious players and key opinion-
formers in the Muslim world. In this training, with CMM, the emphasis is geared now toward 
communicating one’s core message coherently and directly in order that critical religious 
infrastructures at a grassroots level are comprehended respectfully. 
 
Communication, which is at the at the heart of IFD2, is not about replicating talking points 
or producing a well-rehearsed (stylised) message to an audience in a diplomatic setting where 
the player appears. Communicating by practising IFD2 is about entering into, and making 
better, social worlds by establishing new worlds and reconstructing old worlds through 
substantive dialogue and practical discourse within a socio-political interfaith context. In 
building these new social worlds communicatively, the religion attaché will undoubtedly 
meet setbacks. When re-reading Pearce, we comprehend that in many of these dialogue 
situations with religious and tribal audiences the player will be confronted by four basic 
prospects as she/he attempts to develop grassroots relations when employing the second 
component in this strategy:562 
 
• Upon entering the previously constructed social worlds of Muslim audiences, the religion 
attaché is likely to feel confused about regarding the basic function of these communities. 
 
• International Muslim audiences are, on the whole, socially constructed by critical knowledge 
and function towards one another on the basis of mutual understanding. 
                                                         
561 Ibid., 30-31. 
562 Ibid., 40-41. 
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• The religion attaché must come to realise that there is not one unique social world to be 
associated with Muslim audiences; this is why the numerous techniques which are not 
success-oriented deserve consideration. 
 
•  If the religion attaché is to work within the Muslim world, she/he must understand that 
she/he will be involved in constructing new social worlds out of these newly formed sacred-
secular relationships. 
 
Recalling Habermas’s strategic action model, we understand again why this approach is 
vital. Hence, it stops the religion attaché from taking a success-driven posture by first coming 
to grips with understanding Islamic society, and then re-building trusted relations along the 
lines of mutual understanding and mutual interest. 
 
To ensure that the attaché will contribute evenhandedly in the dialogue setting, IFD2 
integrates two additional concepts taken from Pearce’s practical theory of the “coordinated 
management of meaning.” In recalling his theory, CMM explores, in all, four concepts for 
understanding dialogue (the communication perspective, coherence, coordination and 
mystery). Our strategy places most value on two: the communication perspective and 
coordination. Let us first look at the communication perspective: taking a communication 
perspective in the dialogue setting urges the attaché to take communication seriously and, as 
a player, to act wisely to understand a situation and [even] act wisely in those situations.563 
“The communication perspective demonstrates that by looking into the process of 
communication rather than through it, we treat communication itself as substantial and 
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consequential.”564 Pearce first indicates this idea in the context of a communication situation 
in the importance of a player to identify “bifurcation points” when in conversation. These 
bifurcation points, which are regarded as the most important episodes (as detailed below), are 
moments within the conversation that have the potential to sway the direction of 
communication, leading to either a positive or negative end. “In a real sense, we see what we 
know rather than the other way around, and our ability to discern bifurcation points and to 
make wise decisions about how to act into them requires some sharper conceptual tool for 
understanding communication.”565 Three basic instructions implied by Pearce’s research, 
which encourage the religious attaché to assure even-handedness in its dialogue situation, are: 
 
(i) The attaché must be willing to see “organisations, families, persons and nations as deeply 
textured clusters of persons-in-conversation.”566 Many traditional outlets within 
predominantly Muslim audiences are part of an entire system which our player must 
recognise as integral to the communication process, not as an extended entity apart from the 
political, economic and social structure of that community (or the umma). It is this entire 
entity that the player must initially engage as a whole before change is likely to occur. Pearce 
points out, “In a similar way, organisations [shall be recognised] as clusters of conversations 
and managers as orchestrating conversations rather than embodying information or power. 
Matters of efficiency, morale, productivity, and conflict can be handled by attention to what 
                                                        
564 W. Barnett Pearce, Claiming Our Birthright: Social Constructionism and the Discipline of 
Communication Essay presented in conjunction with The National Communication Association and 
The Crooked Timbers Project (Albuquerque, New Mexico, August 1-4, 2006, photocopied), 7. 
565 W. Barnett Pearce, Communication and the Making of Social Worlds (Santa Barbra, 
California: Field Graduate University, date unknown, photocopied essay), 2. 
566 W. Barnett Pearce and Kimberly A. Pearce “Taking a Communication Perspective on 
Dialogue”, R. Anderson and L.A. Baxter et. al., Theorizing Difference in Communication Studies 
(Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2003), 39-56. 
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conversations occur, where, with what participants, in what type of language, and about what 
topics.”567 
  
(ii) Next, the attaché should understand that communication is substantial and that its 
properties have consequences.  Pearce draws attention to Deborah Tannen’s study, The 
Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue, which acknowledges that US 
commercial communication is dominated by adversarial forms of communication.568 In fact, 
this “sell-sell hostile” debate culture has no place in sacred-secular relationship-making. 
When engaging Muslim audiences, the attaché must put confrontation in a back seat and thus 
be ready to simplify complex communicative issues through discussion. 
 
(iii) Finally, the attaché must treat such things as “beliefs, personalities, attitudes, power 
relationships, and social and economic structures as made, not found.”569 Acknowledging 
Pearce, this is key to understanding that our attaché may have a hand in shaping such things 
through good direct communication. Mindful of the social construction model, the attaché 
will understand in this final suggestion that good communication leans more toward 
establishing or rebuilding social worlds in partnership with other agents and players than 
                                                        
567 W. Barnett Pearce and Kimberly A. Pearce “Taking a Communication Perspective on 
Dialogue”, R. Anderson and L.A. Baxter et. al., Theorizing Difference in Communication Studies 
(Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2003), 39-56. 
568 Pearce notes, “The second step in the communication perspective is the realisation that the 
qualities of communication have fateful implications for the social worlds in which we live. Deborah 
Tannen notes that the culture in my country, the United States of America, has become dominated by 
a habit ‘of approaching almost any issue, problem, or public person in an adversarial way.’ While not 
denying the value and situational virtue of opposition, she calls into question the habit of ‘using 
opposition to accomplish every goal, even those that do not require fighting but might also (or better) 
be accomplished by other means, such as exploring, expanding, discussing, investigating, and the 
exchanging of ideas suggested by the word “dialogue”.’” W. Barnett Pearce, A Brief Introduction to 
“The Coordinated Managed of Meaning (CMM)” [article online] available from 
 http://www.russcomm.ru/eng/rca_biblio/p/pearce.shtml; Internet, accessed 9 April 2009. See also 
Deborah Tannen, The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue (New York: Random 
House, 1998). 
569 W. Barnett Pearce, Making Social Worlds, 40. 
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unilaterally defining rules and implementing them without acknowledgment from key players 
within Islamic society.  
 
Taking a communication perspective in dialogues is one of the most substantial 
actions for the religion attaché. When engaging with Muslim audiences at a grassroots level, 
the religious attaché is able to change the relationship dynamic by sharing with critical 
decision-makers and opinion-formers the same responsibility to produce a progressive body 
of communication which the public may find acceptable. This means that the body of 
communication was initially constructed on the basis of mutual understanding directly rather 
than indirectly. Far from being success-driven or one-sided, it is aware of “critical moments” 
at which the conversation can take a negative turn. 
 
Pearce’s second concept relates to employing coordination in the communication 
process. Here, we focus on coordination as a valued tool in presenting one’s core message 
and interacting communicatively to ensure a stable dialogue is established. The concept of 
coordination is simply that of paying close attention to the various turn-by-turns in dialogue 
(critical moments), since these indicate the players’ actions: 
 
Using the term ‘coordination’ as a way of understanding these experiences is part of… the 
‘social construction’ approach to communication. It suggests that, instead of a 
correspondence between mental state and action, we pose questions and look for answers in 
the flow of actions themselves. That is, we understand what people say and do as taking 
‘turns’ in the patterns of communication, not as ‘signs pointing to something else.’570 
 
                                                        
570 Ibid., 89. Pearce makes clear that “The theory of the coordinated management of meaning 
(CMM) does not try to offer a set of propositions about the events and objects of the social world. 
Rather, it is a set of concepts and tools focusing on the process by which those events and objects are 
made. It functions to discipline and enable inquiry into specific moments of that process for the 
purpose of understanding, acting wisely, and intervening to improve the process.” Ibid.,78. 
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The attaché must focus on the communicative actions of the other in order to 
understand where the dialogue is heading. A communicative partnership between the attaché 
and the religious player can form only when they are both in sync with each other, and this is 
a sign of the depth of their engagement. In this case, the attaché is able to see the entire  
conversation and into its changing trajectory which inevitably (after presenting its core 
message) determines the general outcome and after-life of the dialogue.  
 
The term ‘coordination’ is used in CMM to direct attention to our efforts to align our actions 
with those of others. Among other things, the necessity to coordinate with others shows that 
communication is inherently and fundamentally social. No matter what speech act – whether 
threat, compliment, instruction, question, insult, or anything else – its successful performance 
requires not only your action but the complementary actions of others.571 
 
When applying this concept, the attaché is able to act wisely within these critical moments of 
conversation. She/he can, within a split second, mentally review critical episodes from the 
past which may become vital to the development of social construction within these 
audiences. It is true that, as human beings, “we have trouble recognising and acting wisely 
into bifurcation points because we are so caught up in the meaning of what is going on that 
we lose sight of the possibilities of changing the shape of the pattern.”572 Coordinating action 
and paying attention to the flow of the dialogue emerges as conducive to constructing 
cohesive communication.  
 
The religion attaché must take seriously the act of making and managing meaning in 
the dialogue setting. We may see this point in terms of comparing synthetic with authentic 
human relations. If we recall again the indirect engagement efforts employed by the State 
Department between 2001 and 2008 to promote a robust nation-branding campaign in the 
                                                        
571 Ibid., 46. 
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Muslim world, we see that its efforts were not authentic and were not received by Muslim 
audiences as genuine (considering the failure of the USG to raise its favourability in the 
Muslim world). The indirect Brand America campaign employed by the Bush administration 
under the authority of then Undersecretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Relations Karen 
P. Hughes, was deeply synthetic. In this sense, its failure to directly engage Muslim 
audiences on the basis of mutual understanding and its preference for winning indicate that a 
non-authentic relationship between the USG and the Muslim world would inevitably result. 
In retrospect, such efforts clearly belong to the category of short-term diplomatic solution, 
which temporarily calmed some Muslim audiences in order that the USG could continue to 
exercise its might against others. This has produced grave problems which today demand a 
more authentic solution. Such examples indicate why the attaché must employ authentic 
forms of communicative action at a grassroots level to enhance the US-Muslim world 
communicative process.  
  
Pearce concludes by stating that the essence of “meaning is so important to what it 
means to be a human being and in the making of social worlds that it has distracted us from 
the other half of the process of communication.”573 This fierce position only indicates how 
important both aspects – communication and meaning – are. In a nutshell, the duty of the 
attaché must be to ensure that its communicative actions entail meaningful dialogue, no 
matter whether the communication process lasts five minutes or five hours – in order to 
create new and improved social worlds.   
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9.5. The value of IFD2 
  
If President Obama’s “political rhetoric of hope” does not move beyond its present 
state of dramaturgy, a visible gap will surface to distort US Muslim-world relations. In so 
many words, the world awaits one man’s political actions. My Post-Secular Communication 
Strategy of Interfaith Diplomacy prescribes how the Clinton State Department may prevent a 
number of shortcomings if it were to recruit a new FSO that employs direct communicative 
action with Muslims at a grassroots-level. Herein lies the main reason why this study is not 
concerned with upgrading public diplomacy or examining at length Obama’s proposed 
foreign policy, but is instead concerned with the imperative of adopting a communication 
strategy to restore grassroots communicative relations with Islamic society.   
 
Since the latter part of the twentieth century, the NGO contributions linked to the 
contemporary interfaith movement, which set out to promote international peacemaking 
among religious groups, shed light on why and how the current State Department must 
implement its change in course when dealing with socially-constructed religious and tribal 
audiences in the Muslim world. Thus, extensive forms of interaction beyond Obama’s direct-
Oval Office engagement are required and have yet to be offered. These extensive forms of 
engagement should first adjust certain aspects of the USG’s diplomatic infrastructure, 
beginning with communication training. Previous State Department efforts, which were 
reduced to nation-branding, were inadequate and negligent ways of connecting with Muslims. 
They were found to consist of:  
 
i) Looking for a predetermined end through indirect relations;  
ii) Inviting religious players and Muslim publics to participate in programming which sought to 
manipulate their presence; and  
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iii) Stylised/rehearsed messages presented to Muslim audiences.  
 
 A more substantive communicative action, emphasising understanding over success 
(strategic over instrumental action), is more appropriate for this task. This thesis, on the 
whole, recommends a ground-up communication strategy which begins by deploying 
religious attachés to broaden Obama’s direct Oval Office engagement efforts throughout the 
Muslim world. This will allow the religion attaché not just an opportunity to employ 
traditional diplomatic approaches with civil society and government, but also to practise 
smart communication by taking three crucial steps:  
 
i) Recognising the post-secular 
ii) Entering with the religious player into the mutually-inclusive pluralist arena of socio-political 
IFD; and 
iii)  Once in this arena, practise communication by drawing on aspects of communication theory 
as outlined above.  
 
The Post-Secular Communication Strategy of Interfaith Diplomacy might appear a 
complex communication strategy to train a religion attaché in building trusted relations at a 
grassroots level, and its complexity probably derives from having to integrate three 
multifaceted themes relating to politics, theology and communication theory. Though, 
inevitably, the integration of these themes will not be trouble-free in practise, the weaknesses 
identified with the communication strategy of IFD2 generally relate to its application, as 
opposed to its character. 
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• The first weakness of this model may be associated with the reluctance of secularists within 
the USG to apply a hybrid communication strategy that draws on religious themes, which in 
turn is likely to improve US-Muslim world relations. Continuing on its track of failure to 
improve these confirms the narrow nature of the USG, which has never allocated enough 
space for addressing religion as a critical issue facing US foreign policy. 
 
• Secondly, it may be argued that IFD2 is not a ready-made communication strategy. To ensure 
IFD2 is implemented sufficiently within the dialogue setting by the attaché, additional training 
is required after recruitment. As with any communication strategy, the key players must 
receive a certain amount of training in an academic setting (i.e. the Foreign Service Institute), 
and this is catered for with my academic course, The Dynamics of Interfaith Diplomacy, 
intended for US diplomats and specialists (designed in conjunction with the University of 
Arkansas Clinton School of Public Service).  
 
• Finally, it may be argued that the strengths of IFD2’s application within the Muslim world are 
unconfirmed. As will be asserted in the conclusion, this communication strategy deserves 
additional testing by future researchers. In addition, the examination by test groups which 
compared IFD2’s capabilities and strengths to brand management resources applied under the 
Bush administration may verify whether it will succeed in the diplomatic setting. 
 
However, its strengths, in contrast, show it to be a practicable alternative: 
 
• First, given that it requires extensive training to implement, its strength lies in this very 
requirement. In training the religion attaché, this communication strategy will introduce the 
attaché to the inter-disciplinary approach which she/he must take to understand post-
secularism, by becoming familiar with procedures from the discipline of both politics and 
theology/comparative religious studies. 
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• Secondly, IFD2 establishes a constructive communication protocol (providing additional 
padding) to some US public diplomacy efforts in the Muslim world. Far from addressing a 
commercial trend within this community, a structured communicative approach is used when 
employing direct human-to-human relations at a people-to-people and organisational level to 
Muslim audiences. 
 
• Third, IFD2 provides a legitimate communication approach which allows the religion attaché 
to reach beyond traditional zero-sum diplomatic methods when engaging religious and tribal 
audiences. Instead of trying to appeal to the Muslim world by marketing foreign policy 
through secular means, the religion attaché is able to reach across secular lines in order to 
meet the religious player on common ground.  
 
• Fourth, as a form of détente diplomacy, IFD2 is adept at relaxing both players in the dialogue, 
thus enhancing the formation of social and political relations. The attaché is able to present 
the US core foreign policy message to Muslim audiences and to key religious players at this 
introductory level once the tension has been eased by the use of IFD2.  
 
• And finally, as a communication strategy IFD2 does not stop at being a communication 
approach in this context; it is, for example, the springboard for improving sacred-secular 
relations in both the private sector and the NGO community. With religious and tribal 
conflicts emerging globally, not only US foreign relations, but also private sector entities 
(which seek to build client relations with international religious publics), need to identify best 
practices of engagement. Moreover, NGO interfaith groups have for some time expressed a 
wish for a communication strategy such as IFD2 to improve political and civic relations. What 
we learn in these cases is that a more substantive communication approach is needed to 
consolidate relations, rather than players in their dialogues drawing on ad-hoc communication 
approaches. For this, IFD2 provides a coherent model which private sector, civic and religious 
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players alike can employ to improve communicative relations. 
 
Beyond the strengths and weaknesses identified, the Post-Secular Communication 
Strategy of Interfaith Diplomacy offers an honest starting point for FSO training. Given the 
current communication problem between the USG and the Muslim world, let us not forget 
how important it is for the Obama administration to establish a core foreign policy message 
that will enhance the attaché’s use of this strategy in the field. However, we should not forget 
the need to invest in the art of communication. This ensures that the attaché’s communicative 
character is far removed from teleological action and a zero-sum game theory.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Of course, recognising our common humanity is only the beginning of our task. Words alone cannot meet the 
needs of our people. These needs will be met only if we act boldly in the years ahead; and if we understand that 
the challenges we face are shared, and our failure to meet them will hurt us all… Now, that does not mean we 
should ignore sources of tension. Indeed, it suggests the opposite: we must face these tensions squarely. 
Barack Obama  
Remarks by the President on a New Beginning, 2009  
 
  
The inauguration of President Barack Hussein Obama represented not only a 
symbolic day in American history, but an unmatched opportunity pointing toward a new 
political era, untarnished by the previous administration. Two wars, an American economy in 
ruins, and a planet in peril, hardly describe the prospective road ahead for the Obama 
administration. But amidst this great backdrop, including threats presented by religious 
terrorism and the creation of new Jihadist fronts in Yemen, the President has shown great 
willingness at the executive level to carry out direct Oval Office engagement with the 
Muslim world. A recognition by Obama that US-Muslim world engagement must remain a 
national security priority adds flesh to America’s willingness to “extend a hand to the Muslim 
world.”574  
 
However, over the last half-century, traditional political philosophies such as 
Morgenthau’s political realism have stymied the prospects of sacred-secular engagement. 
This philosophy has contributed to the debate on what exactly is legitimate with regards to 
nation-state relations and how the nation state must refuse to integrate the moral aspirations 
of a particular nation into political debate. By 2001, the Bush administration would embrace 
this position in its secular approach to engage the Muslim world. The administration’s                                                         
574 Barack Obama, Inauguration Address [address online]; available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/; Internet, accessed 12 January 2010. 
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posture included recognising elite groups, nations-states and secular systems while pushing to 
the fringe non-secular voices. Hence, Hady Amr and P.W. Singer were correct to advise, 
“there is a glaring need for the United States to undertake a proactive strategy [in the Muslim 
world] aimed at restoring long-term security through the presentation of American principles 
as a part of US foreign policy.”575 But, if Amr and Singer’s position is to stand as correct, this 
means (at a diplomatic-level) that the USG will have to re-define its engagement process in 
this post-secular era to include the integration of both secular and non-secular voices into 
public discourse. Consequently, President Obama’s 2009 Cairo address indicates that 
America must open itself up to broader forms of engagement that go beyond the secular. He 
acknowledges, “I am convinced that in order to move forward, we must say openly to each 
other the things we hold in our hearts and that too often are said only behind closed doors. 
There must be a sustained effort to listen to each other; to learn from each other; to respect 
one another; and to seek common ground.”576  
 
  But it is unclear if Clinton’s strategy that focuses primarily on three uniquely secular 
but broad  areas  the administration, in the coming year, will gear its attention toward will be 
effective: i) An emphasis on job creation in the Muslim world, ii) Advancing science and 
technology, and iii) Promoting wide-spread educational opportunities.577 None of these broad 
approaches have factored in the dynamics of communication training and the role US 
diplomats will need to play in restoring relations with Muslims. It is likely that Clinton has 
identified these broad areas because they fit into a conception of traditional ways in which the 
                                                        
575 Hady Amr and P. W. Singer, Engaging the Muslim World: A Communication Strategy to 
Win the War of Ideas (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007), 17.  
576 Barack Obama, A New Year, A New Beginning [available online]; 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nowruz/; Internet, accessed 12 January 2010. 
577 Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the Forum for the Future (3 November 2009) [address online]; 
available from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/11/131236.htm; Internet, accessed 12 
January 2010. 
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US might advance its power in certain Muslim countries. As identified above, this is a danger 
in US-Muslim world engagement in that hidden forms of manipulation are at times present to 
allow the US to reach its national interest. Joseph S. Nye Jr. states that:  
 
Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one’s 
purpose by affecting the behaviour of others. The distinction between them is one of degree 
both in the nature of the behaviour and in the tangibility of the resources. Command power – 
the ability to change what others do – can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power – 
the ability to shape what others want – can rest on the attractiveness of one’s culture and 
value so the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes 
others fail to express some preferences because they seem too unrealistic.578  
 
Interestingly, there is no power in restoring communication, nor are America’s 
immediate national security interests met. This is why restoring relations with non-secular 
audiences has never ranked as a top priority in the American political system. But in moving 
forward, Clinton will need to upgrade her vague scheme of applying smart power to one that 
values the notion of communicative engagement (not for the purpose of advancing American 
power but for promoting productive relations with Islamic society).  
 
It may in fact be the case Clinton anticipates that: If the US adjusts its military might 
and employs a more programme-based approach that does not sell America in a blunt way, 
we are likely to restore relations and combat terror from a diplomatic posture. 
Unfortunately, this play will not work. In order for Secretary Clinton, Undersecretary Judith 
Hale and the new Director General of the US Foreign Service to get this right, they will be 
required to rethink these three broad secular approaches to include a post-secular framework 
which begins with restoring communication. Hence, the question remains as to how Secretary 
                                                        
578 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Succes in World Politics (New York: Public 
Affairs Press, 2004), 7. 
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Clinton & Co. are to address the many voices in the Muslim world that do not wish to engage 
on secular grounds. In addressing this, the following points must again be considered: 
 
Table 8 
Meeting the Muslim World on Post-Secular Grounds 
 
1) The USG should readily identify that it has embarked upon a post-secular era which warns against 
its apprehensive political posture toward religious issues (both domestic and foreign); 
2) In maintaining its liberal-secular traditions, the USG must become more accustomed to 
incorporating forms of post-secular political engagement to address religious and other traditional 
issues when linked to Muslim publics; 
3) The establishment of a special post-secular political forum that encourages public deliberation that 
integrates religious and political players in order to balance the political realm’s decision-making 
process when developing policies related to broad religious affairs; 
4) In this forum, the USG should consider partnerships with local networks (moderate and hostile) of 
political, religious and private infrastructures in Muslim publics to reshape failed US foreign policies 
which over the last decade have failed to invest in understanding the shared objectives and values of 
Islamic society, and; 
 5) Ensure that there is creative post-secular communicative language that the USG is able to employ 
in its effort to rebuild equitable sacred-secular relations with international religious publics in order 
that it might cease to rely on outdated secular measures. 
  
Deeply imbedded within the umma, the fact remains that a perceived American 
foreign policy of exceptionalism coupled with commercial marketing approaches will neither 
have a positive bearing on Muslim audiences or help to restore America’s longstanding 
image problem. Not even the world’s sole superpower – on a good day – is capable of 
“selling” its way out of a history of substandard foreign policy in the Near East which, over 
the last decade, has neglected to listen to or directly engage with moderate Islamic voices. 
For this reason, Secretary Clinton has no other alternative but to take into account the 
following setbacks under the Bush administration that distorted the engagement process:  
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1)  A history of an American foreign policy rooted in political arrogance and exceptionalism 
throughout the Near East; 
 
2) The State Department’s willingness to reintroduce a pre-existing public diplomacy campaign 
that would “sell” America to the Muslim world; 
 
3) The USG’s reputation as a liberal-secular nation that often devalues non-secular perspectives 
and aspirations in international relations; and 
 
4)  The impact of American domestic propaganda spread by neo-conservatives that influenced 
America’s public diplomacy campaign between 2001 and 2008.  
 
Though Secretary Clinton’s recommendation does not fall into the category of “selling” 
America to the Muslim world, it does stop at incorporating broad approaches that go beyond 
the secular. Nicholas J. Cull of the USC’s Centre on Public Diplomacy reminds us here that 
(in the case of public diplomacy) presenting a random approach is unlikely to appease a 
foreign audience.579 Recalling the limitations of American public diplomacy under the Bush 
administration, and its random presentation of approaches, would be parallel to Russia’s Cold 
War public diplomacy machine of the Khrushchev-era as influenced by Leonid Brezhnev.  
Cull regards this robust disposition steered by domestic propaganda as the Brezhnev 
syndrome. He affirms that, 
…one important goal of Soviet engagement with foreign publics was the production of 
positive images for domestic consumption; the Kremlin knew the value of telling their own 
population that the Soviet society remained the admiration of the world. Apparently genuine 
attempts to engage with foreign audiences in the Khrushchev-era had given way to a new 
kind of activity, not public diplomacy as a form of foreign policy but foreign engagement of 
the crudest kind as a blunt instrument of domestic propaganda.580 
  
                                                        
579 Nicholas J. Cull, “Karen Hughes and the Brezhnev Syndrome: The Trial of Public 
Diplomacy as Domestic Performance”, The Trials of Engagement: The Future of Public Diplomacy, 
Scott Lucas and Ali Fisher (Forthcoming, 2011).  
580 Ibid. 
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 Both “domestic propaganda” and “conservative ideals” were unfortunately introduced into 
America’s blunt instrument, as opposed to the tool of listening. However, in likeness to the 
Kremlin’s arrogance, American public diplomacy would follow.   
  
Like a car driver who sticks a piece of tape over a dashboard warning light, they masked the 
warning signs of their declining world role until it was too late. While the Brezhnev-era case 
is an extreme example, it shows that engagement with foreign publics is not always 
conducted with international objectives in mind; sometimes public diplomacy has a short-
term domestic motive.581 
 
In addition, Clinton must recognise that in order to defeat Jihadist propaganda, restore 
relations with Muslims and improve America’s standing in the world, a long-sustained, 
organised effort to engage the Muslim world, beginning at a grassroots level, is required. 
Phillip M. Taylor proposes, “You can’t fight a war against an idea, at least not with tanks and 
bombs and missiles. That is why the West is losing the propaganda war and why it will 
continue to lose it, and indeed make it harder to win. The struggle needs to be defined in 
informational and educational terms. It needs to recognise that if it continues to be waged 
with hard power it will not be the ‘Long War’ but the ‘Forever War.’”582 Hence, a new post-
secular framework is required, that includes policy-makers recognising the importance of 
integrating non-secular voices into the larger political discourse and the relevance of going 
beyond the secular when engaging both religious and other traditional communities.  
 
   In proposing a newer, sharper way forward, this study modifies previous 
recommendations to establish a  distinctive strategy that contributes to reconciling the US-
Muslim world communication problem. By adding both an interfaith and communication 
dimension to Edward Luttwak and Douglas Johnston’s existing project, this study broadens                                                         
581 Ibid. 
582 Phillip M. Taylor, “Public Diplomacy on Trial?”, The Trials of Engagement: The Future of 
Public Diplomacy, Scott Lucas and Ali Fisher (Forthcoming, 2011).  
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the State Department’s communicative opportunities with the Muslim world by making clear 
the prospects of post-secularism.  In contrast, many proposals and recommendations by 
leading think-tanks in the last few years have attempted to address the US’s ongoing 
communication problem, but, as with Secretary Clinton’s approach, they have omitted going 
beyond proposing secular approaches to engage Islamic society.    
 
• The Brookings Institute, The Need to Communicate: How to Improve US Public Diplomacy 
with the Islamic World 
 
• Council on Foreign Relations, Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating US 
Public Diplomacy 
 
• Center for the Study of the Presidency, Strengthening US-Muslim Communications 
 
• Government Accountability Office, US Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts 
but Faces Significant Challenges 
 
• Heritage Foundation, How to Reinvigorate US Public Diplomacy 
 
    Expanding American public diplomacy is the often-made but limiting recommendation 
made by leading theorists and researchers. But many fail to comprehend that attention given 
to public diplomacy expansion in the Muslim world is liken to bandaging a gaping wound. 
To treat this problem will mean returning to its problematised source, communication. This is 
the fundamental reason why this dissertation is not concerned with upgrading public 
diplomacy. Instead, its priority has focused on how a new political discourse supporting 
communication training offers new prospects for improving relations. This has included 
illustrating how the establishment of a Religion Attaché Officers corps within the US Foreign 
Service will yield more practicable results. Therefore, an attaché armed with a background in 
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broad religious affairs and training in Interfaith Diplomacy is likely to make significant 
headway in counteracting tension caused by the US-Muslim world communication problem. 
 
 Unfortunately, reapplying Karen P. Hughes’s single-player commercial marketing 
crusade in the Muslim world is unlikely to work at any rate. In fact, this dramaturgical 
approach is likely to fuel more tension than yield positive results. Cull reminds us that,  
 
Hughes made one critical error at the outset, and reflective of the early onset of the Brezhnev 
Syndrome. She travelled with a sizeable American press corps. With Bush’s foreign policy on 
trial, she then allowed herself to be drawn into counter-productive bouts of defending the 
administration rather than focusing on her declared objective of listening. Possibly Hughes 
had become a victim of her double-hated office which compelled attention to both 
international and domestic audiences. Possibly her reaction was just the reflex of a seasoned 
campaigner who could not help but come out swinging. Whatever the reason, the tour 
generated an almost wholly negative press at home and overseas.583 
 
Secretary Clinton, in this case, must be forewarned of drawing plays steeped in the 
Brezhnev Syndrome from the Bush administration’s playbook by deploying US Special 
Representative to Muslim Communities Farah Anwar Pandith as a single-player to improve 
relations. Strong decisive leadership is needed, but the motivation to restore relations and 
gather the perspectives and aspirations of Muslim audiences must originate at a grassroots 
level by not one but multiple players. This is the reason why a shift in construct and 
communication dynamic are together required to assure diplomatic renewal.  
 
 Thus, it is fair to argue that Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Edward Luttwak, 
and Douglas Johnston have provided practicable recommendations to enhance America’s 
diplomatic relationship with predominantly religious communities. However, their work is                                                         
583  Nicholas J. Cull, “Karen Hughes and the Brezhnev Syndrome: The Trial of Public 
Diplomacy as Domestic Performance”, The Trials of Engagement: The Future of Public Diplomacy, 
Scott Lucas and Ali Fisher (Forthcoming, 2011).  
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limited to structural recommendations that include a well-dressed proposal for a religion 
attaché, the attaché’s diplomatic responsibilities, cost assessment, embassy deployment and 
even a functioning recruitment plan. As important as structure will be to enlisting a new 
diplomatic officer, making sense of its communication dynamic in the diplomatic setting is of 
equal concern. If Johnston’s religion attaché model were employed today (at the directive of 
Secretary Clinton and the Director General of the US Foreign Service) State would have a 
high-calibre officer trained in broad religious affairs but ill-informed of how to restore 
communicative relations. Thus, I have taken a broad approach in my proposal to suggest that 
the State Department:  
 
a) Comprehend better vital aspects within Islamic society by depending more on its 
diplomatic infrastructures;  
 
b) Build direct relations with Muslim audiences, in doing so, which pay due heed to the 
traditional voice of Islam, and; 
 
c) Restore relations at a grassroots level which build on mutual understanding and mutual 
interests, incorporating the voices of key religious players within Islamic society.  
 
In essence, this requires Clinton to comprehend how to reshape the current 
communicative context, which will inevitably require (in addition to recruiting a religion 
attaché) attention to be given to communication training. The Post-Secular Communication 
Strategy of Interfaith Diplomacy accomplishes this task. It provides a structural 
communication approach that is both applicable and teachable in the Foreign Service setting. 
This study has taken a scholarly approach to outline the contribution of post-secularism and 
its role in integrating both religious and political players to extinguish tension often 
established at the grassroots level. As post-9/11 forces become more cataclysmic and State’s 
reliance on direct Oval Office engagement wanes, key State Department officials may have 
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no other alternative but to take seriously communication training and the relevance of a post-
secular framework. Consequently, my post-secular communication strategy of Interfaith 
Diplomacy comes to their aid by making sure the religion attaché: 1) Makes a post-secular 
recognition; 2) Enters an arena of socio-political interfaith dialogue, and; 3) Practices post-
secular communication. In employing this communication strategy that goes beyond secular 
resources, this study recommends that the Obama administration take seriously the following 
broad steps to implement IFD2. In introducing Interfaith Diplomacy to the USG system, I 
recommend the following plan of action be considered:  
 
1. Organising a Presidential Summit on the Future of US-Muslim World Engagement – 
Clearly, there is no singular way to restore relations with the Muslim world. This presidential 
summit shall focus on integrating the many perspectives of academics, researchers, think-
tanks, and USG officials into a high-level summit. In addition to the Annapolis Conference 
(November 27, 2007), this summit shall convene both secular and non-secular 
recommendations on ways to improve US-Muslim world relations. Perspectives beyond 
public diplomacy should be evaluated at this summit, leading to the State Department 
implementing a comprehensive multi-track recommendation for engaging the Muslim world 
(through political communication, commerce, religion, and education).   
 
2. Creating a US Department of State Religion Attaché Fellowship Program – Young graduate 
students with a broad academic background in the fields of Politics and Religious studies are 
first-rate candidates for religion attaché recruitment. Similar to the Thomas R. Pickering 
Foreign Affairs Fellowship (that provides funding and assistance to become an FSO to 
American graduate students), a comparable programme must be established. This programme 
should seek to carry out two specific goals: 1) recruiting graduate students versed in broad 
religious and political affairs; and 2) preparing new recruits for early communication training 
in Interfaith Diplomacy alongside critical foreign language training. In the coming year, the 
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State Department should consider long-term partnerships with American universities 
dedicated to cross-disciplinary research (e.g. Georgetown Berkley Center for Religion, Peace 
and World Affairs; Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Notre 
Dame Kroc Institute for International Peace; Columbia University-Union Theological 
Seminary). 
 
3. Teaching “The Dynamics of Interfaith Diplomacy” course – While religion attaché 
recruitment is critical, communication training is of equal concern. While leading think-tanks 
and researchers (since 2004) have recommended structural upgrades to US public diplomacy, 
attention within this academic setting (at the Foreign Service Institute) should focus on 
training future attachés in the practicable communication approach of Interfaith Diplomacy.  
In making aware the critical nature of direct communication between religious and political 
players at a grassroots level, the course shall provide a unique opportunity for the attaché to 
engage interdisciplinary theories relating to diplomacy, communication theory and interfaith 
relations.   
 
4. Establishing ACE Communication Centres at Key US Embassies – ACE (A Century of 
Engagement) institutes shall serve as premier hubs that will allow for additional religion 
attaché training at key embassies. By establishing ACE centres, the State Department will be 
able to broaden its communicative base to relay the message to the Muslim world that the 
USG is committed to enhancing US communicative relations for a period of one century. Its 
aims will be to: 1) provide a space that will allow religion attachés and local religious/tribal 
officials a space to meet for productive engagement; 2) serve as a satellite-hub where religion 
attachés may continue communicative training while in the field; and 3) serve as a post-
secular forum where US Ambassadors, religion attachés, and religio-tribal players may hold 
public deliberations to resolve pressing public concerns.  
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 The nexus in US-Muslim world engagement will not arrive by applying conventional 
wisdom or in a quick redeployment of secular approaches in US diplomacy toward 
predominantly Muslim audiences. It will arrive when USG officials become audacious 
enough to employ approaches that go beyond the secular to introduce the non-conventional in 
US foreign policymaking. Comprehending the value of this appeal came at a late hour under 
the Bush administration in the latter part of November 2008 in its scramble to reintroduce  
the marginalised (religious and tribal) voice into the popular policymaking discourse in 
Afghanistan. Rethinking its diplomatic and military failures within the Afghan region, the 
outgoing Bush Administration was left with no alternative but to examine its hard power 
posture against the Taliban which, for seven years, marginalised the religio-tribal voice.  
Thus, its eagerness to embrace the “conventional-way” evidently culminated in massive 
failure to defeat the Taliban, halt insurgency within the South Asian region and curb the 
massive opium/heroin trade involving two million Afghan farmers.584 
 
In 2008, Greg Bruno of the Council on Foreign Relations raised the question as to 
whether a new and less conventional strategy for Afghanistan would yield different results. 
Contributing to this non-conventional strategy, former US Central Commander General 
David Petraeus proposed a “ground-up” approach to encourage the USG to support “local 
                                                        
584 In a more formidable CNN commentary recommendation to then President-Elect Barack 
Obama (2008), New America Foundation National Security Analyst Peter Bergen noted eight major 
points of consideration for the new administration on handling Afghanistan, which included: 1) 
Building the size of the Afghan army and police; 2) Solving the security shortfall in the short-term; 3) 
Reduce the size of the insurgency; 4) Embarking on effective reconstruction; 5) Holding a free, fair 
and secure election in 2009; 6) Decoupling the Taliban from the drug trade; 7) Fixing the problems in 
the NATO mission; and 8) Ending coalition air strikes that have a high probability of killing civilians.  
Peter Bergen, Commentary: Letter to Obama – How to rescue war in Afghanistan [article online]; 
available from http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/11/11/bergen.afghanistan/index.html; Internet, 
accessed 29 January 2009; see also, Peter Bergen, How Not to Lose Afghanistan (and Pakistan), New 
America Foundation (19 October 2008) [article online]; available from 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/how_not_lose_afghanistan_and_pakistan; Internet, 
accessed 29 January 2009.  (See CNN.com and New America Foundation piece.) 
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reconciliation initiatives” between Afghan tribes in such regions as Helmand and Kandahar 
and the citizens of Kabul.585 Taking seriously the marginalised voice during the late phase of 
his lame-duck term pointed toward Bush’s willingness (after seven years of failed policies) to 
try and bring about cooperative peace between the many different values, tribes and customs 
within the region. Since the transition of US presidential power, Petraeus’s “ground-up” 
proposal has taken shape, with a one-hundred person think-tank providing a formal overview 
“that focuses specifically on two agendas: possible government reconciliation with the 
Taliban and cooperation with neighbouring countries, including Pakistan and Iran.”586 
Acknowledging the impact of this non-conventional approach, Secretary of Defence Robert 
Gates agreed publicly with Petraeus’s tribal reconciliation plan in October 2008 at a NATO 
summit in Budapest, and then in the following month at the United States Institute of Peace, 
stating, “At the end of the day the only solution in Afghanistan is to work with the tribes and 
provincial leaders in terms of trying to create a backlash… against the Taliban.”587 Since this 
time, the Obama administration has acknowledged that this non-conventional approach is 
beneficial and has expanded it to a degree. Hence, the application of non-conventional 
wisdom and post-secular approaches to engage Islamic society are becoming somewhat 
appealing to the Department of Defense.  
 
 
                                                         
585 Greg Bruno, A Tribal Strategy for Afghanistan, Council on Foreign Relations (7 
November 2008) [article online]; available from http://www.cfr.org/publication/17686/; Internet, 
accessed 29 January 2009. 
586 See Bruno, A Tribal Strategy for Afghanistan, 1. 
587 See Jim Garamone, NATO Ministers Discuss Afghan Problems, Challenges (9 October 
2008) [article online]; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=51463; 
html; Internet, accessed 29 January 2009; Ann Scott Tyson, Petraeus Mounts Strategy Review, 
Washington Post (16 October 2008) [article online]; available from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/10/15/ST2008101503820.html; Internet, 
accessed 29 January 2009.  
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 Since this time, the Obama administration has acknowledged this non-conventional 
approach by recalculating its reliance on hard power, thereby recognising the potential in 
reconciling with low-level Taliban operatives. Applying non-conventional wisdom to engage 
and reintegrate the cooperative Taliban back into Afghan society is an attractive strategy 
supported by the State Department and Department of Defense. Gen. Stanley McChrystal  
(NATO Commander in Afghanistan) has recently supported the establishment of a Peace and 
Reintegration programme led by the Government of Afghanistan to sustain regional security 
and deter Taliban fighters. Defending future peace talks with the Taliban, McChrystal claims: 
 
It’s impossible to paint the Taliban all with one brush. If you try to say the Taliban 
organisation has this relationship with al-Qaeda, it varies through the organisation… I think 
there’s a huge rank and file in the Taliban that sees al-Qaeda as essentially something from 
which they get no value and a tremendous amount of pain. In fact the presence of al-Qaeda is 
one of the reasons why the Taliban was driven from Afghanistan. They don’t want to pay the 
price for al-Qaeda’s extremism for ever.588 
 
In establishing a new reintegration scheme, at the January 2010 London Conference 
on Afghanistan, Afghan President Hamid Karazi introduced a six-point plan to accompany 
this effort, which includes supporting: 1) Peace, reconciliation and reintegration; 2) Security; 
3) Good governance; 4) The fight against corruption; 5) Economic development; and 6) 
Regional cooperation.589 To assure the first aim, Karazi maintained: 
 
[Over] 70 percent of the people fighting with the Taliban are not ideologically committed to 
al-Qaeda… They’re fighting for local grievance, or they’ve been misled about the purposes 
of… the alliance presence in Afghanistan… If they’re given an opportunity for jobs and 
security and if they understand the purposes of the presence there, we think a lot of them will                                                         
588 Financial Times, FT Interview Transcript: Gen. Stanley McChrystal (25 January 2010) 
[article online] available from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1036aae6-074a-11df-a9b7-
00144feabdc0.html; Internet, accessed 27 January 2010; BBC News, US Commander Signals 
Peacetalks with Taliban [article online]; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8478076.stm; 
Internet, accessed 2 February 2010. 
589 Hamid Karazi, London Conference on Afghanistan: Hamid Karazi’s Opening Remarks (28 
January 2010) [article online]; available from http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-
news/?view=Speech&id=21645138; Internet, accessed 1 February 2010. 
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come back… Isn’t it a lot better to invite them off the battlefield through a programme of 
jobs, land, integration than it is to have to try to kill every one of them?590 
 
In step with the Karazi proposal, Secretary Clinton would acknowledge America’s 
support of this new strategy by announcing the creation of a Peace and Reintegration Trust 
Fund at the London Conference. The $500 million initiative will seek to court “those Taliban 
who are not a part of al-Qaeda, or their terrorist networks, who accept the Afghan 
constitution, who have no ideological enmity with [Afghanistan or its allies].”591 In assuring 
that this would be an Afghan-led endeavour, Clinton gained further support by stating,  “The 
United States military has been authorised to use substantial funds to support the effort, 
enabling our commanders on the ground to support Afghan Government-led initiatives to 
take insurgents off the battlefield.”592 
 
   In moving forward with this broad proposal, the challenge lies in ensuring that this 
reintegration scheme does not become entrenched in doubt as to whether “talks will work”.  
When placing such a productive opportunity in this context, we often limit its probability 
from the outset.  Hamid Karazi’s Peace and Reintegration scheme (in a real sense) opens up a 
constructive pathway to re-invite the failed US-Islamic engagement process to restart at the 
grassroots level. Hence, it appears that the USG, under the Obama administration, has 
become accustomed to implementing non-conventional approaches to sustain US national 
                                                        
590 Stephen Kauffman, London Conference to Discuss Rehabilitation of Taliban Fighters 
[article online]; available from http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-
english/2010/January/20100125141811esnamfuak0.1798822.html; Internet, accessed 2  February 
2010. 
591 Gordon Brown and Hamid Karazi, Gordon Brown and Hamid Karazi’s Interview with 
Radio 4 (28 January 2010) [transcript online]; available from http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-
news/?view=Speech&id=21644120; Internet, accessed 2 February 2010. 
592 Secretary Clinton, Secretary Clinton at London Conference on Afghanistan [speech online]; 
available from http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/london_conference_afghanistan; Internet, 
accessed 2 February 2010. 
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security, thereby suggesting that similar approaches may be welcomed to enrich USG 
communication.    
 Currently, the State Department has no alternative but to press forward and embrace 
non-conventional wisdom in the present era. Improving US-Muslim world relations requires 
a communication strategy which goes beyond a reliance on secular approaches to meet the 
demands presented by post-9/11 religious forces. During the Bush administration, US foreign 
policy was marketed through campaigns such as “Brand-America” and the “Shared Values 
Initiative”, which simply presented robust ambitions without recognising the aspirations and 
perspectives of Muslims. The Post-secular Communication Strategy of Interfaith Diplomacy, 
set out in this dissertation, seeks a deeper connection between US diplomats and religious 
actors focusing on an engagement with an enriched communicative activity within the 
Muslim world. This much-needed communication strategy advances multilateral cooperation 
to assure that the aspirations and perspectives of the Muslim audience are incorporated into 
the larger policymaking discourse. If the State Department were to incorporate both the 
structural recommendations that call for a Religion Attaché Officer and the communication 
strategy of Interfaith Diplomacy, we are likely to see the State Department issue a more 
engaged approach in restoring relations within the Muslim world. 
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